THE COMMERCIAL IMAGINATION

ACQUISITIONS EDITOR
STATISTICAL REFERENCE INDEX
CONGRESSIONAL INFORMATION SERVICE
4520 EAST-WEST HIGHWAY
WASHINGTON DC 20014

GEORGE GILDER

The First Excerpts from his Forthcoming Book

And: William Adams, Theodore Caplow, Lawrence Chickering, Irving Crespi, Solomon Dutka, Linda Lichter, Robert Lichter, Seymour Martin Lipset, Stephen Miller, Harry O'Neill, Rudolph Penner, Stanley Rothman, Kenneth Schwartz, Nick Thimmesch, Claudia Winkler

Public Opinion

Volume 5, Number 5 October/November 1982

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PUBLIC OPINION, October/November 1982, Vol. 5, No. 5. Published bimonthly by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.

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Subscription rates: $18.00 for one year, $34.00 for two years. Individual copy: $3.50. Information on bulk orders of multiple subscriptions available on request. Editorial and business offices: c/o AEI, 1150 17th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Send changes of address and all subscription correspondence to Circulation Department, c/o AEI, same address.

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Second class postage paid at Washington, D.C.

ISSN 0149-9157

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Spooking the Public: The Social Security Specter

We all know about the Florida sinkholes that gobble up cars, apartment buildings, and other assorted odds and ends. There must be some others down there that gobble up the proposals for social security reform emanating from the numerous advisory boards, presidential commissions, and academics who have studied the program since its financial difficulties began to emerge in the late 1970s. At least dozens of seemingly equitable and efficient solutions to the social security problem have disappeared without a trace, and any politician who touches the issue faces the danger of disappearing with them.

There are two types of arithmetic afflicting social security—economic and political. Economically, the old-age, survivors, and disability insurance trust funds need a cash infusion or an aggregate benefit reduction of somewhere between $60 billion and $127 billion over the 1983-87 period in order to maintain a trust fund sufficient to pay all obligations without suffering severe cash flow problems. While these amounts appear large, they are not overwhelming relative to total benefits. In fact, current deficits pale beside those that will emerge under current law during the first half of the twenty-first century.

When the members of the baby boom of the 1940s and 1950s reach retirement age, the demands on the system rise concomitantly. According to the intermediate demographic assumptions of the trustees of the system, the number of beneficiaries will rise about 60 percent between the year 2000 and 2025. By the latter year it will take a payroll tax rate between 35 and 50 percent higher than today's 10.8 percent OASDI rate to cover the benefits promised by current law. The situation continues to worsen until 2035 when the relative costs of the system finally begin to fall slowly.

Politically, those running for office must contend with the fact that there are 36 million beneficiaries out there, the vast majority of whom are eligible to vote. More than 5 million will be added to the retirement rolls by 1990, and it is safe to assume that almost all of those have an intense interest in potential benefit reforms. Those already retired and those nearing retirement are also likely to have relatives who know that if social security is cut drastically, they will be expected to take up more of the financial load of supporting elderly and disabled family members. Noting that only slightly more than 86 million voted in the last presidential election, it is probably safe to assume that close to a majority of the electorate now has a very intense and immediate financial interest in the level of benefits in the near future.

Largely because of their overwhelming political power, the elderly have been doing reasonably well economically in recent years. In the early 1960s, retirees represented one of the poorest segments of the population, with about a third of elderly families and 60 per-

cent of elderly individuals living below the poverty line. But a series of benefit increases in the late 1960s and early 1970s culminating in a 20 percent benefit increase in 1972, greatly improved their relative economic status. Since 1972, benefits have been indexed to the consumer price index. Because of temporary indexing flaws between 1972 and 1977, and because newer retirees tend to retire with higher lifetime earnings, which earn them more benefits, average real benefits have continued to grow since that time. By 1980 the incidence of poverty among the elderly had fallen to 8.5 percent for elderly families and to 30.6 percent for individuals. This compares to 10.3 and 22.9 percent for the population as a whole.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s wage rates failed to keep up with inflation and the elderly did better on average than the ordinary worker. Indeed, the notion that inflation is particularly destructive to the elderly is quite wrong. The very poor who have few assets and who live entirely on social security or supplemental security income have, as already noted, been completely protected against inflation since 1972. Those who are slightly better off generally have the bulk of their wealth invested in a home, and typically the rise in house prices has greatly exceeded the inflation rate. Relatively, only those who have significant fixed private pensions—still a minority of the elderly population—or those wealthy enough to have significant portfolios of bonds and stocks have lost much during the last fifteen years.

While the improving economic status of the elderly may make them less frantic about protecting the benefit system from change, it is still very difficult to alter the political incentives facing those contending for political office. The data on the economic status of the elderly refer to the experience of the average person. Many still live beneath or near the poverty line and many, because of special circumstances, may have suffered significant economic losses in recent years. Those atypical beneficiaries may be numerous enough to swing a close election, and politicians—including those from safe districts—often make a habit of "running scared."

The Panama Canal Syndrome

Even retirees who have done well economically usually feel strongly about protecting their benefits. My own experience, as a recipient of much hostile mail because of my past writing on social security, suggests two very strong emotions affecting those who take the time and trouble to write a nasty letter. The first I would label the Panama Canal syndrome. Recipients feel that they bought their benefits; they paid highly for them with the sweat of their brows; and, by golly, they own and want to keep every last penny of their entitlements. One makes no impression whatsoever with arithmetic analyses that show that the benefits received by current retirees imply a rate of return on their own past tax payments far in excess of what could have been earned

Question: Now I'm going to read you some problems that other people have mentioned to us. For each, would you tell me whether it is a very serious problem, a somewhat serious problem, or hardly a problem at all for you *personally*.

Question: And how serious a problem would you say (Read each item) is for most people over 65 these days—a very serious problem, a somewhat serious problem, or hardly a problem at all for most people over 65?



Source: Surveys by Louis Harris & Associates for the National Council on the Aging, Inc., June 15-July 31, 1981.

on private investments and a far higher rate of return than will be earned by future retirees. Despite all evidence to the contrary, the social security system is still regarded by many as a pure contributory pension system and not as a system of transfer payments from the young to the old. All of the jargon surrounding the system perpetuates this myth. Officially, payroll taxes are called "contributions." You "earn" benefits by working. It is hard to sell the notion that social security contains a large welfare element and is highly redistributive.

I get the impression from my mail that the second strong emotion derives from a profound sense of insecurity among the elderly. On average they may be doing fairly well economically, but the threat of financial disaster because of serious illness or because of economic instability, such as that resulting from exploding energy prices, is ever present. Many have a profound fear of becoming financially dependent on their children or on welfare after living a long life of financial independence.

The poll results in figure 1 provide some evidence of that same emotion. Many more of those over sixty-five think that others over sixty-five experience severe health and economic difficulties than actually experience those difficulties personally. In other words, the risks associated with living a long time are given a much heavier weight than experience suggests is warranted. This is quite natural when those risks would have dire consequences if they became actualities.

There is another curious statistic regarding the elderly that may provide additional evidence of intense feelings of insecurity. Economists generally accept something called the "life cycle" theory of saving. According to the theory, it is rational to borrow while being educated and starting a career, but in the peak earning years one should save for retirement. Then, during retirement, one should draw on the assets accumulated earlier. It is an elegant theory with much aesthetic appeal. The trouble is that the elderly do not stop saving during retirement like they are supposed to. They continue to accumulate assets while retired. In fact, some evidence suggests that their propensity to save rises with age! What are they saving for? As they get older they may become increasingly altruistic with regard to their heirs. But this is implausible. I suspect that they become more and more worried about the possibility of a financial disaster related to illness or other events, and that they are saving for precautionary reasons.

Any reduction in social security benefits reduces the degree of protection against financial disaster, even for the fairly well to do. Moreover, any small reduction in benefits might be interpreted as a precursor of greater reductions later.

The Good News

If I am correct in suggesting that the strongest opposition to benefit reductions comes from those who feel financially insecure, and that even many elderly who have reasonable incomes nevertheless feel insecure, it is a big mistake to rationalize modest changes in benefits on the grounds that otherwise the social security system faces a financial catastrophe. Scaring the already frightened elderly further will not add rationality to the discussion. Politicians should be emphasizing that the cash needs of the OASDI trust funds in the 1983-87 period are very *unlikely* to exceed 12 percent of total benefits. In other words, at the very worst, with the old-age, survivors, and disability funds merged, the average benefit reduction *below what would otherwise be paid* would be unlikely to exceed 12 percent. This could still involve some increase in the money value of benefits over the period, though not enough to compensate for inflation.

I do not expect that a benefit reduction as high as 12 percent will actually take place. Such an estimate makes very pessimistic economic assumptions, and it is reasonable to assume that ways will be found to add to the financial resources of the trust funds. I only wish that public discussion would emphasize that the worst possible perils facing the elderly are very strictly limited.

Similarly, very modest changes in the benefit structure can greatly reduce the burdens imposed by social security in the first half of the twenty-first century. For example, reducing the annual growth rate of average benefits by one percentage point between 1983 and 2025 would imply that, even under fairly pessimistic economic and demographic assumptions, the payroll tax rates for OASDI would not, in social security's seventy-five year projection period, have to exceed the 11.4 percent now scheduled for 1985. This would allow for a substantial increase in the real value of average benefit levels although they could not grow as fast as the real standard of living of the population as a whole.

Put this way, the social security problem appears tractable. We have, however, given the impression of an impending disaster in public discussions of the problem. I have spoken to many young people who believe that they will never get a cent out of the social security system. In fact, even if the economy grows only modestly, they are likely to receive average benefits considerably higher than today's retirees, even if total benefits are not allowed to grow faster than the GNP from this day forward.

It is time to underplay the social security problem. It is little wonder that poll results on social security appear confused and irrational. The public discussion has been confused and irrational. It has left the impression that a drastic reform of the benefit structure is required. In fact, we do not need a revolution. An evolution will do. I expect that even an evolution will be strongly resisted, and I am not sure that we shall succeed in slowing the growth of benefits at all. But the chances of success will be much greater if we stop making people believe that we are about to deprive them of a very large part of their economic sustenance.

THE BALANCE SHEET ON BUSINESS

Is business being blamed for the recession and the lethargic economic recovery? Is public support for corporate tax cuts eroding? Is business going to face a new wave of regulation as public dissatisfaction with its performance grows? Survey data show no new or rising anti-business sentiment in America. This is not to say that Americans are unreservedly pleased with business; like other major institutions in our society, it gets a strong dose of criticism for many aspects of its performance.

Several themes run through the data we examined. First, the public strongly endorses the free enterprise system. Second, the government receives a greater share of blame for economic woes than does business, but business isn't blameless. Third, the public's regulatory scorecard suggests desire for less government intervention but support for keeping an eye on business. Fourth, there is support for cutting business taxes to stimulate economic growth.

In the world of survey research, different questions and contexts often produce discrepant results. The juxtaposition of two questions on page 22 shows how the public conveys different messages in its assessment of business. The CBS/*NYT* question is open-ended, asking respondents to volunteer an answer. Blaming big business (cited by 3 percent of respondents) was not automatic. The *Los Angeles Times* question asked respondents specifically how much big business is to blame, and business gets a major share.

When Americans answer complex questions about particular aspects of business performance, their responses are often more indicative of their general views than their specific evaluation. This is sometimes critical and sometimes supportive—depending on the nerve the questioner touched.

KHK

STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE FREE ENTERPRISE SYSTEM

Question: (Agree/Disagree) The private business system in the United States works better than any other system yet devised for industrial countries.



Note: 80% of whites and 73% of blacks agreed with the statement, 73% of those with less than $5,000 income agreed compared to 86% of those who earned $25,000 or more.

Source: Survey by Civic Service, Inc., March 5-18, 1981.

WHAT'S GOOD FOR BUSINESS IS GOOD FOR ME

Question: Some people think what's good for business is bad for the average person. For example, the more money business makes the worse off you and I are. Others think what's good for business is also good for the average person—the more money business makes the better off we'll all be. What do you think—what's good for business is bad for the average person, or what's good for business is also good for the average person?



Source: Survey by The Roper Organization (Roper Report 81-6), May 30-June 6, 1981.

THE BUSINESS CLIMATE

ASSESSING CURRENT AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

Question: Ronald Reagan's economic program includes both budget cuts and a cut in taxes. Have you personally been helped or hurt by Ronald Reagan's economic program?



Question: Whatever its effect on you, do you think the economic program has helped or hurt the country's economy so far?



Question: Do you think the economic program eventually will help or hurt the country's economy?

Note: In a late August survey by Penn + Schoen for The Garth Analysis, 28% said the administration's economic program had helped the economy so far, 35% said hurt, and 34% said the policies had had no effect. When asked whether the "administration's economic program will eventually improve the economy . . ." 54% said the program would eventually help, 21% said it would hurt, and 17% said it would have no effect. A late August *LA Times* poll found that 45% of respondents felt that Reagan's policies are making the nation's economy better; 38% said worse. Only 26% felt their personal finances were better; 41% said worse.

Source: Surveys by CBS News/*New York Times*, September 13-16, 1982.

CASTING BLAME FOR INFLATION

Question: In your opinion, which is most responsible for inflation—government, business, or labor?



Note: In the ABC News/*Washington Post* survey, the question was phrased: "Among these three groups, which one would you say is most to blame for inflation in the U.S.: government, business, or labor?" *For January 1982 "no difference" (vol.) = 6% and "don't know/no opinion" = 4% are combined.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of September 15-18, 1978; survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, January 22-30, 1982.

DIFFERENT QUESTIONS PRODUCE DIFFERENT RESULTS

Question: How much do you blame . . . big business/Jimmy Carter/Congress/the Democratic party/the Federal Reserve Bank/Japanese competition/foreign oil prices/Ronald Reagan/the Republican party/the unions . . . for economic conditions today—almost completely, or very much, or some, or not very much, or hardly at all?



Note: Recalculated for comparison purposes. "Not sure" less than 10% for all items except Federal Reserve Bank, which was 20%. *Much = "Almost completely" + "Very much;" Not much = "Not much" + "Hardly at all."

Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, August 22-26, 1982.

Question: Who or what do you think is most responsible for that [for the economy getting better/worse]?*



Note: *Question asked after asking respondents if economy had gotten better or worse. Economy gotten worse = 62% of sample; Economy gotten better = 12% of sample. "Other" and "No opinion" not shown.

Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, May 18-23, 1982.

TAXES AND REGULATION

EASE THE REGULATORY BURDEN . . .

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of President Reagan's proposal to remove many government regulations? Do you feel strongly about that, or not so strongly?



Note: Approve = strongly approve + approve; Disapprove = disapprove + strongly disapprove in January 1982.

Source: Surveys by the *Los Angeles Times*, latest that of January 3-7, 1982.

. . . BUT KEEP AN EYE ON BUSINESS

Question: Now I'm going to name some things, and for each one would you tell me whether you think there is too much government regulation of it now, or not enough government regulation now, or about the right amount of government regulation now? First, automobile safety.



Source: Survey by The Roper Organization (Roper Report 82-3), February 12-27, 1982.

TAXES AND GROWTH

Question: Economic prosperity for all requires substantial and continuing investment in new plants and equipment. For example, it takes about $35,000 in investment to provide a job for one new worker—the truck he drives, the factory he works in, the machines he operates, and so forth. A number of economists have expressed concern about a shortage of investment capital and where the new money needed will come from. Here are five ways the amount of capital available for investment in new plants and equipment could be increased. I'd like your reaction to each of these ideas. (Card shown respondent) First, reduce taxes on dividends so that more people will buy stock. Do you think that's a *good* idea or is *not* a good idea? . . . Giving U.S. companies a tax break for investing.



Note: Only 7% agreed that "rais(ing) income taxes so that the government can pay for new plants and equipment" was a good idea. 86% disagreed.

Source: Survey by The Roper Organization (Roper Report 82-6), June 5-12, 1982.

Question: Now I'm going to ask you some questions about different kinds of taxes. I'd like you to tell me which of the following taxes you think are much too high, which are too high, which are too low, and which are about right? And what about taxes on businesses? Do you think they are much too high, too high, too low, or are they just about right?



Note: *Too high = Much too high + Too high. Combined for comparison purposes.

Source: Surveys by NBC News/Associated Press, latest that of May 18-19, 1981.

BUSINESS FAILURES

Question: Now, here are some criticisms that have been made about American business management. (Card shown respondent) Would you read over that list and then call off any of them that *you personally* are very much concerned about?

Very much concerned about business...


June 1976
June 1982
54%
Not paying enough attention to the quality of the products they produce
67%
55%
Making too much profit and thereby keeping prices high
62%
47%
Neglect of the environment -- polluting air and water
59%
42%
Not paying enough attention to the safety of the products they produce
47%
39%
Making payoffs and bribes to foreign officials in order to get business
37%
18%
Not paying enough attention to hiring minorities (blacks, women, etc.)
24%
11%
Not having enough people outside their own company management on their boards of directors
17%

Note: For June 1976, None = 2% and Don't know = 6%. For June 1982, None = 2% and Don't know = 1%. Multiple responses per respondent.

Source: Surveys by The Roper Organization (Roper Report 82-6), latest that of June 5-12, 1982.

BIG IS NOT BEAUTIFUL IN THE BUSINESS WORLD

Question: Now, turning to another subject, what is your opinion of *most* large business corporations. There may be exceptions, of course, but would you say your opinion of *most* big business corporations is highly favorable, or moderately favorable, or not too favorable, or rather *un*favorable? Again, there may be exceptions, but would you say your opinion of *most small* business companies is highly favorable, or moderately favorable, or not too favorable, or rather *un*favorable?



Source: Surveys by The Roper Organization (Roper Report 82-6), latest that of June 5-12, 1982.

PROFIT: A FOUR LETTER WORD?

Question: Let's turn now to the subject of business profits. Here is a card with four pairs of statements on it. (Card shown respondent) Would you read the first pair of statements and tell me which one you are most inclined to agree with—a or b? How about the next pair—do you agree more with c or d?

Most inclined to agree that...

Profits paid stockholders are proper compensation	44%	or	Profits paid stockholders should be used for higher wages and lower prices	36%	Both (vol.) 5% Neither (vol.) 1% Don't know 13%
Most profits are plowed back to improve performance and efficiency	32%	or	Most profits go to make rich people richer	48%	Both (vol.) 6% Neither (vol.) 2% Don't know 12%
Profit motive is good--causes people to invest and provide monies to build plants, industries	53%	or	Profit motive is bad--social needs are ignored in pursuit of high profits	27%	Both (vol.) 5% Neither (vol.) 2% Don't know 14%
Profit system results in better products at lower prices	44%	or	Profit system results in inferior products at inflated prices	32%	Both (vol.) 4% Neither (vol.) 4% Don't know 16%

Source: Survey by The Roper Organization (Roper Report 82-2), January 9-23, 1982.

HOW THE BUSINESS SYSTEM SHOULD BE RUN

Question: Business corporations in our society are responsible to one degree or another to various groups. Here are some of those groups. (Card shown respondent) First, under the way the free enterprise system is supposed to work, which of those groups do you think a business corporation owes its primary responsibility to? Now, which of those groups do you think business corporations *do* operate most for the benefit of—that is, whose interests do they consider most? And finally, which of those groups do you personally think business corporations *ought* to be most responsible to?

	Under way system is supposed to work, corporations owe primary responsibility to:	Do operate for benefit of:	Ought to be responsible to:
The stockholders who own it	41%	43%	18%
The customers who buy its products or services	37%	12%	53%
The rank and file employees who work for it	20%	6%	22%
The nation as a whole	17%	3%	22%
The executives who manage it	10%	43%	5%

Note: Multiple responses per respondent.

Source: Survey by The Roper Organization (Ropert Report 82-3), February 12-27, 1982.

ENDURING PATTERNS IN AMERICAN LIFE: A DECADE OF NORC SURVEYS

The continuity of American life is a powerful theme of a decade of National Opinion Research Center surveys. The NORC General Social Surveys provide an invaluable comprehensive assessment of Americans' attitudes on a wide range of fundamental issues. Some of the patterns that emerge from this rich data set are displayed in the pages that follow. The theme of continuity also emerges from three studies of "Middletown," a Midwestern community examined by sociologists Robert and Helen Lynd in 1924 and 1937. Over fifty years after the first study, a team of sociologists returned to Middletown to gauge the changes in this typical American town and found that continuity, not change, was the dominant characteristic of the families there. In a companion article on pages 30 and 31, Theodore Caplow discusses the Middletown and NORC data.

THE QUALITY OF LIFE

Question: On the whole, how satisfied are you with the work you do—would you say you are very satisfied, moderately satisfied, a little dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?

Question: Taken all together, how would you say things are these days—would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?

Question: In general, do you find life exciting, pretty routine, or dull?



Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, latest that of February-April, 1982.

GETTING AHEAD IS GETTING HARDER

Question: We are interested in how people are getting along financially these days. So far as you and your family are concerned, would you say that you are pretty well satisfied with your present financial situation, more or less satisfied, or not satisfied at all?

Question: During the last few years, has your financial situation been getting better, getting worse, or has it stayed the same?



	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1980	1982
Pretty well satisfied with present financial situation	33%	31%	31%	31%	31%	34%	34%	29%	26%
More or less satisfied	45	46	46	42	46	44	42	45	46
Not at all satisfied	23	24	23	27	23	22	24	27	28

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1980	1982
During last few years . . .									
Financial situation has been getting better	43%	42%	40%	35%	36%	38%	42%	34%	31%
Stayed same	39	41	39	37	41	40	40	40	39
Worse	18	16	22	28	23	22	19	25	29

Question: Now I'm going to read you several more statements. Some people agree with a statement, others disagree. As I read each one, tell me whether you more or less agree with it, or more or less disagree. Now I'd like your opinions on a number of different things. . . . It's hardly fair to bring a child into the world with the way things look for the future. . . . In spite of what some people say, the lot (situation/condition) of the average man is getting worse, not better.



	1973	1974	1976	1977	1980	1982
Lot of the average man is getting worse	56%	61%	61%	56%	69%	68%
Disagree	44	39	39	44	31	32
It's hardly fair to bring a child into the world today	37%	37%	43%	40%	48%	35%
Disagree	63	63	57	61	52	65

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, latest that of February-April, 1982.

FAMILY

HOME IS WHERE THE HEART IS

Question: On these cards are various aspects of life. We would like to know how important each of these aspects of life is *for you*. On each of these cards you see on the right hand side a scale with seven points. The lowest point with number 1 indicates that this aspect of life is unimportant to you. Point 7 at the top indicates that particular aspect of life is very important to you. The numbers in between indicate varying degrees of importance. Please take a look at all the cards first. Then, tell me for *each card* its letter and the number you've decided on.



Question: Do you expect to have any (more) children?



Question: What do you think is the ideal number of children for a family to have?



Note: Categories "Five," "Six," "Seven or more," and "As many as you want" were combined.



Question: Taking things all together, how would you describe your marriage? Would you say that your marriage is very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy? (Asked only of currently married respondents).

Question: Should divorce in this country be easier or more difficult to obtain than it is now?

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, latest that of February-April, 1932.

EDUCATION

THE PUBLIC'S PRIORITIES

Question: We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First (Read Item A) . . . are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on (Item)?



Question: Here are a few questions regarding race relations in our country. We'd like your opinion. Do you think white students and (negro/black) students should go to the same schools or to separate schools?

Question: In general, do you favor or oppose the busing of (negro/black) and white school children from one school district to another?



POLITICS

NONE OF THE ABOVE

Question: Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested. Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, some of the time, only now and then, or hardly at all?





Question: Now I'm going to read you several more statements. Some people agree with a statement, others disagree. As I read each one, tell me whether you more or less agree with it, or more or less disagree. Now I'd like your opinions on a number of different things. . . . Most public officials (people in public office) are not really interested in the problems of the average man.


Percent
Agree that most public officials are not really interested in the problems of the average man
Disagree
(60)
(68)
(41)
(32)
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982

Question: We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. I'm going to show you a seven-point scale on which the *political* views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal—point 1—to extremely conservative—point 7. Where would you place yourself on this scale? (Hand card): 1. Extremely liberal, 2. Liberal, 3. Slightly liberal, 4. Moderate, middle of road, 5. Slightly conservative, 6. Conservative, 7. Extremely conservative.

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, latest that of February-April, 1982.

Note: Liberal = Extremely liberal, liberal, and Slightly liberal. Moderate = Moderate, Middle of the road. Conservative = Slightly conservative, Conservative, and Extremely conservative.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

LOW MARX FOR COMMUNISM

Question: Do you think it will be best for the future of this country if we take an active part in world affairs, or if we stay out of world affairs?

Question: We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First (Read item A) . . . are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on (Item)? . . . Military, Armaments, Defense . . . Foreign aid.





Question: You will notice that the boxes on this card go from the highest position of "plus 5" for a country which you *like* very much, to the lowest position of "minus 5" for a country you *dislike* very much. How far up the scale or how far down the scale would you rate the following countries? Read each item . . . Russia . . . England.

Question: Thinking about all the different kinds of governments in the world today, which of these statements comes closest to how you feel about communism as a form of government? . . . It's the worst kind of all; it's bad, but no worse than some others; it's all right for some countries; it's a good form of government.



Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, latest that of February-April, 1982.

Decades of Pu
Comparing NORC a

by Theodore Caplow

The opportunity offered by the editors of *Public Opinion* to compare our Middletown III study with the National Opinion Research Center's surveys of changes in attitudes and values of the American people from 1972 to 1982, is more than welcome. The two studies illuminate each other in many ways. Middletown III, which I conducted with Howard Bahr, Bruce Chadwick, and a score of other collaborators from 1976 to 1982, is a thorough examination of a single middle-sized midwestern city whose social fabric was first examined by Robert and Helen Lynd in 1924-25 (Middletown I) and again in 1935 (Middletown II). The Middletown studies provide information about the same attitudes and values as the NORC surveys, but extended over six decades instead of a single decade. The information obtained in Middletown from sample surveys at the beginning and end of that long interval was buttressed by a great deal of firsthand observation. The NORC surveys, of course, have all the advantages of using national rather than local samples and of having replicated the original inquiry no less than nine times, while the original Middletown study was replicated only twice in six decades. Despite these conspicuous differences in method and coverage, the findings of the two are entirely congruent; they do not contradict each other in any way.

Both studies show that:

1. Americans distinguish sharply between their personal situations, which please most of them most of the time, and the state of the nation, which displeases many of them much of the time.
2. The attitudes and values that regulate personal choices are remarkably stable, compared to opinions on public issues, which are quite volatile, just as people's sentiments toward relatives, neighbors, and friends are much more persistent than their feelings about public figures.
3. Most of the changes that take place in public opinion on public issues are attributable to propaganda or persuasion, not to spontaneous drift. When opposing factions are trying to change public opinion, in opposite directions, their efforts often cancel each other out, leaving opinion unchanged.

With these points in mind, a closer look at the NORC tables reproduced on pages 25-29 and 32-36 may be instructive. There is one precaution to be taken when interpreting these tables, however. Since they are based on annual population samples of approximately 1,500, the sampling error for most should fall between 2 and 3 percent if the sampling was perfect, and somewhat higher if it was slightly flawed, as most samples are. The easiest way to interpret the tables and graphs is to add "plus or minus 3 percent" to every percentage figure and then to see how much difference remains. Thus, for example, in the graph that shows responses to the question "Taken all together, how would you say things are these days—would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy or not too happy?" (see page 21) the proportion of the 1972 sample saying "Pretty happy" was 53 percent, but it should be read as "50 to 56 percent." The proportion saying "Not too happy," shown as 18 percent, should be read as "15 to 21 percent." So corrected, the apparent small differences from year to year between 1972 and 1982 disappear entirely. There was no significant difference in the distribution of happiness between any year and any other year in this series. The finding that only a small minority report themselves as "Not too happy" is confirmed by ten successive trials.

I'm OK, We're Not

The subsequent charts tell similar stories: no change in the pattern of satisfaction with work over the past ten years, and only a small minority dissatisfied; no change in the proportions of those who find life exciting, routine, or dull, but very few who find it dull; pervasive satisfaction with marriage. This bias toward personal happiness is not at all new (it was conspicuous in the Middletown I surveys two generations ago) nor does it seem to be limited to the United States. In a 1977 study by the Dem Institute of Paris, 88 percent of a French national sample said they were generally satisfied with their family lives, and 68 percent were content with their jobs. More than 90 percent said they were happy or pretty happy. But notice this! In that same French sample, only 37 percent believed that the majority of their countrymen were happy. And when asked about prominent public figures Brigitte Bardot and Jacques Chirac, most respondents said they would not be happy to change places with them.

We found a similar tendency again and again in Middletown. When Middletown people compare their own families with what they visualize as average or typical families, nearly all of them discover with pleasure that their own families are much more affectionate, secure, and peaceful. Considered abstractly, this illusion

blic Opinion: d Middletown Data

contributes to the well-being of the community at very little cost. It allows people to deplore the decline of the family, the disappearance of religion and the decay of workmanship, while rejoicing in their own performance as parents, churchgoers, and workers.

We cannot rationally conclude that our subjects are mistaken when they report themselves happy; that is an intellectual dead end. It is a little more plausible to argue that people express more satisfaction to a survey interviewer than they really feel in order to appear competent and successful. Indeed, the existence of such a complacency effect in surveys can be empirically demonstrated, but it is rather minor and does not begin to account for the massive tilt toward personal satisfaction reported in both the NORC and the Middletown studies.

Not *all* the responses show satisfaction. The proportion of the population who think their financial situation has been improving is significantly smaller in 1982 than it was in 1972, and the proportion who think they are worse off is much higher in 1982, with significant fluctuations in the intervening years. More people now think the lot of the average man is getting worse. There have been significant shifts of public opinion on many public issues during the past ten years. For example, on divorce, school desegregation, busing, the popularity of the Soviet Union, the defects of communism, the participation of women in politics, the participation of blacks in politics, criminal justice, and the death penalty, there were significant differences from the beginning to the end of NORC's decade, and many interesting fluctuations in between. But on the most hotly contested public questions—abortion, gun control, free speech—there have been only negligible changes, presumably because the pervasive efforts of contending factions have more or less balanced each other out.

The amenability of public opinion to persuasion on public issues is nicely illustrated by the largest fluctuation reported in any of these tables and charts: the increase in the percentage saying "We're spending too little on armaments and defense," from 29 percent in 1978 to 60 percent in 1980, and then a decrease back to 31 percent in 1982. Events and Mr. Reagan shifted the majority from being opposed to being in favor of increased defense spending. Subsequent events shifted the majority back to their original opposition.

Private Satisfaction, Public Discontent

Overall, there is nothing pathological about the pattern displayed in these studies. Public opinion in a democracy is *supposed* to be volatile. How could it otherwise keep up with the successive crises that are the raison d'être of democratic politics? But it is probably just as well that most people most of the time keep their distance from the public sector, which they cannot greatly influence, and concentrate their attention on their private world. Politics and public life are important for 43 percent of the sample, about the same proportion as those who regularly vote. But religion is important to 75 percent and, as other recent studies show, the people who interest themselves both in politics and religion are better informed about religion than about politics. Meanwhile, the family—that supposedly vestigial and declining institution—is reckoned as important by an overwhelming 97 percent of the sample.

So that is the pattern of American attitudes today—pervasive satisfaction in the private sphere, widespread discontent in the public sphere. We would most surely ascribe this peculiar cultural pattern to the special problems of 1982, if we did not have a growing body of reliable data to show that this spectacular bifurcation in our culture was fully present ten years ago, and was definitely visible fifty years before that.

"The latest figures on the country's outlook have been finalized. Happiness is up 1.5 percent while gloom is experiencing somewhat of a setback!"

Drawing by Clifford Wirth. Reprinted with permission.

WOMEN

BREAKING BARRIERS

Question: If your party nominated a woman for president, would you vote for her if she were qualified for the job?

Question: Tell me if you agree or disagree with this statement: Most men are better suited emotionally for politics than are most women.





Question: Do you agree or disagree with this statement? Women should take care of running their homes and leave running the country up to men.

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of a married woman earning money in business or industry if she has a husband capable of supporting her?

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, latest that of February-April, 1982.

ABORTION

CONSENSUS AND DIVISION

Question: Please tell me whether or not you think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion . . .

	Yes	No
1972	87%	13%
1973	92	8
1974	92	8
1975	91	9
1976	91	9
1977	91	10
1978	91	9
1980	90	10
1982	92	8



	Yes	No
1972	79%	21%
1973	84	17
1974	87	14
1975	84	16
1976	84	16
1977	84	16
1978	83	17
1980	83	17
1982	87	13

	Yes	No
1972	79%	21%
1973	85	16
1974	85	15
1975	83	17
1976	84	16
1977	86	15
1978	82	18
1980	83	17
1982	84	16



	Yes	No
1972	49%	51%
1973	53	47
1974	55	45
1975	53	47
1976	53	47
1977	53	47
1978	47	53
1980	52	48
1982	52	48

	Yes	No
1972	44%	57%
1973	49	51
1974	50	50
1975	48	52
1976	50	50
1977	50	50
1978	41	59
1980	48	52
1982	49	51



	Yes	No
1972	40%	60%
1973	48	52
1974	47	53
1975	46	54
1976	46	54
1977	47	54
1978	40	60
1980	47	53
1982	49	51

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, latest that of February-April, 1982.

Note: The response "If the woman wants it for any reason" was added in 1977. The responses were: 1977, Yes=38%, No=62%; 1978, Yes=33%, No=67%; 1980, Yes=41%, No=59%; 1982, Yes=41%, No=59%.

SEX

WHAT'S ACCEPTABLE, WHAT'S NOT



Question: There's been a lot of discussion about the way morals and attitudes about sex are changing in this country. If a man and a woman have sex relations before marriage, do you think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all?

Question: What is your opinion about a *married* person having sexual relations with someone *other* than the marriage partner—is it always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all?

Question: What about sexual relations between two adults of the same sex—is it always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all?

RACE

A DECADE OF PROGRESS

Question: How strongly would you object if a member of your family wanted to bring a (negro/black/white) friend home to dinner? Would you object strongly, mildly or not at all? (1972, 1973, 1974, 1976, 1977 asked of non-blacks only about "negro/black friend"; 1980 and 1982 asked of all respondents—asked blacks about "white friend" and asked non-blacks about "negro/black friend")

Question: Here are some opinions other people have expressed in connection with (negro/black)—white relations. Which statement on the card comes closest to how you, yourself feel. . . . (Agree strongly, Agree slightly, Disagree slightly, Disagree strongly)? . . . White people have a right to keep (negroes/blacks) out of their neighborhoods if they want to, and (negroes/blacks) should respect that right. (1972, 1976, 1977 asked of non-blacks only; 1980 and 1982 asked of all respondents)

Question: If your party nominated a (negro/black) for president, would you vote for him if he were qualified for the job? (1972, 1975, 1977 asked of non-blacks only; 1974, 1978, 1982 asked of all respondents)



Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, latest that of February-April, 1982.

Note: The percentage of blacks saying they "didn't object at all to a member of the family bringing a member of the opposite race home for dinner" was 96% in 1980, and 94% in 1982. The percentage of blacks saying they "disagreed slightly/strongly that whites have a right to keep blacks out of the neighborhood" was 86% in 1980, and 91% in 1982. The percentage of blacks saying they would vote for a black for president were: 1974, 96%; 1978, 96%; 1982, 97%.

CIVIL LIBERTIES

Question: There are always some people whose ideas are considered bad or dangerous by other people. For instance, somebody who is against all churches and religion. . . . If such a person wanted to make a speech in your community against churches and religion, should he be allowed to speak, or not? Should such a person be allowed to teach in a college or university, or not? If some people in your community suggested that a book he wrote against churches and religion should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing this book, or not? Or, consider a person who believes that blacks are genetically inferior. If such a person wanted to make a speech in your community claiming that blacks are inferior, should he be allowed to speak, or not? Should such a person be allowed to teach in a college or university, or not? If some people in your community suggested that a book he wrote which said Blacks are inferior should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing this book, or not? Now, I should like to ask you some questions about a man who admits he is a Communist. Suppose this admitted Communist wanted to make a speech in your community. Should he be allowed to speak, or not? Suppose he is teaching in a college. Should he be fired, or not? Suppose he wrote a book which is in your public library. Somebody in your community suggests that the book should be removed from the library. Would you favor removing it, or not? And what about a man who admits that he is a homosexual? Suppose this admitted homosexual wanted to make a speech in your community. Should he be allowed to speak, or not? Should such a person be allowed to teach in a college or university, or not? If some people in your community suggested that a book he wrote in favor of homosexuality should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing this book, or not?







Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, latest that of February-April, 1982.

Note: Allow book in library = "Not favor removing book." For communist, Allow to teach = "should not be fired."

CRIME

THE PUBLIC GETS TOUGH

Question: Is there any area right around here—that is, within a mile—where you would be afraid to walk alone at night? How about at home at night—do you feel safe and secure, or not?





Question: Would you favor or oppose a law which would require a person to obtain a police permit before he or she could buy a gun?

Question: Do you happen to have in your home (or garage) any guns or revolvers?

Question: Are you in favor of the death penalty for persons convicted of murder? (1972-73). Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder? (1974-78, 1980, 1982)

Question: In general, do you think the courts in this area deal too harshly or not harshly enough with criminals?



Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, latest that of February-April, 1982.

BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION POST FALKLANDS

Question: How would you vote if there were a general election tomorrow? (Ask those undecided/refused: Which party are you most inclined to support?)



	Conservative	Labour	Liberal	SDP	Alliance	Other
January 1981	35%	45%	17%			4%
February	33	41	17	8%		2
March	28	38	17	15		2
April	30	38	17	12		3
June	31	39	16	12		3
July	30	36	13	18		2
August	30	39	13	16		2
September	27	38	16	17		2
October	27	31	14	26		2
November	27	27	8	16	19%	2
December	27	29	11	19	13	1
January 1982	29	30	12	15	13	1
February	30	33	12	11	11	3
March	34	34	11	11	8	2
April	35	30	10	11	12	2
May	44	30	10	7	7	1
June	48	28	10	8	6	1
July	45	31	10	4	8	1
August	44	30	9	6	8	2
September	42	30	13	4	10	1
October	42	33	10	4	8	1

Note: *May 1979 points are general election results. For pre-1981 data, see *Public Opinion*, February/March 1981, p. 34.

Source: Surveys by Market & Opinion Research International, latest that of October 7-11, 1982.

MEN AND WOMEN RATE THATCHER'S PERFORMANCE

Question: Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way Mrs. Thatcher is doing her job as prime minister?



PUBLIC OPIN

LEBANON AND ISRAEL'S STANDING

Question: In view of what is known to you, do you think the operation in Lebanon was justified?



Israeli respondents

Question: In your opinion has the operation in Lebanon enhanced or damaged Israel's standing among the nations?



Note: In a July survey taken by DAHAF, 83% said yes to "considering all factors, the price paid, and the results obtained, was it right or wrong to set out on the war?"

Source: Survey by Modi'in Ezrahi Research Institute, June 21-30, 1982.

WHO IS BEST SUITED TO LEAD

Question: Who is best suited to be the prime minister?

Question: Who is best suited to be the defense minister?

	January	February	March	May	Mid-June	Mid-August	September (pre-massacre)	September (post-massacre)
Begin best suited to be prime minister	42%	42%	41%	40%	52%	54%	50%	43%
Sharon best suited to be defense minister	42	46	43	42	56	52	49	42



Note: Other individuals not shown.

Source: Surveys by Modi'in Ezrahi Research Institute, latest that of Late September 1982

ION IN ISRAEL

RATING BEGIN'S AND SHARON'S PERFORMANCE

Question: What score would you give to the quality of Menachem Begin's performance as prime minister. . . . Very good, good, not good/not bad, not good, or bad?*

Question: What score would you give to the quality of Ariel Sharon's performance as defense minister. . . . Very good, good, not good/not bad, not good, or bad?*

Rating of Prime Minister Begin's performance

	March 17-18	May 16-23	June 28-July 6	July 28-August 5	August 30-September 5	September 22-23
Very good	14%	23%	47%	49%	44%	37%
Good	41	38	30	27	38	35
Not good/not bad	24	*	12	13	*	*
Not good	18	21	5	5	10	16
Bad	3	13	4	3	5	11

Rating of Ariel Sharon's performance

	April	June 28-July 6	July 28-August 5	August 30-September 5	September 22-23
Very good	23%	48%	49%	45%	33%
Good	31	30	27	33	31
Not good/not bad	21	11	11	*	*
Not good	11	6	4	10	18
Bad	9	5	5	8	16

Note: *The "not good/not bad" category was not always offered. All data are printed here, but only those points which are directly comparable are shown above.

Source: Surveys by DAHAF Research Institute, latest that of September 22-23, 1982.



IF THE ELECTION WERE HELD TODAY

Question: Had the elections been held today which party would you vote for?



Note: Poll results were converted into seats by DAHAF. There are 120 seats in the Israeli Knesset. Thus, 61 seats are required for a majority.

Source: Survey by DAHAF Research Institute, latest that of September 22-23, 1982.

AESTHETIC ADVICE FOR MADISON AVENUE

Question: *Overall* how would you rate the advertising you have seen or heard for each type of product?



Note: Questionnaires in this mail survey were mailed to 5,000 individuals throughout the United States. Completed questionnaires were returned by 3,440 persons; 1,824 female heads of households and 1,616 male heads of households. Differences in response by sex were slight.

Source: Survey by Warwick, Welsh & Miller/Home Testing Institute, February 1981.

by Harry O'Neill and Kenneth Schwartz

Flat Tax Facts

Federal income tax reform is always a popular subject, particularly in the current economic climate. Inflation has led to troublesome bracket creep; there has been a steady decline in the rate of savings and investment; noncompliance is increasing; a growing number of people regard the income tax as the most unfair of all the taxes. One congressional response to these economic problems has been renewed interest in the flat rate tax. Currently, there are nine bills in the hopper—five in the House and four in the Senate. Politicians, economists, and the business community are battling over all of them. Choose your side and it is easy to find an "authority" to back you up.

But what about the public? Are they ready to endorse the flat rate tax? The results of a nationwide survey of 1,005 adults gives some insight into this question. The survey—the most comprehensive public poll available on this issue—was commissioned by the LTV Corporation and conducted by Opinion Research Corporation in July of this year.

In the early stages of debate over a complex and controversial issue, surveys often reveal both positive and negative opinion, depending on what aspect of an issue is being examined. The flat rate tax is no exception. Both proponents and opponents can find some comfort in the results, but neither enjoys a clear-cut victory.

When asked their preference, "as a matter of general principle," more than six people in ten (63 percent) think the federal income tax system should have tax rates that reflect different circumstances, rather than taxing every taxpayer at the same rate (30 percent). This belief that the tax system should somehow recognize individual differences rather than treating all taxpayers equally is predominant throughout all segments of the population. This appears to cement the case for the status quo, but we can't stop here. People's preferences change considerably after they are read a description of the progressive and flat rate tax systems. Interviewers began by reading the following description of the progressive income tax and its itemized deductions:

> At the present time we have a progressive federal income tax, whereby the tax rate increases as taxable income increases. The present tax rates run from 12 percent to 50 percent, depending on income. Also, individual taxpayers can itemize certain expenses and deduct them from their income before figuring what their tax should be.

They then read this description of the flat rate tax system in which nearly all the deductions and credits now given taxpayers would be eliminated:

> A number of proposals have been made to change the federal income tax to a flat rate tax, whereby everybody—regardless of the amount of income—would pay the same rate, but this single rate would be much lower than the present top rate of 50 percent, perhaps somewhere between 15-20 percent. With this flat rate tax, however, nearly all deductions and credits now given to taxpayers would be eliminated.

With these descriptions in mind, 45 percent of the public say they would prefer the flat rate tax, while 41 percent opt for the progressive tax. Only 2 percent say it would make no difference to them, and 12 percent express no opinion. Thus, when the two tax systems are explained and the question is shifted from the abstract to the personal level, the flat rate tax moves from the two-to-one loser's spot into a virtual tie with the progressive tax. Interesting differences occur by sex, region, and income

Table 1

PREFERENCE FOR PROGRESSIVE OR FLAT RATE TAX

	Personally prefer:				
	Flat rate tax	Progressive tax	No difference	No opinion	(Number of interviews)
Total public	45%	41%	2%	12%	(1,005)
Men	52	39	2	7	(501)
Women	40	41	2	17	(504)
Northeast	43	44	2	11	(221)
Midwest	42	43	2	13	(266)
South	45	41	1	13	(328)
West	53	31	5	11	(190)
Under $15,000 household income	38	45	3	14	(239)
$15,000 to $24,999	51	39	2	8	(210)
$25,000 to $34,999	53	35	1	11	(204)
$35,000 or more	54	36	2	8	(194)

Source: Survey by Opinion Research Corporation for The LTV Corporation, July 9-16, 1982.

(see table 1). The flat rate tax is preferred by the majority of men, while neither is favored by a majority of women. By region, the flat rate tax is preferred by a majority only in the West. The other regions show a standoff between the two systems. Among income groups, only those with household incomes under $15,000 choose the progressive tax over the flat rate tax.

When the question is made even more specific, the picture changes again. While 45 percent of the public opt for the flat rate tax when the elimination of deductions is described in general terms, support falls significantly when specific deductions are cited. We asked the following question of the 45 percent favoring the flat rate tax:

> As mentioned before, if we were to go to a flat rate tax system nearly all the deductions that are now allowed would be eliminated. I am going to read you several of the deductions that might be eliminated. As I read each one, please tell me if you would still prefer the flat rate tax system if that deduction were eliminated.

The deductions included were interest on a home mortgage, state and local income taxes, charitable contributions, medical expenses, and business expenses. A large majority of those who initially favored the flat rate tax continue to do so in the face of the elimination of each deduction—ranging from 66 percent with medical expenses to 75 percent with charitable contributions (see table 2).

Table 2

PREFERENCE FOR PROGRESSIVE OR FLAT RATE TAX WITH THE ELIMINATION OF SPECIFIC DEDUCTIONS

(among those who initially prefer the flat rate tax: 45 percent)

Deduction	Still prefer flat rate tax if deduction is eliminated	Would not prefer flat rate tax if deduction is eliminated
Charitable contributions	75%	20%
State & local income taxes	72	23
Business expenses	73	22
Interest on home mortgage	67	28
Medical expenses	66	31

Note: N = 452. "No difference, no opinion" not shown.

Source: Survey by Opinion Research Corporation for The LTV Corporation, July 9-16, 1982.

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Viewed another way, though, the defections resulting from the elimination of these deductions tip the scale in favor of the progressive tax (see table 3).

Table 3

PREFERENCE FOR PROGRESSIVE OR FLAT RATE TAX WITH THE ELIMINATION OF SPECIFIC DEDUCTIONS

(among the total public)

Deduction	Still prefer flat rate tax if deduction is eliminated	Prefer progressive tax—either initially or if deduction is eliminated	No difference; No opinion
Charitable contributions	34%	50%	16%
State & local income taxes	33	51	16
Business expenses	33	51	16
Interest on home mortgage	30	54	16
Medical expenses	30	55	15

Source: Survey by Opinion Research Corporation for The LTV Corporation, July 9-16, 1982.

The Fairness Factor

Several of the benefits put forth by proponents of the flat rate tax were tested and fared well. First, by a margin of 72 percent to 16 percent the public believes the flat rate tax would be easier for the average taxpayer to understand. And by an even larger margin—70 percent to 10 percent—the public believes the flat rate tax would be less costly for the government to administer. Majorities throughout the population give the flat rate tax a significant edge on these two benefits. The third benefit is related to the problem of noncompliance with the current system. Presumably because the flat rate tax is simpler to compute and is seen as more equitable, people believe it would provide the government with more tax revenues. Here, the flat rate tax is given only a marginal edge over the progressive tax by the public at large—42 percent to 38 percent.

A key issue in the debate over the flat rate tax is its fairness. Opponents strongly contend that the flat rate tax would shift the tax burden from high income groups to middle- and low-income groups. As Senator Russell Long phrased it on the Senate floor: "If you're rich, you'll love it; if you're not rich, look out." Here, too, public opinion depends on question wording. When asked which tax system would be fairer to most taxpayers, the public responds 47 percent to 37 percent in favor of the flat rate tax. When asked which would be fairer to "people like yourself," the results are virtually identical—47 percent to 38 percent in favor of the flat rate tax. When examined by household income, only those in the lowest bracket—under $15,000—are not sure which system is fairer.

If the questioning stopped here, the flat rate tax proponents would have some useful ammunition. But further questioning enhances the opposition's arsenal. By a margin of 46 percent to 38 percent the public believes that those with incomes over $50,000 would pay more taxes under the progressive tax system. In fact, by a greater margin of 51 percent to 32 percent, people believe that those with incomes under $15,000 would pay more taxes under the flat rate tax system. This view of how the tax would affect lower-income individuals is predominant at all income levels. These opinions should encourage opponents of the flat rate tax, who argue that it would be unfair to those with lower incomes, and that it would benefit the wealthy.

The public clearly has mixed views about the preferred approach to federal income taxation. Particular question wordings can produce favorable results on either side. Beyond this caveat, however, some reliable conclusions do emerge from this survey. They are:

- There is considerable support for the philosophical idea that individual circumstances require a tax system more complex than one that treats all taxpayers the same.
- However, this philosophical notion is not so embedded that arguments cannot be mounted against it. When forced to consider the two competing systems on a more personal level, many supporters of the progressive tax defect.
- Proponents of a flat rate tax should consider retaining some of the more commonly used deductions, as their elimination significantly reduces public support for the general concept.
- Strong arguments in favor of a flat rate tax are that it would be easier for the average taxpayer to understand and less costly for the government to administer.
- Flat rate tax proponents have but a tenuous edge with the argument that their system will raise more tax revenues than the current system.
- The most telling issue in the debate over the efficacy of the flat rate tax may be its fairness—and here public opinion is as yet unclear. While a plurality of the public believes the flat rate tax would be fairer than the progressive tax to most taxpayers and to "people like yourself," the public also expects a flat rate tax to take more tax dollars from low-income families and less from high-income families. At the moment, opinion on the fairness issue depends on the wording of the argument.

Even though opinion on specific proposals has not yet crystallized, there is a clear dissatisfaction with the current system of taxation. The one significant revelation from this poll is that the people believe some reform is in order.

by William C. Adams

Blaming Israel for Begin

Never before has any significant share of the public openly aligned themselves with the Arabs against Israel. Now, for the first time, three out of ten Americans say they sympathize more with the Arab nations than with Israel.

The change did not come overnight. Starting in 1977 and 1978, large numbers began to see Menachem Begin as intransigent and arrogant, to object to Begin's policies toward the West Bank, to develop some concern for the status of the Palestinians, and to listen to the arguments of moderate Arab leaders—most crucially, to Anwar Sadat.

By 1981 public attitudes had undergone some powerful revisions. The Middle East was no longer seen as David vs. Goliath, U.S. friend vs. U.S. enemies, good vs. evil. David was by then equipped with considerably more than a slingshot; a few key Arab states had become widely known as fairly pro-American; and the automatic presumption of Israeli virtue had vanished.

However, these and other changes had not diminished the fundamental, long-standing American loyalty to the state of Israel. Specific disappointments with Begin were divorced from the public's continuing commitment to Israel, as if Begin were temporary, while Israel's struggle against extremists bent on its annihilation was long-term and real. Although Begin suffered, in American eyes, from comparisons to Golda Meir or Anwar Sadat, he profited greatly from contrasts with Yassir Arafat or Muammar Qaddafi.

Just prior to the Israeli drive into southern Lebanon, I wrote that there was "no guarantee that objections to the Begin government will not eventually erode the broad support for Israel" and that there was an "unappreciated potential for volatility" in U.S. public opinion toward Israel and the Arabs.[1] Four months later, distaste for Begin's government finally shattered the barrier that had served to keep the image of the state of Israel so highly positive and distinct from that of the prime minister and his retinue.

This change should not be exaggerated. Americans have not embraced Yassir Arafat and dismissed Israel; there remains a potent emotional attraction to Israel. But something significant has happened. For five years, positive evaluations of Israel were immune to vicissitudes in negative reactions to Begin policies. In August and September of 1982, however, one large share of the public began to hold Israel accountable for Begin, a new outlook that may portend even greater changes in the future.

June 6 to August 12

Preliminary American reactions to the limited operation in southern Lebanon were divided (40 percent favored, 35 percent opposed—Gallup, June 11-14). Later evaluations were much more censorious. By July, less than one-fourth said they approved the invasion, while one-half said they opposed it (*Los Angeles Times*, July 5-8; Gallup, July 23-26).

One further indication of the strength of the dis-

approval is shown by a Harris question which put the ultimate outcome in the best possible light:

> If the conflict ends with all military powers—Israeli, Syrian and PLO—finally getting out of Lebanon, do you think the Israeli move into Lebanon was justified or not?

Because Americans so often judge policies (like Reaganomics) by their accomplishments, rather than by their techniques or theory, and because Americans overwhelmingly wanted to see the Lebanese "rule themselves" (Harris, July 18-22), one would expect this formulation to elicit strong contingent support for the "Israeli move." (Harris even avoided the tougher word "invasion.")

Despite this highly favorable wording, in early July only 44 percent would give approval, while 36 percent still insisted the action was unjustified, and 20 percent were not sure. By the first week in August, there was no longer a statistically significant plurality in Israel's corner, even with the happy-ending scenario; 43 percent approved and 42 percent had come to disapprove.

One of the key reasons for the reluctance to sanction the invasion seemed to be the belief that civilian casualties were out of proportion to the military threat to Israel. A steadily increasing share of the public agreed with the loaded assertion that "Israel was wrong to go to war and kill thousands of Lebanese civilians." Harris polls found that in the third week of June, 49 percent agreed; in the second week of July, 52 percent agreed; and by the first week in August, 63 percent agreed and only 29 percent disagreed.

More Americans were prepared to characterize the Israeli action as "aggressive" (42 percent) than "defensive" (27 percent) as early as the first week in July. By that time, people were skeptical about whether an expanded military effort would really solve anything. Only 17 percent believed that "the serious losses suffered by the Palestinian forces will weaken a troublesome element in the area and make [peace] agreements easier," and 48 percent were afraid that peace talks would become more difficult, according to Harris data.

At the same time, there was no massive repudiation of Israel's actions, and there was clearly support (57 percent pro in both June and July Harris polls) for the initial Israeli aim of stopping PLO bases from "regularly shelling Israel." There was admiration for the "military skill Israel showed" (57 percent).

A large segment of the U.S. public thought entry into Vietnam was a mistake, but, once involved, nevertheless preferred to escalate the effort in order to win. Likewise, it appears that many of those who said Israel should not have embarked on its northward drive also wanted to see the Israelis victorious. For example, only 24 percent agreed that "the Israeli army should have attacked Lebanon to begin with." However, 46 percent wanted Israel to "finish the job of pushing the PLO out of Lebanon," and 46 percent wanted to see Israel stay on "until the Syrians agree to leave" Lebanon (*Los Angeles Times*, July 4-8).

Until the end of July and the beginning of August, reactions generally followed previous patterns in which the overall reputation of the nation of Israel escaped unscathed from skepticism toward particular Begin policies, even among the minority of Americans who most strongly objected to Begin's moves. There was, in fact, an initial increase in the proportion of Americans saying they favored Israel over the Arab nations. And, despite some disapproval of the invasion, Begin's own ratings did not immediately suffer.

Americans were already divided in their attitudes toward Menachem Begin, and they remained so throughout most of the summer. Begin had never achieved the sort of personal popularity and rapport with Americans that was enjoyed by previous Israeli prime ministers. But neither was there an anti-Begin consensus.

One survey which provoked interest was a *Los Angeles Times* poll suggesting Begin's popularity rose sharply after the invasion. In January of 1982, the public was evenly divided into those with opinions favorable to Begin (33 percent), unfavorable to Begin (34 percent), and undecided or uninformed about him (33 percent). By early July, those with favorable opinions constituted a full 50 percent of the sample, with 29 percent viewing Begin negatively.

Actually, much of the apparent boost for Begin was probably an artifact of question order. The second poll inserted Yassir Arafat for evaluation immediately before Begin, with Begin benefiting immensely from the juxtaposition. But, if the shift was not entirely a fluke, it suggests that Begin's comparatively low-key style during the early summer may have paid off and that, as with Margaret Thatcher, there is some appeal to a victorious allied leader. In any event, Begin's ratings reaffirm that there was no revolution in American attitudes during Israel's march to the outskirts of Beirut.

Some analysts predicted that Yassir Arafat's appearances before network cameras would influence opinions during June and July. However, both Arafat and the PLO retained their highly negative images. Only 15 percent had a favorable impression of Arafat and only 9 percent had a favorable view of the PLO as of the first week in July (*Los Angeles Times*).

Yet, just as Americans continued to distinguish Begin from Israel, they continued to distinguish the PLO from the Palestinian people. A solid majority (60 percent) clung to the idea that the PLO did not represent the Palestinian people (NBC/AP, August 17), so that the negative image of the PLO did not extend to Palestinian civilians.

On balance, news during June and July seems to have intensified the complex and mixed public impressions of the Middle East which had evolved over the preceding five years. In this instance, America's ally took steps that were interpreted as courageous, skillful, and

having some initial justification but that were simultaneously seen as overly aggressive and insensitive to civilian casualties—fighting against what was seen as a repugnant organization which has terrorized in the name of poor refugees who do deserve an improved status.

Because the enemy was the PLO, misgivings about Israel were held in check. Then came (1) the continued bombings of Beirut, (2) the scorning of Reagan's peace plan, and (3) the massacre at Sabra and Shatila.

August 12 to September 24

Starting about mid-August, a succession of surveys revealed that objections had spread past specific Begin policies and had begun, for the first time, to hit opinions of Israel itself. Heavy media coverage of the Israeli bombardment of Beirut and the agony it inflicted also exploded a bomb on the image of Israel. Six out of ten Americans concluded Israel "used more force than was necessary" against the PLO in Beirut (ABC/*Washington Post*, August 17).

By the middle of August, Gallup discovered the largest proportion giving an unfavorable opinion of Israel in almost twenty years of ratings—36 percent (up from 19 percent in 1981). Those voicing favorable views fell from 75 to 56 percent between 1981 and 1982. Previously, whatever the extent of dissatisfaction with particular Begin policies, this measure had not declined (see table 1).

Another portentous finding emerged in mid-August. For the first time, roughly as many Americans saw Israel as unreliable and uncooperative (42 percent) as saw the country as a reliable ally (44 percent). A year earlier a large majority believed Israel was a reliable ally (see table 2).

Table 1
RATINGS OF ISRAEL

	1976	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
Favorable rating of Israel	60%	59%	68%	74%	75%	56%
Unfavorable	24	28	24	21	19	36
No opinion	16	13	8	5	6	8

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of August 13-16, 1982.

Table 2
RELIABILITY OF ISRAEL AS AN ALLY

	October 1981	March 1982	August 1982	September 1982
Israel is a reliable ally	64%	54%	44%	40%
Israel is not a reliable ally	24	35	42	45
No opinion	12	11	14	15

Source: Surveys by ABC News/*Washington Post*, latest that of September 24-26, 1982.

These were ominous signs for Israel. Nevertheless, the lower August appraisals still had not translated into any greater sympathy for Israel's opponents. In August, results on the "Israel versus the Arabs" question were virtually identical to years past: 43 percent were pro-Israel and 13 percent were pro-Arab (*Los Angeles Times*, August 22-26).

These and other data suggest Israel's image might still have rebounded from the August losses had not two other pivotal events followed closely: Begin's strong denunciation of Reagan's peace plan and Begin's controversial response to the massacre of Palestinians in Beirut. The public opinion consequences were far-reaching. Three key shifts can be identified.

First, negative views toward Begin became much more widespread. Second, there occurred the first major surge in the number of people who expressed outright sympathy for the Arabs in preference to Israel. Third, sentiment favoring strong U.S. pressure on Israel increased substantially.

No other Israeli prime minister ever came close to the negative ratings given Menachem Begin. An ABC News/*Washington Post* poll of September 24-26 showed only 26 percent holding a favorable opinion of Begin with 47 percent unfavorable and the rest uncertain (see figure 1).

Figure 1

Question: Would you say your feelings about Israel's prime minister Menachem Begin are very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or don't you have an impression of him one way or the other?



Note: The percentages giving the response "No opinion" were 39% in March, 35% in August, and 27% in September.

Source: Surveys by ABC News/*Washington Post*, latest that of September 24-26, 1982.

More critical was the new tendency to blame Israel for Begin's policies. Previously, there had been little correlation in attitudes toward Israel and attitudes toward Begin. (In fact, Israel's ratings had actually im-

proved somewhat during the same 1977-1981 period of increased American apprehension about Begin policies.) But, starting in August, Israel's image dropped in tandem with Begin's.

Americans overwhelmingly concluded that Israel was now linked to—and injured by—Begin. A Gallup poll of September 22-23 found that 70 percent of all Americans surveyed believed "Begin's policies are hurting support for Israel in the United States." Jewish Americans were even more emphatic about Begin's damage; 78 percent of those surveyed in Gallup's special large sample of Jews (September 22-23) also agreed that "Begin's policies" hurt support for Israel in the United States.

Americans had resisted that linkage for five years, but it may be that Begin had been in power long enough that he no longer seemed "temporary." For years reporters had told Americans that Begin was popular in Israel. Throughout the summer of 1982, Americans were told repeatedly that Israelis overwhelmingly and enthusiastically approved Begin's offensive in Lebanon. By August and September, many Americans had stopped distinguishing Israel from Begin.

The most stunning product of the new linkage of Begin with Israel was an unprecedented surge in the number of Americans who aligned themselves with the Arabs in opposition to Israel. From the 1967 war until Begin came to power in 1977, the share of Ameri-

Figure 2

Question: In the Middle East situation, are your sympathies more with Israel or more with the Arab nations? (Asked of those who answered affirmatively the question: "Have you heard or read about the situation in the Middle East?"—usually 80-90% of the total sample.)



	1967	1968	1970	1973	1975	1977	1978			1979	1981	1982	
	June	Jan.	Mar.	Dec.	Jan.	June	Mar.	May	Nov.	Jan.	July	May	Sept.
Israel	56%	50%	44%	50%	44%	44%	38%	44%	39%	42%	44%	51%	32%
Arab Nations	4	5	3	7	8	8	11	10	13	15	11	12	28
Neither	25	28	32	25	22	28	33	33	30	29	34	26	21
No opinion	15	17	21	18	26	20	18	13	18	14	11	11	19

Note: Sample size for September 1982 point was 605 American adults.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of April 30-May 3, 1982 and the Gallup Organization for *Newsweek*, September 22-23, 1982.

cans who said they sympathized more with the Arabs stayed in the miniscule range of 3 to 8 percent. Under Begin's tenure, the pro-Arab proportion had climbed into the teens but had never exceeded 18 percent (see figure 2). As late as the third week in August, the *Los Angeles Times* poll pegged the pro-Arab share at 13 percent; other August polls showed 18 percent as pro-Arab.

In late September all of that changed. Two major national polls conducted between September 22 and 26 asked the same question: "In the Mideast situation, are your sympathies more with Israel or more with the Arab nations?" In both polls, nearly three out of every ten Americans surveyed sided with the Arabs over Israel. In the new Gallup poll, 28 percent supported the Arabs. In the ABC News/*Washington Post* poll, 27 percent were pro-Arab. The polls differed, however, on the proportions who identified with Israel.

The astonishing Gallup finding was that only 32 percent said they favored Israel. Given this survey's sampling error of 5 percent, there was no statistically significant difference in the proportion favoring the Israeli and Arab sides—32 vs. 28 percent, respectively. The ABC News/*Washington Post* poll, on the other hand, showed a much smaller drop in support for Israel —48 percent, down from 55 percent in March.

This expansion of the pro-Arab contingent is probably in part a reflexive protest to the atrocities of Sabra and Shatila. But perceptions that are crystallized during powerful emotional episodes are not quickly abandoned. And now that a larger segment of the public has begun to hold Israel accountable for Begin's actions, any continued disenchantment with Begin is likely to damage Israel as never before.

Some columnists have argued that the anti-Begin demonstrations and editorials in the wake of the Sabra and Shatila massacres ought to reestablish some distance between the image of Israel as a nation and the image of the current prime minister. Yet Americans who have made that link still see Begin in power with the apparent support of most of his countrymen (see Opinion Roundup, pages 38-39 for data on Israeli attitudes). It seems unlikely that a few demonstrations will be sufficient to reconstruct the barrier protecting Israel's image from Begin's image.

In addition to the first significant realignment, September brought a newfound public willingness to punish Israel. In the past, Americans had usually resisted options such as cutting off aid, even when they objected to certain Begin policies. Again, the old logic was not to risk hurting the state of Israel because of problems with the current prime minister. This logic was increasingly rejected.

The ABC News/*Washington Post* poll in late September found 59 percent agreeing that the United States "should stop supplying Israel with military arms," while only 35 percent disagreed. In the Gallup poll at that time, 50 percent favored suspending or reducing aid "in order to force a pullout of Israeli forces from Lebanon"; 38 percent opposed those sanctions.

Again, it is important to remember that a plurality of Americans are still definitely concerned about Israel's fate and that there has been no complete turnabout in American attitudes. Nevertheless, a plurality now say American foreign policy "leans too much in favor of Israel" (ABC News/*Washington Post*) and are willing to talk to the PLO (Gallup); only 9 percent want to see the West Bank under full Israeli sovereignty (Gallup).

In 1977, Seymour Martin Lipset and William Schneider estimated that there was a hard core of 25 percent of Israeli supporters in the American population and that the rest of the support was "soft" in varying degrees. Many of the recent findings give their view added credence. In late September, 26 percent were favorable to Begin; 24 percent of all Americans surveyed agreed that the "most appropriate role for American Jews" was to "support Israel's government regardless of the Israeli government's actions."

To a large degree, the hard-core supporters of Israel still represent what Lipset and Schneider called "the only 'veto group' in the American electorate concerned with the Middle East" because of the intensity of their commitment to Israel. Thus, although policy makers may feel a little less restraint, U.S. political dynamics may not immediately change as much as the poll shifts first suggest. Yet the strong champions of Israel are themselves acutely aware of the implications of a new opinion climate and the direction of current trends.

In September, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) wrote its friends:

> The PLO and their supporters have chosen the battlefield—it is not Lebanon, although that is where the guns have been fired. The real battlefield is Washington, D.C., and on the nightly news. For that is where the hearts and minds of the American people will be won. *And that is where Israel's future may be determined.*

Due to the Begin-Israel linkage, the hearts and minds of Americans are vulnerable to persuasion and events as never before. Altogether 81 percent of the American public thought Israel bore at least partial responsibility for the massacre in Beirut—49 percent said "partial responsibility" and 32 percent said "Israel is very much responsible" (Gallup). Only 8 percent agreed with Begin that Israel bore no responsibility for the tragedy.

Yet fundamentally, the opinion changes of September were not so much because Americans had decided to hold Israel responsible for the Beirut massacres. The transformation started in August when many Americans decided the time had come to hold Israel responsible for Menachem Begin.

[1] William C. Adams, "Middle East Meets West: Surveying American Attitudes," *Public Opinion*, April/May 1983, pp. 51-55.

$3.50

11/28/83 R2110-1

Public Opinion

Published by American Enterprise Institute

Dec/Jan 1983

ACQUISITIONS EDITOR
STATISTICAL REFERENCE
CONGRESSIONAL INFORMATION SERVICE
4520 EAST-WEST HIGHWAY
WASHINGTON DC 20014

FINALLY, THE PEOPLE SPEAK!

Where we are now; Where we're headed

Public Opinion

Volume 5, Number 6 December/January 1983

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PUBLIC OPINION, December/January 1983, Vol. 5, No. 6. Published bimonthly by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. Copyright 1983 American Enterprise Institute. Subscription rates: $18.00 for one year, $34.00 for two years. Individual copy: $3.50. Information on bulk orders of multiple subscriptions available on request. Editorial and business offices: c/o AEI, 1150 17th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Send changes of address and all subscription correspondence to Circulation Department, c/o AEI, same address. "American Enterprise Institute" and are registered service marks of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.

Second class postage paid at Washington, D.C.

ISSN 0149-9157

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The Year of the Referendum

by Austin Ranney

In the November 1982 elections at least one referendum measure was on the ballot in 42 states and the District of Columbia, and just under 200 propositions were voted on in all.

Sixty-four propositions in 26 states appear to have attracted more than local interest. As in 1978 and 1980 (see *Public Opinion*, Nov./Dec. 1978, pp. 26-28 and Feb./Mar. 1981, pp. 40-41), the turnout on these propositions was generally higher than in elections for the House of Representatives, although the gap was a bit narrower than in the earlier years. The mean turnout on the 64 propositions was 40.2 percent of the voting-age population, compared with *Congressional Quarterly's* estimated 35.7 percent in all races for the House. The 1982 turnout on referendums was slightly higher than what it had been in 1978, but, as one would expect, well below the comparable figure of 52.1 percent in the presidential year of 1980.

The outcomes of the selected 64 propositions show several clear trends. The measures receiving the most national attention were the "nuclear weapons freeze" propositions on the ballots in 9 states and the District of Columbia; they won everywhere except in Arizona, and provided liberals with by far their greatest successes in 1982 referendum voting. What impact, if any, the results will have on national policy remains to be seen, but it is worth noting that the issue did *not* arouse the unusually high voter interest and turnout some observers had predicted: The mean turnout on the freeze proposition was 37.6 percent, compared with 40.2 percent for all referendums.

Nuclear Weapons Freeze Measures

☒ **Arizona**

Yes	273,146	40.7%
No	397,462	59.3%
	670,608	Turnout = 32.5%

☑ **California**

Yes	3,795,732	52.5%
No	3,439,082	47.5%
	7,234,814	Turnout = 39.6%

☑ **District of Columbia**

Yes	79,219	69.8%
No	34,366	30.2%
	113,585	Turnout = 23.3%

☑ **Massachusetts**

Yes	1,319,442	73.4%
No	471,968	26.3%
	1,791,410	Turnout = 40.8%

☑ **Michigan**

Yes	1,585,809	56.6%
No	1,216,172	43.4%
	2,801,981	Turnout = 42.7%

☑ **New Jersey**

Yes	1,255,468	66.1%
No	643,780	33.9%
	1,899,248	Turnout = 34.3%

☑ **North Dakota**

Yes	139,089	58.4%
No	98,882	41.6%
	237,971	Turnout = 50.3%

☑ **Oregon**

Yes	606,143	61.5%
No	378,780	38.5%
	984,923	Turnout = 50.4%

☑ **Rhode Island**

Yes	161,852	59.3%
No	112,011	40.7%
	273,863	Turnout = 37.7%

☑ **Wisconsin** (September)

Yes	641,514	75.8%
No	205,018	24.2%
	846,532	Turnout = 24.4%

Measures Limiting Nuclear Power and Waste Disposal

☒ **Colorado** (study conversion of Rocky Flats nuclear plant to other uses)

Yes	263,236	35.4%
No	481,074	64.6%
	744,310	Turnout = 33.4%

☒ **Maine** (end nuclear production of electricity after 1987)

Yes	201,617	44.0%
No	256,124	56.0%
	457,741	Turnout = 55.1%

☑ **Massachusetts** (restrict building of new nuclear power plants and disposal of nuclear waste)

Yes	1,244,171	67.4%
No	602,351	32.6%
	1,846,522	Turnout = 42.0%

☒ **Montana** (remove present prohibitions against placing nuclear waste in state)

Yes	69,126	24.3%
No	214,740	75.7%
	283,866	Turnout = 49.9%

☑ **Montana** (against basing MX missile in the state)

Yes	162,164	57.2%
No	121,536	42.8%
	283,700	Turnout = 49.9%

"Bottle Bills"

☒ **Arizona**

Yes	223,825	31.9%
No	477,856	68.1%
	701,681	Turnout = 34.0%

☒ **California**

Yes	3,281,803	44.1%
No	4,162,884	55.9%
	7,444,687	Turnout = 40.7%

☒ **Colorado**

Yes	191,420	24.4%
No	591,812	75.6%
	783,232	Turnout = 35.2%

☑ **Massachusetts** (retain present law)

Yes	1,142,566	59.1%
No	790,966	40.9%
	1,933,532	Turnout = 44.0%

☒ **Washington**

Yes	311,614	29.4%
No	747,637	70.6%
	1,059,251	Turnout = 33.6%

Pro-Consumer Utility Regulation Measures

☒ **Michigan** (establish publicly elected public service commission)

Yes	1,026,160	36.7%
No	1,771,098	63.3%
	2,797,258	Turnout = 42.7%

☑ **Michigan** (prohibit automatic utility rate adjustments without prior hearings)

Yes	1,670,381	59.6%
No	1,131,990	40.4%
	2,802,371	Turnout = 42.8%

☑ **Nevada** (approve legislature's establishment of office of advocate for utility customers)

Yes	158,296	71.6%
No	62,802	28.4%
	221,098	Turnout = 33.4%

☒ **Missouri** (establish organizations to represent utility consumers in hearings before public service commission)

Yes	510,613	38.7%
No	808,607	61.3%
	1,319,220	Turnout = 36.2%

☒ **Ohio** (establish elected public utility board)

Yes	1,050,745	32.6%
No	2,174,587	67.4%
	3,225,332	Turnout = 41.4%

Tax measures drew less attention in 1982 than in the earlier years, but there was no shortage of them. Thirteen such measures were on the ballots in 12 states, with 9 tax-cutting propositions winning and 3 losing. The most consistent pattern of all emerged in votes in 7 states on measures related to criminal justice: Arizona, Illinois, and Florida voted to make more difficult the pre-trial release of persons accused of felonies; Connecticut and Hawaii voted to allow trials on felony charges without requiring indictments by grand juries; Massachusetts voted to legalize the death penalty; and Virginia voted against a measure to restore civil rights to convicted felons.

Other measures that attracted considerable national attention were handgun control in California (defeated), legalization of gambling in Minnesota (won), South Dakota (won), and Montana (won); and limitation of state funding of abortions in Alaska (defeated).

We noted in 1980 that the strong conservative trends some observers saw in the presidential and congressional elections were not reflected in those referendum results which, by my admittedly challengeable coding, posed reasonably clear choices between conservative and liberal positions. The same methods yield another set of contrary trends in 1982. Most commentators summed up the congressional elections as a significant gain for Democrats and liberals, but my "scorecard" for the referendums shows an overall 33-22 victory for conservative positions. By my count, liberals won 9-1 on nuclear weapons freeze measures and 3-2 on nuclear power measures. Conservatives won 4-1 on "bottle bills," 3-2 on utility regulation, 9-3 on tax cuts, 7-0 on get-tough-on-crime measures, and 7-4 on other issues. Again, however, it is necessary to say that these results may be artifacts of my coding—or, even more likely, products of the fact that most voters are less concerned with whether a particular measure represents a "liberal" or a "conservative" position than with whether it is right or wrong.

Austin Ranney
Resident Scholar
American Enterprise Institute

Totals do not reflect late absentee votes and recounted ballots.

Tax Measures

☑ **Alaska** (limit increases in state appropriations)

Yes	102,135	60.8%
No	65,786	39.2%
	167,921	Turnout = 58.5%

☑ **Colorado** (limit rate of increase of property taxes)

Yes	466,813	65.6%
No	244,424	34.4%
	711,237	Turnout = 32.0%

☑ **Maine** (index income tax rates to inflation rate)

Yes	240,023	56.7%
No	182,939	43.3%
	422,962	Turnout = 50.9%

☒ **Nevada** (permit imposition of an estate tax)

Yes	86,701	39.2%
No	134,359	60.9%
	221,060	Turnout = 33.4%

☑ **Nevada** (exempt goods and furniture of single households from taxation)

Yes	169,066	75.7%
No	54,368	24.3%
	223,434	Turnout = 33.8%

☒ **Nevada** (exempt food from taxation)

Yes	94,014	41.2%
No	133,999	58.8%
	228,013	Turnout = 34.5%

☒ **North Carolina** (permit legislature to issue general tax increment bonds without voter approval)

Yes	182,167	18.4%
No	810,565	81.6%
	992,732	Turnout = 22.5%

☒ **Oregon** (limit property taxes to 1.5% of true cash value)

Yes	486,865	49.2%
No	502,411	50.8%
	989,276	Turnout = 50.6%



"Let's leave out 'No Taxation without Representation'! What congress would vote taxes without consulting the people?"

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☒ **Oregon** (increase tax base of taxing districts as new construction increases the districts' value)

Yes	212,777	22.1%
No	750,303	77.9%
	963,080	Turnout = 49.3%

☒ **South Carolina** (exempt any industry deciding to locate in state from any new taxes for 5 years)

Yes	231,387	48.9%
No	241,546	51.1%
	472,933	Turnout = 20.6%

☑ **Texas** (repeal state property tax)

Yes	1,609,998	72.0%
No	626,123	28.0%
	2,236,121	Turnout = 20.7%

☒ **Washington** (remove sales tax on food, replace it with a corporate profits tax)

Yes	453,221	33.8%
No	889,091	66.2%
	1,342,312	Turnout = 33.0%

☑ **West Virginia** (property tax limitation and homestead exemption)

Yes	404,851	80.0%
No	101,347	20.0%
	506,198	Turnout = 35.9%

Measures on Crime

☑ **Arizona** (prohibit bail for accused felons who pose danger to society)

Yes	550,220	81.0%
No	128,992	19.0%
	679,212	Turnout = 32.9%

☑ **Connecticut** (abolish grand jury, substitute hearings, in cases where life imprisonment or death might be imposed)

Yes	437,231	73.6%
No	157,080	26.4%
	594,311	Turnout = 25.0%

☑ **Florida** (no pre-trial release if public safety not reasonably assured)

Yes	1,412,269	60.6%
No	917,092	39.4%
	2,329,361	Turnout = 28.5%

☑ **Hawaii** (abolish grand jury, substitute hearings, in felony cases)

Yes	191,798	66.8%
No	95,216	33.2%
	287,014	Turnout = 40.1%

☑ **Illinois** (prohibit bail in cases where life imprisonment might be imposed)

Yes	1,389,796	85.3%
No	239,380	14.7%
	1,629,176	Turnout = 19.5%

☑ **Massachusetts** (legalize death penalty)

Yes	1,125,653	60.1%
No	746,733	39.9%
	1,872,386	Turnout = 42.6%

☒ **Virginia** (restore civil rights to convicted felons after serving sentences)

Yes	396,322	36.6%
No	685,753	63.4%
	1,082,073	Turnout = 26.5%

Other Measures

☑ **Alaska** ("tundra rebellion": claiming state ownership of federal land)

Yes	126,471	72.7%
No	47,485	27.3%
	173,956	Turnout = 60.6%

☒ **Alaska** (limit state funding of abortions)

Yes	72,062	40.8%
No	104,152	59.1%
	176,214	Turnout = 61.4%

☒ **Arizona** (repeal "sagebrush rebellion" by abandoning state claims to certain federal lands)

Yes	279,411	42.9%
No	372,179	57.1%
	651,590	Turnout = 31.6%

☒ **California** (handgun control)

Yes	2,776,973	37.2%
No	4,690,734	62.8%
	7,467,707	Turnout = 40.9%

☒ **California** (measures for water conservation and redistribution)

Yes	2,449,513	35.3%
No	4,488,645	64.7%
	6,938,158	Turnout = 38.0%

☒ **Colorado** (permit wine sales in grocery stores)

Yes	288,797	34.3%
No	552,205	65.6%
	841,002	Turnout = 37.8%

☑ **Idaho** (lower voting age from 21 to 18; end restrictions on offices women can hold)

Yes	193,007	65.3%
No	102,321	34.7%
	295,328	Turnout = 44.7%

☒ **Maine** (repeal control of wholesale and retail milk prices)

Yes	222,422	48.9%
No	232,430	51.1%
	454,852	Turnout = 54.7%

☑ **Minnesota** (permit parimutuel betting on horse racing)

Yes	1,108,255	64.0%
No	624,721	36.0%
	1,732,976	Turnout = 58.0%

☒ **Montana** (expansion of authorized gambling and creating of state gaming commission)

Yes	111,686	37.6%
No	185,542	62.4%
	297,228	Turnout = 52.2%

☒ **Montana** (abolish quotas for beer and wine licenses for restaurants)

Yes	116,444	39.7%
No	177,181	60.3%
	293,625	Turnout = 51.6%

☑ **Nebraska** (prohibit all non-family purchasing of farm and ranch property)

Yes	290,377	56.4%
No	224,555	43.6%
	514,932	Turnout = 45.0%

☑ **Nevada** (affirm citizens' rights to keep and bear arms)

Yes	162,432	71.0%
No	66,361	29.0%
	228,793	Turnout = 34.6%

☑ **New Hampshire** (affirm state citizens' right to keep and bear arms)

Yes	178,773	72.9%
No	66,441	27.1%
	245,214	Turnout = 35.2%

☒ **North Dakota** (outlaw blackjack)

Yes	96,677	37.0%
No	164,816	63.0%
	261,493	Turnout = 54.9%

☒ **Oregon** (abolish state land conservation and development commission and state's land use planning authority)

Yes	447,462	44.8%
No	552,192	55.2%
	999,654	Turnout = 51.2%

☒ **Oregon** (permit self-service at gasoline stations)

Yes	426,603	42.0%
No	589,320	58.0%
	1,015,923	Turnout = 52.0%

☒ **South Dakota** (legalize gambling)

Yes	107,555	42.2%
No	147,147	57.8%
	254,702	Turnout = 52.8%

☒ **Washington** (reduce interest rate charged on credit sales from maximum of 18% to maximum of 12%)

Yes	348,753	33.7%
No	685,590	66.3%
	1,034,343	Turnout = 32.8%

Michael Millard assisted Dr. Ranney in the preparation of this article.

CONSERVATIVE-LIBERAL SCORECARD, 1982

Issue	*Conservative Wins*	*Liberal Wins*
Nuclear weapons freeze	Ariz.	Calif., D.C., Mass., Mich., N.J., N.D., Ore., R.I., Wis.
Nuclear power and waste disposal limitations	Colo., Maine	Mass., Mont. (2)
Bottle bills	Ariz., Calif., Colo., Wash.	Mass.
Pro-consumer utility regulations	Mich., Mo., Ohio	Mich., Nev.
Tax measures	Alaska, Colo., Maine, Nev. (2), N.C., Tex., Wash., W. Va.	Nev., Ore., S.C.
Get-tough-on-crime	Ariz., Conn., Fla., Haw., Ill., Mass., Va.	
Other issues	Alaska, Ariz., Calif. (2), Nev., N.H., Wash.	Alaska, Ida., Maine, Ore.

ELECTION '82

CONGRESSIONAL CONSEQUENCES

Question: Some people say it doesn't make any difference which candidates win the election for the U.S. Congress because regardless of who wins, nothing much changes. Others say which candidates win elections makes a big difference. How much difference do you personally think it makes: a great deal, a fair amount, only some, or just about no difference at all?


No difference at all 13%
It makes a great deal of difference which candidates win the congressional elections 37%
Only some 18%
Fair amount 32%

Note: Sample size = 1,602.
Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, October 5-11, 1982.

VOTING: PARTY STILL A FACTOR

Question: Here are some things people tell us make a difference to them in deciding how to vote for Congress. For each, I'd like to know if in deciding how you vote for Congress this fall it is something that will make a great deal of difference, some difference, or not much difference. In deciding how you vote for Congress this fall, will . . . the political party a candidate belongs to . . . make a great deal of difference, some difference, or not much difference? . . .


Great deal of difference 23%
Not much 38%
The political party a candidate belongs to will make some difference in deciding how to vote for Congress 39%

Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, September 13-18, 1982.

A REAGAN REFERENDUM?

Question: Do you think the elections for Congress give you a way to indicate your opinion about the performance of Ronald Reagan and the Republicans?



Note: Sample size = 1,664 of which 1,305 were registered voters. In an October 23-28 CBS/*NYT* survey, 51% said that Ronald Reagan wouldn't be much of a factor in their vote for Congress, 23% said their vote was a vote for Reagan, and 21% said against.
Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, September 13-18, 1982.

SINGLE ISSUE VOTING?

Question: Is there any *one* issue that is so important to you that you would change your vote because you disagreed with a candidate's position on that single issue? (If yes) What is that issue?



Note: Categories eliciting a 2% response were: taxes, balanced budget, Middle East, ERA, environment, gun control, religion. Other = 4%, No opinion = 8%. Sample size = 1,664 of which 1,305 were registered voters.
Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, September 13-18, 1982.

HOUSE HIGHLIGHTS



U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PROPORTION OF POPULAR VOTE, 1932-1982

	1932	34	36	38	40	42	44	46	48	50	52	54	56	58	60	62	64	66	68	70	72	74	76	78	80	82*
Democrat %	55	54	56	49	51	46	51	44	52	49	50	53	51	56	54	52	57	51	50	53	52	58	56	54	50	56
Republican %	41	42	40	47	46	51	47	53	46	49	49	47	49	43	45	47	42	48	48	45	46	41	42	45	48	44

Source: 1932-1970: *Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970: Part 2*, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (1975), p. 1084. 1972: *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1977* (p. 500). 1974-1978: *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1979* (p. 505). 1980: *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1981* (p. 484). 1982: *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, November 6, 1982 (Unofficial results). *Based only on contested races.

REGIONAL FLAVORS



Note: In 1982 in 10 unopposed races where figures were unavailable, we have estimated the vote to avoid serious distortion.

Source: For 1976 and 1978, *Public Opinion*, November/December 1978, p. 25. For 1980, *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1981*. For 1982, *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, November 6, 1982, and Secretaries of State offices and Election Boards.

SENATE SCORECARD



PARTY IDENTIFICATION IN THE SENATE, 1933-1983

	1933	35	37	39	41	43	45	47	49	51	53	55	57	59	61	63	65	67	69	71	73	75	77	79	81	83
Democrat %	63	72	79	72	69	60	59	47	56	51	49	50	51	65	65	67	68	64	57	54	58	61	61	58	46	46
Republican %	36	26	17	24	29	39	40	53	44	49	50	49	49	35	35	33	32	36	43	44	42	37	38	41	53	54

Note: Data are for beginning of the first session of each Congress. 1945 does not include 1 vacancy at the start of each session. "Other" in 1971, 1973, 1975 includes 1 Conservative-Republican.

Source: For 1933-1981: *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1981. For 1983, *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, November 6, 1982.

WINNERS . . .

82%	Matsunaga (D-Hi.)*
69%	Jackson (D-Wash.)*
69%	Byrd (D-W. Va.)*
67%	Zorinsky (D-Neb.)*
65%	Moynihan (D, L-NY)*
65%	Burdick (D-ND)*
64%	Proxmire (D-Wi.)*
64%	Stennis (D-Miss.)*
63%	Sarbanes (D-Md.)*
62%	Chiles (D-Fl.)*
62%	Sasser (D-Tenn.)*
61%	Kennedy (D-Mass.)*
61%	Mitchell (D-Maine)*
60%	Heinz (R-Pa.)*
59%	DeConcini (D-Az.)*
59%	Bentsen (D-Tx.)*
59%	Hatch (R-Utah)*
58%	Metzenbaum (D-Ohio)*
58%	Riegle (D-Mich.)*
57%	Wallop (R-Wyo.)*
56%	Roth (R-Del.)*
54%	Lugar (R-Ind.)*
54%	Melcher (D-Mont.)*
54%	Bingaman (D-NM)
53%	Wilson (R-Cal.)
53%	Durenberger (R-Minn.)*
52%	Lautenberg (D-NJ)
51%	Weicker (R-Conn.)*
51%	Trible (R-Va.)
51%	Chafee (R-RI)*
51%	Danforth (R-Mo.)*
50%	Stafford (R-Vt.)*
50%	Hecht (R-Nev.)

AND LOSERS

Brown (R-Hi.)	18%
Jewett (R-Wash.)	24%
Benedict (R-W. Va.)	31%
Keck (R-Neb.)	28%
Sullivan (R, C, RTL-NY)	35%
Knorr (R-ND)	35%
McCallum (R-Wi.)	34%
Barbour (R-Miss.)	36%
Hogan (R-Md.)	37%
Poole (R-Fl.)	38%
Beard (R-Tenn.)	38%
Shamie (R-Mass.)	39%
Emery (R-Maine)	39%
Wecht (D-Pa.)	40%
Dunn (R-Az.)	41%
Collins (R-Tx.)	41%
Wilson (D-Utah)	41%
Pfeifer (R-Ohio)	41%
Ruppe (R-Mich.)	42%
McDaniel (D-Wyo.)	43%
Levinson (D-Del.)	44%
Fithian (D-Ind.)	46%
Williams (R-Mont.)	42%
Schmitt (R-NM)*	46%
Brown (D-Cal.)	47%
Dayton (D-Minn.)	47%
Fenwick (R-NJ)	48%
Moffett (D-Conn.)	46%
Davis (D-Va.)	49%
Michaelson (D-RI)	49%
Woods (D-Mo.)	49%
Guest (D-Vt.)	47%
Cannon (D-Nev.)*	48%

Note: * = incumbent candidates. Percentages based on unofficial returns.

Source: *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, November 6, 1982.

★★★ Looking Ahead to 1984 ★★★

Terms up in the Senate
19 Republicans
14 Democrats

TURNOUT TURNS UP?

ELECTORAL ENTHUSIASM

Question: How much thought have you given to the coming November elections—quite a lot or only a little?



Note: For September 1982, sample size = 1,486.
Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of September 17-20, 1982.

WHAT WE SAID

Question: What are the chances that you will vote in that election; are you certain to vote, will you probably vote, are the chances about 50-50, or don't you think you will vote in that election?



Note: Sample size = 1,602 of which 1,103 were registered voters.
Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, October 5-11, 1982.

AND WHAT WE DID



	For president	For U.S. House of Representatives
1932	52%	50%
1934	—	41
1936	56	54
1938	—	44
1940	59	55
1942	—	33
1944	56	53
1946	—	37
1948	51	48
1950	—	41
1952	62	58
1954	—	42
1956	59	56
1958	—	43
1960	63	59
1962	—	45
1964	62	58
1966	—	45
1968	61	55
1970	—	44
1972	56	51
1974	—	36
1976	54	50
1978	—	36
1980	53	48
1982*	—	36

Note: Population is resident population 21 years old and over, 1932-1970, except as noted, and 18 and over thereafter; includes Armed Forces. Prior to 1960, excludes Alaska and Hawaii. District of Columbia is included in votes cast for president beginning 1964 and in votes cast for representative beginning 1972. *Based only on contested races. (See also Ladd text, page 25.)

Source: 1932-1980: *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1981*, p. 496. 1982: Voting figures from *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, November 6, 1982. The voting age population based on figures from the Bureau of the Census, Population Division.

SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT

Once again after the 1982 election, there has been a spate of articles on both the overall rate of voting and on which party may have benefited from it.

Many of the early stories asserted that voter participation jumped significantly in 1982. Actually no substantial jump occurred. Different ways of computing turnout produce different findings, but none substantiates the claim of a "big voter turnout" (*New York Times*, Nov. 10) compared even to the relatively low voting rate of the recent past. In the calculations made by *Congressional Quarterly*, 35.7 percent of those of voting age participated in House balloting, up just 1.2 percent from 1978. *CQ* added, quite correctly, that the unofficial 1982 figure would "inch upward when absentee ballots and all third party votes are tallied." Even allowing for another .8 percent from uncounted ballots, House voting in 1982 would be the second or third lowest since World War II.

A second part of the early commentary stressed that the Democrats did a better job of bringing out their supporters. Peter Hart has argued that the Reagan program polarized the country and gave extra motivation to Democratic voters. One of Mr. Hart's Republican counterparts, Vince Breglio, seems to concur. The sharpest rise in turnout, he maintained, came among "marginal" Democratic voters—lower-income people, blacks, and Hispanics. Gene Eidenberg, the recent director of the Democratic National Committee, saw the edge resulting from a big push by organized labor.

Assessing the impact of differential turnout rates on partisan outcomes is tricky. Undoubtedly Democrats beat the Republicans at voter mobilization in some races, but the net result just isn't known yet, and may never be known. What can be said, from an exhaustive analysis of exit poll data, is that the national electorate in 1982, compared to previous elections, does not indicate any decided turnout shift to either party. The social and partisan makeup of the 1982 electorate approximates the norm for recent elections.

The post-election commentary also erred in computing the actual number of voters and the proportion voting. *Congressional Quarterly* pointed out that its figures excluded all third party and absentee ballots. But *CQ* did not mention that its figures excluded *almost 2.5 million other people who cast valid ballots in the 26 congressional districts that were classified as "uncontested"* (see accompanying table).

The base used in computing turnout—169.3 million residents of voting age—is also incorrect: a half million residents are ineligible because of institutionalized status; the 487,000 District of Columbia residents of voting age do not elect a congressman; and 808,000 adults in Georgia's 4th and 5th districts vote on November 30, not November 2. All these people should be eliminated from the tally. In addition, 6 million registered aliens are enumerated by the Census, but because they are not citizens, they could not vote. Census Bureau officials would not hazard a guess about the number of illegal aliens and other non-citizens included in its base. The estimate of 6.5 million that we suggest in the table is an extrapolation from *Statistical Abstract* figures.

The generally accepted figures this year counted as "nonvoters" perhaps 14 million people who by law could not vote, and left uncounted about 2.5 million who could vote and did. Actual participation in the 1982 House vote was 41 percent, not the 36 percent cited in stories after the election. Of course, comparable adjustments would have to be made in turnout figures for preceding years to get a comparative base.

	E. C. L.
	169,342,000
Voting age residents institutionalized and not eligible to vote	— 500,000
Registered aliens of voting age	— 6,000,000
District of Columbia resident voting age population	— 487,000
Georgia 4th and 5th district voting age population	— 808,000
Illegal aliens of voting age enumerated in the Census population ccunt.	— 6,500,000
Total vote (nearly complete unofficial) for House races, excluding D.C. and 2 Georgia races (accounted for above) and uncalculated:	60,439,098
Voters (actual and estimated) in uncontested races	+ 2,433,846
	62,872,944

$$\frac{62,872,944}{155,047,000} = 40.6\% + .5\% \text{ for absentee ballots, etc., } = 41.1\%$$

WAS THERE A LATE SWING?

In all recent elections the decision to vote has been made late in the election cycle. 1982 was no exception. Many people are no longer tied to one party or the other, and they "float free" until election day forces a choice. Did these late deciders choose one party or the other disproportionately? They did not —in either the congressional, gubernatorial, or senatorial balloting. Sometimes there was a modest late break to the Democrats, but just as often the late move was to the Republicans. The latter occurred in the Lehrman-Cuomo contest.

MORE THAN A QUARTER DECIDED HOW TO VOTE WITHIN WEEK BEFORE ELECTION

Question: When did you make up your mind on who to vote for as your congressman in the U.S. House of Representatives?

NO DISPROPORTIONATE NATIONAL SWING TO EITHER PARTY

Those who:	Voted Democratic	Voted Republican
Decided today (9%)	56%	40%
Yesterday (4%)	54	44
Over the weekend (6%)	58	39
Last week (9%)	54	43
Before last week (74%)	57	40

BUT IN NEW YORK, LEHRMAN BOOSTED BY LAST MINUTE DECISION

Those who:	Voted for Cuomo	Voted for Lehrman
Decided today	45%	54%
Yesterday	44	56
Over the weekend	50	49
Last week	38	60
Before last week	52	46

Note: National sample size = 24,438 voters as they left voting booths. New York = 1,421 voters as they left voting booths.

Source: Survey by ABC News, November 2, 1982.

ELECTION BOXSCORE

1976

PARTY IDENTIFICATION

Democrat——
47%
22%
31%

1978

Republican——
49%
23%
28%

1980

Independent——
43%
26%
31%

1982

45%
27%
28%

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES[1]

	1976 Dem	1976 Rep	1978 Dem	1978 Rep	1980 Dem	1980 Rep	1982 Dem	1982 Rep
Total	292	143	276	159	243	192	269	166
Women	13	5	11	5	10	9	12	9
Blacks	15	0	15	0	17	0	21	0

SENATE

	1976 Dem	1976 Rep	1978 Dem	1978 Rep	1980 Dem	1980 Rep	1982 Dem	1982 Rep
Total	62	38	59	41	46	53	46	54
Women	0	0	1	1	0	2	0	2
Blacks	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0

GOVERNORS[2]

1976 Dem	1976 Rep	1978 Dem	1978 Rep	1980 Dem	1980 Rep	1982 Dem	1982 Rep
37	12	32	18	27	23	34	16

MEMBERS OF STATE LEGISLATURES[3]

	1976 Dem	1976 Rep	1978 Dem	1978 Rep	1980 Dem	1980 Rep	1982 Dem	1982 Rep
	5,128	2,370	4,762	2,680	4,483	2,918	4,643	2,734
Blacks	295		307		318		337	
Women	688		774		887		966	

PROPORTIONS OF STATE LEGISLATURES

Democrat——
68%
31%

Republican——
64%
36%

60%
39%

63%
37%

CONTROL OF STATE LEGISLATIVE CHAMBERS BY PARTY[4]

	1976 Dem	1976 Rep	1978 Dem	1978 Rep	1980 Dem	1980 Rep	1982 Dem	1982 Rep
National	80	18	68	27	63	35	71	26
Northeast	13	5	12	6	10	8	12	6
South	32	0	32	0	31	1	32	0
North Central	17	5	11	10	10	12	14	7
West	18	8	13	11	12	14	13	13

STATES WITH BOTH LEGISLATIVE HOUSES AND GOVERNOR OF SAME PARTY[4]

1976 Dem	1976 Rep	1978 Dem	1978 Rep	1980 Dem	1980 Rep	1982 Dem	1982 Rep
29	1	20	4	17	7	23	4

Note:

[1] Includes 2 Democratic victories in Georgia on Nov. 30

[2] For 1982 assumes that the Republican James Thompson wins reelection as Governor of Illinois subject to recounts.

[3] Nebraska excluded from legislative house calculation because it is a unicameral, nonpartisan legislative system. For 1980, excludes 1 vacancy each in lower house for Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, New York, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin, and 2 vacancies each for Indiana and New Hampshire; excludes 1 vacancy each in upper house for Connecticut, Missouri, New Hampshire, and Texas, and 2 vacancies each for New Jersey and Pennsylvania. For 1982, excludes 1 undecided race in Wisconsin upper house and 1 undecided race in the lower house in New Hampshire: Excludes 1 vacancy each in the upper house in Texas and Wisconsin and in the lower house in South Carolina and Vermont.

[4] For 1982: Excludes Wisconsin upper house, which is split 16 Democrats, 15 Republicans, 1 undecided, and 1 vacancy that will not be filled until after the start of the new legislative session. If the undecided race and/or the vacancy should be won by Democrats, the Democrats would control one more state legislative house and there would be one more state in which the Democrats controlled both houses of the legislature and the governorship.

Source: For 1976 and 1978, *Public Opinion*, November/December, 1978, p. 25. For 1980: Party Identification—Combined surveys by the Gallup Organization, October 10-13, 1980, through December 5-8, 1980. Members of Congress—*Statistical Abstract of the United States 1981*, p. 484. Governors—*U.S. News and World Report*, November 17, 1980. Members of state legislatures and state houses control by party—*Statistical Abstract of the United States 1981*, p. 494. States with both houses and governor of same party—*Statistical Abstract of the United States 1981*, pp. 493-494. For 1982: Party Identification—combined surveys by the Gallup Organization, August 14-17, 1982 through October 16-19, 1982. Members of Congress—*U.S. News and World Report*, November 15, 1982. Number of blacks and women in Congress, 1976-1980—*Vital Statistics on Congress, 1982*, American Enterprise Institute, pp. 26-27; 1982—Elections Research Center. Governors—*U.S. News and World Report*, November 15, 1982. Members of state legislatures and state house control by party and states with both houses and governor of same party—*Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, November 13, 1982, pp. 2248-2249, and Boards of Elections in Wisconsin, Illinois, Maine, New Hampshire, and Virginia.

DEVIATION FROM THE DEMOCRATIC NORM

The charts below show the deviation from the national vote for the Democratic candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives among various subgroups of the population based on University of Michigan Election Studies and ABC exit poll data.



Percent national vote for Democratic candidate for U.S. House of Representatives

	1952	1956	1958	1960	1962	1964	1966	1968	1970	1972	1974	1976	1978	1980	1982
%	49	53	60	55	58	65	57	52	55	56	62	57	58	54	59

Note: To make ABC data comparable to Michigan data, ABC numbers for 1982 have been recalculated to eliminate the "other" category. ABC sample size = 24,438 voters as they left voting booths.

Source: 1952-1980: Surveys by the Center for Political Studies of the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan Election Studies. 1982: ABC News, November 2, 1982.

POLLING

CBS 1978

Question: Who did you just vote for in the election for U.S. House of Representatives?



Note: Sample size = 8,933 voters as they left voting booths.
Source: Survey by CBS News, November 7, 1978.

CBS 1982

Question: In the election for U.S. House of Representatives in this district, who did you just vote for?



Note: Sample size = 5,785 voters in opposed districts as they left voting booths.
* = less than .5%.
Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, November 2, 1982.

THE VOTERS

NBC 1982

Question: Which candidate for the United States House of Representatives did you just vote for?



Note: Sample size = 11,610 voters as they left the voting booths
Source: Survey by NBC News, November 2, 1982

ABC 1982

Question: In the congressional race for your district's representative to the U.S. House in Washington, did you vote for the Democrat, the Republican, Other?



Note: Sample size = 24,438 voters as they left the voting booths.
Source: Survey by ABC News, November 2, 1982

A REFERENDU

Both the Democrats and the Republicans recognized that the 1982 congressional election would be a referendum on the first two years of the Reagan administration. Too much had been made of the "great policy departure" for it to be any other way.

Normal political calculations hold that with 10 percent unemployment—the highest rate since World War II—the referendum goes against the party in power. And yet for at least the last decade, Americans have been making clear that they have ambivalent feelings about the role and performance of contem-

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling his job as president?



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

Question: If the 1984 presidential election were held today, would you vote for: Ronald Reagan or Ted Kennedy? . . . Ronald Reagan or Walter Mondale?



Note: Sample size = 5,785 voters in opposed districts as they left voting booths.
Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, November 2, 1982.

Question: If the 1984 election were being held today and it was Ronald Reagan against Senator Edward Kennedy, for whom would you vote? . . . against former Vice President Walter Mondale?



Note: Sample size = 24,438 voters as they left voting booths.
Source: Survey by ABC News, November 2, 1982.

Question: Who's more to blame for economic problems in the U.S. today?


Voters
No opinion 13%
Reagan and the Republicans 38%
Previous Democratic policies more to blame for economic problems in the U.S. today 48%

Note: Sample size = 5,785 voters in opposed districts as they left the voting booths.
Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, November 2, 1982.

Of the Democrats who approve of Reagan's handling of the presidency	37%	voted Rep.	Of the Democrats who think Reagan program of cuts in spending and taxes will help economy	32%	voted Rep.
Of Rep. who approve	82%	"	Of Rep. who think program will help	82%	"
Of Ind. who approve	62%	"	Of Ind. who think program will help	57%	"
Of the Democrats who disapprove of Reagan's handling of the presidency	9%	voted Rep.	Of the Democrats who think Reagan program of cuts in spending and taxes will hurt economy	9%	voted Rep.
Of Rep. who disapprove	57%	"	Of Rep. who think program will hurt	51%	"
Of Ind. who disapprove	22%	"	Of Ind. who think program will hurt	20%	"

Note: Sample size = 24,438 voters as they left voting booths. National response: Will help = 55%; Will hurt = 45%.
Source: Survey by ABC News, November 2, 1982.

M ON REAGAN?

porary government, that they are not inclined to give their support to either the Democrats or the Republicans, and that they are receptive to change but unsure about what is needed. All during the 1982 campaign, this ambivalent electorate said it needed more time to reach a verdict on Ronald Reagan and his administration. Those who voted for Congress on November 2 showed clearly that the referendum has not yet gone decisively for or against Ronald Reagan—that the vote of November 2 confirmed that this was a "wait and see" election.

E.C.L.

Question: Here's a list of things many people say are problems facing the country today. Please put a checkmark next to the one—and only one—which you feel is the most important problem.



Question: And which political party do you think would do better at dealing with the problem you checked, the Republican party or the Democratic party?



Question: Were any of the items below very important to you in choosing which candidate to vote for today in the race for U.S. House of Representatives from your district?


My candidate's opposition to Reagan's economic policies
25%
My candidate's support for Reagan's economic policies
23%
My candidate's long experience in government
22%
None of the above were very important
16%
The political party of my candidate
15%
My candidate's support for an immediate freeze on nuclear weapons
8%
My candidate's opposition to an immediate freeze on nuclear weapons
4%

Note: Sample size = 24,438 voters as they left voting booths.
Source: Survey by ABC News, November 2, 1982.

Question: Have you personally been helped or hurt by Ronald Reagan's economic program?



Question: In the long run, do you think Ronald Reagan's economic program will: help the country's economy; hurt the country's economy?



Question: What's the best thing to do now about Reagan's economic program?



Note: Sample size = 5,785 voters in opposed districts as they left voting booths.

Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, November 2, 1982.

DEMOGRAPHICS OF

AGE: THE GREAT SOCIAL SECURITY PROTEST THAT WASN'T

CBS 1978

Question: Who did you just vote for in the election for U.S. House of Representatives?



Note: Sample size = 8,933 voters in opposed districts as they left voting booths.

Source: Survey by CBS News, November 7, 1978.

CBS 1982

Question: In the election for U.S. House of Representatives in this district, who did you just vote for?



Note: Sample size = 5,785 voters in opposed districts as they left voting booths.

Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, November 2, 1982.

NBC 1982

Question: Which candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives did you just vote for?



Note: Sample size = 11,610 voters as they left voting booths.

Source: Survey by NBC News, November 2, 1982.

ABC 1982

Question: In the congressional race for your district's representative to the U.S. House in Washington, did you vote for the Democrat, the Republican, other?



Note: Sample size = 24,438 voters as they left voting booths.

Source: Survey by ABC News, November 2, 1982.

VOTERS

NEW JERSEY'S SENATE RACE: A CHANCE TO WIN ONE FOR AN OLDIE

	Voted Democratic	Voted Republican
18-24 years	55%	41%
25-29 years	55	41
30-39 years	55	42
40-49 years	52	46
50-59 years	60	38
60 and over	55	45

CALIFORNIA'S SENATE RACE: NO LINGERING EFFECTS OF WILSON'S ALLEGED GAFFE ON SOCIAL SECURITY

	Voted Democratic	Voted Republican
18-24 years	46%	49%
25-29 years	54	43
30-39 years	58	39
40-49 years	42	54
50-59 years	39	58
60 and over	42	54

ILLINOIS'S GUBERNATORIAL RACE: THE OLD STORY OF MODEST CONSERVATIZING BY AGE

	Voted Democratic	Voted Republican
18-24 years	54%	44%
25-29 years	51	48
30-39 years	49	49
40-49 years	48	50
50-59 years	42	58
60 and over	44	55

Note: Sample sizes: New Jersey = 1,394 voters as they left voting booths; California = 1,677 voters as they left voting booths; Illinois = 1,354 voters as they left voting booths.

Source: Surveys by ABC News, November 2, 1982.

THE ELECTORATE

EDUCATION

Voters

Percent voting Democratic for House



Note: NBC sample size = 11,610 voters as they left voting booths; ABC = 24,438 voters as they left voting booths.
Source: Surveys by NBC News and ABC News, November 2, 1982.

EDUCATION EFFECT APPARENT EVEN WHEN INCOME IS HELD CONSTANT

Voters	Voted Republican for Congress	Republican Party I.D.	Conservative
Family income under $15,000			
Less than high school graduate	27%	20%	32%
High school graduate	32	20	29
College	35	23	32
Family income $15,000-29,999			
Less than high school graduate	35	23	36
High school graduate	38	23	37
College	43	26	38
Family income of $30,000 and up			
Less than high school graduate	43	28	44
High school graduate	46	28	41
College	48	32	45

THE POST-GRADUATE DEMOCRATIC BLIP*



Note: National sample size = 24,438 voters as they left voting booths. New Jersey = 1,394 voters as they left voting booths. California = 1,677 voters as they left voting booths. New York = 1,421 voters as they left voting booths.

*What is evident in Senate and gubernatorial races appeared nationally as indicated in above chart for national House vote.
Source: Surveys by ABC News, November 2, 1982.

MEN AND WOMEN: THE GREAT

CONGRESSIONAL VOTE BY SEX



Note: CBS: Sample size = 5,785 voters in opposed districts as they left voting booths. NBC: Sample size = 11,610 voters as they left voting booths. ABC: Sample size = 24,438 voters as they left voting booths.

Source: Surveys by CBS News/*New York Times*, NBC News, and ABC News, November 2, 1982.

PERCENTAGE DEVIATION FROM NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC VOTE BY SEX



Percent voted Democratic nationally	1952	1956	1958	1960	1962	1964	1966	1968	1970	1972	1974	1976	1978	1980	1982
	49	53	60	55	58	65	57	52	55	56	62	57	58	54	59*

Note: 59% is a recalculated figure. Recalculation was done to make ABC results consistent with Michigan results.

Source: 1952-1980 Surveys by the Center for Political Studies of the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan Election Studies; ABC News, November 2, 1982.

REALIGNING ISSUE THAT WASN'T

MODEST AND PERSISTENT VARIATION



Note: Sample size = 24,438 voters as they left voting booths.
Source: Survey by ABC News, November 2, 1982.

WOMEN'S DEVIATION FROM THE STATEWIDE DEMOCRATIC NORM

Voters

In Senate Voting		In Gubernatorial Voting	
California	+5	Alabama	+ 3
Connecticut	+7	California	+ 4
Michigan	+7	Connecticut	+ 2
New Jersey	0	Illinois	− 2
New York	+5	New York	+ 7
Ohio	+6	Ohio	+ 5
Pennsylvania	−1	Pennsylvania	+ 5
Texas	+4	Texas	+ 5
Wisconsin	+1	Wisconsin	+ 9
		Iowa	+13
		Michigan	+13

Note: Samples were all voters as they left voting booths. Alabama = 1,641. California = 1,677. Connecticut = 1,052. Illinois = 1,354. Michigan = 1,160. New Jersey = 1,394. New York = 1,421. Ohio = 1,155. Pennsylvania = 1,346. Texas = 1,218. Iowa = 1,562. Michigan = 1,160. Wisconsin = 1,413.

Source: Surveys by ABC News, November 2, 1982.

RELIGION AND ETHNICITY: OLD MEMORIES DIE HARD



Note: In the 1982 CBS/*New York Times* survey, "Protestant" = White Protestant. Sample sizes: CBS/*New York Times* = 5,785 voters in opposed districts as they left voting booths. NBC = 11,610 voters as they left voting booths. ABC = 24,438 voters as they left voting booths.

Source: Surveys by CBS News/*New York Times*, NBC News, and ABC News, November 2, 1982.

PARTY IDENTIFICATION BY ETHNIC GROUP

Question: Regardless of how you voted, in politics today do you consider yourself a . . . Democrat, Republican, Independent, other?

Which one of the categories below best describes most of your ancestors? (Check one only) German or Austrian; English Scottish or Welsh; Irish; Italian; Scandinavian; Hispanic; Polish; Afro-American, or something else?

Voters — By ethnicity:	Consider self Democrat	Republican	Independent	Other	Percent Voting Democratic for House
English, Scottish, Welsh	33%	33%	30%	4%	48%
In the Northeast	23%	38%	35%	3%	40%
In the South	43%	25%	29%	4%	56%
German, Austrian	34%	31%	31%	4%	50%
Protestant	29%	38%	30%	4%	44%
Catholic	42%	25%	30%	3%	56%
Scandinavian	33%	32%	31%	3%	50%
Italian	44%	23%	28%	5%	58%
Irish	45%	24%	27%	4%	59%
In New York	40%	27%	24%	8%	50%
In Connecticut	45%	13%	40%	2%	64%
In Iowa	45%	17%	36%	2%	67%
In Ohio	40%	24%	31%	5%	61%
Polish	52%	15%	31%	3%	63%
Hispanic	60%	16%	22%	3%	72%
Afro-American	78%	5%	15%	3%	91%

Note: All samples were voters as they left voting booths. National sample = 24,438. New York = 1,421. Connecticut = 1,052. Iowa = 1,569. Ohio = 1,155.

Source: Survey by ABC News, November 2, 1982.

THE NEW YORK GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION: THE WORLD TURNED UPSIDE DOWN

OCCUPATION OF CHIEF WAGE EARNER

Question: In the election for governor, who did you just vote for . . . Mario Cuomo, Lew Lehrman, someone else, didn't vote for governor.

Question: In the race for governor, did you vote for the Democrat Mario Cuomo, the Republican Lew Lehrman, other?



INCOME



Note: Voters as they left voting booths, in opposed districts in New York.
Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, November 2, 1982.

Note: Sample size = 1,421 voters as they left voting booths in New York.
Source: Survey by ABC News, November 2, 1982.

DEVIATION FROM TOTAL VOTE FOR CUOMO BY ETHNIC GROUP/RELIGION



Note: Sample size = 1,421 voters as they left voting booths in New York.
Source: Survey by ABC News, November 2, 1982.

CBS STATE SURVEYS

Question: Has the Reagan economic program helped, hurt, or had no effect?

Question: Will Reagan's economic program eventually: help the economy? Hurt the economy?

Question: Compared to a year ago, is your family's financial situation: better today, worse today, about the same?

Voters as they left voting booths

	Reagan economic program has:			Program will eventually:		Financial situation:		
	Helped	Hurt	Had no effect	Help	Hurt	Better	Worse	About same
Ala.	24%	56%	19%	55%	45%	22%	36%	41%
Ark.	25	52	24	53	47	19	37	44
Cal.	41	46	13	60	40	27	31	43
Conn.	32	51	18	55	45	27	30	44
Ill.	18	64	18	54	46	16	39	44
Iowa	21	62	17	58	42	17	38	45
Maine	30	53	17	55	45	23	31	46
Mass.		n/a		50*	50*	24	29	46
Mich.	19	63	18	53	47	15	40	44
Minn.	30	55	15	57	43	18	38	44
Miss.	38	48	13	59	41	22	37	41
Mo.	32	54	14	53	45	20	36	44
Mont.	32	55	13	59	41	21	36	34
Neb.	39	45	16	66	34	20	30	49
Nev.	35	48	17	65	35	25	32	43
N.J.	27	57	16	52	48	22	30	48
N.M.	33	51	16	57	43	25	32	42
N.Y.	25	56	17	51	49	23	31	46
Ohio	27	59	14	55	45	21	39	40
R.I.	18	69	13	47	53	22	38	41
Tenn.	26	59	14	47	53	17	42	41
Tex.		n/a		59	41	24	36	40
Utah	48	39	13	72	28	23	29	48
Va.	40	49	11	57	43	26	28	46
Vt.		n/a		58	42	22	28	51
W. Va.	20	65	15	47	53	19	44	38
Wyo.	40	44	16	71	29	26	32	42

Note: * "No answer" calculated out for comparison purposes; all were less than 10% except Massachusetts, which was 12%.

MEET THE NEW GEORGE WALLACE

Question: Do you think George Wallace has the same positions on issues he had 20 years ago?

Alabama residents



WHY TEDDY DIDN'T RUN

Question: Should Ted Kennedy run for president in 1984?

Massachusetts residents



THE DOONESBURY FACTOR

Question: Do you read the comic strip "Doonesbury" regularly, occasionally, or not at all?

New Jersey residents



Source: Surveys by CBS News, November 2, 1982.

ON DEATH AND DYING

TO BE . . .

Question: When a person has a disease that cannot be cured, do you think doctors should be allowed by law to end the patient's life by some painless means if the patient and his family request it?



Note: In response to a similar Harris question in 1973, 69% of respondents said a patient with a terminal disease should be able to tell his doctor to let him die rather than to extend his life; 31% said it was wrong. In 1977, 80% said let him die; 20% said it was wrong. In 1981, 69% said let him die; 31% said it was wrong.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of July 6-9, 1973.

. . . OR NOT TO BE

Question: Do you think a person has the right to end his or her own life if this person . . . has an incurable disease . . . has gone bankrupt . . . has dishonored his or her family . . . is tired of living and ready to die?

A person does not have a right to end his or her life if he or she...



Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, latest that of February-April, 1982.

A LOOK AT THE AFTERLIFE

ALL THIS AND HEAVEN TOO

Question: Do you think there is a Heaven where people who have led good lives are eternally rewarded?



Question: Do you think there is a Hell, to which people who have led bad lives without being sorry are eternally damned?



Question: Here is an interesting question. . . . How would you describe your own chances of going to Heaven—excellent, good, only fair, or poor? (Based on those who think there is a Heaven = 71%)



Respondents were asked which of 24 descriptions of the afterlife applied to their own beliefs. Among the most interesting answers:

There will be love between people
53%

There will be humor
25%

One will grow intellectually
18%

There will be some sort of contact with people on earth
12%

It will be boring
5%

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, Princeton Religion Research Center, December 5-8, 1980.

by Linda S. Lichter,
S. Robert Lichter and Stanley Rothman

Hollywood and America: The Odd Couple

I think there should be no mistake about the sense of responsibility we carry . . . and this has led us to believe that we can, within a framework of good showmanship, advance valid social comments, valid ethical concepts, valid generalizations about the human condition which have meaning for the audience.

Sheldon Leonard
Television Producer

Conservatives and liberals harmonize on few issues, but they are, at least, equally vehement in criticizing television entertainment. On the liberal side, women and minority groups claim that television's unflattering portrayals of them perpetuate negative stereotypes. Conservatives object to the loose morality which they view as undermining the traditional American values of family, hard work, and patriotism. And myriad groups, from the PTA to the National Institute of Mental Health, worry that pervasive television violence is breeding aggressive individuals or even criminals.

Disagreements over the political messages of television programs and their relation to the "politics" of their creators have been sharp, although little hard evidence exists to bolster either side. Typical of those who view television as a conservative voice is a researcher at the prestigious Annenberg School of Communication who concludes, "The basic reality of the television world is the reality of the American middle class establishment; its morality is the conventional and rigid Sunday-school morality of the middle class."[1]

For many who adhere to this line of thought, the personal politics of television writers and producers are similarly conservative or of small consequence because their product inevitably supports conservative values. In this view, "The production and manufacture of television drama are rooted to business interests in the United States. Consequently, the content must be produced by people who are either willing to suppress deep-seated dissident values or by people who are fundamentally in agreement with the system."[2]

On the flip side of this question, Michael Robinson writes that television programs reflect the liberal values of program creators on such topics as homosexuality, interracial marriage, and the social position of women and minorities.[3]

Similarly, Ben Stein claims that television has an antipathy toward "establishment figures" and an accompanying sympathy for the poor and minorities. Based on interviews with Hollywood writers and producers, he concludes that, ". . . the attitudes of the people who create television coincide almost exactly with

[1] Larry Gross, "The Real World of Television," *Today's Education*, vol. 63, Jan./Feb. 1974, p. 56.

[2] Muriel Cantor, *Prime-Time Television* (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage, 1980), p. 19.

[3] Michael Robinson, "Prime-Time Chic," *Public Opinion*, vol. 2, Mar./May 1979, pp. 42-47.

the picture on television."[4]

Profiling Hollywood's Elite

Who are the creators of TV entertainment? What are their backgrounds? What do they think about American society, and how do they react to the criticisms leveled against their product? To find out, we interviewed 104 of Hollywood's most influential television writers, producers, and executives, as part of a larger study of elite groups. Since formal titles mean little in this field, we constructed a sample based on reputation by asking industry "insiders" for the names of key people.

We selected only names on whose importance our sources were agreed. We eliminated those who had not been associated with the development, production, or selection of two or more successful prime-time series. The final list consisted of approximately 350 names, from which we sampled randomly. Of 172 individuals who were contacted, 104 (60 percent) agreed to be interviewed.

The 104 individuals interviewed represent the cream of television's creative community. The sample includes 15 presidents of independent production companies, 18 executive producers, 43 additional producers, 26 of whom are also writers, and 10 network vice-presidents responsible for program development and selection. The remainder gave such titles as executive story consultant, program director, and story supervisor. Among those surveyed are some of the most experienced and respected members of the craft. Many have been honored with Emmy Awards, and a few are household names. Most important, this group has had a major role in shaping the shows whose themes and stars have become staples of our popular culture.

Demographics

The social and personal backgrounds of the television elite are summarized in table 1. This group is populated almost exclusively by middle-aged white males.

By and large they represent an urban and cosmopolitan sector of society. Very few have roots in middle America; instead, they were raised in big cities on the east and west coasts. Seventy-three percent hail from either California or the Boston-Washington corridor, with over one in three coming from New York state alone. Eighty-two percent grew up in large metropolitan areas, leaving fewer than one in five who made the fabled journey from small town America to Hollywood.

Table 1
BACKGROUNDS OF THE TV ELITE

White	99%
Male	98
From metropolitan area	82
From northeast corridor	56
Father voted Democratic	68
Father graduated college	35
Raised in Jewish religion	59
College graduate	75
Family income $200,000+	63
Political liberal	75
Religion "none"	44
Regular churchgoer	7

In many other ways, however, television's top creators have travelled far from the world of their youth. Relative to their parents (and to the average American), they are well educated, extraordinarily well paid, have adopted secular outlooks, and are politically very liberal.

They come from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds, although few were forced to start at the bottom of the ladder. Only 15 percent come from blue-collar backgrounds, and the largest number, 42 percent, say their fathers were businessmen. A minority of their fathers, 47 percent, had some college training, and only 35 percent obtained a degree. When asked to rate their family's economic circumstances during their youth as below average, average, or above average, they were evenly divided, with about one-third in each category.

Not surprisingly, these writers, producers, and executives are much better educated than their parents. Over nine out of ten attended college, three-fourths received degrees, and 31 percent had some graduate training. These educational advances pale before the dramatic rise in their economic status. Of those who responded, one in four reported a 1981 family income in excess of half a million dollars, and almost two-thirds (63 percent) earned over $200,000. Only 4 percent reported incomes of less than $75,000.

The television elite have traversed considerable distances in their attitudes, as well as their circumstances. In the sphere of religion, they have moved toward a markedly more secular orientation. Ninety-three percent had a religious upbringing, the majority (59 percent) in the Jewish faith. An additional 25 percent were raised in some Protestant denomination, and the remaining 12 percent as Catholics. Currently, however, 45 percent claim no religious affiliation whatsoever, more than six times the number of those who were not raised in any religious tradition. This is also greater than the proportion who currently profess to any particular religion. Defections have occurred from all religions, so that only 38 percent now call themselves Jews, 12 percent remain Protestants, and 5 percent have retained their Catholic faith. Moreover, most of those remaining affiliations appear to be purely nominal. Ninety-three percent say they seldom or never attend religious services.

Politically, the television elite are drawn from liberal and Democratic backgrounds. Whether or not their parents imparted their own commitments, a large majority of the television elite now consider themselves liberals and regularly vote Democratic. Seventy-five percent describe themselves as left of center politically, compared to only 14 percent who place themselves to the right of center. This contrasts sharply with the national picture. In a 1982 national poll, only 27 percent of the general public classified themselves as liberal, 32 per-

[4] Ben Stein, *The View from Sunset Boulevard* (New York: Basic Books, 1975), p. 105.

cent termed themselves conservatives, and the remainder called themselves moderates. In response to similar poll questions over the past two decades, self-described conservatives have always outnumbered liberals, and the latter have never accounted for more than 29 percent of those questioned.

The television elite's ideological self-descriptions are reflected in their political behavior. Table 2 shows how they voted in presidential elections since 1968. In the past four elections, among those voting, Democrats outpolled Republicans by margins that never dropped below three to one and rose above five to one. No Republican presidential candidate received more than 25 percent of this group's votes. In 1972, Nixon racked up 62 percent of the vote nationwide, but among the television elite the landslide flowed in the other direction. They supported McGovern by a margin of 82 to 15 percent. In 1980, there were substantial defections from the Democratic ranks here as elsewhere, and Carter received only 50 percent of their votes. But the beneficiary was not Ronald Reagan, who polled only 20 percent of this group. Instead, the disillusioned Democrats switched to John Anderson, whose 27 percent total put him well ahead of Reagan.

Table 2
PRESIDENTIAL VOTING RECORD OF THE TV ELITE: 1968-80

1968	
Nixon	17%
Humphrey	80
1972	
Nixon	15
McGovern	82
1976	
Ford	25
Carter	72
1980	
Reagan	20
Carter	49
Anderson	27

Note: Three to four percent voted for minor party candidates.

Social and Political Attitudes

The television elite's liberal self-image and presidential selections are consistent with their attitudes on social and political issues, as table 3 reveals. We questioned them on four kinds of topics: economic issues, political and social authority, disadvantaged groups, and sex and morality.

In the realm of economics, these wealthy liberals do not reject the private enterprise system, although many favor expansion of the welfare state. Seven out of ten believe that the government should substantially reduce the income gap between the rich and the poor, a policy which would surely reduce their own incomes, and 44 percent think the government should guarantee employment to anyone who wants a job.

For most, however, economic liberalism does not shade over into radicalism. They support the private enterprise system that has been so good to them. Ninety-four percent support the notion that people with more ability should earn more; 81 percent reject public ownership of corporations; indeed, almost two-thirds believe

Table 3
TV ELITE ATTITUDES ON SOCIAL ISSUES

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Economics				
Government should redistribute income	24%	45%	16%	14%
Government should guarantee jobs	8	37	26	30
Big corporations should be publicly owned	6	13	14	66
Private enterprise is fair to workers	18	51	25	6
Less regulation of business is good for U.S.	20	45	25	11
People with more ability should earn more	62	32	5	1
Political Alienation				
U.S. institutions need complete overhaul	8	35	28	29
Structure of society causes alienation	16	46	25	12
U.S. legal system favors wealthy	39	37	16	8
Public officials don't care about average man	23	42	32	3
People in authority know best	0	18	39	43
Disadvantaged Groups				
Women are better off at home	0	8	17	75
Women should get preference in hiring	4	24	39	33
Blacks lack education to advance	28	45	20	7
Blacks lack motivation to advance	1	17	19	63
Black gains come at white expense	2	1	19	78
Blacks should get preference in hiring	4	39	32	25
Whites and nonwhites should not marry	2	13	23	62
Discrimination can be ended	5	8	23	64
Poor people are victims of circumstance	13	48	31	8
Sex and Morality				
Woman has right to decide on abortion	91	6	1	2
Homosexuality is wrong	5	15	31	49
Homosexuals shouldn't teach in schools	6	9	20	66
Adultery is wrong	16	33	32	19

Note: Figures in tables do not always add up to 100% because of rounding.

less government regulation of business would be good for the country. Finally, over two out of three see the American private enterprise system as fair to workers.

Rebels With Causes

The television elite pledges allegiance to capitalism, but it is far more skeptical about the social and political institutions allied to this economic system. Three out of four say our legal system favors the wealthy, and nearly two-thirds believe that the very structure of American society causes people to become alienated from it. They are just as critical of those in positions of authority. Just under two-thirds agree that public officials are not interested in the average citizen, and 82 percent reject the notion that those in authority know best. Almost half disagree strongly that one should defer to those in authority, and not a single person expressed strong confidence in authority.

Given their widespread rejection of both American social institutions and their guardians, one would suspect that many in the television elite would like to see substantial changes in our society. In fact, a substantial minority of 43 percent endorses a complete overhaul of American institutions. In short, their acceptance of the economic system is tempered by a deep-set alienation from the social and political system.

If the television elite's political alienation contrasts sharply with their moderate economic views, it is quite consonant with their social liberalism. They express strong support for the social advancement of women and blacks, and they picture society as unfair to blacks, whose underprivileged position is seen as no fault of their own. Such strong sentiments notwithstanding, a majority reject preferential hiring as a means of assisting women's or blacks' advancement. Seventy-two percent reject this type of affirmative action for women, and 57 percent reject it for blacks. Perhaps reflecting the difference between sentiment and policy, most are not sanguine that social discrimination can be ended. Only 13 percent believe that racial and religious discrimination can be ended in their lifetimes.

The television elite's social liberalism is also evidenced by their views on sex and morality, another focal point for television's critics. On such issues as abortion, homosexual rights, and extramarital sex, their views diverge sharply from traditional values. Ninety-seven percent believe that a woman has the right to decide for herself whether to have an abortion; even more striking, 91 percent agree strongly with this position. Four out of five do not regard homosexual relations as wrong. Only five percent feel strongly that homosexuality is wrong, compared to 49 percent who disagree strongly. An even greater proportion, 86 percent, support the rights of homosexuals to teach in public schools. Finally, a majority of 51 percent refuse to condemn adultery as wrong. Moreover, the majority of those who feel strongly about this issue take a permissive stance; only 17 percent strongly agree that extramarital affairs are wrong. From this evidence, it would be difficult to overestimate the clash of values when television's creative community confronts fundamentalist Christian critics like the Moral Majority or the Coalition for Better Television.

Different Strokes

These findings suggest that the television elite's political alienation is rooted in social rather than economic issues. It is their social liberalism that most clearly distinguishes them from the general public. To probe this topic more deeply, we inquired into their hopes for the future, as well as their assessments of the present. We asked them to choose goals for America to pursue for the next decade, by selecting the most important and least important from the following six choices:

1. Maintaining a high rate of economic growth
2. Making sure that this country has strong defense forces
3. Seeing that the people have more say in how things get decided at work and in their communities
4. Progressing toward a less impersonal, more humane society
5. The fight against crime
6. Progressing toward a society where ideas are more important than money

For the past decade, political scientist Ronald Inglehart has been presenting such choices to subjects in America and Western Europe. He classifies economic growth, national defense, and crime as traditional "instrumental" values. A humane society, participation, and placing ideas above money, on the other hand, are "expressive" or "post-bourgeois" values that are gaining strength among new elite sectors in post-industrial societies. In most major social groups, "post-bourgeois" choices still represent a minority position. Among leading journalists we interviewed, a very liberal elite on most issues, only one in three chose "post-bourgeois" goals as most important. Corporate executives, a more conservative elite, rejected such goals by an eight-to-one margin. In sharp contrast, the television elite prefers "post-bourgeois" or "expressive" values over "instrumental" ones by almost two-to-one, as table 4 indicates.

The television elite's strong preferences for expressive over instrumental social goals explain why many feel alienated from traditional social and political institutions—their value orientation is fundamentally different from that of the general public.

This elite seeks new directors as well as new directions for American society. We asked them to rate ten leadership groups in terms of the influence each wields over American life. Then we asked them to rate the same groups according to the amount of influence each *should* have. The groups include such traditional forces in American life as business and labor, government agencies, the military, and religion, along with such rising contenders as the news media, blacks, feminists, intel-

Table 4

TV ELITE CHOICES AND GOALS FOR AMERICAN SOCIETY

Goals	Most Important	Least Important
National defense	5%	37%
Economic growth	19	13
Fight crime	13	11
Humane society	43	6
Ideas, not money	14	14
Community participation	6	20
Totals		
Instrumental	37%	61%
Expressive	63	40

lectuals, and consumer groups. We calculated the average influence rating assigned to each group on a scale ranging from "1" meaning very little influence, to "7" representing a great deal of influence.

The findings confirm the impression that the television elite is deeply dissatisfied with the direction our society is taking and would like to alter it in profound ways. They perceive America's power structure as dominated by the media and business, who finish in a virtual tie at the top of the heap. Blacks and feminists are at the bottom. When this group is asked for their preferences, the picture changes dramatically. The new kingpins would be consumer groups and intellectuals, followed by blacks and feminists. Business and the media fall from the top to the middle of the pack. Lowest in the pecking order would be government, religion, and the military. It would be hard to imagine a more thorough indictment of the social order. (See table 5.)

Table 5

TV ELITE RANKS OF INFLUENCE AMONG LEADERSHIP GROUPS

Perceived Influence	Preferred Influence
1. Media	1. Consumer groups
2. Business	2. Intellectuals
3. Government agencies	3. Blacks
4. Unions	4. Feminists
5. Military	5. Business
6. Consumer groups	6. Media
7. Religion	7. Unions
8. Intellectuals	8. Government agencies
9. Blacks	9. Religion
10. Feminists	10. Military

Our results seem all of a piece. Television creators emerge as upholders of the "new liberalism" that surfaced among upper status cosmopolitan groups in the 1960s. The crucial question is whether this perspective influences their work. In short, does this social portrait of television's creators tell us anything about their artistic output? Ultimately, this can only be determined by systematic analysis of television entertainment. For example, we found that businessmen are mainly bad guys in TV entertainment; this is consistent with the attitudes held by the people who create these shows.[5] But much work remains before we will have an overall picture of television's social message. In the interim, we asked members of the creative community what they thought about the social implications of their work. Do they see themselves as pure entertainers, or as educators, or even social reformers? Do they necessarily disagree with complaints that sex or violence permeate primetime?

Table 6

TV ELITE ATTITUDES TOWARD TV ENTERTAINMENT

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Dis-agree	Strongly Dis-agree
TV should promote social reform	21%	45%	21%	13%
TV should be realistic	37	39	12	12
TV is too critical of traditional values	1	11	32	56
There is too much sex on TV	10	20	32	38
There is too much violence on TV	21	38	27	14

The results shown in table 6 are clear and consistent. The television elites believe they have a role to play in reforming American society. They reject conservatives' criticisms of TV entertainment, while giving credence to liberals' complaints of television violence. First, television's creators make clear their preference for realism over escapist fantasy. Fully three out of four believe that TV should portray society realistically, and those who feel strongly agree by more than a three-to-one margin. Moreover, two out of three believe that TV entertainment should be a major force for social reform. This is perhaps the single most striking finding in our study. According to television's creators, they are not in it just for the money. They also seek to move their audience toward their own vision of the good society.

Thus, they reject the criticism that television is too critical of traditional values by an eight-to-one margin. A majority strongly disagree with this argument, and only one person strongly endorses it. Similarly, 62 percent disagree that there is too much sex on TV, as fundamentalist Christian groups have charged. By contrast, nearly 60 percent agree that television is too violent.

In sum, they view TV entertainment largely as we might expect on the basis of their social attitudes. Like many other liberal, cosmopolitan, upper status Americans, they believe sex is less of a problem than violence on television, and they see the medium as a source of needed social reform. The difference is that they are the creative force behind that very medium.

[5] For some initial findings, see L. Lichter, R. Lichter, and S. Rothman, "How Show Business Shows Business," *Public Opinion*, vol. 5, Oct./Nov. 1982, pp. 10-12; L. Lichter and R. Lichter, *Prime-Time Crime* (Washington, D.C.: the Media Institute, 1983).

Malbin

(Continued from page 16)

"put a lid on" the situation. But the metaphor is inappropriate. If they are not designed with extreme care, the laws more often turn out to be like rocks placed on a mold of jellied consommé. The laws sink to the bottom, as natural impulses ooze around them to find new paths for their expression.

Self-interest is what Irving Kristol has referred to as a condition, not a problem. Problems have solutions, Kristol points out; the word implies that. Conditions may be inexorable. They may even have good sides. The job of government, Alexander Hamilton once said, is not to try to eliminate self-interest: "It is as easy to change human nature as to oppose the strong current of the selfish passions. A wise legislator will gently divert the channel, and direct it, if possible, to the public good."

A wise legislator would not try to eliminate or repress selfishness in campaigns, but to dilute it and then turn it toward reinforcing salutary campaign activities and political institutions. Diluting the power of specific interest groups is conceptually, though perhaps not practically, simple: increase the diversity of funding sources and you decrease the importance of any one source. Permitting at least some PAC contributions is better than relying on direct corporate political activity or independent expenditures because more people, with more diverse interests, can get involved.

PACs do not represent everybody, of course. Specifically, poor people and the politically unorganized are left out of the current campaign picture. So would they be with either an unregulated environment or with any approach based on a strategy of limits. If the aim is to equalize opportunities, that can be achieved most surely, and most directly, with vouchers or 100 percent tax credits for small (up to $25) contributors.

Diverting channels may be a lot trickier than diluting them. Consider, for example, the indirect effects of full public financing for the presidential general election campaign. People who cannot contribute to the country's most visible candidates give instead to independent expenditure groups, to congressional candidates, and to the national political parties. When one change can produce so many related changes elsewhere, a person should be cautious before proposing further reforms. Nevertheless, some ideas seem worth considering.

The main negative effect of PAC contributions is that they reinforce lobbying efforts that fractionalize the legislative process. But limiting PACs would do nothing to the other, and more important, lobbying activities that help produce this result. It would be far more fruitful to concentrate on building up the one institution within Congress that is best suited to counter decentralization—the political party.

Political parties have done well under the current campaign finance law. Republicans have built up their contributor list since 1974 to more than 1.5 million people, using direct mail, while Democrats have made an impressive start since 1980 at catching up. The parties are not as strong as they were in the 1890s, nor can the campaign finance laws ever make them that way. But they are a lot stronger now than they were ten years ago. The parties can be made even stronger with a few more changes in the law, such as raising or eliminating the limits on what parties can spend on a candidate's behalf, or decreasing the amounts PACs may contribute to candidates while increasing what they may give to the parties, or requiring the national television networks to give the parties sixty minutes of free air time, to be used in blocs of at least five minutes.

Proposals could be spun out indefinitely, but the point should be clear from these few. The uses of limits are indirect, and they have limits. If the aim is to improve Congress, it would be wise to break out of the thought patterns imposed by this year's PAC journalism.

Mann-Ornstein

(Continued from page 11)

Afterwards, Michel said that he had heard the message sent by his constituents. So, too, did his colleagues.

Liberalism Lives

Not all specific election messages went to Republicans. Liberal Democrats also received a message—the reverse of that sent to them in 1978 and 1980. In 1982, every liberal Democratic Senator up for reelection won; nearly all increased their margin over their last election contest. Sarbanes, Metzenbaum, Riegle, Matsunaga, and Mitchell all were considered vulnerable a year ago; all won handily. None shrank from his voting record, philosophy, or feisty opposition to President Reagan's conservative policies. Democratic feistiness is likely to increase, as a result, in 1983 and 1984.

But feistiness does not mean returning to the Great Society. The political agenda has shifted, away from unbridled growth in the federal government, and toward an economic growth orientation. There *is* a "new" liberalism, and it differs from that espoused in the 1960s.

Conclusion

The 1982 elections will matter in policy terms. But the message sent by voters in the elections was a message that had been sent in other ways long before the election. The dramatic changes in the president's coalition, which mass media analysts attributed on election night to the twenty-six-seat shift in the House, in fact had occurred well before the November election took place. A message to "trim the sails" first went out in August of 1981 after the foundation had been laid for the Reagan economic program and continued through much of 1982. The election most importantly reinforced and confirmed the validity of that message, among Republicans and Democrats alike.

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Public Opinion

Published by American Enterprise Institute

Feb/March 1983

IS THE ALLIANCE SPLITTING?

- THE FRACTURE
- THE ELITES
- THE SUCCESSORS
- THE REMEDY

Public Opinion

Volume 6, Number 1 February/March 1983

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PUBLIC OPINION, February/March 1983, Vol. 6, No. 1. Published bimonthly by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. Copyright 1983 American Enterprise Institute. Subscription rates: $18.00 for one year, $34.00 for two years. Individual copy: $3.50. Information on bulk orders of multiple subscriptions available on request. Editorial and business offices: c/o AEI, 1150 17th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Send changes of address and all subscription correspondence to Circulation Department, c/o AEI, same address. "American Enterprise Institute" and  are registered service marks of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.

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ISSN 0149-9157

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Elite and Public Opinion: The Alliance's New Fissure?

The stability of the Western alliance rests on a sense of shared values and interests between the United States and Western Europe; but that sense of mutual commitment may be deteriorating. Consider the following:

- Two-thirds of Americans believe that the United States is taking on too much of the burden of defending Western security.
- In four West European countries, an average of 35 percent find Ronald Reagan more credible than Yuri Andropov on limiting nuclear weapons. Seventeen percent find Andropov more credible, while 35 percent say neither has credibility.
- At the end of 1981, an average of 43 percent of those polled in seven West European countries said they had little or no confidence in "the ability of the United States to deal responsibly with world problems."
- One quarter of those polled in seven West European countries cite "the U.S. military buildup" and "U.S. aggressive policies toward the U.S.S.R." as the principal reasons for current international tensions.

Europeans, feeling little confidence in American leadership, increasingly tend toward neutralism. Americans, unsure of their own international interests, appear less likely to care. Elites in Europe and the United States may be doing more to encourage these tendencies than to hold the alliance together.

The Lure of Neutralism

In West Germany, the Netherlands, Britain, and France, more people favor than oppose "a move toward neutralism in Western Europe." (See table 1.) Surprisingly, this doesn't seem to make much difference to Americans. The evidence is more encouraging when Europeans are asked about their *own country's* neutrality; exceptions are Italy and France, two countries with strong communist parties. The desire to get out of NATO and become a "neutral" country increased everywhere during 1981, Ronald Reagan's first year in office.

Most West Europeans continue to feel that NATO is essential to their country's security. Between 62 and 70 percent of the British, Germans, Italians, Dutch, and Norwegians polled by USIA felt that way in March 1981. But essential does not necessarily mean effective. Citizens of Britain, France, Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands were not overwhelmingly confident that NATO could prevent an attack on Western Europe (an average of 47 percent were at least fairly confident, while 36 percent had little or no confidence).

Confidence in collective security is a bit shaky, but confidence in national security is not particularly high either. USIA polls taken in seven countries in September 1981 showed that almost one in three Europeans felt that their country should not put up any military resistance if attacked by the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons. One in five felt their country should not resist if Soviets attacked with nonnuclear weapons. The view that military force should never be used, even if one's country is attacked by the Soviet Union, was held by 20 percent in Britain, 26 percent in West Germany, 28 percent in the Netherlands, 33 percent in Italy, and 44 percent in France.

Do Europeans want the United States to shoulder more of the burden of Western security? In Gallup surveys taken in seven West European countries last September for the *International Herald Tribune* and the Atlantic Institute (IHT/AI), only 20 percent, on the average, felt that the United States was not doing enough for Western security. At the same time, an average of only 29 percent felt that West European countries were not doing enough for their own security. Thus, it is not surprising that West Europeans are unenthusiastic about deploying Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe if there is no arms control agreement. Deployment is supported by narrow margins in Britain (43-34 percent), France (34-29 percent), and West Germany (37-35 percent). It is opposed in the Netherlands.

Insecurity and Distrust

This increasing European wariness appears to have two causes. The first, paradoxically, is a pervasive sense of military insecurity. The IHT/AI survey gave respondents a list of ten problems and asked them to identify "your greatest concerns for yourself and your country today." "The threat of war" came out third, averaging

Public Opinion's Assistant Editor Nicola Furian compiled the data for this article. She also worked on the preliminary analysis of the results.

35 percent across the seven European countries polled, just behind crime and considerably behind unemployment (67 percent). At the bottom of the list in every country, and averaging only 7 percent overall, was "inadequate defense."

Another question asked people to select factors that are "most important to the future security of Western countries." At the top of the list, averaging 32 percent, was "productive arms control talks." "Greater defense collaboration among West European countries" was at the bottom of the list (18 percent). If increasing East-West tensions have made Europeans feel more vulnerable militarily, the preferred response is to lessen the chances for provocation, not to boost defense.

The IHT/AI poll also asked respondents to identify factors that "are most responsible for current international tensions." First on the list was the "Soviet military buildup" averaging 38 percent across seven countries. However, substantial portions also cited "the U.S. military buildup" (24 percent, on average) and "U.S. aggressive policies toward the U.S.S.R." (23 percent). The results point to a second factor behind the European impulse toward nonalignment—distrust of American leadership. USIA polls taken in March, October, and December 1981 show a decline in European confidence in U.S. world leadership.

But it cannot be said that European attitudes toward the United States have become markedly negative. In 1981, "great" or "considerable" respect for the United States still outweighed "little" or "no" respect in every country. Favorable opinions of the United States outnumbered unfavorable opinions by two to one. And, by an average of 53 to 38 percent, citizens in Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands were at least fairly confident that if their security were threatened by a Soviet attack, the United States would come to their defense "even if this would risk the destruction of U.S. cities." This issue is more complex than simple "anti-Americanism." Europeans continue to like the United States and believe it is seriously committed to their security; but, they have come to distrust U.S. leadership and judgment.

Elite Estrangement

What makes the problem especially serious is that doubts about the Western alliance and U.S. leadership seem to be increasing most rapidly among European elites—precisely the groups that have been most responsible for maintaining a consensus behind the Atlantic alliance. A poll of French citizens taken by the Gallup Organization for the French-American Foundation last June provided particularly striking evidence.

- The view that the worldwide prestige of the United States has diminished over the past ten years characterized 21 percent of French citizens with a primary education, 31 percent of those with secondary schooling, and 52 percent of the university educated.
- The view that the main objective of U.S. foreign policy is "to prevent the spread of communism" rose with education from 16 to 26 to 36 percent. However, the belief that America's objective is "to maintain world peace" declined with education, from 33 to 26 to 18 percent.
- As education increased, so did the percentages saying they were not confident of "the capacity of the United States to exercise good judgment in current world problems," from 34 to 42 to 52 percent.

High-status Europeans also tended to be more critical of the United States in the IHT/AI survey. For instance, the college educated in West Germany were the most likely to blame the U.S. military buildup and U.S. confrontationalist policies toward the Soviet Union for international tensions. German university graduates were much more likely to feel that the United States was shouldering too much of the burden of Western security. In Italy, the latter position was taken by 12 percent of those with no schooling, 20 percent of those with primary schooling, and 25 percent of those with secondary schooling.

What is most striking in the IHT/AI poll is the sharp distrust of the United States among young Europeans, particularly those under age twenty-four. In six out of the seven countries polled—all except Great Britain—the youngest group was also the most likely to cite a criticism of the United States as a principal reason for current international tensions. In France, for example, 14 percent of the total sample compared to 25 percent of the youngest age group blamed the U.S. military buildup.

Table 1
GROWING NEUTRALISM

Question: Some have said that Western Europe would be safer if it moved toward neutralism in the East-West conflict. Others argue that such a move would be dangerous. Would you, yourself, favor or oppose a move toward neutralism in Western Europe?

	Favor	Oppose
West Germany	57%	43%
Netherlands	53	32
Great Britain	45	42
France	43	41
United States	41	45

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization (U.S. and European affiliates), for *Newsweek* magazine, January 1983, N between 500 and 754 in each country.

Question: All things considered, do you think it is better for (this country) to belong to NATO, that is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or would it be better for us to get out of NATO and become a neutral country?

	Better to belong		Better to get out	
	March 1981	July 1981	March 1981	July 1981
West Germany	67%	64%	14%	18%
Great Britain	67	59	20	29
Netherlands	62	56	17	25
Italy	60	49	30	42
France*	45	33	40	51

*In France, the question referred to the Atlantic alliance instead of NATO.

Source: Surveys by the United States Information Agency, latest that of July 1981.

These findings point to the problem of the "Successor Generation" in Europe, identified by Kenneth Adler and Douglas Wertman in *Public Opinion* ("Is NATO in Trouble?" Aug./Sept. 1981) and discussed by Stephen Szabo in this issue. This is the young, university-educated age cohort from which the future European leadership will be drawn. Adler and Wertman found, for instance, that neutralist sentiments were strongest among the well-educated young in West European countries, while support for NATO was "overwhelming" among those over fifty with a university education.

American Opinion: Limited Concern

As seen in table 1, the American public is not greatly disturbed by the prospect of European neutralism. Americans favor deploying medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe if talks between the United States and the Soviets fail, but by a less-than-overwhelming margin of 45 to 31 percent. In the Gallup survey for the French-American Foundation, respondents in both countries were asked whether they thought the French and American governments generally agreed or generally did not agree on several issues: the Arab-Israeli conflict, détente with the Soviet Union, and limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. In each case, the French respondents were more likely than the American respondents to perceive the two governments in agreement. Americans generally see greater differences between the Atlantic partners than Europeans do. When Europeans were asked in the IHT/IA survey to choose words that best described the U.S. role in defending West European and U.S. interests, the top two choices were "essential" and "interfering." When Americans were asked to choose words describing the role West European countries play in defending Western interests, they chose "inconsistent" and "insufficient."

In areas *not* related to America's own defense and security, the trend in opinion since the late 1960s has

Table 2

	1978			1982		
	Public	Leaders	Gap	Public	Leaders	Gap
POSSIBLE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY GOALS (Percent who label that goal "very important")						
Defending our allies' security	50%	77%	27	50%	82%	32
Worldwide arms control	64	81	17	64	86	22
Helping to improve the standard of living of less developed nations	35	64	29	35	55	20
Protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression	34	30	− 4	34	43	9
Combatting world hunger	59	67	8	58	64	6
Matching Soviet military power	na	na		49	52	3
Securing adequate supplies of energy	78	68	10	70	72	2
Promoting and defending human rights in other countries	39	35	− 4	43	41	− 2
Helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations	26	15	−11	29	23	− 6
Containing communism	60	45	−15	59	44	−15
Protecting the interests of American business abroad	45	26	−19	44	25	−19
Strengthening the United Nations	47	26	−21	48	25	−23
Keeping up the value of the dollar	86	73	−13	71	38	−33
Protecting the jobs of American workers	78	34	−44	77	43	−34
FAVOR USE OF U.S. TROOPS . . . (Percent favor)						
If Iran invaded Saudi Arabia	na	na		25%	54%	29
If Soviet troops invaded Western Europe	54%	92%	38	64	92	28
If North Korea invaded South Korea	21	45	24	22	50	28
If Japan were invaded by the Soviet Union	42	81	39	51	78	27
If Arab forces invaded Israel	22	31	9	30	47	17
If the Arabs cut off all oil shipments to the United States	36	29	− 7	38	36	− 2
If South Africa invaded Angola	na	na		8	5	− 3
If the People's Republic of China invaded Taiwan	20	18	− 2	19	15	− 4
If the government of El Salvador were about to be defeated by leftist rebels	na	na		19	10	− 9
If the Soviet Union invaded the People's Republic of China	na	na		21	6	−15
If the Soviet Union invaded Poland	na	na		29	6	−23
THREAT TO THE U.S. IF COMMUNISTS CAME TO POWER IN . . . (Percent "great threat")						
Saudi Arabia	na	na		49	61	12
Mexico	53	51	− 2	61	70	9
France	26	33	7	31	37	7
Iran	35	52	17	24	17	− 7
El Salvador	na	na		21	10	−11
Taiwan	na	na		17	6	−11

Note: na = not asked. N for public samples = 1,546 (1978) and 1,547 (1982); N for leadership samples = 366 (1978) and 341 (1982).
Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, latest that of October 29-November 6, 1982.

been away from internationalism. The National Opinion Research Center and the Gallup poll have asked Americans the following question at periodic intervals since the late 1940s: "Do you think it will be best for the future of the country if we take an active part in world affairs or if we stay out of world affairs?" During the late 1940s and 1950s, the distribution of responses was fairly stable—about 70 percent said we should play an active role in world affairs. When the question was picked up again in the mid-1970s, the proportion favoring an active role had slipped to 66 percent. It fell to 59 percent in 1978. In November 1982, it was at an all-time low of 54 percent. These answers are strongly correlated with education: better-educated people tend to be more internationalist in outlook and more favorable to an active world role for the United States. Even though the level of mass education has been steadily growing since the late 1940s, however, the level of mass internationalism has been declining.

Thus, public support for such non-security-related internationalist goals as foreign economic aid, protecting human rights, and free trade has declined in recent years, while the public's concern over military security has grown. According to surveys commissioned by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in 1974 and 1978, the American public's support for increased defense spending, foreign military aid, defending our allies' security, and the use of force to protect American interests abroad rose sharply during the late 1970s. This security-consciousness has remained strong, according to the results of the Chicago Council's 1982 survey, although support for higher defense spending has fallen markedly.

Table 2 shows how the public responded in 1978 and 1982 to a list of possible foreign policy goals for the United States. Goals which reflect American self-interest rank highest—concerns such as protecting American jobs, keeping up the value of the dollar and securing adequate supplies of energy. (See table 2.) The American public's commitment to Europe is clearly justified and supported principally in terms of this country's own national security. That is why containing communism and defending our allies' security are significantly more popular than foreign military aid and protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression: in the latter instances, the relation to U.S. national security is not obvious. Similarly, table 2 indicates that a majority of Americans are willing to send troops abroad only if one of our major allies (Western Europe, Japan) is attacked by our principal enemy (the Soviet Union). Even a threat to U.S. oil supplies in the Middle East fails to elicit widespread support for the dispatch of U.S. forces.

It is worth noting that in the 1974 Chicago Council survey, the public's support for this country's alliance commitments was substantially lower. During the late 1970s, Soviet adventurism and the Soviet military buildup were widely perceived as constituting a grave threat to America's security. That sense of military insecurity reached near-panic proportions in 1980, after the seizure of American hostages in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and it played no small role in electing Ronald Reagan. It also created a much stronger sense of commitment to our allies, as Lloyd Free and William Watts reported in these pages in early 1980 ("Internationalism Comes of Age . . . Again," April/May 1980).

The perception of the Soviet threat clearly influences America's alliance commitments. So does the perception of a shared security obligation. Thus, in the 1982 Chicago Council survey, strong majorities of the public felt that the United States has a vital interest in Japan (82 percent), Great Britain (80 percent), and West Germany (76 percent). But the sense of vital interest was much weaker in the case of France (58 percent) and Italy (35 percent), where anti-American feelings and tendencies toward neutralism and pacifism have been more evident. The warning is clear: if Europeans devalue the alliance relationship, so will Americans.

American Leaders: Divided Concern

The Chicago Council surveys also included interviews with a leadership sample of Americans in senior positions (government, business, labor, education, religion, journalism, and civic service) with knowledge of and influence on international affairs and foreign policy.[1] Table 2 compares public opinion and leadership opinion on a number of foreign policy issues from the 1978 and 1982 Chicago Council surveys.

The principal difference between public opinion and leadership opinion can be stated simply: leaders are more internationalist. They are much less likely than the public to feel that protecting American jobs and keeping up the value of the dollar are important foreign policy goals. In the case of protecting weaker nations from foreign aggression, matching Soviet military power, promoting human rights, and promoting democracy abroad, leadership opinion is almost no different from public opinion. Leaders were even less enthusiastic than the public about containing communism and protecting American business interests abroad, two conservative goals, and strengthening the United Nations, a liberal goal.

On questions relating to troop involvement, leaders are more supportive in cases that involve threats to countries allied to the United States—Western Europe, South Korea, Japan, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. In situations where no alliance commitments are at stake, leaders are less amenable than the public to the use of U.S. troops. These differences show up quite sharply in the case of Soviet invasions of China and Poland, where over 20 percent of the public, but very few of the leaders, would be willing to involve American forces. Similarly, leaders are more likely than the public to see communist threats in countries allied to the United States—

(Continued on page 51)

nomic growth ranks last on the national agenda. It ranks seventh out of twelve as a national priority for business executives.

Conclusion

Despite the differences we have noted, our data demonstrate an underlying consensus unifying all Americans. There are many points of convergence, no matter what environmental and economic beliefs individuals endorse. The public's commitment to the environment indicates a deep-seated conviction that we can progress toward a strong economy *and* a sound environment. Along the way there are going to be some serious dilemmas. Our survey reveals that the public is prepared to weigh these choices responsibly.

Schneider

(Continued from page 8)

Mexico, France, and Saudi Arabia—but less likely to see communist threats in countries perceived as peripheral to American interests—Iran, El Salvador, and Taiwan.

In 1982, as in previous surveys, the leaders polled by the Chicago Council were much more supportive than the public of foreign economic and military aid and were almost unanimous in their opinion that the United States should play an active role in world affairs. One of the sharpest differences was over the issue of protectionism. The public favored protective tariffs; the leaders opposed them. On the issues just listed, the foreign policy leaders tended to be more supportive of Reagan administration policy.

In other respects, however, the foreign policy leaders were less supportive of administration policy than the general public.

- Eighty-one percent of leaders and 41 percent of the public favored the idea of "entering into negotiations with Cuba looking toward reestablishing diplomatic and economic relations and exchanging ambassadors."
- The leaders were significantly more in favor of various measures aimed at promoting détente with the Soviet Union, including joint efforts to solve energy problems, arms control agreements, and exchanges. Conversely, the leaders were less supportive than the public of such anti-détente measures as restricting U.S.-Soviet trade, prohibiting scientific exchanges, and forbidding grain sales to the Soviet Union.
- A mutual, verifiable freeze on nuclear weapons was favored by 58 percent of the public and 79 percent of the leaders.
- Only 45 percent of the public, but 79 percent of the leaders, wanted the United States to take a more active role in opposing apartheid in South Africa.
- Sixty-three percent of the public, but only 55 percent of the leaders, felt that "the United States may have to support some military dictators because they are friendly toward us and opposed to the communists."

Alliance and Consensus

Leadership opinion tends to be internationalist, more or less in line with the traditional bipartisan foreign policy consensus of the 1950s and early 1960s. That consensus embraced a continuity of goals—essentially containment of Soviet aggression—and an acceptance of both cooperative and confrontational strategies. Among political activists, however, that consensus eroded rapidly in the wake of the Vietnam war. Activist sentiment tends to be polarized between conservative internationalism, which is interventionist, pro-military, and staunchly anti-communist, and liberal internationalism, which is more concerned with economic and humanitarian issues, suspicious of military power, and more preoccupied with global interdependence than with East-West issues. The bipartisan, two-track consensus of the 1950s was an establishment consensus, and that establishment has lost its hold over the two major political parties—and over foreign policy. Jimmy Carter tended to follow a liberal internationalist line until the end of 1979, and leadership opinion was often to the right of him, particularly on security issues. Ronald Reagan is a conservative internationalist, and as the 1982 survey reveals, leadership opinion is frequently to his left.

Is the Western alliance a liberal or a conservative policy commitment? It is neither. It is an internationalist commitment that the public is willing to accept because it seems vital to American security interests. The Atlantic alliance is precisely the kind of internationalist commitment that originated in and was sustained by the bipartisan foreign policy consensus of the 1950s. Today, liberal internationalists tend to undervalue the Western alliance in favor of globalist policies and North-South relations. Conservative internationalists tend to overvalue the Western alliance by seeing it not simply as a security arrangement, but as an ideological challenge to communism and to the Soviet Union.

These interpretations of the Western alliance tend to divide Americans and antagonize Europeans. Public opinion data from Europe and the United States suggest that the basic concept of the alliance remains sound. Both Europeans and Americans believe that it is "essential" for their mutual security. What endangers the alliance are the efforts by American political activists to give it an ideological thrust, to make the Atlantic alliance the spearhead of either a globalist or an anti-communist campaign. There is no consensus, in Europe or in the United States, behind that kind of policy. In short, the way to destroy the Western alliance is to make it controversial.

[1] See John E. Rielly, ed., *American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1983* (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1983).



by Stephen F. Szabo

The Successor Generation in Europe

A new generation is about to assume leadership of Western Europe. A majority of Europeans alive today were born after World War II ended. Many of the postwar generation already occupy key second echelon positions in parliaments, parties, and foreign affairs. By the end of this decade they will control their nation's foreign and defense policies. Because they constitute Europe's delayed postwar baby boom, their numbers will give them disproportionate political influence.

This generational changing of the guard will have important implications for the Atlantic alliance and the American role in Europe in the 1990s and beyond. Manifestations of the new era are already visible in the sudden emergence of the European peace movement, a movement dominated by the young and motivated by deep suspicion of American motives and policies. Evidence of this mistrust is apparent in the one-sided emphasis of most of the peace demonstrations on U.S. rather than Soviet missiles and in the proclivity of many younger Europeans to view both of the "two superpowers" as a threat to European security. The peace movement expresses the new generation's different historical experiences, values, and attitudes. The U.S. government has established a number of interagency task forces in the past months to study European opinion and European youth, indicating that officials are aware of the changing environment.

The experience of the "founders" generation (referring to those who founded the alliance) was radically different from that of Europeans born since the war. Europeans of prewar vintage shaped their views of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the security environment in a Europe devastated by war and threatened by Stalinist Russia. The United States stood as a model of a self-confident and dominant power whose values and social system contrasted favorably with those of Europe and the U.S.S.R.

Postwar Europeans have matured in a new Europe: one in which the European Economic Community, NATO, affluence, and political stability are givens. The cold war and Reconstruction were not part of their formative experience. Many remember only vaguely, at best, the building of the Berlin Wall. To many, even the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 is distant history. Having been shaped during an era of détente, their views of Soviet society were affected by Brezhnev's system rather than Stalin's. America does not connote to them the Marshall Plan and the Berlin Airlift, or even John Kennedy, but rather Vietnam and Watergate.

Postwar Europeans are also distinctive in their social backgrounds and the values and attitudes these backgrounds have fostered. University education expanded rapidly in the 1960s and early 1970s, so that today two to three times as many young Europeans attend a university as in the 1950s. This expansion created a more socially diverse student population (although working-class students are still scarce) and placed large numbers of young people into a political and cultural network which few of their parents had known.

Consequently, they are less likely to defer to the established political leadership, more likely to want to become involved in decisions that affect their lives, and more likely to share a critical or neo-Marxist attitude on domestic and international issues. Many were socialized on European campuses that produced the Vietnam protest movement and where little sympathy for American policy could be found.

In addition to the expansion of universities, the social environment young Europeans have known has consisted of the city rather than the small town, and modern rather than traditional values. An important consequence of this modernization process has been a marked decline in the practice of religion among postwar Europeans. In 1980, 2 percent of Germans between the ages of sixteen and twenty-nine attended church regularly compared to 18 percent over the age of sixty. In 1963, the number of sixteen-to-twenty-nine year olds practicing religion was 11 percent. In Italy, twice as

many Italians (44 percent) born before 1940 as those born after 1940 attend mass at least weekly. Twenty years ago, little age variation could be found.

Secularization has had important political consequences, since religious practice and support for parties of the right are closely associated, particularly in Catholic Europe. Postwar Europeans are more likely to support parties of the left than their parents were. They tend to be drawn, however, to the nontraditional left, parties of the new left such as the French Socialists, Italian Radicals, the neo-Marxist wing of the German SPD, and ecologist/anti-nuclear parties.

Youth alone does not adequately explain the young's leftist preferences. In fact, the young were not naturally leftist in the Europe of the 1950s. In West Germany, for example, 32 percent of the eighteen-to-twenty-four year-old group in 1950 preferred the Social Democrats and 24 percent the Christian Democrats; by 1980, 50 percent of this youngest age group favored the SPD and only 31 percent the CDU. Polls conducted in 1982 found support for the Greens equal to support for the SPD in the eighteen-to-twenty-one year-old group. In Italy the age contrasts are most dramatic among the university educated. While the prewar university educated preferred the right by 47 to 21 percent, Italians born later than 1949 who have been university educated, support the left by a 46 to 28 percent margin. No such dramatic age differences occurred in the 1950s or early 1960s concerning party preference. Similarly in France, the Socialists have become the preferred party of the postwar generation.

A growing number of the politically active members of the European left are from the "Successor Generation." Of the four largest European states, only in Britain did an age-related shift in party preference fail to materialize. Widespread volatility associated with a decline in class alignments, not generational loyalty, has characterized British voting behavior. The young also tend to be the strongest supporters of the ecologist and anti-nuclear parties and make up the largest group of nonvoters in Western Europe. Shifts in partisan preference have placed more younger Europeans in the political environments most critical of American policy and most supportive of neutralist tendencies.

Their historical and social backgrounds have produced a postwar generation that is distinctive from their predecessors. No single historical event has shaped the postwar generation as 1914, the depression, or 1939-1945 did previous ones. Rather, the *lack* of dramatic events and discontinuities separates postwar Europeans from their elders. This experience has been felt most intensely by the university-educated portion of the postwar group. Western Europe's new leaders will emerge from this small but influential minority, becoming the spokesmen for their generation and shaping the policies of European states. The views of this group, then, rather than those of all postwar Europeans, are crucial to any discussion of the Successor Generation.

Views of Security

A look at their views of foreign and defense policies, as expressed in public opinion surveys conducted between 1979 and 1981, reveals that postwar university-educated Europeans differ sharply from prewar university graduates on a number of issues. The Successor Generation is clearly more reserved in its attitudes toward American society and American leadership than preceding generations. Young Europeans of all educational backgrounds still recognize a substantial contrast between Soviet and American societies. America continues to be viewed as a democratic and open society, despite its many perceived flaws in the area of social and racial inequalities and violence. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is seen as repressive, bureaucratic, and boring. Dissidents' critiques have combined with the new left's condemnation of East European socialism as "barbarism with a human face" to remove for the young any of the remaining luster of the Soviet model. The United States is still considered by all age groups to be clearly more trustworthy than the U.S.S.R. However, clear signs of disenchantment are discernible among the better-educated young. In Italy, for example, 73 percent of the prewar university-educated group believed the United States protected human rights well as compared to 19 percent who believed the opposite. Among eighteen-to-twenty-nine year olds with similar education backgrounds, only 42 percent rated the U.S. performance on human rights as good and 41 percent felt it was bad. In West Germany, a 1976-1979 panel study of sixteen-to-thirty-four year olds found that 83 percent listed West Germany as a just society compared to 44 percent characterizing the United States as just and 1 percent viewing the U.S.S.R. in a similar light. Opinions among the better-educated and politically active portion of the sample, however, were much more negative about American society, which they tended to see as excessively materialistic.

Neither of the two superpowers, however, holds much of an attraction for young Europeans, aside from the continued popularity of certain American cultural artifacts such as pop music and jeans. They grew up in a resurgent Europe, so they are not awed by any dramatic discrepancies between U.S. and European living standards. Postwar Europeans, rather, have begun to look for European alternatives to the two dominant models. The idea of a "third force" between the U.S.S.R. and America, which appealed to some Europeans in the 1940s, may well be revived in the 1980s.

Figure 1 indicates that the best educated of the postwar generation tend to support NATO membership. However, those in the youngest cohort also exhibit a growing neutralist preference. Data from the mid-1960s reveal no such age contrast among the better educated. In addition, the better-educated young tend to be most resistant to increasing defense spending. Only 13 percent of university-educated Italians born since 1950

Figure 1

PERCENT OF BEST-EDUCATED WHO FAVOR NATO OR NEUTRALITY



Source: U.S. International Communication Agency, March 1981.

favor increased defense efforts as compared to 50 percent of the prewar better-educated group. In West Germany, 16 percent of the postwar group support increases in defense spending compared to 38 percent of their prewar counterparts. There are similar patterns in views on nuclear weapons. In France, parallel but less dramatic age contrasts appear. In Britain, they do not. At a time of growing youth unemployment, young Europeans are more likely to see increased defense spending as diverting resources from social priorities.

Generations and Nations

Across national boundaries, the Successor Generations do hold roughly similar views on defense spending, neutralism, and the superpowers. However, the similarities of a generation should not obscure persistent national diversity. The generation gap appears to be greatest in West Germany and Italy and smallest in Britain and France.

In both West Germany and Italy, discontinuities in recent historical experience are most dramatic. In both societies the immediate past was discredited in the postwar period, and America served as an alternative social and political model. Günter Grass, for example, wrote that the United States was as an *Ersatzvaterland* for Germans, especially young Germans, in the 1950s. Both societies have experienced rapid economic and social change since the fifties, the radicalization of a number of universities in the late sixties, and the emergence of a generation more critical of the role played by America in the world and in their societies. The reorientation of West German foreign policy away from an exclusively Western focus toward an emphasis upon détente has intensified a generation's search for identity.

In France and Britain, generation gaps are less dramatic. The Gaullist critique of the "Yalta duopoly" and the long stress upon an independent French role left little in the way of idealization of the United States. As a consequence, there has been less room for disillusionment. On the contrary a strong sense of national identity and a power politics view of the world has apparently immunized the young to the lures of pacifism and neutralism. The Gaullist consensus on foreign and security policy is widespread among all age groups.

In Britain, the relatively slower pace of economic and social change and an increasing preoccupation with the consequences of economic decline has muted any dramatic generational contrasts in foreign policy views. In spite of their involvement in the campaign for nuclear disarmament, young Britons are not more pacifist, anti-defense, or pro-European than their elders.

Implications for U.S. Policy Makers

American policy makers will have to take European public opinion more seriously in the development of alliance security policy. A European audience increasingly influenced by the attitudes and preferences of the Successor Generation is likely to be more critical of U.S. policy initiatives than those the United States has dealt with in the first thirty years of the alliance. The attentive public will not only be more critical, but it will also be larger.

American policy makers have to remember that the European audience is an important segment of their domestic audience. They will have to be more sensitive to the contours of European opinion than has been the case in all postwar administrations.

Finally, a major emphasis has to be given to public diplomacy, including information activities and exchanges (especially of key young leaders). The sharp decline of the past decade in resources devoted to public diplomacy must be reversed, as must the serious erosion in American foreign language and area expertise.

Soviet expenditures on public diplomacy are at least four times greater than American efforts. Recent Soviet successes in the struggle for European opinion are an indication of the stakes involved.

Stephen F. Szabo is editor of The Successor Generation: International Perspectives of Postwar Europeans *(London: Butterworth, 1983). This article is based on the findings of the book and represents the views of the author and not necessarily those of the United States government. Portions of this article have been published in* Europa Archiv.

Greece's New Isolationism?

by Panayote Dimitras

For a long time, many observers of Greek politics felt that the Greek public was pro-Western and anti-Turkish. That impression was based on the positions of the parties of the right and the center that represented more than two-thirds of the Greek electorate after 1977, and more than three-quarters of it before that. Thus, many observers thought, no party of the Greek left that was isolationist or pro-Soviet could hope to gain control of a substantial portion of the electorate to bring it to power.

Hence, when the Greek Socialist party (PASOK) started rising in the polls, many were surprised. How could such an outspoken opponent of the West attract so many? One explanation offered was that the deep economic crisis and the charismatic personality of the PASOK leader, Andreas Papandreou, counted more heavily than foreign policy in the voters' minds. Papandreou's moderation in the final stages of the campaign and during his first year in office reassured those observers that Greek public opinion was still favorable to the West.

The reality is very different. Greek public opinion is today hostile to the West, less hostile to the East, and somewhat conciliatory toward Turkey. This attitude was revealed in the biannual polls conducted in Athens by EURODIM since 1979,[1] and has been confirmed by a number of other polls.

Hostility to the West

Since 1979, EURODIM has included three questions on Greek relations with the U.S.A., NATO, and the EEC. The answers (see table 1) show a progressive, though slow, deterioration of the image of those Western institutions in Greek public opinion.

The proportion of favorable attitudes toward the U.S.A. decreased from 36 percent in October 1979 to 29 percent in September 1982, despite a short-lived improvement in 1981. The U.S. involvement in El Salvador, widely publicized by the Greek media, the feud over interest rates, and the cooling of the bilateral relations between Greece and the United States in early 1982, neutralized the impact of Mr. Papandreou's post-electoral conciliatory declarations. The decline of "pro-Americanism" has not meant a surge in outright opposition to all bilateral relations between the two countries. The proportion of hard-core anti-Americans has remained almost stable through time. Those formerly pro-American have not moved to opposition. They have joined the ranks of the "wait and see" proponents. According to the last poll, almost one out of two Greeks (46 percent) withhold judgment on the future of bilateral relations.

Opposition to NATO membership is much stronger: one-half of those surveyed advocate complete withdrawal from NATO, while another quarter prefer the "French formula," staying only in the political organization, as Greece did between 1974 and 1980. Greece's full membership in the Atlantic alliance is approved by only one-sixth of the Athens sample (which means no more than one-quarter in a national survey). In the last EURODIM poll before Greece reintegrated with the military organization, the proportion of proponents of full membership was almost the same, but there were fewer (37 percent) outright opponents; many more had come to advocate the status quo, the "French solution" (35 percent). The November 1980 poll was taken just after reintegration and shows only a marginal improvement in the proportion of proponents of full membership. The government had handled the reintegration poorly: Greeks were first made aware of it through a leak in the press. PASOK and the KKE (the Greek Communist party) used the issue, and Greek public opinion became more hostile to NATO.

Opposition to the United States and NATO is to some extent understandable, given recent Greek history. Opposition to the EEC, however, shows that there is a deep-seated isolationism in Greek public opinion. Our polls show that full Greek membership in the EEC, starting in January 1981, has only contributed to a deterioration of the EEC's image. In September 1982, only a quarter approved full membership.

A fourth question that EURODIM has included in four of its polls refers to the status of U.S. bases. An overwhelming majority of the people want bases to be dismantled. Interestingly, in May 1981, when PASOK was still advocating immediate withdrawal of the bases, opposition stood at only 57 percent. Now that PASOK is negotiating temporary renewal of basing agreements, opposition has dramatically increased.

Suspicion

These data show that Greek public opinion is suspicious of, if not hostile to, the West. In some surveys, EURODIM included additional questions that help explain this attitude. The most indicative data are found in the September 1982 poll, when EURODIM included six questions that had already been asked by Gallup International in eight other countries.

A completely different attitude toward the Western alliance exists in Greece compared to the other countries. Only the Greeks do not trust NATO's ability to defend their country and consider the presence of the U.S. army on their soil as a source of additional danger for their security. Like the British, they also believe that nuclear weapons on their soil increase the chance of attack.

This opposition does not mean that a majority of Greeks are pro-Soviet. To be sure, the Greeks are the only European people who have a negative image of the United States, and it is the only country in which more than one-third have a positive image of the U.S.S.R.

Twice as many Greeks hold a favorable opinion of the U.S.S.R. than of the U.S. (36% vs. 18%). But only 15 percent would accept Soviet domination rather than risk war, with 35 percent offering no opinion. There are striking similarities in the results of the three countries that have strong communist parties: Greece, France, and Italy. Only one-half would fight the Soviets while, in each country, one-third did not take a stand.

A Generational Phenomenon?

A number of observers have suggested that hostility toward the alliance is rooted in generational change. Our analysis of responses to the questions we asked shows that age partially explains Greece's isolationism: the older generations, in comparison to the younger ones, have a better opinion of the United States, NATO and the EEC; they are less afraid of the presence of nuclear weapons and the American army; they are more willing to fight a potential Soviet attack; they have a less favorable opinion of the U.S.S.R. Generational differences are not overwhelming, however. Even among people over fifty, a majority do not like the U.S.A. and do not want an immediate improvement in bilateral relations; they do not trust NATO and do not want Greece to stay in it as a full member; they want U.S. bases out. What differentiates these older generations from the younger ones is the *degree* of isolationism. The younger generations almost unanimously tend to oppose all internationalist positions. They overwhelmingly take extreme isolationist positions (out of NATO, for example) even when an intermediate position is offered. Only on the question about risking war or Soviet domination do they hide in the "don't know" category (57 percent in the eighteen-to-twenty year-old group gave that response, 41 percent of the twenty-one-to-twenty-four year olds, 43 percent of the twenty-five-to-thirty-four year olds). In the eighteen-to-twenty-four year-old group there are more Greeks willing to accept Soviet domination than willing to risk a war.

But further analysis of our data shows that, when we control for partisanship —a crucial factor in explaining the foreign policy attitudes of Greeks—the relationship between age and isolationism almost vanishes. We can conclude that Greek isolationism is a much deeper phenomenon that has affected all generations. It appears more pronounced in young people only because it reflects their more left-wing political choices.

Table 1

GREEK PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD THE U.S.A., NATO, AND THE U.S. BASES

	Oct. 1979	Mar. 1980	Nov. 1980	May 1981	Nov. 1981	Mar. 1982	Sept. 1982
Relations with the U.S.A. should:							
Improve slowly	30%	26%	26%	31%	36%	22%	25%
Stay as they are	6	8	4	6	7	8	4
Depend on the future U.S. attitude toward us	40	36	32	30	31	39	46
Be totally severed	16	27	33	29	24	26	23
Greece should:							
Stay (return until Nov. 1980) in the military organization	10	19	23	27	23	18	17
Stay only in the political organization	36	35	30	25	23	23	20
Completely withdraw from NATO	30	37	38	40	51	55	53
U.S. bases should:							
Go	n.a.	n.a.	57	57	n.a.	73	70
Stay	n.a.	n.a.	31	33	n.a.	20	21

Note: n.a. = not asked.
Source: Surveys by EURODIM, latest that of September 1982.

Table 2

PUBLIC OPINION ATTITUDES TOWARD THE WESTERN ALLIANCE

	Greece	UK	France	FRG	Italy	Belgium
Favorable opinion of the U.S.	18%	46%	55%	73%	63%	49%
Unfavorable	80	44	32	24	21	22
Favorable opinion of the USSR	36	14	13	20	13	11
Unfavorable	62	74	73	77	68	61
Confidence in NATO's ability to defend Western Europe:						
A great deal or a fair amount	22	56	39	61	49	43
Not very much or none at all	74	35	38	35	28	33
Presence of American nuclear weapons:						
Increases chances of an attack	49	42	24	27	24	14
Provides greater protection	25	29	31	41	25	55
Has no effect	24	24	23	28	21	19
Presence of American troops:						
Increases chances of an attack	52	25	n.a.	15	n.a.	n.a.
Provides greater protection	21	24	n.a.	48	n.a.	n.a.
Has no effect	25	46	n.a.	33	n.a.	n.a.
Would rather:						
Accept Russian domination	15	12	13	19	17	n.a.
Risk war	50	75	57	74	48	n.a.
Don't know	35	13	30	7	35	n.a.

Note: "Don't know" not shown in first five questions. n.a. = not asked.
Source: Survey by EURODIM, 1982 (Greece), Gallup for other countries.

Conciliation with Turkey?

The most surprising finding of the EURODIM polls has been the rather conciliatory attitudes toward Turkey. In March 1982, only 40 percent felt that the exclusive responsibility for the bilateral problems laid with the Turks, and therefore that concessions should come from them. Some 15 percent said that responsibility lies with, and concessions should be made equally by, both countries. Thirty percent accept

(Continued on page 20)

Stamford Nonprofit Agencies Which Provided Data

Aid for the Retarded, Inc.
Alcoholism Council
American Red Cross, Stamford Chapter
Birthright of Greater Stamford
Boy Scouts of America, Fairfield County Council
Catholic Family and Community Services
Center of the Jewish Community
Child Care Center of Stamford, Inc.
Child Guidance Clinic of Greater Stamford
Children's Creative Workshop
Committee on Training and Employment
—Anti-crime Program
—Domus Foundation
—El Centro Hispano
—HEAT/Energy Program
—Neighborhood Services
—School Lunch
—Southend Community Center
—Southend Dental Clinic
—Stamford Youth Coordinating and Planning Agency
—Viewpoint Recovery Program
—Youth Employment and Education Program

Connecticut Legal Services
Council of Churches and Synagogues
Easter Seal Rehabilitation Center of Southwestern Connecticut
Elderly Nutrition Program
Family and Children's Services
Family Life Workshop
Gateway Communities
Girl Scouts—Southwestern Connecticut Council
Hartman Regional Theater Company
Head Start Program—Stamford
Horizon Summer Program
Hospice of Stamford, Inc.
Hot Line
Info Line of Southwestern Connecticut
Jewish Family Service
Let's Play House
Liberation Program, Inc.
Literacy Volunteers of Stamford
Meals on Wheels of Stamford-Darien, Inc.
Meridian House Foundation, Inc.
New Covenant House of Hospitality
New Neighborhoods, Inc.
Person to Person
Polish/Slavic Information Center
Rape Crisis Center of Stamford
Rogers School Community Center Organization
Salvation Army
Senior Employment Service
Southfield Community Organization
Southwestern Area Commerce and Industry Association
Stamford Boys' Club, Inc.
Stamford Counseling Center
Stamford Economic Assistance Corp.
Stamford Girls' Club
Stamford Museum and Nature Center
Stamford State Opera
United Way of Stamford
Urban League of Southwestern Fairfield County
Visiting Nurse Association
Voluntary Action Center
YMCA of Stamford
YWCA of Stamford
Yerwood Center
Zion Lutheran Church

Dimitras

(Continued from page 15)

that Greece is partly to blame and should therefore make some concessions. The majority of Greeks in 1980 preferred direct negotiations with Turkey to mediation by the superpowers.

The average Greek, being suspicious of or hostile toward the stronger countries of the East and West, is hoping for a compromise with Turkey that will allow these two small countries to prosper in cooperation, as happened in the 1930s and 1940s. This conclusion will startle all those familiar with the strongly chauvinistic and vehemently anti-Turkish education in Greek schools.

Conclusion

Greek public attitudes are a strong reaction to 150 years of foreign intervention in Greek politics. In the short run, we do not foresee any spectacular changes. We can expect a slow improvement of the image of those institutions that are perceived as treating Greece in a way that furthers her national interests. If an agreement on U.S. bases is concluded and can be successfully presented to the Greeks, an improved image of the United States will result. That, coupled with an improvement in their relations with Turkey, will likely make the Greeks less hostile to NATO.

The key to this reinternationalization of Greek public opinion is the attitude of the government and that of its charismatic prime minister. If he gets satisfactory responses from the United States, NATO and the EEC, he can use his persuasiveness to swing voters toward the West. If the outcome of these negotiations is not satisfactory, Mr. Papandreou will probably revert to isolationist policies in order to avoid erosion of his party base. In that respect, 1983 is going to be a crucial year.

[1] The EURODIM survey is carried out in the Greater Athens area, where one-third of the Greek population live. Given the relative regional homogeneity of Greek political behavior, the results of an Athens poll have only a 5 to 7 percent leftward bias. In each poll, EURODIM conducts 700 interviews in 28 wards. Quota sampling is used. The population covered is voting age.

by G. Donald Ferree, Jr.,
W. Wayne Shannon, and Everett Carll Ladd

Stamford, Connecticut Weathers Reaganomics

During the past two years, as the Reagan administration has advanced new domestic policies, American politics has been dominated both by a sense of change and a debate over its wisdom. There have been heated arguments over the desirability of budget cuts and their effects on social services, and in general on the merit of efforts to scale back the domestic role of the national government. Curiously, all sides seem to agree on one key point—that a major reduction of government domestic programs is actually under way. In liberal circles the perception remains strong that the "Reagan Revolution" is decimating human service programs, while many conservatives suppose that a bloated and wasteful public service sector is at least in part being brought under control. But how much change in the scope of government really *has* been achieved? What have been the actual effects on delivery of services?

These are big questions, and they deserve sober, painstaking assessment. A half-century ago, in his great book on public opinion, Walter Lippmann worried about the gulf separating "the world outside"—things as they really are—from "the pictures in our heads." Today this gap often seems even wider than it was in Lippmann's time. Last spring and summer, we were given an opportunity to provide *one small part* of the answer to the question of what federal program changes *actually are* doing, when the Stamford (Connecticut) Foundation invited us to explore one, fairly small, southern New England city.

We conducted a large public survey (1,007 respondents) of Stamford residents, interviewed community leaders, collected budget data on city agencies and private nonprofit service providers for the fiscal years covering July 1, 1979 to July 1, 1982, and conducted extensive personal interviews with city and nonprofit agency officials.

Stamford can hardly be taken as the "representative" central city. For one thing, there is so much variety in American urban experience that no city is really typical. Beyond this, Stamford is different from many central cities of the Northeast: It is not economically troubled and declining. It has a highly educated population, a substantial but smaller proportion of the poor and minorities, and an expanding economy.

In many ways, Stamford resembles a "sunbelt city." Its modern population experience has been one of growth rather than decline. In 1940, when Hartford had 166,000 people and New Haven 160,000, Stamford was a very small city of 48,000 residents. After 1940, the

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The Stamford Community Project was a project of the Institute for Social Inquiry of the University of Connecticut. W. Wayne Shannon served as project director. Other principal investigators were G. Donald Ferree, Jr., Everett Carll Ladd and Carol W. Lewis. Francis J. Leazes, Jr. and Kenneth Trayes, Jr. were senior project associates. The study was sponsored by the Stamford Foundation. Our 250-page report, Stamford's Public Sector: Responses to a Changing Federal Role, *was published in October 1982 and is available from the Institute for Social Inquiry (Telephone: 203/486-4440).*

population of Connecticut's larger cities declined, but Stamford's grew steadily until the 1970s when a modest decline occurred. This population profile is much like that of many newer cities of the South and West, and quite different from that of most older northeastern urban places.

In recent years, the minority population of Stamford has grown significantly. For example, in 1950 just 5 percent of the population was black, but by 1980 the proportion had tripled. The Hispanic population also increased substantially, reaching nearly 6 percent of the total in 1980. Still, with nearly four-fifths of its residents from non-Hispanic European origins, Stamford has a far smaller minority population than most northeastern central cities. Blacks and Hispanics, for example, are now a clear majority in Hartford.

While most of the older northeastern cities are poorer than the states where they are located, Stamford residents continue to be better off than the entire Connecticut populace. In 1970, when the state's median family income was $11,811, Stamford's was $13,571. In 1980, even with the substantial influx of lower income minority residents, the Stamford median was $26,692, against a state figure of $23,151. Similarly, Stamford is an anomaly among northeastern cities in its educational base: a higher proportion of its residents than of the state as a whole are college graduates—this even though Connecticut itself ranks high in educational attainment. Property values and property costs are far higher in Stamford than in any other Connecticut city and far surpass the state averages. Unemployment is lower than in other central cities.

Nonetheless, Stamford faces the same kind of human service delivery problems as cities across the country, and it operates in the same general environment of federal program changes.

The Stamford Results

Our inquiry yielded a remarkably clear and consistent set of results. The public opinion survey, analysis of city and nonprofit agency budgets, and interviews with agency staff all point to a single conclusion: *Despite the widespread perception that significant governmental changes are under way, there was only the most modest evidence of real impact on city agencies, the community's nonprofit organizations, and the public.* In each case the effects of federal policy changes were incremental—certainly not the stuff of "revolution."

Interviews with city administrators revealed considerable anxiety, but they presented little hard evidence that federal policy has had substantial effects. Despite a sharp decline of CETA (Comprehensive Employment and Training Act) funding and some erosion of Community Development Block Grant and other federal monies, most government agencies in Stamford reported little change in service delivery. Aside from CETA-paid public service workers, no layoffs had occurred in the city agencies. When asked if changing federal policies would lead to real losses of services to local residents, city administrators responded with a wide and varied list of *potential service reductions* but presented little evidence of *actual reductions* in their own agencies. We concluded that a recent state-mandated reassessment of real properties and a local tax revolt were easily more consequential in creating stress on the city budget than federal funding cuts or program changes.

A similar pattern was found in Stamford's nonprofit human service agencies. With the help of a panel of local experts, we identified a large and representative group of nonprofit agencies. (See page 20.) Some fifty-five agencies provided budget data and consented to personal interviews. To our knowledge, there has been no inquiry of comparable depth on the impact of federal policies on a community's nonprofit sector.

Although we tried to identify federal dollars from every possible source, we found—with some surprise, given all the talk about the "federalization" of the nonprofit sector—that twenty-seven of the agencies received no federal support at all. Federal funding to the other twenty-eight declined from $4,774,286 in fiscal year 1980 to $4,468,150 in fiscal year 1982. This relatively modest overall change masks sharp differences in individual agencies' experiences. Some agencies had funding increases while others felt sharp decreases. Two agencies, the Committee on Training and Employment (the city's antipoverty program) and Stamford Legal Services, have had significant federal funding reductions, losing, respectively, 28 percent and 26 percent of their overall budgets in *inflation-adjusted dollars* from fiscal years 1980 to 1982. But these agencies are exceptional—in a class by themselves among the Stamford nonprofit organizations. Our data by no means support the conclusion that the city's nonprofit service delivery sector, as a whole, had entered into a period of austerity and service reduction. And, whether or not they were living in a fools' paradise, the great majority of Stamford's nonprofit agencies did not foresee a coming threat. In fact, only *three* of the fifty-five expected their overall budgets to be lower in 1983 than in 1982.

How the People See It

To obtain the public's perspective on service delivery programs and changes that may have been affecting them, we interviewed 1,007 adult Stamford residents by telephone in late June and early July. This survey shows that the citizens of Stamford, like their counterparts across the nation, want a lot of public services—and last summer, they feared that major service losses were resulting from federal funding cuts. When asked, "Is there any particular area where you think there has been or will be a real loss of services?" large numbers mentioned at least one—with services for the elderly, education, and welfare heading this list. (See table 1.) There was remarkable agreement across the various social, economic, and ethnic groups that services would be lost. However, when respondents were then asked,

Table 1
PERCEIVED LOSS OF SERVICES
(Stamford)

Question: Is there any particular area where you think there has been or will be a real loss of services? . . . (If so) Where? (accept up to 3)

Areas in which a loss of services was cited:	Number of responses	Percent of total
Social security and the elderly	236	23.4
Education	197	19.6
Welfare	149	14.8
Jobs	59	5.9
Health	40	4.0
Housing	27	2.7
Mass transit	27	2.7
Student loans	25	2.5
Food stamps	18	1.8
Aid for the handicapped	15	1.5
Day care	24	2.4
Youth programs	31	3.1
All others	104	10.3
No loss mentioned	401	39.8

Note: 606 respondents cited at least one area; the numbers add to more than 606 because of multiple responses. Sample = 1,007 respondents.

Source: Survey by the Institute for Social Inquiry, University of Connecticut, with fieldwork done by Yankelovich, Skelly and White, June-July 1982.

"Have you or anyone in your family lost or been denied any service because of federal cutbacks?" and were specifically encouraged to mention up to three service losses, their responses were far different. Just one in eight (13 percent) claimed that someone in the family had lost a benefit. (The proportion was somewhat higher, 17 percent, among nonwhites.) Overall, 13 percent mentioned one service area, and only the smallest fraction mentioned more than one. Losses cited most frequently—by 5 percent and 3 percent of our sample, respectively—were in student loans and social security. These programs are by no means targeted exclusively to the disadvantaged—and, indeed, the proportions citing losses in them were distributed quite evenly across all the income groups in the sample. Some 2 percent mentioned jobs in various ways. Programs for the poor —such as welfare, food stamps, CETA, and legal aid—were rarely cited as areas where cutbacks had been felt. (See table 2.) It should be stressed that we interviewed a cross-section of the entire community: *The poor themselves, not just the middle- and upper-middle class respondents, failed to report cuts in social welfare programs.*

In another part of the survey, we asked those who said their families had used such specific services as child care, job training, clinics and health care, housing, and aid for the handicapped and the elderly if they had noticed any change in the service over the last year. Service decreases were noted by only very small minorities. Table 3 shows the proportion reporting a decrease in service. Although blacks and other nonwhites in Stamford showed a greater tendency to report recent decreases in services, the percentage citing such losses never exceeded seven in any group. Among whites, those with low incomes were only slightly more likely to cite service losses than the more affluent.

Table 2
ACTUAL LOSS OF SERVICES
(Stamford)

Question: Have you or anyone in your family lost or been denied any service because of federal cutbacks? . . . (If so) And what was that?

Areas in which a loss of services was cited:	Number of responses	Percent of total
Student loans	49	4.9
Social security and the elderly	30	3.0
Jobs	20	2.0
Education	8	.8
Welfare	4	.4
Health	3	.3
Housing	3	.3
Food stamps	3	.3
Youth programs	3	.3
Veterans programs	2	.2
Day care	1	.1
Aid for the handicapped	1	.1
Legal aid	1	.1
All others	13	1.3
No loss mentioned	880	87.4

Note: 127 respondents cited at least one area; the numbers add to more than 127 due to multiple responses. Sample = 1,007 respondents.

Source: Survey by the Institute for Social Inquiry, University of Connecticut, with fieldwork done by Yankelovich, Skelly and White, June-July 1982.

Table 3
PERCENT REPORTING DECREASE IN SERVICE BY RACE AND INCOME
(Stamford)

Question: Have you noticed any actual change in the level of the service over the past year or so?

Has the level of service provided increased, decreased, or what? (Type of service) . . . Child Care? . . . Job Training? . . . Clinics and other Health Services? . . . Housing? . . . Handicapped? . . . Elderly? . . . Other? . . .

Areas in which a decrease in service was cited:	Whites	Blacks	Others (mainly Hispanic)
Child care	0%	2%	7%
Job training	0	1	0
Health	1	3	0
Housing	1	7	4
Handicapped	0	1	2
Elderly	1	4	0
Others	2	2	4

	Whites less than $10,000	Whites $10-20,000	Whites $20-50,000	Whites $50,000 and over
Child care	0%	0%	0%	1%
Job training	0	0	0	1
Health	4	0	1	1
Housing	4	0	1	0
Handicapped	0	1	0	1
Elderly	0	1	1	2
Others	0	0	2	2

Source: Survey by the Institute for Social Inquiry, University of Connecticut, with fieldwork done by Yankelovich, Skelly and White, June-July 1982.

Several colleagues to whom we reported these data expressed doubts about them. At the core of their concern, it seems, was that our survey findings were incompatible with the pictures in their heads: the "Reagan Revolution" against government was in full swing so many people *must* be facing service losses. We received no answer when we asked why people who had lost government services and benefits would not acknowledge this to the competent professional interviewers of Yankelovich, Skelly and White (who generously did the field work for us from their Stamford offices). If anything, people might be expected to exaggerate, or to mention problems that were real, but unconnected to recent program changes. It was pointed out that (1) our Stamford poll might have come too early (June 1982) to reflect the effect of cuts, and (2) that "Gold Coast" Stamford is hardly typical of Connecticut or the country at large.

To respond to these concerns, we repeated in December the two basic questions—on expected service losses and actual service losses—in a Connecticut Poll survey of 500 adults across the state. The statewide answers were virtually identical to those given in Stamford six months earlier. About half of the Connecticut sample said they thought many services were being cut back. Social security and other benefits for the elderly, education, and welfare led the list. (See table 4.) But when respondents were asked if they or anyone in their family had lost or been denied service or benefits, only a very small minority said they had. (See table 5.) As in Stamford, the losses most frequently cited were in student loans (4.4 percent), social security benefits (2.6 percent), and job programs (2 percent). Governmental initiatives such as welfare and food stamps, targeted specifically to the poor, were cited by 1 percent or less of the statewide sample.

Table 4
PERCEIVED LOSS OF SERVICES
(Connecticut)

Question: Is there any particular area where you think there has been or will be a real loss of services? . . . (If so) Where? (accept up to 3)

Areas in which a loss of services was cited:	Number of responses	Percent of total
Social security and the elderly	143	28.6
Education	74	14.8
Welfare	70	14.0
Jobs	32	6.4
Student loans	23	4.6
Health	18	3.6
Unemployment	11	2.2
Food stamps	11	2.2
Housing	8	1.6
Youth programs	8	1.6
Environment	7	1.4
Mental health	7	1.4
Arts	6	1.2
All others	64	12.8
No loss mentioned	252	50.4

Note: 249 respondents cited at least one area; the numbers add to more than 249 due to multiple responses. Sample = 500 respondents.

Source: Survey by the Institute for Social Inquiry, University of Connecticut, December 1982.

Table 5
ACTUAL LOSS OF SERVICES
(Connecticut)

Question: Have you or anyone in your family lost or been denied any service because of federal outbacks? . . . (If so) And what was that?

Areas in which a loss of services was cited:	Number of responses	Percent of total
Student loans	22	4.4
Social security and the elderly	20	4.0
Jobs	10	2.0
Welfare	6	1.2
Food stamps	5	1.0
Education	4	.8
Unemployment	3	.6
Youth programs	2	.4
Veterans programs	2	.4
Housing	1	.2
Health	1	.2
All others	10	2.0
No loss mentioned	442	84.4

Note: 78 respondents cited at least one area; the numbers add to more than 78 due to multiple responses. Sample = 500 respondents.

Source: Survey by the Institute for Social Inquiry, University of Connecticut, December 1982.

Further Work

Two years into the "Reagan Revolution," the statewide Connecticut data suggest only the most marginal impact of changing federal policies on the delivery of social services—as seen by the public in their personal experiences. The most frequently felt impact has been on such "middle class" programs as student loans and social security—which the Reagan administration has altered only slightly. Overall, no group, the poor included, identifies any substantial effects on the government services provided to it. Actual budgetary data for Stamford are consistent with the opinion poll findings.

Because Connecticut might be different from other parts of the country, we should poll nationally to yield factual data on people's experiences with the provision of services, including the loss of services. In such an enterprise, of course, great care should be taken, for bias could easily be introduced. Still, polls can inform us about the impact of governmental programs and changes therein—by asking people about their circumstances. In particular, given all the speculation about vast governmental changes occurring in the early 1980s, it is curious that we now have so little systematic survey data on what people say have been the effects on their own lives.

AMERICAN DIFFERENCES: A REGIONAL REVIEW



Throughout American history, regional differences have loomed large in the country's life. Though boundaries have shifted (for example, the "West" in 1810 included Ohio and Illinois), sectionalism has always been the starting point for those trying to locate the most important national divisions—whether social and cultural, economic, or political. In the pages that follow, we inquire about the present status of American regionalism, especially from a perspective informed by public opinion research. Throughout, we work largely with the nine "census divisions" into which the United States is carved for much statistical analysis: (1) New England and (2) the Middle Atlantic states, which form the Northeastern region; (3) the East North Central and (4) West North Central states, often lumped together as the "Midwest"; (5) the South Atlantic, (6) East South Central, and (7) West South Central states, which together are the "South"; and (8) the Mountain and (9) Pacific states of the present-day "West." *

Much of the popular literature in recent years has either dwelt upon "ominous" trends in American regional experience or has emphasized the sheer magnitude of regional differences. In the former portrait, the energy-poor Frostbelt is seen in a state of secular decline—losing jobs, people, and political power to the buoyant Sunbelt. In the latter depiction—as, for example, in Joel Garreau's *The Nine Nations of North America*—such U.S. regions as New England, "Dixie," "the Foundry," "the Breadbasket," and "Ectopia," are today so dissimilar that their inhabitants actually "feel a dual citizenship"! ". . . each nation has a different prism through which it views the world."

Many of us who write are prone to a little exaggeration, but the popular literature on regionalism has gone well beyond that; it has the story completely twisted. The main economic trend, for example, is not *Frostbelt decline* but rather steady convergence in the regions' economic status. As the graph on page 22 shows, vast inequalities distinguished the principal U.S. regions at the turn of the century. The magnitude was much like that which today separates Canadian provinces—for instance, oil-rich Alberta and the industry-poor Maritimes. Over the last half-century in the United States, though, per capita income by region has become dramatically more uniform. The Sunbelt states of the Southeast have indeed improved their position vis-à-vis the Northeast and Midwest—but this improvement must be understood as *a reduction of the Southeast's historic economic lag.*

In social and political terms, America's regions have also come closer together. Racial attitudes in the southern states still differ from those elsewhere in the country, but they are much less dissimilar now than they were three and four decades ago. Sectional differences in party identification are now much smaller than they used to be. The trend in political attitudes generally is toward regional convergence.

None of this suggests that sectional variations have disappeared or that some are likely to. Especially on such "social questions" as abortion, sexual norms, and the role of women, and on such cultural outlooks as religious beliefs, regional differences remain striking. We display survey findings on many of these questions on pages 22-33. The reader will note a pronounced "bicoastal liberalism," with New England, the Middle Atlantic, and the Pacific states the most "socially liberal," and the "heartland" South and Midwest decidedly more conservative.

Still, even as we remark upon the persistence of regional differences in social attitudes—in the face of such homogenizing influences as greater economic equality and a nation-encompassing system of communications—we should not forget the trend lines. The American experience shows an unmistakable decline in regional social, economic, and political differences.

Everett Carll Ladd

* Unless otherwise indicated, Census regions are used throughout this section. They are: *New England* = Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island. *Middle Atlantic* = New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey. *East North Central* = Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Wisconsin, Illinois. *West North Central* = Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas. *South Atlantic* = Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida. *East South Central* = Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi. *West South Central* = Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas. *Mountain* = Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, Wyoming, Montana, Idaho, Utah, Nevada. *Pacific* = California, Oregon, Washington, Alaska, Hawaii.

INCOMES CONVERGE



Note: Bureau of Economic Analysis regional groupings: *New England* = Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island. *Mideast* = New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia. *Southeast* = Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana. *Southwest* = Oklahoma, Texas, Arizona, New Mexico. *Rocky Mountain* = Colorado, Wyoming, Montana, Idaho, Utah. *Far West* = Nevada, California, Oregon, Washington. *Plains* = Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas. *Great Lakes* = Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Wisconsin, Illinois. Not classified, Alaska, Hawaii.

Regional per capita incomes as a percent of U.S. average

Region	1900	1930	1950	1960	1970	1975	1980	1981
New England	134	129	107	110	100	103	98	105
Mideast	138	143	117	116	113	109	110	108
Great Lakes	106	110	111	108	104	104	102	102
Plains	97	62	95	93	95	98	94	98
Southeast	48	50	68	73	82	86	83	86
Southwest	68	64	87	87	89	93	93	99
Rocky Mountain	145	86	97	94	91	94	94	96
Far West	163	131	120	116	111	111	109	111

REGIONS IN PER CAPITA INCOME ORDER, 1930 and 1981

	1930	1981
Highest	Mideast	Far West
	Far West	Mideast
	New England	New England
	Great Lakes	Great Lakes
	Rocky Mountain	Southwest
	Southwest	Plains
	Plains	Rocky Mountain
Lowest	Southeast	Southeast

Source: *Regional Growth: Historical Perspective.* Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, June 1980, p. 11. 1981 figures supplied by ACIR.

ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: FOLLOWING THE SUN



Note: *Based on current dollars. Data include the District of Columbia and exclude Alaska and Hawaii. BEA regions are used here because they are organized according to industrial similarities and they reflect historical development.

Source: Mark Perlman, *Patterns of Regional Economic Decline and Growth: The Past and What Has Been Happening Lately* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1982).

EDUCATION AND OCCUPATION

Question: What is the highest grade in elementary school or high school that you finished and got credit for?



Note: Data combined for 1977, 1978, 1980, and 1982.
Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1977, 1978, 1980, and 1982.

PERCENT OF REGIONAL POPULATION LIVING ON FARMS, 1950 AND 1980



Note: 1950 figures based on self-identification by respondents as to whether they live on a farm, and are not based on any criterion for the definition of a farm. 1980 figures are based on the 1974 census definition which states that the "farm population consists of all persons living on farms in rural areas." Excludes Puerto Rico.
Source: *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1981, pp. 10 and 659.

REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE NON-AGRICULTURAL WORK FORCE

Of those living in:

New England	Middle Atlantic	East North Central	West North Central	South Atlantic	East South Central	West South Central	Mountain	Pacific	**Percent work in:**
28%	24%	28%	20%	21%	27%	18%	13%	20%	Manufacturing (22%)
22	21	22	25	22	21	24	24	23	Wholesale and Retail (23%)
15	17	16	18	21	20	18	21	19	Government (18%)
22	22	19	20	19	16	17	21	21	Services (20%)
4	6	5	6	6	5	6	6	6	Transportation and Public Utilities (6%)
6	7	5	5	5	4	5	5	6	Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate (6%)
3	3	4	4	6	5	7	6	5	Construction (5%)

Note: The total non-agricultural work force includes those in mining, a category not included in this table. The percentages as shown for the mountain states add up to only 96 because 4% of the labor force in that region are engaged in mining. Numbers in parentheses are national figures.
Source: Computed from *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1981, p. 395.

THE MELTING POT

Question: From what countries or part of the world did your ancestors come? (Ask if more than one country named:) Which one of these countries do you feel closer to?

Of those living in:

New England	Middle Atlantic	East North Central	West North Central	South Atlantic	East South Central	West South Central	Mountain	Pacific	Percent of ancestors came from:
1%	5%	4%	5%	14%	8%	12%	*	5%	Africa
17	10	11	13	15	15	12	11%	12	Ireland
16	14	4	2	2	1	1	6	5	Italy
12	6	5	2	1	2	2	1	2	Poland
0	1	2	3	7	14	8	2	2	American Indian
10	23	28	37	17	12	19	24	17	Germany/Austria
1	2	12	11	2	1	2	13	7	Denmark/Sweden/Norway/Finland
15	12	14	14	27	34	17	23	20	England/Scotland/Wales

Note: * = less than .5 percent. Data combined for 1977, 1978, 1980, 1982. Categories "Canada (French)," "Canada (Other)," "Mexico," "Puerto Rico," "America," and "Other" not shown.

Source: Surveys by National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1982.

RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCES STILL STRONG

Question: What is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other religion, or no religion?

Question: How often do you attend religious services?



Note: * = less than .5%. Data combined for 1977, 1978, 1980, and 1982.

Note: Seldom = Less than once a year/About once a year/Several times a year. Fairly often = About once a month/2-3 times a month/Nearly every week. Regularly = Every week/Several times a week. Data combined for 1977, 1978, 1980, and 1982.

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1977, 1978, 1980, and 1982.

MOOD: ROCKY MOUNTAIN HIGH

Question: Thinking of the concept of the good life, how good do you think your chances are of achieving it—very good, fairly good, not very good, or not good at all?

Very good chance of achieving good life



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 82-1), December 5-12, 1981.

Question: In general, do you find life exciting, pretty routine, or dull?

Find life exciting



Note: Data combined for 1977, 1980, and 1982.
Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1977, 1980, and 1982.

SOCIAL ISSUES: BICOASTAL LIBERALISM

Question: Do you favor or oppose passage of the Equal Rights Amendment? (Asked of respondents who had heard or read about the Equal Rights Amendment = 83%)

Favor passage of the Equal Rights Amendment



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, December 11-14, 1981.

Question: After each item on the list below, please indicate in the appropriate box whether you personally are basically for, or basically against the item . . . The death penalty for murderers.

Favor death penalty for murderers



Note: National response = 79%. Sample size = 24,438 voters as they left voting booths.
Source: Survey by ABC News, November 2, 1982.

Question: Do you agree or disagree with this statement? Women should take care of running their houses and leave running the country up to men.

Agree, women should take care of running their houses and leave running the country up to men



Note: Data combined for 1977, 1978, and 1982.
Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1977, 1978, and 1982.

Question: Please tell me whether or not *you* think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a *legal* abortion if . . . the woman wants it for any reason?

A woman should be able to obtain a legal abortion if she wants it for any reason



Note: Data combined for 1977, 1978, 1980, and 1982.

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1977, 1978, 1980, and 1982.

Question: Please tell me whether or not *you* think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a *legal* abortion if . . . she is not married and does not want to marry the man?

Pregnant woman should be able to obtain a legal abortion if she is not married and does not want to marry the man



Note: Data combined for 1977, 1978, 1980, and 1982.

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1977, 1978, 1980, and 1982.

Question: The United States Supreme Court has ruled that no state or local government may *require* the reading of the Lord's Prayer or Bible verses in public schools. What are your views on this—do you approve or disapprove of the court ruling?

Approve of Supreme Court ruling that no state or local government may require the reading of the Lord's prayer or Bible verses in schools



Note: Data combined for 1977 and 1982.

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1977 and 1982.

Question: There's been a lot of discussion about the way morals and attitudes about sex are changing in this country. If a man and a woman have sex relations before marriage, do you think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all?

Always wrong/almost always wrong for a man and a woman to have sex before marriage



Note: Data combined for 1977, 1978, and 1982.

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1977, 1978, and 1982.

Question: What about sexual relations between two *adults* of the *same* sex—do you think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all?

Homosexual relations are always wrong/ almost always wrong



Note: Data combined for 1977, 1980, and 1982.

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1977, 1980, and 1982.

Question: Now, I should like to ask you some questions about a man who admits he is a Communist. . . . Suppose he is teaching in a college. Should he be fired, or not?

An admitted Communist should be allowed to teach at a college/should not be fired



Note: Data combined for 1977, 1980, and 1982.

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1977, 1980, and 1982.

RELIGIOUS ISSUES: CONTINENTAL DIVIDES

Question: Here are five pairs of statements about religion. (Hand respondent card) Would you tell me which statement in each pair comes closest to describing your practices or beliefs? . . . Statement A: The Bible is the word of God recorded without mistake. Statement B: The Bible was written by men and is subject to personal interpretation. . . . Statement A: Have been "born again." Statement B: Have not been "born again." . . . Statement A: The Devil really exists. Statement B: The Devil is a convenient term for evil.

The Bible is the word of God recorded without mistake



Have been "born again"



The Devil really exists



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 82-3) February 12-27, 1982.

Question: How important would you say religion is in your own life—would you say very important, fairly important, or not very important?

Religion very important in life



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, December 11-14, 1981.

SOUTHERN DISCOMFORT

Question: If the question of national prohibition should come up again, would you vote wet, or dry?

Would vote wet if question of national prohibition came up again

1942



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, November 12-17, 1942.

Question: Would you favor or oppose a law forbidding the sale of all beer, wine, and liquor throughout the nation?

Oppose law forbidding sale of alcohol throughout nation

1981

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, January 9-12, 1981.

POLITICS AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Question: We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First (Read item A) . . . are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on (item)? . . . Welfare . . . Improving and protecting the nation's health?

Spending too much on welfare



Spending too little on improving and protecting the nation's health



Note: Data combined for 1977, 1978, 1980, and 1982.
Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1977, 1978, 1980, and 1982.

Question: Do you think it will be best for the future of this country if we take an active part in world affairs, or if we stay out of world affairs?

Best for the country if we take an active part in world affairs



Note: Data combined for 1978 and 1982.
Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1978 and 1982.

Question: After each item on the list below, please indicate in the appropriate box whether you personally are basically for, or basically against the item. . . . An immediate freeze of nuclear weapons.

For an immediate nuclear freeze

Voters as they left voting booths



Note: Sample = 24,438 voters as they left the voting booth.
Source: Survey by ABC News, November 2, 1982.

POLITICS: T

REPUBLICAN PERCENTAGE OF PO



Source: For 1952 and 1956, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colon* 1976, p. 456. For 1964-1980, *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1981, p. 4

THEN AND NOW

Question: In politics, do you consider yourself a Republican, Socialist, Independent, or Democrat?



Note: "Other" category which included Socialist calculated out for comparison purposes.

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, July 21-26, 1940.

Question: Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent, or what?



Note: "Other party"/"Refused to say" calculated out for comparison purposes. Data combined for 1977, 1978, 1980, and 1982.

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1977, 1978, 1980, and 1982.

Question: Regardless of the party you may favor, do you lean more toward the liberal side or the conservative side politically?



Note: National response: "Liberal side" = 24%, "Somewhere in between" = 38%, "Conservative side" = 38%. Sample size = 24,438 voters as they left voting booths.

Source: Survey by ABC News, November 2, 1982.

THE REGIONS

ULAR VOTE FOR PRESIDENT, 1952-1980



Times to 1970, Vol. 2, p. 1,077-8. For 1980, *Statistical Abstract of the United States,*

REAGAN

Question: Which statement comes closest for you: Reaganomics a success, Reaganomics a failure, Reaganomics needs more time?

Reaganomics a success | *Failure* | *Needs more time*

Voters as they left voting booths



Note: Sample size = 11,618 voters as they left voting booths. *New England* = CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT. *Mid Atlantic* = DE, DC, MD, NJ, NY, PA, WV. *Industrial Midwest* = IL, IN, MI, OH, WI. *Midwest Farm* = IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, SD, ND. *New South* = AR, FL, KY, NC, OK, TN, TX, VA. *Deep South* = AL, GA, LA, MS, SC. *Mountain* = AZ, CO, ID, MT, NV, NM, UT, WY. *Pacific* = AK, CA, HI, OR, WA.

Source: Survey by NBC News/Associated Press, November 2, 1982.

Question: Do you think Reagan's program of cuts in federal spending and cuts in income taxes will eventually help the nation's economy or not?

Reagan's program of federal spending and income tax cuts will eventually help the economy | *Will not help*



Note: Sample size = 24,438 voters as they left the voting booths.

Source: Survey by ABC News, November 2, 1982.

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling his job as President?

Approve of Reagan's handling of job as President | *Disapprove*



Note: Sample size = 24,438 voters as they left the voting booths.

Source: Survey by ABC News, November 2, 1982.

Note: Subsequent Reagan approval ratings among the general public have been lower than this poll of voters as they left the voting booths (see p. 36 for latest Gallup ratings). The exit poll, with its large sample, enables us to look at the ninefold regions.

ADA AND ACA RATINGS OF THE 97th CONGRESS, 2nd SESSION, 1982

Each year, the Americans for Democratic Action and the Americans for Constitutional Action "rate" members of Congress on selected votes. Each member is given a score, representing the number of times he voted correctly according to the rating group. The figure below shows the interaction of party and region by displaying the average score congressmen and senators received, by region. The pattern closely resembles the bicoastal liberalism shown on pages 26 and 27.

PARTY AND REGION INTERACT


Democrats
Republicans
Senate
ADA
ACA
New England 92% 54% 17% 47%
Middle Atlantic 98% 44% 28% 56%
East North Central 83% 23% 31% 70%
West North Central 54% 30% 44% 63%
South Atlantic 59% 17% 42% 70%
East South Central 50% 7% 47% 82%
West South Central 48% 10% 52% 85%
Mountain 69% 8% 37% 79%
Pacific 81% 33% 22% 54%
National: Democrats 69% Republicans 25% Democrats 36% Republicans 66%
House
New England 85% 64% 13% 38%
Middle Atlantic 81% 32% 14% 59%
East North Central 77% 20% 15% 76%
West North Central 70% 21% 22% 74%
South Atlantic 38% 8% 46% 83%
East South Central 39% 9% 42% 82%
West South Central 31% 7% 52% 87%
Mountain 72% 6% 20% 88%
Pacific 79% 8% 15% 89%
National: Democrats 63% Republicans 19% Democrats 27% Republicans 75%

Source: Americans for Democratic Action press release, January 2, 1983; 1982 ACARI Index, Americans for Constitutional Action, October 1982.

RACE: SOUTH SLOWLY JOINS THE NATION

Question: Another of Truman's proposals concerns interstate travel. Do you think Negroes should or should not be required to occupy a separate part of a train or bus when traveling from one state to another?

1948

Negroes should be required to occupy a separate part of train or bus when travelling from one state to another



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, March 5-10, 1948.

Question: One of Truman's proposals concerns employment practices. How far do you yourself think the federal government should go in requiring employers to hire people without regard to their race, religion, color, or nationality?

Federal government should go all the way in requiring employers to hire people without regard for race, religion, color or nationality



Note: Categories "Part of the way," "Should be left to states," "Qualified as to race, religion or color," "Creed shouldn't enter, but race is important," and "Doesn't matter—ways to evade it" not shown. All responses to these categories were less than 13%.

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, March 5-10, 1948.

Question: Here are some opinions other people have expressed in connection with (Negro/black)—white relations. Which statement on the card comes closest to how you, yourself, feel? (Agree strongly, agree slightly, disagree slightly, disagree strongly)? . . . White people have a right to keep (Negroes/blacks) out of their neighborhoods if they want to, and (Negroes/blacks) should respect that right.

Agree, whites have a right to keep blacks out of their neighborhoods if they want to and blacks should respect that right

White response



Note: Data combined for 1977, 1980, and 1982. "Agree" = "Agree strongly/Agree slightly."

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1977, 1980, and 1982.

Question: Here are a few questions regarding race relations in our country. We'd like your opinion. Do you think white students and (Negro/black) students should go to the same schools or to separate schools?

White and black students should go to same schools

White response



Note: Data combined for 1977, 1980, and 1982.

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1977, 1980, and 1982.

TV DINERS

Question: Some people read or watch TV or listen to the radio while they eat. Which of these things, if any, do you personally usually do while you eat your evening meal? (Card shown respondent)



Note: Numbers add to more than 100% due to multiple responses.

Question: There are many different styles of food and cooking—regional and national. Which of these kinds of foods and cooking do you really enjoy? (Card shown respondent)



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 83-1), December 4-11, 1982.

THE PUBLIC LOOKS AHEAD

Feelings of optimism/pessimism, whether about one's personal situation or the state of the nation, seem to be influenced strongly by two broad experiences: one involving the country's political health and direction; the other its economic performance. When assessments of both are down—as they were in 1974—with the economy buried in recession and the polity in Watergate—the public is necessarily highly pessimistic. When both are up, optimism soars. Frequently one gets different mixes of these two variables. This was the case in 1982, as shown in the charts which follow. Economic performance was mixed—with unemployment up but inflation down—and the public's sense of political direction showed unease but not negativism.

Polls conducted by the Roper Organization over the last decade give an interesting indication of the interaction of these two components of optimism/pessimism. Each December, Roper has asked the pair of questions shown below. In December 1974, Americans were highly pessimistic in both personal and national terms. In December 1976, however, with the country out of recession and a new president just elected, personal and national optimism took off. In December 1978, pessimism had again risen, while in December 1980 the public was optimistic once more. We see a striking set of two-year alternations, then, tied to fluctuations of economic performance and to the degree of satisfaction with national political leadership. The latter was understandably higher as new presidents took office following the elections of 1976 and 1980.

In 1982, however, the pattern of steady two-year alternations broke. In both personal assessment and expectations for the country, Americans showed the optimism that had been theirs in 1976 and 1980. Roper called attention to this in releasing his data. Personal expectations, he wrote, are "a good deal closer to the level of ebullience that existed as President Carter was about to take office than they are to the gloomy levels that existed at the time of the last big recession in 1974." Similarly, Roper noted, expectations for the nation "come much closer to expressing . . . optimism than to expressing the kind of pessimism that existed at the time of the last recession." In late 1982, assessments of the economy's future showed bright spots as well as deep concern; this, together with the public's relative confidence in national leadership and direction, produced a dramatically different, far more optimistic mood.

Everett Carll Ladd

GREATER EXPECTATIONS

Question: Do you expect (following year named) to be a better year for you than (present year named), about the same, or not as good as (present year named)?



Note: October 1971 survey by the Roper Organization, but prior to the Roper Reports.

Question: Now, at the start of this interview I asked you what (following year named) looks like to you in personal terms. Thinking about the country as a whole, what kind of year do you think (following year named) will be for the nation—better than (present year named), about the same, or not as good as (present year named)?



Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 83-1), latest that of December 4-11, 1982.

WHAT'S HAPPENING NOW

"36 percent of me had a good day, 42 percent had a bad day and 22 percent is undecided!"

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Question: Do you think the nation's economy is: getting better, getting worse, or staying the same?



Note: August 17, 1982 data based on sample size of 913. October 5-11, 1982 data based on those who answered certain, probably, or 50-50 chance when questioned whether they would vote in the 1982 election = 84%. November 2, 1982 ABC News exit poll responses: "Nation's economy getting better" = 32%, "Staying the same" = 25%, "Getting worse" = 44%.

Source: Surveys by ABC News/*Washington Post*, February 26-March 6, 1981, through November 17-22, 1981; ABC News, December 11-12, 1981; ABC News/*Washington Post*, January 22-30, 1982 through October 5-11, 1982 and January 18-23, 1983.

Question: We are interested in how people's financial situation may have changed. Would you say that you are financially better off now than you were a year ago or are you financially worse off now?

Question: Looking ahead—do you expect that at this time next year you will be financially better off than now or worse off than now?



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of November 5-8, 1982.

AND WHAT'S AHEAD

Question: Generally speaking, do you think now is a good time or a bad time to buy a house?
Question: Speaking now of the automobile market—do you think the next 12 months or so will be a good time or bad time to buy a car?



Note: The Michigan Index of Consumer Sentiment is a composite of five questions about current and future personal prospects, short and long-term national prospects, and current buying attitudes. The index was developed in 1952. The complete text of the questions can be found in *Public Opinion*, June/July 1980, p. 30.

Source: The Institute for Social Research, Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, latest that of January 1983.

Question: During the next 12 months, do you think that prices in general will go up, or go down, or stay where they are now? By about what percent do you expect prices to go up, on the average, during the next 12 months?
Question: How about people out of work during the coming 12 months—do you think that there will be more unemployment than now, about the same, or less?



Source: The Institute for Social Research, Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, latest that of December 1982.

Question: Do you think the economic program (Ronald Reagan's) eventually will help or hurt the country's economy?



Note: September data based on 1,305 registered adults. Responses to November 2, 1982 exit poll: "Reagan's economic program will eventually help the country" = 51%; "Hurt" = 42%; "No opinion" = 7%.
Source: Surveys by CBS News/*New York Times*, latest that of January 16-19, 1983.

REAGAN, THATCHER

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling his job as president? (United States)
Question: Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way Mrs. Thatcher is doing her job as prime minister? (Great Britain)
Question: Do you have complete confidence, some confidence, not very much confidence, or no confidence at all in Francois Mitterrand to resolve the problems facing France today?



Note: Confidence = "Complete confidence" + "A lot of confidence." No confidence = "Not much confidence" + "No confidence at all." The French firm BVA (Polling for *Paris Match*) uses a slightly different popularity measure. The BVA question "What opinion do you have of Francois Mitterrand as president of the Republic" shows Mitterrand moving from 61% with a good opinion ... May of 1981 to 48% in November 1982.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of January 14-17, 1983 (United States); Market & Opinion Research International, latest that of January 20-26, 1983 (Great Britain); SOFRES for *Figaro* magazine, latest that of January 20-27, 1983 (France).

REAGAN

1981	Approve	Disapprove	No opinion
June 5-8	59%	28%	13%
June 19-22	59	29	12
June 26-29	58	30	12
July 17-19	60	29	11
July 24-27	56	30	14
July 31-August 3	60	28	12
August 14-17	60	29	11
September 18-21	52	37	11
October 2-4	56	35	9
October 30-November 2	53	35	12
November 13-16	49	40	11
November 20-23	54	37	9
December 11-14	49	41	10
1982			
January 8-11	49	40	11
January 22-25	47	42	11
February 5-8	47	43	10
March 12-15	46	45	9
April 2-5	45	46	9
April 23-26	43	47	11
May 3	44	46	10
May 14-17	45	44	11
June 11-14	45	45	10
June 25-28	44	46	10
July 23-26	42	46	12
July 30-August 2	41	47	12
August 13-16	41	49	10
August 27-30	42	46	12
September 17-20	42	48	10
October 15-18	42	48	10
November 5-8	43	47	10
November 19-22	43	47	10
December 10-13	41	50	9
January 14-17	37	54	9

THATCHER

1981	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	No opinion
June	34%	61%	5%
July	31	62	7
August	29	64	7
September	28	65	7
October	30	65	5
November	28	64	8
December	25	66	9
1982			
January	32	61	7
February	30	63	7
March	36	57	7
April	41	53	6
May	56	40	4
June	59	36	5
July	51	41	8
August	49	43	8
September	46	48	6
October 7-12	46	46	8
October 21-26	46	46	8
November 4-10	47	46	7
November 18-24	48	45	7
December 9-15	47	45	8
January 6-12	49	43	8
January 20-26	49	45	6

AND MITTERRAND



MITTERRAND

	Confidence	No confidence	No opinion
1981			
June	74%	20%	6%
July	71	24	5
September	62	32	6
October	64	31	5
November	60	35	5
December	57	37	6
1982			
January	59	35	6
February	58	37	5
March	58	36	6
April	56	39	5
May	58	37	5
June	63	33	4
July	57	39	4
September	54	42	4
October	51	43	6
November	53	43	4
December	49	46	5
January 20-27	50	45	5

OPTIMISM UP IN GREAT BRITAIN AND U.S.

Question: (So) (As) far as you are concerned, do you think that (following year named) will be better or worse than (present year named)?







Note: U.S. 1983 predictions were based on a sample size of 1,038. For U.S., "same" category = 18% for 1978, 19% for 1981, 11% for 1982 and 10% for 1983. For France, "same" = 35% for 1972, 38% for 1978, 40% for 1979, 27% for 1980, 35% for 1981, 28% for 1982, and 36% for 1983. For Britain, "same" = 21% for 1978, 26% for 1979, 13% for 1980, 15% for 1981, 19% for 1982 and 22% for 1983. For Great Britain and for the U.S. "don't know" and "same" were combined for 1972, 30% and 21% respectively.

Source: Surveys by Gallup International Research Institute, latest that of November 19-28, 1982.

NADER'S NADIR?

Question: I am going to read you the names of different groups and people. Please tell me for each one, how good or bad a job they have done in protecting the interests of consumers—whether they have done an excellent job, a pretty good job, only a fair job, or a poor job—or do you know nothing about them?

Ralph Nader has done an excellent/pretty good job in protecting the interests of consumers



Note: In a 1981 Corporate Priorities report prepared by Yankelovich, Skelly and White, 40% of those surveyed said they "always/usually believe" Ralph Nader. 21% said "seldom/never believe."

Source: Surveys by Louis Harris and Associates; *Consumerism at the Crossroads* for the Sentry Insurance Company, November 27-December 7, 1976, and *Consumerism in the Eighties* for Atlantic Richfield Company, October 15-26, 1982.

by John F. Bibby

Patterns in Midterm Gubernatorial and State Legislative Elections

Commentators on midterm elections are consumed by a desire to discover from election returns whether or not the voters approve of the president's policies. In the 1982 House and Senate outcomes, however, there was no consensus. The Democratic Speaker of the House saw the Republican loss of twenty-six House seats as a disastrous defeat for the president; the Republican White House saw the same numbers as normal losses for a midterm and, therefore, no reason to change course. One difficulty in interpreting the midterm congressional elections is that net partisan swing of seats is normally such a small percentage of the total chamber

Table 1
CHANGE IN PARTISAN CONTROL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, 1982

Governors
(Elections in 36 states)[1]

	Rep.	Dem.
Net gain/loss	−7	+7
Incumbents reelected	6	13
Incumbents defeated	4	1
Open seats won	2	10

States with switched partisan control of governorship: 11
Republican to Democrat: 9
Democrat to Republican: 2

Pre-1982 Lineup		Post-1982 Lineup	
Republicans	23	Republicans	16
Democrats	27	Democrats	34

State Legislatures
(Elections in 45 states)

	Rep.	Dem.
Chambers gained	+2	+11
Chambers lost	−11	−2
Net chambers gained/lost	−9	+9
State legislatures where party gained control of both houses	−4	+4
Chambers in which party gained seats (no change: 14 chambers)[2]	24	51

	Pre-1982 Lineup		Post-1982 Lineup	
	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.	Dem.
Chambers controlled[3]	35	63	25	73
States in which party controlled both houses	15	29	10	34

[1] Republicans were defending 16 seats; Democrats were defending 20 seats.
[2] Both parties lost seats in the New Hampshire House due to the election of two independents in a tie in one district.
[3] Nebraska has a nonpartisan legislature and is not, therefore, included.

membership. In 1982, 2.2 percent of the House seats changed hands and no change took place in the Senate. Like most recent midterm contests, the 1982 congressional and senatorial elections convey more stability than change.

Ironically, the impact of the 1982 midterm elections was greatest in the states where partisan change was most apparent. As table 1 demonstrates, there was a change in party control in eleven of the thirty-six states in which governorships were at stake, resulting in a net Democratic gain of seven. Change was as visible in the state legislative races. Democrats captured eleven legislative chambers from the GOP while surrendering two, and gained control of both houses of the legislature in four states. As a result, the Democrats now control both houses of the legislature in thirty-four states while the Republicans control eleven, with control in four states split between the two parties.

Gubernatorial Elections

• *Shifts in Party Control.* The losses suffered by the president's party in the 1982 midterm elections were consistent with gubernatorial elections since 1950. In every midterm election between 1950 and 1982 the president's party has lost governorships, except in 1962 when there was no net change (see table 2). During this period, the president's party lost an average of six governorships. Republican governors have been particularly vulnerable. The party has never lost fewer than five governors at midterm and has averaged a loss of seven. Democratic losses at midterm have been less severe, with an average loss of five seats.

These data demonstrate that midterm gubernatorial elections are highly susceptible to national trends. Indeed, change in partisan control of governorships is likely to be greater than is the extent of switched party control of seats in Congress. A further irony concerning gubernatorial elections is their marked independence from national trends in presidential years. In four of the eight presidential elections since 1950, the party of the winning presidential candidate has actually lost governorships (1956, 1960, 1964, and 1972). Even in the landslides of 1964 and 1972, the party of the successful presidential candidate suffered a loss of governorships. These data clearly show the increased incidence of ticket-splitting between presidential and gubernatorial elections since the turn of the century. In the period 1896-1908, the percentage of elections in which presidential and gubernatorial results coincided was 89.5. For the elections of 1976-1980, that figure had fallen to 63 percent (see table 3). Recently, the Democrats have been least effective in capturing state houses while winning the presidency. Between 1950 and 1980,

Table 2
RESULTS OF GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS, 1950-1982

Year	Dem.	Rep.	GOP % of major party vote	Gains/Losses Dem.	Rep.
1950	23	25	53.1%	− 6	+ 6
1952	18	30	47.0	− 5	+ 5
1954	27	21	47.2	+ 9	− 9
1956	29	19	46.8	+ 2	− 2
1958	35	14	44.1	+ 6	− 5
1960	34	16	46.5	− 1	+ 2
1962	34	16	50.0	No change	
1964	33	17	45.2	− 1	+ 1
1966	25	25	53.1	− 8	+ 8
1968	19	31	47.3	− 6	+ 6
1970	29	21	46.6	+10	−10
1972	31	19	49.7	+ 2	− 2
1974	36	13	43.6	+ 5	− 6
1976	37	12	50.8	+ 1	− 1
1978	32	18	47.8	− 5	+ 6
1980	27	23	50.0	− 5	+ 5
1982	34	16	45.6	+ 7	− 7

Note: In 1974 and 1978, there was one independent governor.

Summary

Midterm Elections

Average loss for the president's party	6.2
Republicans	7.4
Democrats	4.8

Presidential Election Years

Average gain/loss for party of winning presidential candidate	+1.4
Republicans	+2.4
Democrats	− .33

the party gained a governorship only once during a successful presidential campaign (1976). The GOP, by contrast, has more frequently registered gubernatorial gains when winning the presidency (average gain: two).

The declining number of state executives elected with the president helps account for the modest shifts in partisan control of governorships in presidential years. In 1932-1934, thirty-four states chose governors in presidential election years, but only thirteen did in 1980. Thirty-six states now elect their governors at midterm. Part of the rationale for moving gubernatorial elections to the midterm time slot was to insulate state elections from national trends. It is apparent from the data presented here, however, that this objective has not been achieved. Indeed, national trends appear to have a greater impact on midterm gubernatorial elections than those occurring simultaneously with the president.

Table 3
TICKET-SPLITTING IN PRESIDENTIAL AND GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS, 1880-1980

Period	Percent of elections with coinciding results for president and governor	Percent of elections with different results for president and governor
1880-1892	93.1	6.9
1896-1908	88.5	11.5
1912-1924	81.2	18.5
1928-1940	77.8	22.2
1944-1956	75.5	24.5
1960-1972	56.0	44.0
1976-1980	63.0	37.0

Source: Data for the years 1880 to 1972 are taken from Larry Sabato, *Goodbye to Good-Time Charlie* (Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1978), p. 147. His data have been supplemented with 1976-80 election returns.

In presidential years, the gubernatorial candidates are not the most prominent persons on the ballot. But at midterm they are the most visible candidates seeking public office. Governors are widely perceived to be powerful officials and they are normally involved in their state's major policy controversies. With this policy involvement comes inevitable discontent for past actions; and with perceived power and visibility comes a strong likelihood of being held accountable for the condition of the state. As candidates at the head of the ticket, governors are the target of voter discontent, since the president is not on the ballot.

The 1982 elections certainly found Republican gubernatorial aspirants in an exposed and defensive posture due to the weakened state of the economy. A significant loss of governorships was, therefore, to be expected. The Republican loss of seven was consistent with the average loss (6.2) suffered by the president's party at midterm.

- *Incumbency.* The higher vulnerability of governors is well documented. House incumbents have averaged over 90 percent reelection rates since 1960, and senators have had a reelection average of almost 80 percent. By contrast, gubernatorial incumbents have won on the average 72 percent of the time (see table 4). The fate of incumbent governors in 1982 was consistent with this pattern. Five incumbents (21 percent) of the twenty-four seeking reelection in 1982 were defeated (see table 1).[1] The effect of the national Democratic trend was strong—thirteen of fourteen (93 percent) incumbent Democrats and six of ten GOP governors renewed their state house franchises. All but one of the Democratic incumbents won reelection, and nine of the thirteen winners increased their percentage of the vote over

Table 4
INCUMBENCY AND PARTISAN TURNOVER IN GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS, 1957-1982

Year	Number of elections	Elections with incumbents (332) Total	Incumbent won	Incumbent lost	Elections with no incumbents (164) Total	Party turnover	Percent of incumbents who lost	Percent of all elections with incumbents
1957-58	36	22	13	9	14	4	41%	61%
1959-60	30	14	8	6	16	7	43	47
1961-62	37	26	16	10	11	3	38	70
1963-64	28	14	12	2	14	3	14	50
1965-66	37	22	15	7	15	6	32	59
1967-68	24	14	10	4	10	6	29	58
1969-70	37	24	17	7	13	10	29	65
1971-72	21	9	7	2	12	4	22	43
1973-74	37	22	17	5	15	9	23	59
1975-76	17	9	7	2	8	5	22	53
1977-78	38	22	17	5	16	8	23	58
1979-80	16	10	7	3	6	2	30	63
1981-82	38	24	19	5	14	9	21	63
Total	396	232	165	67	164	76	28	58

Source: The data compiled by Malcolm Jewell and David Olson, *American State Political Parties and Elections*, Revised Edition (Homewood, Ill., Dorsey Press, 1982), p. 213 has been updated to reflect 1981-1982 elections.

what they had received in 1978. The exceptions were John V. Evans (Idaho), George Ariyoshi (Hawaii), and Harry R. Hughes (Maryland). Only three of the successful Republican incumbents were able to increase their vote percentage: Lamar Alexander (Tennessee), Victor G. Atiyeh (Oregon), and William J. Janklow (South Dakota).

The national Democratic trend in gubernatorial elections also had an impact in the states where no incumbent was on the ballot. In ten (83 percent) of the twelve open seat races, the Democrats emerged victorious. They seized control of four midwest states with retiring GOP governors (Minnesota, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin) and Alaska. Only in California did the Republicans capture a governorship occupied by a retiring Democratic incumbent.

• *Interparty Competition.* A pattern of increased interparty competition in gubernatorial elections continued in 1982. In sixteen states the winner's margin of victory was less than 54 percent of the vote (eleven Democrats and five Republicans). In only five states did the successful candidate receive more than 65 percent of the vote. No distinct regional pattern in the extent of interparty competition was present. With the decline in the influence of party identification on voter choice, it is possible for both parties to compete effectively in every part of the nation.

• *Regional Patterns.* The most significant GOP losses occurred in the North Central (midwestern) region where the party lost control of five states, including the large industrial states of Ohio and Michigan, along with Minnesota, Nebraska, and Wisconsin. The Democrats also reasserted their dominance of the South by winning back the states of Arkansas and Texas, leaving the GOP with only one southern governor, David Treen of Louisiana.

Partisan control of governorships has little relationship to patterns of presidential voting in 1980. Ronald Reagan's strongest area in 1980 was the Mountain states, yet Democratic governors resided in the executive residences of all eight Mountain states in 1982. A similar pattern emerges for Southern and Border states. These areas of Reagan strength in 1980 find the GOP in control of only two of fifteen state houses. Ironically, the Republicans picked up a governorship (New Hampshire) in New England, Reagan's weakest region. The state electorates of 1982 were highly volatile and are capable of mobilization by either party in a given year.

State Legislative Elections

• *Shifts in Party Control.* Shifts in partisan control of state legislatures, like switches in party dominance of governorships, have frequently been a more sensitive barometer of political change at midterm than con-

Table 5
RESULTS OF STATE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS
1950-1982

Year	Republicans control both houses	Split control	Nonpartisan legislature	Democrats control both houses	Net number of chambers gained/lost	
					Republicans	Democrats
1950	22	4	2	20	+ 9	− 9
1952	26	2	2	18	+ 2	− 2
1954	20	6	2	20	− 8	+ 8
1956	17	6	2	23	− 6	+ 6
1958	7	8	2	32	− 18	+ 18
1960	14	6	2	29	+ 9	− 9
1962	15	6	2	24	+ 9	− 9
1964	7	9	2	32	− 19	+ 19
1966	17	7	2	24	+ 18	− 18
1968	20	8	2	20	+ 7	− 7
1970	16	6	2	24	− 8	+ 8
1972	16	8	1	24	No change	
1974	4	8	1	37	− 24	+24
1976	4	10	1	35	+ 2	− 2
1978	11	8	1	30	+ 12	− 12
1980	15	5	1	29	+ 5	− 5
1982	11	4	1	34	− 9	+ 9

Summary

Midterm Elections

Average number of chambers lost by president's party 15
Republicans 19
Democrats 12

In each midterm election since 1950, president's party lost control of legislative chambers.

Presidential Election Years

Average gain/loss of chambers for party of winning presidential candidate + 2
Republicans + 1.6
Democrats + 3.5

In four of eight presidential election years the winning presidential candidate's party did *not* have a net gain in legislative chambers.

gressional/senatorial elections. In each midterm election since 1950 the president's party has lost control of legislative chambers. The net average number of chambers lost in this period has been thirteen. The 1982 GOP loss of nine is, therefore, slightly below normal (see table 5).

This consistent pattern of midterm losses of legislative chambers by the president's party, of course, is reflected in the number of states where party control of *both* houses of the legislature changed (table 6). In some midterm years, these swings in party control can be substantial, as in 1966 when the Democrats lost control of twelve state legislatures. The president's party lost control of an average of seven legislatures between 1950 and 1982. The GOP loss of four legislatures is, therefore, quite close to the average.

Table 6
LOSS OF CONTROL OF STATE LEGISLATURES BY THE PRESIDENT'S PARTY IN MIDTERM ELECTIONS, 1950-1982

Year	Number of states in which president's party lost control of both houses of the state legislature	Party controlling presidency
1950	2	Democratic
1954	6	Republican
1958	10	Democratic
1962	5	Democratic
1966	12	Democratic
1970	4	Republican
1974	12	Republican
1978	5	Democratic
1982	4	Republican

While state legislative elections are strongly influenced by the anti-presidential party trends at midterm, these elections show less susceptibility to national trends during presidential election years. In four of the eight presidential elections since 1950, the winning presidential candidate's party has failed to gain control of an additional state legislative chamber. Between 1950 and 1980, the party of the successful presidential candidate has averaged only a net gain of two legislative chambers.

These data on the effect of national trends on state legislative contests are similar to those for gubernatorial elections. Both types of state elections are more dramatically affected by national trends during midterm elections than they are in presidential election years. Significant political change in state elections—for both the governor and legislatures—is, therefore, more likely to occur in off-year than in presidential elections.

Despite the significant 1982 changes in party control of legislative chambers in favor of the Democrats, the shift to the Democrats was not consistently observable in each state. In twenty-four legislative chambers, the Republicans actually gained seats (table 1). Republicans increased their representation in seventeen chambers in spite of the simultaneous election of Democratic governors. Further evidence of the state electorates' tendency to split their tickets can be seen in Iowa, Illinois, and Pennsylvania, where the GOP retained its control of the governorship while Democrats achieved control of both houses of the legislature.

Democratic ascendancy in state legislatures is now almost as great as it was in the post-Watergate era (1975-1976) when the party controlled both houses in thirty-seven states. The significant Republican gains of 1978 and 1980 have been partially removed.

- *Divided Control of State Government.* The 1982 elections have left almost half of the states with divided partisan control of state government. In twenty-eight states the same party controls both the legislature and the governorship, but in twenty-one states one party holds the governorship while the opposition has a majority in at least one house of the legislature (Nebraska has a nonpartisan legislature). This pattern of divided control of state government is consistent with the trends that have been prevalent since the 1960s. It reflects the individualized nature of campaigns and the increasing incidence of split-ticket voting.
- *Difficulty for a Minority Party to Penetrate the State Legislature in Traditional One-Party Areas.* Much of the South uses a two-tiered electoral system in which there is competition for governor and federal office, but one-partyism prevails at the substate or legislative election level. In spite of their demonstrated capacity to contest and win federal and gubernatorial offices, the Republicans control no legislative chambers in the South or Border states. In Louisiana they hold no seats in the upper chamber and in ten of eleven states of the Old Confederacy there are fewer than ten Republicans in the state senates. The 1982 election revealed that true two-party politics is not yet a reality in the South.

* * *

Since the 1950s, gubernatorial and state legislative elections have been particularly sensitive to national trends working against the president's party at midterm. Indeed, the loss for the president's party is greater at the state level than it is at the congressional level, even though state elections are supposedly fought on state issues. The 1982 state midterm elections were consistent with normal patterns as the GOP suffered significant losses. Adverse economic conditions combined with the high profile of governors made GOP candidates convenient targets for unhappy voters.

The swing to the Democrats was most pronounced in the North Central and Southern states where voter turnout was up most significantly since 1978. Low-income and minority voters turned out in unusually large numbers, and they voted Democratic in these regions. The benefits for the Democrats from increased turnout can be seen by the fact that in seven of the nine states where Democrats replaced GOP governors, there was an increase in voter turnout over 1978. The only exceptions were Wisconsin and Nevada. In the two states (California and New Hampshire) lost by the

Democrats to the Republicans, turnout declined between 1978 and 1980.

Realignment Deferred

GOP party initiatives at the state level suffered a setback in 1982, putting the Republicans in approximately the same position they were in after the 1976 elections.

Party growth over the long term requires more than presidential victories. Control of governorships and state legislatures is needed. Governors can provide state parties with the resources and leadership to build effective organizations. Legislatures are the recruiting ground for future congressmen, senators, and governors. Without a strong contingent of state legislators, a party's talent pool is severely restricted. It was with these hard realities in mind that the Republican National Committee under the leadership of Ray Bliss in the 1960s and Bill Brock in the 1970s sought to strengthen its state organizations and give significant aid to state-level parties and candidates. Their initiatives paid handsome dividends. Control of the White House and the Senate, of course, altered party organizational priorities for the 1982 campaign. It is clear from the 1982 results, however, that party-building still occurs from the bottom up, and true majority will elude the GOP unless the election of state governors and legislators is a continuing priority. The 1982 election was not a realigning one.

National Policy Directions

Decisions of the national government dramatically affect state budgets and policy. Governors can, therefore, be expected to seek to influence the direction of national policy through their respective state congressional delegations, direct liaison with the White House, and public relations channels. At their November 1982 meeting, the members of the National Governors Association showed an inclination to become involved in federal budgetary issues. An increased contingent of activist and liberal Democratic governors can make it more difficult for the White House to achieve its policy objectives. This will be most evident in the "New Federalism" initiatives where the cooperation of the governors is required for successful implementation. The likelihood of such cooperation now seems remote.

All Is Not Rosy for the Democrats

While the Republicans can hardly take pleasure from the results of state elections in 1982, they can perhaps be permitted to smile at the prospect of Democratic governors and legislatures confronted with enormous budgetary deficits and little hope that the federal government will step in to help. The choice these Democrats face is not a happy one. They may cut services, raise taxes, or do both. Whatever choice they make, few voters are likely to be pleased.

The difficulty for the Democrats is compounded by a constituency that expects existing services to be maintained, if not increased. The armies of public employees, teachers, union members, and minorities who worked for Democratic candidates across the country will not be satisfied easily by gubernatorial policies of service cutbacks and higher taxes. Therefore, one of the tests of Democratic governors in the 1980s will be their ability to convince their left of center supporters what the governors themselves have already learned: the money to finance liberalism is just not there.

Table 7
CONTROL OF GOVERNORSHIP AND THE OUTCOME OF PRESIDENTIAL VOTING IN THE STATES, 1968-1980

	1968	1972	1976	1980
Number of states in which party that controlled governorship *carried* the state for its presidential candidate	23(46%)	19(38%)	25(50%)	23(46%)
Number of states in which party that controlled governorship did *not* carry the state for its presidential candidate	27(54%)	31(62%)	25(50%)	27(54%)

Implications for the 1984 Presidential Election

There is a widespread belief that failure to control the governorships of key states risks a loss of those states' electoral votes in presidential elections. Commentators have given special attention to the Republican gubernatorial losses in the big states of Texas, Michigan, Ohio, and Florida (total electoral votes: ninety-three). Some pundits also point to other ominous signs for the GOP, especially its lack of success in western and southern states—key blocs of electoral votes in Reagan's 1980 winning coalition. Analysis of recent presidential elections, however, reveals that there is virtually no relationship between control of a state's governorship and the outcome of the presidential voting in the state. For example, in 1980 the party holding the governorship in twenty-seven states did not carry the state for president. As table 7 demonstrates, the same pattern was present in the 1968, 1972, and 1976 presidential elections. Thus, whatever the substantial benefits of holding a governorship are, they do not extend to winning electoral votes for the party's presidential candidate. The 1982 midterm elections, therefore, offer no clues concerning the outcome of the 1984 presidential contest.

[1] In 1982 seven governors chose not to run for election, one of whom (Brown of California) was a candidate for the U.S. Senate. Four governors were constitutionally barred from seeking reelection. Only one governor, King of Massachusetts, was defeated in a primary. Twenty-five governors won renomination, twelve without any primary opposition and nine with relatively minor opposition.

by Kathy Bloomgarden

Managing the Environment: The Public's View

Those who say the goals of economic development and environmental preservation are irreconcilable —be they leaders in government, business, or the environmental movement—are out of touch with public sentiment and out of touch with what is actually taking place in the nation's communities. Americans want both economic revitalization and protection and, what's more, they believe they can have both. Across the country, from Seattle, Washington to Smyrna, Tennessee, there are signs of an emerging consensus on these dual goals. This finding is the centerpiece of a major public opinion survey conducted by Research & Forecasts for The Continental Group.

Revitalization and Responsibility

Economic revitalization and environmental protection are often seen as mutually exclusive. The public, however, does not believe they are at odds with one another. American attitudes about economic recovery are key to understanding why the public believes both goals can be realized.

Our survey documents a strong belief in Americans' personal resourcefulness. Seven out of ten believe that anyone who works hard can get ahead in this country. This outlook emerges from individual experiences within our economic system. Two-thirds of the public report that their economic position is better than that of their families when they were sixteen years old; 21 percent say their position is the same; 12 percent say somewhat worse; and *zero* percent say their position is much worse. Sixty-three percent of Americans assert they have had a fair opportunity to make the most of their lives, compared to a little more than a third (36 percent) who feel they have been held back in some way.

Not only do most Americans believe that the American economic system offers "opportunity," but they also emphatically support the free enterprise system:

- 79 percent agree that an incentive for private profit is necessary in order for an economic system to function effectively;
- 70 percent say that regulation of business by government usually does more harm than good;
- 52 percent agree that the less government has to do with the American economy, the better off the country will be.

Against this background of public commitment to the American enterprise system, a diminished role for government, and confidence in the private market, we might expect environmental concerns to play a secondary role. This is not the case. Our survey also showed strong sympathy with many of the concerns of environmental activists:

- 60 percent say that pollution is one of the most serious problems facing the nation today;
- 84 percent agree that the balance of nature is very delicate and easily upset by human activities;
- 79 percent believe we must prevent any type of animal from becoming extinct, even if it means sacrificing some things for ourselves;
- 72 percent say they feel that American beliefs and values have been a basic cause of our present environmental problems.

It should be pointed out here that adherence to these broad values does not necessarily connote a sophisticated understanding of specific issues. In our study, 55 percent of those surveyed were unable to identify "Love Canal" or gave an incorrect answer when asked what it referred to. Sixty-five percent were unable to identify, or incorrectly identified, James Watt's position in the administration. The public was more knowledgeable about Three Mile Island; 76 percent were able to describe, at least partially correctly, what it referred to.

A New Growth Philosophy

How are we as a nation reconciling our belief in open opportunities provided by our economic system and the

importance of environmental constraints? Several key results in our report point to a public consensus on a new philosophy of growth.

When we asked the public to rank goals for America, 81 percent indicated that maintaining a strong economy was a high priority. Only fighting against crime and protecting freedom of speech ranked higher. In contrast, they ranked maintaining a *high rate* of growth last of twelve priorities. In a separate question, 49 percent felt we must accept a *slower* rate of economic growth in order to protect the environment, as opposed to 24 percent who felt that "we can achieve our current goals of environmental protection and economic growth at the same time" or "we can relax environmental standards in order to achieve economic growth." Bringing the matter closer to home, when asked to think about "new housing and inviting more industry to your community," 61 percent felt their communities ought to continue to grow. The ideal of achieving responsible growth is supported by virtually all segments of the population.

Our data show that Americans' twin objectives are being integrated into decision making at the local and national levels. The public and policy makers are convinced that environmental protection is important. On the other hand, they no longer see protecting the environment as a "crisis" issue; it is now widely perceived as a *management* issue. A solid majority may agree that "pollution is one of the [nation's] most serious problems," but further probing shows that such a response reflects a belief in the importance of environmental watchfulness, rather than a belief that the environment is *actually* critically endangered (see table 1).

Table 1
RANKING OF NATIONAL PROBLEMS

Question: First, I would like to ask you which *three* of these national problems you would like to see the government devote most of its attention to in the next year or two?

	April 1965	April 1970	Jan.-Feb. 1980
Reducing the amount of crime	41%	56%	61%
Reducing unemployment	35	25	48
Conquering "killer" diseases	57	29	41
Improving public education	45	31	35
Helping people in poor areas	32	30	29
Reducing pollution of air and water	**17**	**53**	**24**
Improving housing and run-down neighborhoods	21	27	20
Reducing racial discrimination	29	25	13
Improving highway safety	18	13	7
Beautifying America	3	5	5

Note: Sample sizes: April 1965 = 1,500; April 1970 = 1,500; January/February 1980 = 840.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization (1965 and 1970), and Resources for the Future (1980).

In addition, about two-thirds of Americans (64 percent) say that pollution is not really affecting their lives, compared to 35 percent who say it is. Finally, 57 percent of those we surveyed say that the quality of the environment in this country has "improved" or "stayed the same" in the last decade, compared to 41 percent who say it has grown worse. Robert Mitchell of Resources for the Future observes, "Environmental issues seem to have become an enduring social concern, much like health care, education, and other basic issues." And such enduring concerns demand prudent management.

Dismissing the Stereotypes

Before turning to a discussion of the trade-offs Americans are willing to make to strike a reasonable balance between their concerns about growth and protection of the environment, it is important to address some inaccurate stereotypes.

The portrayal of the business community as uniformly antagonistic to environmental protection is simply false. Businessmen exhibit a high degree of concern and sympathy for environmental matters, and their attitudes are unexpectedly similar to the general public.

Our survey found that 64 percent of the public believe that they and their families derive "some" or "a great deal" of benefit from efforts by environmental groups and the government to protect the environment. We found that 52 percent of the heads of small corporations and 42 percent of executives of larger corporations say they and their families benefit from the government's and environmental groups' efforts. Only about one in ten executives—and an equal percentage of the public—feel they do not benefit at all.

There were further surprises in executives' responses to a range of economic and environmental trade-off questions. While popular conjecture might place executive opinion soundly and consistently on the side of advocating economic growth over environmental concerns, we find businessmen highly flexible. Far from demonstrating knee-jerk pro-growth responses, executives today are assessing trade-offs individually, and in many cases support the environmental protection option (see table 2).

The Roots of Conflict

To illuminate the roots of conflict between the business community and environmentalists and to discern potential areas for increased communication, we surveyed the memberships of four national environmental organizations.

The most striking discovery emerging from the analysis is that business executives and the public share a similar vision of national priorities; environmentalists' views are quite distinct. The vision of environmentalists is, to a considerable extent, the mirror opposite of the vision of executives. The top twelve concerns of all three groups are shown below (see table 3).

The differences between environmentalists and businessmen can perhaps best be summarized as an emphasis on philosophic goals versus pragmatic goals. Both of these tendencies have roots in American traditions. Among the business samples, all but one of the top seven priorities (protecting freedom of speech) call

Table 2
GOALS OF GROWTH
AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

	General public	Top executives/ small corporations	Top executives/ large corporations
We can achieve our current goals of environmental protection and economic growth at the same time	24%	45%	58%
We must relax environmental standards in order to achieve economic growth	24	32	30
We must accept a slower rate of economic growth in order to protect the environment	49	21	9

Note: Response category "don't know" not shown. Sample sizes: General public = 1,310; Top executives, small corporations = 177; Top executives, large corporations = 86.

Source: Survey by Research & Forecasts, Inc., for The Continental Group, Inc., February 16-April 13, 1982.

for solving problems: fighting crime, maintaining a strong economy, maintaining order in the nation, and so on. The environmental sample rejects the primacy of economic concerns—all but one of their top seven priorities (fighting against crime) stress philosophic aims for society: protecting nature, progressing toward a less impersonal society, and progressing toward a society that values ideas more than money.

What accounts for the marked differences between business executives and environmentalists? In part, executives are more likely to describe themselves as political conservatives, while the members of environmental organizations are apt to describe themselves as liberals. Their disagreements about environmental issues arise from differences on specific policy details, and from divergent underlying assumptions about the desired direction of the nation's progress.

Trade-offs

Trade-off questions help measure how the public evaluates decisions about the environment. Structuring questions with two alternatives significantly decreases the public's natural inclination to "agree" as they might with a straight "agree-disagree" question. The environment has long been held by many opinion analysts to be a "motherhood" issue, meaning that any time one talks of protecting the environment, he can be sure of an automatic nod of approval. Through a series of trade-off questions, we felt we could measure underlying public sentiment.

Everett Ladd raised an objection to trade-off questions in the February/March 1982 issue of this magazine. He questioned whether Americans are capable of choosing between economic and environmental options. Ladd suggested that public support for both economic growth and environmental protection is part of the desire of the American public to have more. Ladd stated that, in fact, a clean environment is a form of "materialism," part of the "more" to which Americans feel they are entitled. The question of trade-offs is, therefore, an artificial one in his view, as the choices are no more than "differing pieces of one basic value the public wants and believes it possible to attain." However, our data indicate that trade-offs on economic/environmental issues pose what the public perceives to be realistic choices between two distinct alternatives.

Table 3
PRIORITY RANKINGS OF NATIONAL GOALS:
GENERAL PUBLIC, CORPORATE EXECUTIVES, ENVIRONMENTAL GROUP MEMBERS

	General public		Top executives/ small corporations		Top executives/ large corporations		Environmentalists	
	Rank	% saying a high priority	Rank	% saying a high priority	Rank	% saying a high priority	Rank	% saying a high priority
Fighting against crime	1	92%	4	78%	1	92%	3	75%
Protecting freedom of speech	2	83	2	83	2	88	2	89
Maintaining a strong economy	3	81	1	88	4	83	8	54
Maintaining order in the nation	4	80	3	79	3	87	10	47
Fighting rising prices	5	80	5	65	5	68	9	50
Protecting nature	6	77	8	40	8	52	1	92
Seeing that people have more say in how things get decided at work and in their community	7	69	11	26	11	40	6	64
A strong defense force	8	65	6	63	6	66	11	26
Giving people more say in important government decisions	9	61	9	33	9	43	7	57
Progressing toward a less impersonal, more humane society	10	61	10	28	10	42	4	74
Progressing toward a society where ideas are more important than money	11	47	12	19	12	33	5	68
Maintaining a high rate of economic growth	12	46	7	63	7	53	12	14

If we examine the public's response to trade-off questions on issues such as land use, air pollution standards, and energy production, among others, we find consistently high levels of support for the environmental choice. In the area of land use, 65 percent favor leaving parts of our country in their natural state, untouched by man; 28 percent favor using whatever land is needed to obtain the resources we need. In the area of environmental cleanups, 60 percent favor an emphasis on cleanup first, even if companies have to charge more for their products and services; 35 percent favor an emphasis on keeping prices lower.

It is interesting to compare the trade-off choices of the public to business executives and environmentalists. In just about every instance, in all groups surveyed, close to half or more select the environmental option.

	General public	*Small corp. exec.*	*Large corp. exec.*	*Environmental*
Natural state	*65%*	*50%*	*47%*	*95%*
Use land	*28*	*39*	*39*	*2*

In the area of environmental cleanup: An emphasis on environmental cleanup first, even if companies have to charge more for their products and services *or* an emphasis on keeping prices lower.

	General public	*Small corp. exec.*	*Large corp. exec.*	*Environmental*
Cleanup	*60%*	*59%*	*51%*	*93%*
Lower prices	*35*	*24*	*26*	*4*

In the area of automotive fuel: Continue to build vehicles which use only low-lead gasoline, reducing air pollution, *or* permit the building of vehicles that use lower cost fuels which pollute more.

	General public	*Small corp. exec.*	*Large corp. exec.*	*Environmental*
Low lead	*79%*	*74%*	*77%*	*93%*
Lower cost	*16*	*12*	*9*	*4*

In the area of environmental protection and jobs: Maintaining air pollution standards as they are even if some factories close as a result, *or* relaxing air pollution standards to allow factories to stay open.

	General public	*Small corp. exec.*	*Large corp. exec.*	*Environmental*
Maintain standards	*55%*	*39%*	*34%*	*84%*
Relax standards	*38*	*47*	*40*	*7*

In the area of energy production: Relax environmental protection regulations to increase energy production, *or* maintain environmental protection regulations even if it slows the production of more energy.

	General public	*Small corp. exec.*	*Large corp. exec.*	*Environmental*
Maintain standards	*56%*	*36%*	*24%*	*86%*
Relax standards	*35*	*53*	*62*	*9*

The environmentalist community is steadfast in its dedication to environmental goals. In each forced-choice question, more than nine out of ten environmentalists support the environmentalist position. The biggest differences between businessmen and environmentalists appear on questions concerning energy availability and jobs. On these two trade-off choices, businessmen more frequently select the economic alternative, favoring relaxing air pollution standards to keep factories open, and lessening environmental protection regulations to increase energy production. This supports the conclusion suggested earlier by the national priority rankings of the two groups.

Divided Opinion

The attitudes of the American public toward economic and environmental concerns, in almost every instance, fall somewhere between that of business executives and environmentalists. However, when the three groups disagree, the public tends to align more closely with the business community than with the environmental movement. For example:

- 74 percent of business executives, 76 percent of the general public, and 94 percent of environmentalists agree that the earth is like a spaceship with only limited room and resources;
- 37 percent of business executives, 56 percent of the general public, and 96 percent of environmentalists support maintaining air pollution standards as they are even if some factories close as a result;
- 20 percent of business executives, 40 percent of the general public, and 77 percent of environmentalists want to preserve wilderness areas at all costs.

Given the public's ratings of national goals, both environmental activists and members of the business community would find citizens most responsive to approaches that integrate strategies for economic revitalization with efforts to safeguard the environment. The survey reveals that the public is much more likely to give the highest priority to maintaining a strong economy than is the environmental group (third versus eighth). But among both the public and members of environmental groups, maintaining a *high* rate of eco-

nomic growth ranks last on the national agenda. It ranks seventh out of twelve as a national priority for business executives.

Conclusion

Despite the differences we have noted, our data demonstrate an underlying consensus unifying all Americans. There are many points of convergence, no matter what environmental and economic beliefs individuals endorse. The public's commitment to the environment indicates a deep-seated conviction that we can progress toward a strong economy *and* a sound environment. Along the way there are going to be some serious dilemmas. Our survey reveals that the public is prepared to weigh these choices responsibly.

Schneider

(Continued from page 8)

Mexico, France, and Saudi Arabia—but less likely to see communist threats in countries perceived as peripheral to American interests—Iran, El Salvador, and Taiwan.

In 1982, as in previous surveys, the leaders polled by the Chicago Council were much more supportive than the public of foreign economic and military aid and were almost unanimous in their opinion that the United States should play an active role in world affairs. One of the sharpest differences was over the issue of protectionism. The public favored protective tariffs; the leaders opposed them. On the issues just listed, the foreign policy leaders tended to be more supportive of Reagan administration policy.

In other respects, however, the foreign policy leaders were less supportive of administration policy than the general public.

- Eighty-one percent of leaders and 41 percent of the public favored the idea of "entering into negotiations with Cuba looking toward reestablishing diplomatic and economic relations and exchanging ambassadors."
- The leaders were significantly more in favor of various measures aimed at promoting détente with the Soviet Union, including joint efforts to solve energy problems, arms control agreements, and exchanges. Conversely, the leaders were less supportive than the public of such anti-détente measures as restricting U.S.-Soviet trade, prohibiting scientific exchanges, and forbidding grain sales to the Soviet Union.
- A mutual, verifiable freeze on nuclear weapons was favored by 58 percent of the public and 79 percent of the leaders.
- Only 45 percent of the public, but 79 percent of the leaders, wanted the United States to take a more active role in opposing apartheid in South Africa.
- Sixty-three percent of the public, but only 55 percent of the leaders, felt that "the United States may have to support some military dictators because they are friendly toward us and opposed to the communists."

Alliance and Consensus

Leadership opinion tends to be internationalist, more or less in line with the traditional bipartisan foreign policy consensus of the 1950s and early 1960s. That consensus embraced a continuity of goals—essentially containment of Soviet aggression—and an acceptance of both cooperative and confrontational strategies. Among political activists, however, that consensus eroded rapidly in the wake of the Vietnam war. Activist sentiment tends to be polarized between conservative internationalism, which is interventionist, pro-military, and staunchly anti-communist, and liberal internationalism, which is more concerned with economic and humanitarian issues, suspicious of military power, and more preoccupied with global interdependence than with East-West issues. The bipartisan, two-track consensus of the 1950s was an establishment consensus, and that establishment has lost its hold over the two major political parties—and over foreign policy. Jimmy Carter tended to follow a liberal internationalist line until the end of 1979, and leadership opinion was often to the right of him, particularly on security issues. Ronald Reagan is a conservative internationalist, and as the 1982 survey reveals, leadership opinion is frequently to his left.

Is the Western alliance a liberal or a conservative policy commitment? It is neither. It is an internationalist commitment that the public is willing to accept because it seems vital to American security interests. The Atlantic alliance is precisely the kind of internationalist commitment that originated in and was sustained by the bipartisan foreign policy consensus of the 1950s. Today, liberal internationalists tend to undervalue the Western alliance in favor of globalist policies and North-South relations. Conservative internationalists tend to overvalue the Western alliance by seeing it not simply as a security arrangement, but as an ideological challenge to communism and to the Soviet Union.

These interpretations of the Western alliance tend to divide Americans and antagonize Europeans. Public opinion data from Europe and the United States suggest that the basic concept of the alliance remains sound. Both Europeans and Americans believe that it is "essential" for their mutual security. What endangers the alliance are the efforts by American political activists to give it an ideological thrust, to make the Atlantic alliance the spearhead of either a globalist or an anti-communist campaign. There is no consensus, in Europe or in the United States, behind that kind of policy. In short, the way to destroy the Western alliance is to make it controversial.

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[1] See John E. Rielly, ed., *American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1983* (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1983).


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Published by American Enterprise Institute
Apr/May 1983
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Public Opinion

Volume 6, Number 2 April/May 1983

FIFTH ANNIVERSARY ISSUE

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PUBLIC OPINION, April/May 1983, Vol. 6, No. 2. Published bimonthly by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. Copyright 1983 American Enterprise Institute. Subscription rates: $18.00 for one year, $34.00 for two years. Individual copy: $3.50. Information on bulk orders of multiple subscriptions available on request. Editorial and business offices: c/o AEI, 1150 17th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Send changes of address and all subscription correspondence to Circulation Department, c/o AEI, same address. "American Enterprise Institute" and AEI are registered service marks of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.

Second class postage paid at Washington, D.C.

ISSN 0149-9157

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FIVE YEARS OF PUBLIC OPINION

STABILITY IN ATTITUDES

POLITICS

Question: In politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent?

Question: People who are conservative in their political views are referred to as being right of center and people who are liberal in their political views are referred to as being left of center. Which one of these categories (Respondents were handed a card listing eight categories—far left, substantially left, moderately left, slightly left, slightly right, moderately right, substantially right, far right) best describes your *own* political position?



Note: Left = "far left" + "substantially left" + "moderately left." Center = "slightly left" + "middle of road" (vol.) + "slightly right." Right = "moderately right" + "substantially right" + "far right." For party I.D. question, "Other" calculated out for comparison purposes. January 1983 figures based on three January surveys (4,644 respondents). October-December 1979 data based on the results of five surveys, with a combined sample of 7,680 respondents. Not all askings shown.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of January 1983.

LONG RUN CONFIDENCE



Question: Now I'd like to ask you how you feel about the future. Considering everything, would you say you feel generally optimistic about the future of our country, or generally pessimistic, or that you're uncertain about our country's future?

Question: We'd like to know about the things on this list whether you feel generally optimistic about them as far as the future is concerned, or generally pessimistic about them, or uncertain about them? (Card shown respondent) What about the first item —do you feel generally optimistic about it as far as the future is concerned, or generally pessimistic about it, or uncertain about it?



Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 83-3), latest that of February 12-26, 1983.

Question: Now here are some statements which represent some traditional American values. Will you tell me for each one whether you strongly believe in this statement, partially believe it or don't believe it . . .? We must be ready to make sacrifices if necessary to preserve the free enterprise system.



Source: Surveys by *Time*/Yankelovich, Skelly and White, latest that of June 8-10, 1982.

Question: Some people say that people get ahead by their own hard work; others say that lucky breaks or help from other people are more important. Which do you think is most important?



Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, latest that of February-April, 1982.

NO FUTURE SHOCK

Question: Do you have a lot of confidence, some confidence, or no real confidence that in a few years from now our country will be strong and prosperous?


Percent
100
50
40
30
20
10
0
Registered Voters
Some confidence that in a few years our country will be strong and prosperous
A lot of confidence
No real confidence
J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983

Note: Sample sizes range from a low of 913 in late March 1980 to a high of 1,227 in January 1980; exceptions are August 1980 = 1,644 and October 1980 = 1,632.

Source: Surveys by *Time*/Yankelovich, Skelly and White, latest that of March 1-3, 1983.

PERFORMANCE:

Question: Do you feel that things in this country are generally going in the right direction today, or do you feel that things have pretty seriously gotten off on the wrong track?



Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 83-3), latest that of February 12-26, 1983.

Question: How about the financial situation in your own household—would you say it's getting better, getting worse, or staying about the same? (January 1979—October-November 1979). Compared to a year ago, is your family's financial situation better today, worse today, or about the same? (March 1980—April 1983)



Note: October 1982 based on probable electorate.

Source: Surveys by CBS News/*New York Times*, latest that of April 7-11, 1983.

Question: Do you think the nation's economy is: getting better, getting worse, or staying the same?



Note: Aug. 17, 1982 data based on sample size of 913. Oct. 5-11, 1982 data based on those who said there was a 50-50 chance or better that they would vote in the 1982 election = 84%. Nov. 2, 1982 sample size = 24,438 voters as they left voting booths.

Source: Surveys by ABC News/*Washington Post*, Feb. 26-Mar. 6, 1981 through Nov. 17-22, 1981; ABC News, Dec. 11-12, 1981; ABC News/*Washington Post*, Jan. 22-30, 1982 through Oct. 5-11, 1982; ABC News, Nov. 21, 1982 through Dec. 7-18, 1982; ABC News/*Washington Post*, Jan. 18-22, 1983 through Apr. 8-12, 1983.

SHORT TERM BLIPS

Question: What do you think is the most important problem facing the country today?

Question: Which of the two problems—unemployment or inflation—do you think will cause the more serious economic hardship for people during the next year or so?



Note: Question wording varied slightly over time. Not all response categories are shown. Excluded were "Race relations," ranging from 0-2%; "Other social problems," 5-13%; "Malperformance by government," 3-10%; "All others," 2-18%; "Don't know," 1-4%. * = less than .5%

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of Apr. 15-18, 1983.

Note: April/June 1979 through January/March 1983 are quarterly results.

Source: Surveys by the Institute for Social Research, Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan, latest that of January/March 1983.

BEST IS YET TO COME

Question: Some people think that the United States will never again have it as good as we did in the past; others disagree. How about you? Do you think the country has already seen the best times we are going to, or what?

Source: Survey by Civic Service, Inc., March 5-18, 1981.

TAX...

Question: There is a difference of opinion as to who is *mainly* responsible for the economic problems this country is experiencing: business, labor unions, or the government. Which one do *you* think is mainly responsible? . . . Government, labor unions, business, all of these, none of these.



Source: Surveys by Yankelovich, Skelly and White for the American Council of Life Insurance, latest that of April 24-May 23, 1982.

Question: From which level of government do you feel you get the most for your money—federal, state, or local?



Note: Sample size for May/June 1982 was approximately 1,000.

Question: Which do you think is the worst tax—that is, the least fair? 1. Federal income tax 2. State income tax 3. State sales tax 4. Local property tax



Source: Surveys by Opinion Research Corporation for the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, latest that of May 18-June 4, 1982.

Question: Now I'm going to ask you some questions about different kinds of taxes. I'd like you to tell me which of the following taxes you think are much too high, which are too high, which are too low, and which are about right? What about federal income taxes? Do you think they are much too high, too high, too low or are they just about right? (NBC/AP) Do you consider the amount of federal income tax which you have to pay as too high, about right, or too low? (NORC)



Note: Response categories "Much too high," and "Too high," combined = "Too high." * = less than .5%.

Source: Surveys by NBC News/Associated Press, 1978 and May 18-19, 1981; and the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, spring 1980 and spring 1982.

Question: (Hand card X) Some people have suggested that a nationwide program be set up by the government that would make sure that every American had enough health insurance to cover important medical needs. Putting this type of program into effect would, however, lead to an increase in taxes. Please select the item from this card which best describes how you feel about such a program. Favor strongly; favor somewhat; not sure, but probably favor; not sure, but probably oppose; oppose somewhat; oppose strongly.



Note: 1982 sample size = 1,252. Favor = "Favor strongly" + "Favor somewhat" + "Probably favor." Oppose = "Oppose strongly" + "Oppose somewhat" + "Probably oppose."

Source: Surveys by Yankelovich, Skelly and White for the American Council of Life Insurance, latest that of April 24-May 23, 1982.

AND SPEND

Question: Turning now to the business of the country—we are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount.













Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 83-1), latest that of December 4-11, 1982.

DEFENSE

Question: Do you think it will be best for the future of the country if we take an active part in world affairs or if we stay out of world affairs?

Best for future of country if we take an active part in world affairs



Question: Some people feel that NATO, the military organization of Western Europe and the United States, has outlived its usefulness and that the United States should withdraw militarily from NATO. Others say that NATO has discouraged the Russians from trying a military takeover in Western Europe. Do you feel we should increase our commitment to NATO, keep our commitment what it is now, decrease our commitment but still remain in NATO, or withdraw from NATO entirely?



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, latest that of October-November 1982.

Question: In general, do you feel the military defense system of the U.S. is stronger than that of the Russians, weaker, or almost as strong as the Russian military defense system? (July 1978, April 1979, October 1979, February 1980) (In general) do you feel the military defense system of the U.S. is stronger than that of the Russians, weaker, or about as strong as the Russian military defense system? (November 1978, October 1982, March 1983)



Note: Sample sizes are approximately 1,250 adults, except January/February 1980 = 1,198 likely voters.

Source: Surveys by ABC News/Louis Harris and Associates and Louis Harris and Associates, latest that of March 17-20, 1983.

Question: Turning now to the business of the country—we are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. . . . Military, armaments and defense.



Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 83-1), latest that of December 4-11, 1982.

AND OFFENSE

Question: Thinking about all the different kinds of governments in the world today, which of these statements comes closest to how you feel about communism as a form of government? . . . It's the worst kind of all; it's bad, but no worse than some others; it's all right for some countries; it's a good form of government.

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, latest that of February-April 1982.

Communism is the worst form of government



Question: Would you be willing to risk the destruction of the United States rather than be dominated by the Russians, or not?



Source: Survey by *Los Angeles Times*, March 14-17, 1982.

Question: Some people say that war is so horrible that it is better to accept Russian domination than to risk war. Others say it would be better to fight in defense of your country than to accept Russian domination. Which opinion is closer to your own?



Note: "Don't know" calculated out for comparison purposes = 11%.
Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, February 12-21, 1982.

Question: There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using U.S. troops in other parts of the world. I'd like to ask your opinion about several situations. First, would you favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops if . . . Japan were invaded by the Soviet Union . . . if the Arabs cut off all oil shipments to the U.S. . . . if North Korea invaded South Korea . . . if the government of El Salvador were about to be defeated by leftist rebels . . . if Iran invaded Saudi Arabia . . . if Arab forces invaded Israel . . . if the People's Republic of China invaded Taiwan . . . if the Soviet Union invaded Poland . . . if Soviet troops invaded Western Europe . . . if the Soviet Union invaded the People's Republic of China. (Asked of respondents who said "oppose use of troops" or "Don't know" in 1978 and asked only of asterisked items in 1982.) I am going to read the circumstances under which you said you would oppose sending U.S. troops. On this card are the levels of U.S. involvement that might be appropriate under these circumstances. For each situation, tell me *how far* you feel the U.S. should be willing to go . . . do nothing, try to negotiate, refuse to trade, send military supplies, send U.S. troops.

Favor sending U.S. troops if:



Note: For 1978, and 1982 *unasterisked* items only, "send troops" = the responses of "favor sending troops" to the first question. In 1982 for *asterisked* items only, "send troops" = the response of "favor sending troops" to the first question and "send U.S. troops" to the second question (never more than 2%).

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, latest that of October-November 1982.

THREADS FROM T

1 Would welcome more respect for authority



2 Would welcome less emphasis on working hard



3 Would welcome more emphasis on self-expression



4 Would welcome more acceptance of sexual freedom



5 Always/almost always wrong for man and woman to have sex before marriage



6 Marijuana use should be legalized



7 Should be stricter laws on drinking and driving



8 Favor death penalty for those convicted of murder



9 Favor law requiring police permit before one can buy a gun



1: (Respondent was handed a card). Here are some social changes which might occur in coming years. Would you welcome these or not welcome these? Gallup, latest that of Dec. 11-14, 1981. **2, 3, 4:** Many people feel we are undergoing a period of rapid social change in this country today and that people's values are changing at the same time. Which of the following changes would you welcome, which would you reject and which would leave you indifferent? *Time*/Yankelovich, Skelly and White, latest that of June 8-10, 1982. **5:** There's been a lot of discussion about the way morals and attitudes about sex are changing in this country. If a man and woman have sex relations before marriage, do you think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all? NORC-GSS, latest that of Feb.-Apr. 1982. **6:** Do you think the use of marijuana should be made legal? Gallup, latest that of Oct. 13-14, 1982. **7:** Do you think there should or should not be stricter laws regarding drinking and driving? Gallup, latest that of Mar. 12-15, 1982. **8:** Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder? NORC-GSS, latest that of Feb.-Apr. 1982. **9:** Would you favor or oppose a law which would require a person to obtain a police permit before he or she could buy a gun? NORC-GSS, latest that of Feb.-Apr. 1982. **10:** There has been much talk recently about changing women's status in society today. On the whole, do you favor or oppose most of the efforts to

HE SOCIAL FABRIC

10 Favor efforts to stengthen women's status in society



11 Approve of married woman earning money in business or industry if she has husband capable of supporting her



12 Divorce should be more difficult to obtain than it is now



13 Woman should be able to obtain an abortion if she wants it for any reason



14 Every woman who wants to have an abortion should be able to have one



15 Favor the building of more nuclear power plants in the U.S.



16 Religion is very important in personal life



17 Would vote for a qualified black for president



18 Oppose busing children from one school district to another



strengthen and change women's status in society today? ABC/Harris, 1978 and CBS June 26-28, 1982. **11:** Do you approve or disapprove of a married woman earning money in business or industry if she has a husband capable of supporting her? NORC-GSS, latest that of Feb.-Apr. 1982. **12:** Should divorce in this country be easier or more difficult to obtain than it is now? NORC-GSS, latest that of Feb.-Apr. 1982. **13:** Please tell me whether or not *you* think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a *legal* abortion if . . .? NORC-GSS, latest that of Feb.-Apr. 1982. **14:** Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Every woman who wants to have an abortion should be able to have one? NBC/AP, latest that of Jan. 18-19, 1982.

15: In general, do you favor or oppose the building of more nuclear power plants in the United States? ABC/Harris, March 1978 and Harris/*Business Week*, Feb. 23-27, 1983. **16:** How important would you say religion is in your own life—very important, fairly important, or not very important? Gallup, latest that of 1982. **17:** If your party nominated a (Negro/Black) for president, would you vote for him if he were qualified for the job? NORC-GSS, 1978 and Gallup, March 11-14, 1983. **18:** In general, do you favor or oppose the busing of (Negro/Black) and white school children from one school district to another? NORC-GSS, latest that of Feb.-Apr. 1982.

REAGAN AND

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way (name of President) is handling his job as president?



APPROVAL

	Truman (4/45)	Eisenhower (1/53)	Kennedy (1/61)	Johnson (11/63)	Nixon (1/69)	Ford (8/74)	Carter (1/77)	Reagan (1/81)
Month took office	—	—	—	—	59%	71%	—	51%
After 1st month	—	68%	—	79%	61	50	71%	55
After 2nd month	—	59	73%	80	63	55	72	60
After 3rd month	87%	74	83	75	61	48	63	67
After 4th month	—	74	76	73	65	42	64	68
After 5th month	—	—	74	77	63	39	63	58
After 6th month	—	71	71	75	65	39	67	60
After 7th month	75	—	73	74	62	37	66	60
After 8th month	—	75	75	—	58	39	59	52
After 9th month	—	65	76	—	56	51	51	56
After 10th month	63	—	77	—	68	52	56	54
After 11th month	—	60	78	—	59	—	57	49
After 12th month	50	68	77	69	61	46	52	47
After 13th month	—	71	78	69	56	47	50	47
After 14th month	—	68	79	71	53	44	48	46
After 15th month	43	—	77	—	56	41	41	44
After 16th month	—	64	73	69	59	39	43	45
After 17th month	—	61	71	67	55	46	42	44
After 18th month	32	—	69	64	55	48	39	41
After 19th month	—	71	66	70	56	50	43	42
After 20th month	—	65	67	69	—	48	48	42
After 21st month	35	64	62	65	58	47	49	42
After 22nd month	48	57	—	65	57	45	50	43
After 23rd month	60	63	74	63	52	—	51	41
After 24th month	—	69	76	64	56	—	43	35
After 25th month	—	71	70	63	50	—	37	40
After 26th month	54	66	67	61	50	—	42	41
After 27th month	—	68	66	56	50	—	40	41

Note: In months in which more than one approval poll was conducted, the last results of the month are presented.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of April 15-18, 1983.

HIS PREDECESSORS



REAGAN'S REVIEWS

In the December/January 1982 issue of *Public Opinion*, we outlined five dimensions on which President Reagan's public standing could be assessed. These five areas still provide a useful measure, and we return to them again. On the *personal* side, Reagan's ratings have held up well. Impressions about his *effectiveness*, as seen on page 35, are mixed. Overall impressions of the president's *program* show the public approving of his handling of foreign affairs, and disapproving of his handling of the economy. The *equity and fairness* issue continues to plague this president. The last of the five dimensions—whether the program will be *successful*—shows cautious optimism. The problems that confronted this administration in 1981 still exist, but there is a sense that some progress is being made.

On the final page of this section, we show the president's approval rating as measured by Gallup, Harris, and CBS/*New York Times*. On this barometer of presidential health, Reagan's ratings have shown remarkable stability (albeit not at high levels) in the last year.

Question: For each of these people or groups, please tell me if you know the person and, if so, whether you are very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable toward the person or group? . . . Ronald Reagan.

Registered voters *



Note: *Results based on registered voters who knew Reagan and had an opinion. In October 1982, 23% had a very favorable opinion of Ronald Reagan, 33% somewhat favorable, 19% somewhat unfavorable, and 26% very unfavorable. In December 1982, 21% said very favorable, 32% somewhat favorable, 21% somewhat unfavorable, and 26% very unfavorable.

Source: Survey by Penn + Schoen for The Garth Analysis, April 23-24, 1983.

Question: I'm going to read you some favorable and unfavorable statements people have made to us in describing their feelings about Reagan. For each, I'd like you to tell me if you feel that way about Reagan or not. How about . . . Do you feel that way about Reagan or not?



Note: Question was asked of a split sample.

Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, February 25-March 2, 1983.

GETTING THE JOB DONE

Question: I'm going to read you some favorable and unfavorable statements people have made to us in describing their feelings about Reagan. For each, I'd like you to tell me if you feel that way about Reagan or not. How about . . . Do you feel that way about Reagan or not?



THE CLICHES



Note: Question was asked of a split sample.
Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, February 25-March 2, 1983.

HOW'S HE DOING? THE ECONOMY...

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way (Reagan/Ronald Reagan) is handling the nation's economy? (Is that approve/disapprove strongly or approve/disapprove somewhat?)



	Approve	Disapprove	Don't know/ No opinion
1981			
Sept. 25-26	59%	34%	7%
Oct. 1-5	53	37	9
Oct. 14-18	54	39	7
Nov. 17-22	45	49	7
Dec. 11-12	46	46	8
1982			
Jan. 22-30	46	46	8
Feb. 17-18	38	57	5
Mar. 3-8	42	53	5
Mar. 18-21	43	52	5
Apr. 21-25	44	51	5
May 24-28	40	53	7
Aug. 17	40	55	5
Sept. 9-13	41	52	7
Sept. 24-26	40	55	5
Oct. 5-11	41	51	9
Dec. 7-18	38	57	6
1983			
Jan. 18-22	38	58	5
Feb. 25-Mar. 2	43	54	3
Apr. 8-12	42	54	4

AND FOREIGN POLICY

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way (Reagan/Ronald Reagan) is handling foreign affairs? (Is that approve/disapprove strongly or approve/disapprove somewhat?)



	Approve	Disapprove	Don't know/ No opinion
1981			
Oct. 9-11	63%	30%	7%
Oct. 14-18	61	26	13
Nov. 17-22	54	35	10
Dec. 11-12	53	33	15
1982			
Jan. 22-30	52	33	15
Feb. 17-18	40	41	19
Mar. 3-8	45	43	12
Mar. 18-21	43	45	12
Apr. 21-25	53	34	14
May 24-28	46	35	19
Sept. 9-13	50	35	15
Sept. 24-26	43	45	13
Oct. 5-11	44	39	17
Dec. 7-18	40	41	19
1983			
Jan. 18-22	45	33	22

Note: For September 25-26, 1981 through October 14-18, 1981 Approve = "Approve strongly" and "Approve somewhat." Disapprove = "Disapprove strongly" and "Disapprove somewhat." Sample sizes: September 25-26, 1981 = 501; October 1-5, 1981 = 1,004; December 11-12, 1981 = 1,208; February 17-18, 1982 = 1,002; March 18-21, 1982 = 1,218; May 24-28, 1982 = 1,018; August 17, 1982 = 913; September 24-26, 1982 = 1,007.

Source: Surveys by ABC News, September 25-26, October 1-5, October 9-11, and December 11-12, 1981, and December 7-18, 1982; All others by ABC News/ *Washington Post*, latest that of April 8-12, 1983.

THE FAIRNESS FACTOR

Question: I'm going to read you some favorable and unfavorable statements people have made to us in describing their feelings about Reagan. For each, I'd like you to tell me if you feel that way about Reagan or not. How about . . . Do you feel that way about Reagan or not?



Note. Question was asked of a split sample.
Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, February 25-March 2, 1983.



Question: Overall, would you say Reagan cares more about serving poor and lower income people, middle income people, upper income people . . . or would you say he cares equally about serving all people?

	Poor	Middle	Upper	All People
1981				
February	3%	6%	24%	67%
March	2	5	36	57
April	1	6	31	62
Mid-September	1	8	54	36
Late September	2	6	45	47
October	1	10	55	34
November	1	7	56	36
1982				
January	1	7	53	39
May	1	5	59	35
August	2	8	59	31

Note: Sample sizes: Feb. 19-20, 1981 = 1,205; March 25-29, 1981 = 1,206; Sept. 25-26, 1981 = 501; May 24-28, 1982 = 1,018; August 17, 1982 = 913; October 1-5, 1982 = 1,004. In an October 1982 poll of respondents with a 50-50 chance or better of voting, when asked whether the Reagan administration should do more or less to help the poor, 75% said "more." In a March 1983 *Time*/Yankelovich, Skelly and White poll, 70% agreed "Reagan represents the interests of the rich rather than the average American like myself."

Source: Surveys by ABC News/*Washington Post*, February 19-20, 1981 through September 14-20, 1981; ABC News, October 1-5, 1981 and September 25-26, 1981; ABC News/*Washington Post*, October 5, 1981 through August 17, 1982.

WILL IT WORK?

Question: Whatever its effect on you, do you think the economic program has helped or hurt the country's economy *so far*?



	Jan. 1982	Mar.	May	Sept.	Oct.	Jan. 1983
Helped thus far	36%	27%	25%	34%	33%	30%
Hurt	57	59	66	60	60	67
Too early to tell (vol.)	8	14	9	6	7	3

Note: September 13-18, 1982 data based on 1,305 registered voters. October 23-28, 1982 data based on the probable electorate. "No opinion" calculated out; all were 10% or less, except May 19-23, 1982, "No opinion" = 12%.

Question: Do you think the economic program (Ronald Reagan's) eventually will help or hurt the country's economy?



	Jan. 1982	Mar.	May	Sept.	Jan. 1983
Eventually help	60%	54%	52%	57%	56%
Hurt	26	27	29	30	33
No opinion	14	19	19	13	11

Note: September data based on 1,305 registered adults.

Source: Surveys by CBS News/*New York Times*, latest that of January 16-19, 1983.

Question: In solving the problem of inflation, do you feel that the Reagan administration has or has not made sufficient progress?



Note: Sample sizes: October 1982 = 1,010; December 1982 = 1,019; March 1983 = 1,008. All were registered voters.

Source: Surveys by *Time*/Yankelovich, Skelly and White, latest that of March 1-3, 1983.

Question: A year from now, as a result of President Reagan's economic program, do you feel (Read each item) or not? . . . Unemployment will be reduced to below where it is now.



Note: Sample sizes approximately 1,250.

Source: Surveys by Louis Harris and Associates, latest that of March 17-20, 1983.

LOOKING AHEAD

Question: Are you generally optimistic or pessimistic about the next two years with Ronald Reagan as president?



Note: In both surveys, 4% said "Both/Neither" (vol.). "No opinion" =14% in 1981 and 11% in 1983.

Source: Surveys by CBS News/*New York Times*, latest that of January 16-19, 1983.

Question: Reagan has been president for nearly two years now. Do you think most of the things he has done since he became president will turn out to be good for the country in the long run, bad for the country in the long run, or what?


Some good, some bad 9%
Too soon to tell 5%
Most of the things Reagan has done since he became president will be good for the country in the long run 53%
Bad in the long run 33%

Note: Sample size = 505.

Source: Survey by ABC News, January 6-8, 1983.

THE WINDS OF WAR

Question: Now that Ronald Reagan has been elected president, are you afraid that he might get us into war? (November 1980) Whether or not you voted for him, are you afraid Ronald Reagan might get us into a war? (April 1981) Regardless of your overall opinion of him, are you afraid Ronald Reagan might get us into a war? (January 1982-January 1983)



	Nov. 1980*	Apr. 1981	Jan. 1982	Mar.	May	Sept.	Oct.	Jan. 1983
Afraid Reagan will get us into war	42%	35%	51%	51%	45%	37%	35%	36%
Not afraid	58	65	49	49	55	63	65	64

Note: *November 7-12, 1980 sample = 2,651 reinterviews of 3,091 respondents interviewed before the 1980 elections (Oct. 30-Nov. 1, 1980). All surveys were national samples except October 23-28, 1982 which was probable electorate.

Source: Surveys by CBS News/*New York Times*, latest that of January 16-19, 1983.

REAGAN'S RATINGS

Questions: Do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling his job as president? (Gallup) How would you rate the job President Reagan is doing as president—excellent, pretty good, only fair, or poor? (Harris) Do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling his job as president? (CBS News/*New York Times*)



GALLUP

1981	Approve	Disapprove	No opinion
Jan. 31-Feb. 2	51%	13%	36%
Feb. 13-16	55	18	27
Mar. 13-16	60	24	16
Apr. 3-6	67	18	15
Apr. 10-13	67	19	14
May 8-11	68	21	11
June 5-8	59	28	13
June 19-22	59	29	12
June 26-29	58	30	12
July 17-19	60	29	11
July 24-27	56	30	*
July 31-Aug. 3	60	28	12
Aug. 14-17	60	29	11
Sept. 18-21	52	37	11
Oct. 2-4	56	35	9
Oct. 30-Nov. 2	53	35	12
Nov. 13-16	49	40	11
Nov. 20-23	54	37	9
Dec. 11-14	49	41	10
1982			
Jan. 8-11	49	40	11
Jan. 22-25	47	42	11
Feb. 5-8	47	43	10
Mar. 12-15	46	45	9
Apr. 2-5	45	46	9
Apr. 23-26	43	47	10
Apr 30-May 5	44	46	10
May 14-17	45	44	11
June 11-14	45	45	10
June 25-28	44	46	10
July 23-26	42	46	12
July 30-Aug. 2	41	47	12
Aug. 13-16	41	49	10
Aug. 27-30	42	46	12
Sept. 17-20	42	48	10
Oct. 15-18	42	48	10
Nov. 5-8	43	47	10
Nov. 19-22	43	47	10
Dec. 10-13	41	50	9
1983			
Jan. 14-17	37	54	9
Jan. 21-24	37	53	10
Jan. 28-31	35	56	9
Feb. 25-28	40	50	10
Mar. 11-14	41	49	10
Apr. 15-18	41	49	10

HARRIS

1981	Excellent/ Pretty good	Only fair/ Poor	Not sure
Feb. 19-22	62%	30%	8%
Apr. 29-30	67	29	4
June 3-7	60	39	1
July 8-12	55	43	2
Aug. 11-16	57	42	1
Sept. 19-24	54	44	2
Oct. 28-Nov. 3	51	47	2
Dec. 9-13	47	52	1
1982			
Jan. 8-12	52	47	1
Jan. 27-30	49	50	1
Feb. 12-17	44	56	*
Mar. 12-16	41	58	1
Apr. 16-22	38	61	1
May 21-30	43	56	1
June 18-22	45	56	1
July 9-14	43	55	2
Aug. 5-10	38	61	1
Aug. 26-31	41	57	2
Oct. 29-Nov. 1	44	55	1
Nov. 23-28	45	54	1
1983			
Jan. 2-5	38	61	1
Feb. 11-16	40	60	*
Mar. 17-20	39	59	2
Apr. 7-10	41	58	1

CBS/NEW YORK TIMES

1981	Approve	Disapprove	No opinion
Apr. 22-26	67%	18%	15%
June 22-27	59	23	18
June 28-July 1	59	26	15
Sept. 22-27	53	33	14
1982			
Jan. 11-15	49	38	13
Mar. 11-15	43	42	15
May 19-23	43	44	13
June 26-28	42	45	13
Sept. 13-16	42	44	14
Oct. 23-26	48	42	10
1983			
Jan. 16-19	41	47	12
Apr. 7-11	43	45	12

Note: * = less than .5%. Sample size for CBS News June 26-28, 1982 = 1,174. For October 23-28, 1982 = 1,437 registered voters.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of April 15-18, 1983, Louis Harris and Associates, latest that of April 7-10, 1983, and CBS News, June 26-28, 1982; all others CBS News/*New York Times*, latest that of April 7-11, 1983.

by S. Robert Lichter and Stanley Rothman

What Interests
What Interests the

Ralph Nader was probably the first soldier in the modern public interest army. He was bright, ascetic, and dedicated, a prototype for the hordes of college volunteers who eagerly marched behind him. With missionary zeal, they took on all that they thought was evil in society. It wasn't very long before the campuses and the capital were filled with Nader-like groups, each having a Nader-like mission. Thus was born the public interest movement.

"Public interest" is a term that is widely used but rarely explained. It's been around since the nineteenth century, yet only a few brave souls have attempted definitions. Walter Lippmann, writing in 1955 before the label became interlocked with the movement, explained it as follows: "The public interest may be presumed to be what men would choose if they saw clearly, thought rationally, acted disinterestedly and benevolently." [1]

If men frequently fail to see, think, and act according to these lofty standards, there are those who attempt to do it for them—the public interest groups. They have taken on the entire American citizenry as a constituency, and the task they set for themselves is equally catholic. They are there to speak for all the people, whose voices would be otherwise drowned out, to accomplish "the purposes we all share and must pursue together." [2] They have names like "Common Cause," "Public Citizen," and "Consumer Federation of America." They counterpoise their interests to the selfish or the vested interests; they profess to advocate the public interest "with the same persuasiveness that others advocate special interests." [3]

The term "public interest" may not be new, but the movement is. It arose in the 1960s when the social and political atmosphere changed, bringing new alignments, new codes of behavior, and new definitions. Life had been much simpler in the 1950s. Those were the days when political labels were fewer, but clearer. At one end of the spectrum stood liberals, who supported New Deal social programs; at the other end stood conservatives who opposed them. In general, liberals were working class and Democratic; conservatives were middle class and voted Republican. People with college educations on the whole were much less enthusiastic about New Deal social programs than were those with high school or grade school educations. Then things turned topsy-turvy. The political landscape burst into bloom, yielding up such neologistic hybrids as the new right, the new left, the new or "neo" conservatives, and "neo" liberals. The old liberal and conservative labels were still around, but they bore little resemblance to their 1950s homonyms.

According to Everett Ladd,[4] what was "new" about liberalism and conservatism was that they'd switched classes. In the new order, the lower middle class is the more conservative, and the upper middle class the more liberal. And education tends to be a liberalizing, not a conservatizing, influence. The two groups both adhere to the Democratic party, but to different "wings." The upper status new liberals constitute a burgeoning "intelligentsia." Their concerns include matters of economic privilege and privation, but they center on newer social, cultural, and "life style" issues. It is no accident that the new liberalism and the public interest movement arose at almost the same time. The latter is the purest political expression of the former.

The public interest movement brings together established consumer and civil rights groups with the new Nader groups and other organizations working for governmental and social reform. In little over a decade, it has helped redirect the public agenda to encompass such diverse concerns as voting reform, consumerism, environmentalism, and the right to uphold "deviant" attitudes and life styles.

As part of a larger study on leadership and social change, we surveyed leading members of the public interest movement about their backgrounds, their so-

the Public and Public Interests

cial, economic, and political outlooks, and their aspirations for American society.[5] Our goal was to better understand an influential leadership group and the dynamics of the new liberalism it represents.

Doing Well by Doing Good

There are two prongs to the public interest movement—the formal lobbying organizations and an informal network of attorneys based in public interest law firms, universities, foundations, and government. We created separate lists of key individuals in both sectors. For the organizational sample we selected presidents and boards of directors of major public interest groups, relying on such sources as *Public Interest Profiles, Washington Five,* and the *Encyclopedia of Associations.* For the legal sample we consulted such works as the Ford Foundation's *Public Interest Law: Five Years Later* and the Council for Public Interest Law compendium, *Balancing the Scales of Justice.* We also relied on the invaluable assistance and expertise of Ms. Nan Aron, executive director of the Alliance for Justice, a national association of public interest organizations. We restricted the list to those individuals affiliated with groups based in the Washington, D.C. and New York metropolitan areas.

We randomly selected equal numbers of individuals from each sector to obtain a total sample of 157. These individuals represent a cross section of the public interest elite, including leaders or top staffers of seventy-four organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union, Center for Law and Social Policy, Children's Defense Fund, Common Cause, Congress Watch, Consumer's Union, Critical Mass, Environmental Defense Fund, Public Citizen, and Women's Legal Defense Fund, as well as major public interest law firms.

The social and personal backgrounds of this group, shown in table 1, approximate the "ideal type" of the new liberal. Most are white males, although the group includes a substantial minority of women (31 percent). Most were raised in big cities on the east coast in the comfortable circumstances of the upper middle class. Fifty-six percent recall that their family income was above average while they were growing up, four times the proportion who remember below average economic conditions. Moreover, a majority of their fathers were educated professionals, and 40 percent of those fathers held a postgraduate degree.

Their parents were politically aware and tended toward liberal and Democratic sympathies. Forty-nine percent say their fathers were liberal, and 63 percent apply the liberal label to their mothers. (Only about one-quarter of the general population describe themselves as liberal.) Sixty-four percent say their fathers identified with the Democrats and 71 percent link their mothers to that party. Moreover, the parents usually communicated their political beliefs to their children. Fully half recall frequent political discussions at home, three times the proportion who seldom or never talked about politics.

Public interest leaders are overwhelmingly young, highly educated, well-paid professionals, with secular and liberal outlooks and Democratic voting habits. Their average age is thirty-nine, and a majority are in their thirties, which means that many experienced firsthand the social and political ferment that swept across college campuses during the 1960s. Most were interested in social issues even then; a majority majored in the social sciences, including one in three who studied political science.

Their academic credentials are most impressive. Seventy-two percent went to private colleges or universities, and 45 percent attended highly selective schools. In fact, on a widely used measure of college selectivity that rates colleges from "one" (lowest) to "seven" (highest), the median rating for the entire group is a startling 6.17. Most went on to law school or other

Table 1
SOCIAL AND PERSONAL BACKGROUNDS

Background	Percent
White	97%
Male	69
From metropolitan area	71
From northeast corridor	60
Father voted Democrat	64
Father's occupation professional	52
Father held a postgraduate degree	40
Attended "highly selective" college	45
Social science major	53
Holds postgraduate degree	89
Family income $50,000+	58
Political liberal	90
Raised in Jewish religion	47
Current religion "none"	41

postgraduate training, and most continued in high quality programs. Currently 78 percent are lawyers, and only 11 percent lack some postgraduate degree.

In light of their impressive educational credentials, it is not surprising that public interest leaders are very well paid. Indeed most have done well by doing good (although many could undoubtedly do even better in corporate law firms). Despite their relative youthfulness, 35 percent earned over $50,000 in individual income in 1981; 58 percent exceeded $50,000 in family income. Among business leaders, the subjects of one of our earlier studies, 57 percent had family incomes exceeding $50,000. Inflation might help account for the public interest elites' comparatively greater monetary success, but it should not be forgotten that they are much younger than most business leaders.

If many public interest leaders are following family traditions of upper status liberalism, they depart from their parents in one respect—they have moved toward a more secular orientation. Ninety-five percent had a religious upbringing, including 47 percent in the Jewish faith, 29 percent as Protestants, and 17 percent as Catholics. Currently 41 percent profess no religious affiliation, 35 percent still consider themselves Jews, 13 percent Protestants, and 8 percent Catholics. Moreover, these affiliations are usually only nominal. Eighty-four percent say they seldom or never attend religious services.

Like their parents, the vast majority of public interest leaders regularly vote Democratic; nearly all consider themselves liberals. Since 1968, no Republican presidential candidate has received more than 4 percent of their votes, as table 2 shows. Their strongest support went to George McGovern, who garnered 96 percent of their ballots in the face of the 1972 Nixon landslide. In the other three elections, they supported third party candidates more often than Republicans. In their ideological self-evaluations, 90 percent place themselves left of center, 8 percent in the middle of the road, and only 2 percent to the right of center. Among the general public, by contrast, 21 percent describe themselves as left of center, 43 percent in the center, and 36 percent to the right of center (Gallup, September 1982).

Table 2
PRESIDENTIAL VOTING RECORD 1968-1980

1968	
Nixon	2%
Humphrey	90
1972	
Nixon	4
McGovern	96
1976	
Ford	3
Carter	93
1980	
Reagan	2
Carter	80
Anderson	12

Note: Up to 8 percent voted for minor party candidates.

Profile of the New Liberal

Everett Ladd argues that the new liberal rejects traditional bourgeois values, cultural norms, and older codes of behavior. The new liberal supports "a new morality" and endorses alternate life styles. He seeks government action in the service of social change. He is critical of the United States and its international role, hence he is reluctant to support military spending.

As table 3 shows, every element of this description fits the public interest elite. They agree almost unanimously that the government should substantially reduce the income gap between rich and poor people, and that government bears the responsibility to guarantee jobs for all and to insure a good standard of living. They are equally vehement in rejecting the Reagan administration's position that government should ease its regulation of business. Moreover, substantial minorities dissent from some economic propositions that are practically articles of faith for most Americans. Thirty-seven percent support government takeovers of big corporations, and 29 percent reject the capitalist dictum that people with more ability should earn more.

The liberalism of public interest leaders shades into profound dissatisfaction with the American social and economic order, a feeling not shared by the public. In fact, their alienation was one of our most striking findings. Forty-eight percent agree that our institutions should be completely overhauled, and a majority (51 percent) believe the country would be better off if we moved toward socialism. Three out of four believe the very structure of our society causes alienation, and over 90 percent say our legal system favors the wealthy. Only 30 percent see the private enterprise system as fair to workers. A mere 18 percent accept the basic credo of American capitalism that hard work will lead to financial success. Only about half the public interest leaders believe the system can be salvaged.

Their profound dissatisfaction with the system makes them staunch supporters of affirmative action for disadvantaged groups. They overwhelmingly agree that poor people are victims of circumstances beyond their control and that blacks lack not the motivation but the educational opportunity to climb up the economic

Table 3

ATTITUDES ON SOCIAL ISSUES
(Percent agreement)

Economics	
Government should redistribute income	94%
Government should guarantee jobs	80
Government should take over big corporations	37
Government should guarantee a good standard of living	80
Less regulation of business is good for U.S.	18
People with more ability should earn more	71
Political Alienation	
U.S. institutions need complete overhaul	48
Structure of U.S. society causes alienation	75
U.S. legal system favors wealthy	92
In America, hard work leads to financial security	18
Private enterprise is fair to workers	30
U.S. should move toward socialism	51
Foreign Policy	
More forceful with USSR	9
CIA overthrows sometimes necessary	26
Goal of U.S. foreign policy has been to protect business	74
U.S. military should be the strongest in the world	3
Disadvantaged Groups	
Women should get preference in hiring	79
Blacks are denied education to advance	83
Blacks lack motivation to advance	3
Black gains come at white expense	3
Blacks should get preference in hiring	85
Poor people are victims of circumstance	77
Sex and Morality	
Woman has right to decide on abortion	95
Homosexuality is wrong	12
Homosexuals shouldn't teach in schools	8
Adultery is wrong	55
Energy and Environment	
Environmental problems are not serious	5
We should halt nuclear energy development	68
Nuclear plants are safe	7

ladder. To speed their advances, 85 percent support preferential hiring practices for blacks, and nearly as many (79 percent) would extend that assistance to women.

The Liberal Bent

Public interest leaders' rejection of traditional values extends to the realm of sex and morality. Ninety-five percent are pro-choice on abortion. Only one out of eight regards homosexuality as wrong, and even fewer would restrict a homosexual's right to teach in public schools. They are more evenly split on the issue of extramarital sex; 55 percent agree that adultery is wrong.

If there is one issue that unites this group, it is environmentalism. Protection of the environment provides the raison d'être for many of the groups we sampled, so it is no surprise that virtually all reject the contention that our environmental problems are not serious. Most also view nuclear energy as a threat to the human and natural environment. Over two-thirds want us to halt nuclear energy development immediately, and over 90 percent regard nuclear power as unsafe.

The public interest elite are also critical of America's world role, and take a decidedly dovish stance. Three out of four believe that the primary purpose of our foreign policy has been to protect private business. By contrast only one in four believes the CIA should ever be empowered to undermine foreign governments. They vehemently reject appeals for a defense buildup. A minuscule 3 percent agree that our military should be the strongest in the world, regardless of cost, and only 9 percent call for more forceful dealings with the Soviet Union if that might increase the risk of war.

We asked public interest leaders to rate ten leadership groups in terms of the influence each wields over American life. Then we asked how much influence they believed each group *should* have. As table 4 shows, they see American society as dominated by the traditional "power elite" of business, the military, and government, along with the news media. At the bottom of the heap are the new contenders for influence—intellectuals, blacks, consumer groups, and feminists. If they could, public interest leaders would alter this pecking order according to the principle that "the last shall be first." They would deplete the influence of traditional elites like business, religion, and the military, and vastly expand the role of today's outsiders. And they would place consumer groups (that is, themselves) at the very top rung. It is worth noting that they see unions as residing in the middle of the pack and are content to leave them there.

Heroes and Goats

Thus far we have examined the public interest elite's value choices and policy preferences. But since policies are made by people, we asked them to assess some highly visible individuals and groups in the current political environment. Table 5 shows that their idols lean to the left and their bêtes noires to the right. Not surprisingly, the garland goes to Ralph Nader, progenitor of today's public interest movement. But close on his heels are Senator Edward Kennedy, liberal economist John Kenneth Galbraith, feminist Gloria Steinem, and Atlanta Mayor Andrew Young, all with approval ratings of 86 percent or better. (Nader edges out Kennedy on the basis of a 56 to 49 percent "strong ap-

Table 4

RANKS OF INFLUENCE AMONG LEADERSHIP GROUPS

Perceived influence	Preferred influence
1. Business	1. Consumer groups
2. Media	2. Blacks
3. Military	3. Intellectuals
4. Government agencies	4. Feminists
5. Unions	5. Unions
6. Religion	6. Media
7. Intellectuals	7. Government agencies
8. Blacks	8. Business
9. Consumer groups	9. Religion
10. Feminists	10. Military

proval" rating.) These liberal leaders are followed by Nicaragua's Sandinistas, of whom 50 percent approved and 39 percent disapproved, with the remainder unsure. (No more than 3 percent were unsure about any other person or group.)

Table 5

APPROVAL OF PUBLIC FIGURES AND GROUPS

1. Ralph Nader	93%
2. Edward Kennedy	93
3. John Kenneth Galbraith	90
4. Gloria Steinem	89
5. Andrew Young	86
6. Sandinistas	50
7. Fidel Castro	34
8. Milton Friedman	15
9. Margaret Thatcher	14
10. Jeane Kirkpatrick	14
11. Ronald Reagan	5
12. Moral Majority	2

A majority disapproved of all other individuals listed. Cuban Premier Fidel Castro captured a 34 percent approval rating, more than twice that given any conservative figure. Only about one in seven approved of conservative economist Milton Friedman, U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, or British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. (At about the time of our survey, Mrs. Thatcher was voted "most admired foreign leader" in the *U.S. News & World Report* annual poll of American leaders. This leadership group obviously feels differently.) Pulling up the rear are Ronald Reagan and the Moral Majority, with approval ratings of only 5 and 2 percent, respectively. In fact, 90 percent *strongly* disapproved of both, a proportion double that attained by any other figure.

It would be hard to imagine more consistent results. Public interest leaders approve of liberals and disapprove of conservatives across the board. They are much more critical of the conservative leaders of their own country and of its closest ally than they are of leftist leaders in Latin America. So their assessments of political personalities are consonant with their views on the issues, and all echo their liberal perspective.

Finally, beyond specific ideas and values, we were interested in the broader intellectual milieu of the public interest elite. Where do they get their ideas, or at least the information to support them? To find out, we asked them to assess the reliability of a dozen information sources, including major media and journals of opinion on both the left and right. The results are shown in table 6. According to this group, America's most reliable source of information is the Public Broadcasting Service. This may reflect a shared cultural and ideological style. In our study of the media elite, PBS personnel were well to the left of other journalists, and one staffer called public broadcasting "the Peace Corps of the 1980s." The *Times* placed second, followed by the *New York Review of Books*, the *Nation*, and the *New Republic*. Our subjects consider these last three journals of the left more reliable than such mainstream news magazines as *Time* and *Newsweek*. They place leading conservative journals at the bottom of the scale.

What do these findings tell us about the leadership of the public interest movement? At the top, it is primarily a movement of young lawyers who were raised in comfortable circumstances and cosmopolitan environments, studied at elite schools, and gravitated toward the power centers of New York and Washington.

TABLE 6

RELIABILITY OF INFORMATIONAL SOURCES

1. PBS
2. *New York Times*
3. *New York Review of Books*
4. *The Nation*
5. *The New Republic*
6. *Newsweek*
7. *Time*
8. TV Network News
9. *U.S. News & World Report*
10. *Public Interest*
11. *Commentary*
12. *National Review*

As principal upholders of today's new liberalism, the public interest elite represent an emerging political tradition born of our rapid transition to a post-industrial society. As such, in their quest to represent the public interest, they often deviate from the outlook and perspectives of the general public. This alienated yet influential group represents a paradox. For, despite their rejection of much of America's social and economic order, their very existence attests to the vitality of our pluralist political system.

1. Walter Lippmann, *Essays in the Public Philosophy*, (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1955), p. 42.
2. John Gardner, *In Common Cause* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.) 1973, p. 16.
3. Ibid, p. 18.
4. Everett Carll Ladd, "The New Lines Are Drawn," *Public Opinion*, July/August 1978.
5. This study is directed by Stanley Rothman and Robert Lichter under the auspices of Smith College, George Washington University, and the Research Institute on International Change at Columbia University.

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Stanley Rothman is Mary Huggins Gamble professor of government at Smith College.

New Hampshire: An Early Poll for the Earliest Primary

by David Moore

It's not easy being number one. The 1984 campaign, like the 1980 and 1976 campaigns before it, has spawned challenges to New Hampshire's status as the nation's first presidential primary. New Hampshire has been first since 1916, but nobody cared much until six decades later when television, George McGovern, and Democratic party reforms combined to give the first primary unprecedented influence. Quick to recognize a bonanza, New Hampshire's neighbors began doing their best to horn in on the financial and political abundance that befalls the state holding the first "significant" campaign contest.

In 1975, Massachusetts and Vermont moved their 1976 primary dates to the same day as New Hampshire. But Granite State politicians, their will as hard as the rock for which the state is known, passed a law requiring the primary to be held "on the second Tuesday in March *or on the Tuesday immediately preceding the date on which any other state shall hold a similar election whichever is earlier*" (emphasis added). Just to make certain they were taken seriously, New Hampshire leaders threatened to move the date back to Christmas —or Thanksgiving, for that matter—if neighbors insisted on challenging them.

The threat was effective; in 1976 and 1980, New Hampshire's primary was held late in February, the week before Massachusetts and Vermont. This season's challenge arose when the Democratic National Committee decided that in 1984 it would enforce a thirteen-week (March 13-June 12) limitation on preconvention campaigning, a period in which all state parties are supposed to select their delegates. Noncompliance with the new DNC rules would result in delegates being denied recognition at the convention. The late Governor Gallen and other state Democratic leaders, however, prevailed upon the DNC to grant an exemption to New Hampshire, allowing its primary to be held a week early, on March 6. But recently, it was discovered that Vermont will hold a non-binding beauty contest on the same day as New Hampshire in an attempt to cash in on some of the media coverage and political and financial benefits of an early contest.

Although New Hampshire party leaders have tried most valiantly to retain the primacy of the New Hampshire primary, its Democratic electorate is surprisingly ambivalent about whether the primary should remain first. This is one of the findings of a statewide telephone survey commissioned by *Public Opinion* and conducted by the University of New Hampshire poll. Five hundred eighty-seven registered New Hampshire Democrats and Independents leaning Democratic (both Democrats and Independents can vote in the Democratic primary) were interviewed in late March. Barely half of the sample felt the primary should remain first (36 percent felt strongly and 16 percent moderately), but 40 percent said it didn't matter.

The Candidates

When our survey began, four Democrats (Mondale, Cranston, Hart, and Askew) had officially declared their candidacies. Glenn and Hollings were unofficially declared, and Udall and Kennedy had taken themselves out of the race. Bumpers has since joined the noncandidate group.

In the early stages of a campaign, candidate name recognition is often a principal factor influencing voter choice. To examine this, we first told respondents that "although the primary is a year away, several Democratic candidates have already visited the state to campaign." Then they were asked if they had "read about or seen any of the candidates in the news media or in person." Candidates' names were not mentioned in this question. Only 3 percent had seen one or more candidates in person. Two percent of those we surveyed had seen Mondale, and between 0.5 and 1 percent mentioned Cranston, Hart, and Hollings. As expected, many more had seen or heard of the candidates via the mass media (see table 1).

Respondents were then read a list of seven official and unofficial candidates (including Bumpers) and asked, first, if they were familiar with each candidate, and, second, how they would rate each candidate (strongly or moderately favorable or unfavorable). In this question, each candidate was identified by his political office and his home state, such as "Former Governor Reuben Askew from Florida," and "Senator Ernest Hollings from South Carolina." On every second interview, the names were read in reverse order to re-

duce question order bias.

As expected, the "unprompted" recognition levels were much lower than the "prompted" ones, with only 48 percent of the respondents, for example, volunteering Mondale's name. When we read his name in the next question, 94 percent of those surveyed indicated they were familiar with him (see table 1). The ratings suggest that at this time there are really three groups of candidates: (1) front-runner Mondale and his major challenger, Glenn; (2) Cranston and Hart, who have each developed strong launching positions for their campaigns; and (3) Askew and Hollings, who have yet to make much of an impact.

Table 1
CANDIDATE RATINGS AND RECOGNITION
(N=587)

	Recognition		Ratings	
	Unprompted*	Prompted**	Favorable	Unfavorable
Mondale	48%	94%	62%	18%
Glenn	33	84	46	16
Cranston	23	66	26	20
Hart	22	40	30	8
Askew	7	41	7	18
Hollings	6	26	6	11

*"Although the primary is a year away, several Democratic candidates have already visited the state to campaign. Have you read about or seen any of the candidates in the news media or in person? (if so) Which one(s)?"

**"Now I'm going to read you the names of several Democrats who may be running in the New Hampshire presidential primary next year. For each one, please tell me if you are familiar with him, and if so, whether you feel very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable toward him."

Askew's rating is particularly intriguing, for he has the highest ratio of unfavorable to favorable ratings of any of the candidates. While his unprompted recognition was only 7 percent, the prompted recognition jumped to 41 percent, equal to that of Hart and half again higher than that of Hollings. Askew has received very little news coverage in the state, certainly less than Hollings and substantially less than Hart. Thus, his apparent high recognition may in fact be high misperception. New Hampshire Democrats may be confusing the former Florida governor with a former Maryland governor and vice president with a similar sounding name. Although Askew announced his candidacy by saying, "I am not Jimmy Carter," perhaps he should have said, "I am not Spiro Agnew."

The comparison between Cranston and Hart suggests that Cranston may have an image problem. The two men earned comparable unprompted recognition levels (23 percent and 22 percent, respectively), but when respondents were given the candidates' names, Cranston was recognized by far more voters than Hart (66 percent to 40 percent). Despite the higher recognition, Cranston's rating at 26 percent favorable to 20 percent unfavorable is significantly worse than Hart's at 30 percent to 8 percent. The figures mean that of just those who rated the respective candidates, 79 percent gave Hart a favorable rating while only 57 percent gave Cranston a favorable rating.

The relative ratings of the candidates are reflected in the vote choices respondents would make "if the election were held today." Mondale is certainly the candidate to beat, enjoying support from 41 percent of the Democrats compared to 19 percent for Glenn, 8 percent for Hart, 4 percent for Cranston, 1 percent for Hollings, and 27 percent undecided (see table 2).

Table 2
CANDIDATE PREFERENCES
(N=587)

	With Kennedy	Without Kennedy	Approval Voting**
Kennedy	33%	—	—
Mondale	26	41%	53%
Glenn	12	19	36
Hart	5	8	16
Cranston	3	4	11
Hollings	1	1	2
Askew	*	*	3
Unsure	20	27	27
	100%	100%	

*Less than 0.5%.

**Allows voter to choose more than one candidate.

Senator Edward Kennedy retains substantial support in New Hampshire, despite his noncandidacy. Almost three-fourths of the state's Democrats (73 percent) believe Kennedy will "stick to his position" on not running, while only 18 percent "think there's a chance he'll end up running anyhow." (An identically worded question in a nationwide poll conducted by ABC News last January showed only 57 percent of the American public expected Kennedy to stick to his position, while 39 percent felt he would end up running anyhow.) But if Kennedy were running, he would in fact lead the pack at this point. Mondale benefits most from Kennedy's noncandidacy, picking up almost half the Kennedy supporters. About a fifth go to Glenn and another fifth to the unsure category; the few remaining go mostly to Hart.

All respondents who indicated a preference for one of the candidates were asked their reasons for that choice. For Mondale and Glenn, simple name recognition ("the only one I know," "I've heard a lot about him") is a key factor contributing to their popularity. Mondale's experience and his position as vice president, grouped in the "experience/capability" category, set him apart from—and very much ahead of—the rest of the candidates.

The Issues

Democrats in New Hampshire are highly dissatisfied with President Reagan's handling of the economy, rat-

ing it even lower than former President Jimmy Carter's economic performance in office. Only 20 percent give Reagan an excellent or good rating on the economy, 31 percent say fair, and 45 percent say poor. "Looking back a couple of years" to rate Carter's handling of the economy, about the same percentage of New Hampshire Democrats (19 percent) say excellent or good as they do for Reagan, but considerably more say fair (45 percent) rather than poor (28 percent), essentially a reversal of the figures for Reagan.

It is not surprising, therefore, that among the "two or three issues" respondents would "most like the candidates to talk about as the campaign gets under way," the economy clearly dominates. A full 70 percent volunteer one or more economic issues, with the economy in general cited most frequently (37 percent), followed closely by jobs or unemployment (35 percent) (see table 3). Almost half the respondents specify defense or arms control issues. Some aspect of social spending is mentioned by 30 percent of the respondents, concern about environmental pollution by 13 percent, and acid rain by 7 percent. Overall, New Hampshire Democrats' worries reflect national concerns, thus their primary provides implications for the country as a whole.

Table 3
ISSUE CONCERNS OF VOTERS
(N=587)

"As the primary gets under way, what are the *two* or *three* issues that you would *most* like the candidates to talk about?"
[No issues were read to the respondents.]

Economy (70%)*		**Social Programs (30%)***	
General	37%	Social security/ elderly	25%
Jobs, unemployment	35	Education	3
Taxes	10	Health	3
Inflation	7	Crime, drug abuse	3
Balanced budget	5		
Interest rates	2	**Environment (18%)***	
		General	13%
Defense/Arms Control (49%)*		Acid rain	7
Nuclear freeze/ arms control	26%	**Foreign Policy (14%)***	
Nuclear power	16	General	9%
Defense spending	15	El Salvador	4
		Trade, protectionism	1

*Percentage of respondents mentioning one *or more* items in this category.

New Hampshire's Mainstream Democrats

New Hampshire, say some political analysts, is one of the least representative states in the nation: It is too small, too rural, too conservative, too racially homogeneous—too far removed from the mainstream of American politics—to exert the great influence it does simply because it holds the first presidential primary. But this myth of an idiosyncratic New Hampshire is not supported by survey research. It is true that the New Hampshire electorate as a whole is more Republican and conservative than the nation as a whole, but the Democrats in the state, though constituting a minority party, fall into the mainstream of the party nationwide.

In the current survey, New Hampshire Democrats reveal a political philosophy that virtually mirrors Democrats across the country. Approximately the same proportion of state Democrats are liberal (40 percent) as are national Democrats (39 percent), though there are fewer moderates in New Hampshire (28 percent) than in the nation (34 percent), and more conservatives in the state (32 percent vs. 27 percent). Moreover, on the issues, New Hampshire Democrats generally take the more liberal position by a wide margin. Respondents were asked, for example, whether they would be more or less likely to support a candidate who favored or opposed selected issues, and on each of the issues the majority position conforms to that of the Democrats in Congress. By two-to-one margins or better, respondents favor a candidate who calls for an immediate nuclear freeze, wants to increase federal spending to create jobs, favors a decrease in defense spending, and favors a delay in the tax cut scheduled for next July. And by a

Table 4
VOTERS' ATTITUDES ON SELECTED ISSUES
(N=587)

"Now I'm going to read you a list of proposals that some candidates have made to deal with problems faced by this country. Please tell me if you would be more likely or less likely to vote for a candidate who makes the proposal, or wouldn't it make much difference one way or the other?"

A Candidate who:	More likely	Less likely	No difference
1. Calls for a balanced budget	60%	15%	25%
2. Favors an *immediate* nuclear freeze between the United States and Soviet Union	66	20	14
3. Favors increasing federal spending to create new jobs	59	27	13
4. Wants to decrease defense spending	58	29	13
5. Favors delaying the tax cut scheduled to take place next July in order to help reduce the federal deficit	52	26	22
6. Opposes any further aid to El Salvador	51	26	23
7. Opposes any further legislation against acid rain, until more studies can pinpoint the causes of acid rain	35	48	17
8. Favors construction of the MX missile and B-1 bomber	19	58	23

three-to-one margin, they are less likely to support a candidate who favors construction of the MX missile and B-1 bomber (see table 4).

On only one issue do New Hampshire Democrats take what used to be the more conservative position; they favor a candidate who calls for a balanced budget by a four-to-one ratio. But in light of recent publicity about projected deficits of $200 billion or more, and the rhetoric of Democratic leaders critical of such deficits, this preference does not really signify conservatism.

Acid Rain

One other issue, acid rain, is potentially important for the 1984 New Hampshire primary. It is caused—many people believe—by pollutants from coal powered factories, and it is of growing concern to the northeastern states and Canada. Resolutions in support of federal legislation to cut pollutant emissions in half by 1990, were on the ballots of 195 towns in New Hampshire during the annual town meetings in March. Virtually all the towns supported the resolution. None opposed it, and the rest simply tabled the resolution rather than vote on it. The sole Democratic member of the state's congressional delegation, Representative Norman D'Amours, has requested that all presidential candidates indicate their support for or opposition to the resolution, which is supported by most Democratic and Republican party leaders in the state, as well as the state's largest newspaper, the Manchester *Union Leader*.

Despite recent publicity, however, the acid rain issue has not yet become an especially salient one. Only 48 percent would be less likely rather than more likely (35 percent) to support a candidate who opposes acid rain legislation until more studies have been conducted. Nevertheless, as will be shown later, the issue is having a small, though detectable, effect injurious to Glenn.

Candidates and the Issues

At this point in the campaign, Mondale is the candidate for most voters, regardless of ideology or issues. Among just those who indicated a preference among the candidates, Mondale receives about the same level of Democratic support from liberals (60 percent) as he does from moderates (57 percent) and conservatives (56 percent). Glenn, on the other hand, receives much greater support from conservatives (36 percent) and moderates (33 percent) than he does from liberals (14 percent). While Hart does better than Glenn among liberals with 18 percent, among moderates and conservatives he does quite poorly, with 3 percent and 5 percent, respectively. Cranston also appears to do worse at the conservative end of the scale, though the numbers are small.

Approval Voting

The concept of "approval voting"—a procedure that would allow the voter to select as many candidates in a multi-candidate field as the voter finds acceptable—is gaining ground among many who study primary reform. Tom Cronin and Robert Loevy recently incorporated it in a reform package presented in an article in *Public Opinion*. It is currently being considered in a number of states, including New Hampshire. The major argument for the reform is that it much more accurately reflects the actual strength of a candidate in the electorate than does the current system, and is therefore more democratic. This reform would be particularly useful in preventing a candidate with only minority support from emerging the winner because two or more candidates of similar orientation split the majority vote. That type of victory may have occurred in New Hampshire in 1976, for example, when Jimmy Carter, as the sole conservative candidate, triumphed over several liberals who apparently split the majority vote.

According to one study, if approval voting had been used in the 1980 New Hampshire primary, Reagan would still have come in first, but with 57 percent approval compared to the 50 percent he actually received. The most significant change would have been for Howard Baker, who would have made a strong second-place showing with 41 percent approval, instead of the poor third-place (at 13 percent) showing he actually made. George Bush would have come in third with 39 percent, instead of second with 20 percent. And John Anderson would have received 27 percent instead of 10 percent, a fourth place showing in either case. Baker's campaign was squelched by the New Hampshire primary, when the moderate Republicans, torn between Baker and Bush, chose Bush. Bush, of course, continued after New Hampshire and eventually became vice president, though Baker might have gone the same route had there been approval voting in New Hampshire that year.

To test the effect of approval voting at this stage of the campaign, respondents who indicated a candidate preference were told that "the state legislature is considering a bill to allow a voter in the primary to choose more than one candidate—as many candidates as the voter finds acceptable." Then they were asked, "If you could do that, and the election were held today, what other candidates, if any, would you choose?"

Over half of the respondents picked more than one candidate: 41 percent chose two candidates; 9 percent, three candidates; and 1 percent, four candidates (see table 2). Glenn would be helped most, jumping to an approval of 36 percent compared to a single-choice vote of 19 percent; but Mondale would also benefit, receiving majority approval (53 percent) rather than just a minority vote choice (41 percent). Hart's and Cranston's support would at least double, while Hollings and Askew would see only slight increases. These figures, of course, still leave 27 percent undecided about any choice.

Although candidate preferences differ somewhat between liberals and conservatives, among the candidates, there have so far been few differences on the major issues. All have expressed support for federal spending to create jobs, cuts in the rates of defense spending increases, a delay or cancellation of the tax cut in July, and support for the nuclear freeze. On an issue that is relatively minor in terms of the number of voters mentioning it, a difference has emerged which could prove to be influential simply because it provides one way to differentiate the candidates. That issue is acid rain.

Mondale has strongly supported legislation to halve the pollutants that cause acid rain, but he has also proposed financial aid for the factories that would have to bear the costs of cutting pollution. All the other candidates, except Glenn, have also supported the 50 percent resolution, though they vary in their exact responses. In his winter visits to New Hampshire this year, Glenn responded to questions about acid rain by citing the need for more studies to determine its cause before additional restrictive legislation is passed. This position was consistent with the needs of his home state, Ohio, where there are many coal-powered factories that would be adversely affected by such legislation.

The difference between Glenn and the rest of the candidates on this issue, widely reported in New Hampshire, is reflected in the results of the survey. The acid rain issue does significantly correlate with respondents' ratings and choice of Glenn, even after controlling for ideology and other demographic characteristics. Among those who do not want further studies before acid rain legislation is enacted (the plurality position among New Hampshire Democrats), Glenn receives only 13 percent support, compared to 24 percent support among those who want such studies. Similarly, his favorability to unfavorability ratio is much worse among those opposing the studies (50 percent to 24 percent) than among those favoring the studies (52 percent to 14 percent).

This correlation between acid rain attitudes and Glenn's support may be a short-term phenomenon, because he has recently outlined a more comprehensive response, similar in most respects to Mondale's, in a letter to Congressman D'Amours. So far, however, this letter has not been given much coverage in the state, and the acid rain issue may continue to affect the Glenn campaign.

The Carter Connection

While Mondale has obviously benefited from the publicity and experience he received as vice president, it is an open question whether his connection with Carter will help or hurt his overall campaign. This survey suggests that, at least in New Hampshire, Mondale is in fact helped by the connection voters make between him and the former president.

Respondents were asked to evaluate Carter on his overall performance as president, his handling of the economy, and his handling of foreign policy. Controlling for ideology and other demographic characteristics of the respondents, there is a strong positive correlation between each of the Carter ratings and Mondale's favorability rating. This correlation does not show up with other candidates' favorability ratings. Such correlations may at first seem to support the fears of those who believe the Carter connection will hurt Mondale, because they confirm that the lower the voters rate Carter, the lower they rate Mondale as well. Nevertheless, although Carter receives rather low ratings, Mondale's favorability rating remains high among those who rate Carter as excellent, good, *and* fair, falling significantly only among those who rate Carter as poor. But few Democrats rate Carter in the lowest category, so overall the connection with Carter is an advantage for Mondale.

The key here seems to be that voters are not rating Carter in a vacuum, but comparatively. They see Carter, whatever his faults, as better than Reagan, and the comparative advantage that Carter enjoys is apparently transferred to Mondale.

The rating of Carter on his handling of the economy, the major issue of the campaign, provides a good example of this comparative perspective: Among Democrats who rate Carter either higher than Reagan (48 percent) or the same as Reagan (22 percent), Mondale receives better than a 5 to 1 favorable to unfavorable rating; while among those who rate Carter lower (30 percent), Mondale receives less than a 2 to 1 favorable to unfavorable rating. The important point for Mondale, however, is that 70 percent of the voters give Carter an equal or better rating than Reagan, and among this substantial majority Mondale does quite well. The pattern is the same for the other ratings.

These figures do not mean, of course, that Mondale should have Carter in tow wherever he campaigns. If Mondale wins the nomination, he will obviously have to face a more heterogeneous electorate which, no doubt, does not give Carter the comparative advantage over Reagan he enjoys among New Hampshire Democrats. But the figures do suggest that any efforts by Mondale to distance himself from Carter are not necessary as far as his campaign for the nomination is concerned, and may be counterproductive if seen as ungrateful. Indeed, such is the charge already being leveled at him by the *Union Leader*. The Carter connection is a positive factor that need not be advertised, but not denied either.

The New Hampshire primary is a media primary, important not because of the number of delegates selected, but because of the message it sends to the American public about candidates' electability. In that sense, the success of any candidate can't be measured just by how many votes he gets, but how news reporters *interpret* the results. And that, no one can predict.

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$3.50

Public Opinion

Published by American Enterprise Institute

June/July 1983

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(What's going on? Confidence in government has been eroding. Now—apparently—change. Could it have happened in a recession? See p. 16)



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Volume 6, Number 3 June/July 1983

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PUBLIC OPINION, June/July 1983, Vol. 6, No. 3. Published bimonthly by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. Copyright 1983 American Enterprise Institute. Subscription rates: $18.00 for one year, $34.00 for two years. Individual copy: $3.50. Information on bulk orders of multiple subscriptions available on request. Editorial and business offices: c/o AEI, 1150 17th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Send changes of address and all subscription correspondence to Circulation Department, c/o AEI, same address. "American Enterprise Institute" and are registered service marks of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.

Second class postage paid at Washington, D.C.

ISSN 0149-9157

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With Friends

It started in October 1980. A less than disinterested Jody Powell began calling around to the networks, complaining that candidate Ronald Reagan was getting a free ride from the national media.

Writing in the January 1981 issue of the *Washington Monthly*, Jonathan Alter picked up on Powell's complaint. Alter claimed that President-elect Ronald Reagan hadn't exactly been getting a free ride from the media, but that he had been paying "half fare."

In 1982 journalist William Greider used *Rolling Stone* to say that Reagan was making monkeys out of the White House press corps.

Press criticism of Reagan's press coverage reached its high point this June. Both the *Columbia Journalism Review* (the nation's most famous magazine about reporting) and "Inside Story," (Hodding Carter's public television series about the nation's media) devoted lead pieces to the inadequacies of press coverage of Ronald Reagan. The *CJR* article, written by C. T. Hanson, unabashedly concluded that, during the first two years of the Reagan presidency, the White House press corps served as a ". . . conduit of White House utterances and official image-mongering intended to sell Reaganomics." Hanson, who serves as *CJR*'s Washington columnist, went so far as to equate the White House press corps with the journalists at Tass and *Izvestia*, *not* because both sets of reporters were liberal, but because both acted as if they were flacking for their governments.

If anything, Hodding Carter's program went further in the direction of *mea culpa*—the press apologizing for not getting the real Reagan story out to the people. Carter trotted out five nationally prominent journalists—Elizabeth Drew, Sam Donaldson, Lou Cannon, Andrea Mitchell, and William Greider—and each went on record in support of the theory that Reagan rendered the press impotent. Each reporter concluded that Reagan has proven to be a master animal trainer—that Reagan, as president, has had greater success in controlling the media than Reagan, as movie star, had in controlling his lab monkey, Bonzo.

What makes this fascinating is that the press has been confessing to a crime it did not commit. Had members of the press corps bothered to look systematically at their own copy instead of focusing on public opinion polls, they would have found what we found—that Ronald Reagan has received disproportionately critical and negative press from the national media. If anybody is making monkeys out of the media when it comes to covering Reagan, it's the press corps itself—not for failing to criticize, but for failing to remember its own criticism.

The 100 Day Story

For the past several months the Media Analysis Project at George Washington University has been analyzing press coverage of the first hundred days of 1983. The Project has four parts—only one involves Reagan, his presidency, and his policies. Our focus involves all *policy* news, more specifically policy news as it appears in the "soft news" portions of the national press.

Soft news includes the editorials, columns, commentaries, and feature reports among nine of the nation's most important news sources, which provide the electorate and the government with the majority of its day-to-day news content.[1] And although Reagan's press was never our primary concern, from the outset we did

[1] Our sources include the three network evening news broadcasts, the three national news magazines, and the nation's three most prestigious dailies, the *Washington Post*, the *New York Times*, and the *Wall Street Journal*.

Like These...

look at all the soft news about Reagan and his presidency, and all the soft news about public policies that included references to the president.

When the study is completed, we will have analyzed thousands of soft news stories that evaluate Ronald Reagan and/or his policies. But this report is a preliminary one: it concerns quantitative findings from the network evening news programs for the first two months of 1983. Still, network journalism represents no small part of the nation's daily news. And the first two months of 1983 are particularly well-suited for this piece—first because the media were doing lots of reporting about the President on the second anniversary of his presidency, and because it was just after January and February that Reagan began his less than meteoric climb in approval polls.

The fact is, our quantitative findings for television match our qualitative findings for print. And 1983 looks to us very much like 1981 and 1982, at least in terms of White House reporting. In all cases the conclusion holds: Reagan has, with the exception of his assassination coverage, neither ridden free nor paid half fare. Reagan really has had his share of media criticism.

About Twenty to One—Negative

No matter how we counted, the results came out the same: bad press for Reagan and for his administration.

Let's start with the *story* as the unit of analysis—in our case the story was either a network commentary or a network feature report more than two and a half minutes long. Focusing on *policy issues*, we identified just under 100 such pieces on network evening news in the first two months of the year. And among all such pieces, Reagan was mentioned or discussed in 46 items.

Most network reporting is colorless—hard news especially. But because we concentrated on soft news coverage, we found lots of coloration—explicit evaluation of politicians and public policies. Two-thirds of all the soft news pieces mentioning Ronald Reagan were easily classified as explicitly favorable or unfavorable.

And just how many of these stories could we classify as positive? Only two! Twenty-seven pieces were directly negative toward Reagan in one dimension or another. The ratio of bad news to good, using stories as the analytical unit, was thirteen and one-half to one. That statistic understates the level of criticism, because Reagan's two positive pieces were, at best, moderately favorable, and because his negative stories were often very unfavorable.

Figure 1

TOTAL WORDS USED IN NETWORK "SOFT NEWS" REPORTS CONSIDERED (A) FAVORABLE, (B) NEUTRAL, (C) UNFAVORABLE TOWARD PRESIDENT REAGAN, JANUARY-FEBRUARY, 1983; ALL THREE NETWORKS COMBINED



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Robinson

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So, we went through each piece, line by line, and judged each as neutral, ambiguous, favorable, or unfavorable in its inference about the President. We then subtracted positives from negatives to reach an algebraic sum for each report. Reagan's highest score was a measly +3. His lowest was a miserable −16, indicating, we believe, just how much more willing the press has been to bury Reagan than to praise him.

Using total inferences instead of stories, Reagan came through the evening news with a net score of −133. That works out to be −2.3 inferences per night on the network evening news. And these figures do not include bad news inferences made about Anne Gorsuch, Rita Lavelle, William Casey, et al., unless Reagan was specifically mentioned in those reports.

We added up the *words* in those stories which we had classified as negative, neutral, ambiguous, or positive. Then we examined the totals, and the results are dramatic (see figure 1).

Stories in which Reagan was treated favorably totaled 400 words—two John Chancellor commentaries of 200 words each. Stories in which Reagan was treated unfavorably totaled 8,800 words—a ratio of twenty-two to one negative![2]

This ratio probably overstates the case, because many of the longest feature pieces made only one or two clear negative inferences about Reagan. But the fact that Reagan got even more bad press than ambiguous and neutral press is a stunning rebuke to those who believe that the media have somehow let Ronald Reagan get away with his presidency.

Specific Criticisms

What sorts of things did these correspondents and commentators criticize? Just about everything except Reagan's personality. Reporters complained most about the *results* of Reaganism. In a feature report on Reagan's first two years, Sam Donaldson and ABC superimposed the President's picture over a brightly colored visual that traced the phenomenal growth in unemployment during Reagan's term. In those same frames, ABC also used audiotape in which Reagan predicted that the recession was over. The report made it perfectly clear that Reaganomics had failed and that Reagan was out of touch with American economic reality. And Donaldson ended on a note that everybody, everywhere, would have to regard as very critical. "There is," concluded Donaldson, "plenty of room for disagreement over whether Ronald Reagan should receive a passing or failing grade for these past two years. But there is a consensus in Washington that unless he changes his game plan, economically, the grade for the next two years will almost certainly be an F."

Over at NBC, John Chancellor attacked Reagan's political judgment on several occasions, but he swung hardest on the Kenneth Adelman nomination. "There was no need," said Chancellor, "for the White House to have stumbled into the Adelman mess. Let me count the ways."

John Chancellor, most prolific of the network commentators, also attacked Reagan's integrity. Speaking about the "EPA mess," Chancellor made Reagan sound like Richard Nixon:

> The White House has been acting improperly for more than two years as far as the EPA is concerned, and is in flagrant violation of the Constitution.
>
> In December 1980, a federal law went into effect. . . . It orders the EPA to clean up the dumps, but the Reagan administration has simply ignored it.
>
> The Constitution says of the president "He shall take care that the laws are faithfully executed." He hasn't, and that's the biggest scandal of them all.

No doubt you're wondering what happened on CBS. Nothing favorable. Unlike the other anchors, Dan Rather chose, on more than one occasion, to lead into feature reports about the failing economy by tying Reagan directly and unfavorably to the bad news.

On February 1, Rather opened a powerful four-minute feature report about the psychological impact of being unemployed with the following paragraph: "While President Reagan was in St. Louis today speaking again of an America on the mend, there was another America not far off—an America of 12 million unemployed where the wounds are still too fresh and painful to mend. Ed Rabel looks tonight at the numbers and the faces . . . and he finds that losing your job involves much more than losing your paycheck."

Two weeks later, Rather gave us something on the order of an instant replay, once again tying Reagan, Ed Rabel, and the recovery together in a much less than flattering way. "At his news conference Wednesday night, President Reagan said the recovery is beginning to flex its muscles. And the latest reports . . . indicate recovery may indeed be just around the corner. Tonight Ed Rabel looks at some people for whom just around the corner isn't quite close enough." Rabel followed with another dramatic feature about America's new poor.

On TV in '83, even when Reagan looked good, he really looked bad. The most favorable piece on Reagan in early 1983 came from John Chancellor—the +3 piece we discussed above. But even that commentary concerning as it did the Nakasone visit to the U.S. in January, began with a slap, not a caress. Chancellor made sure he tempered his general approval with his first sentence. "The administration has handled the visit of the Japanese prime minister with the kind of skill and dexterity it does not always show in foreign affairs." So much for flacking on the evening news.

What about Print?

Is network news unique? Not really. Establishment print—as establishment print reporters would predict

[2] Word totals were rounded to the closest 100 words.

—has been tougher on Reagan than network television. And, in 1983, eastern print went after Reagan on almost every ground imaginable, including grounds which at this point don't look nearly so firm.

One would expect that the *New York Times* would go after Reagan for implementing Reaganomics. But in early 1983, the *Times* went well outside supply-side theory to declare Reagan a political abomination, a total loss politically. "The stench of failure hangs over the Reagan White House" was the opening line in the lead editorial on January 9.

David Broder, the usually moderate and always respected national columnist for the *Washington Post*, pulled out most of the stops as he also wrote a political obituary for Ronald Reagan. "What we are witnessing [in 1983] is not the midpoint of the Reagan presidency, but its phase-out. 'Reaganism,' it is becoming clear, was a one-year phenomenon. . . . What has been occurring ever since is an accelerating retreat from Reaganomics, a process in which he is more spectator than leader."

Reagan did get some good news for his work with the Social Security Commission and for the final legislative compromise. But not from the *Wall Street Journal*. "Ronald Reagan's answer to a political deadlock," said the *Journal*, "was to appoint a bipartisan commission which . . . will soon feed back to Congress and to the President the problem it began with. The ultimate in this style of government should be reached well before the Reagan first term ends . . . a bipartisan commission to study bipartisan commissions."

At the same time Norman Miller, bureau chief for the *Journal*, blasted Reagan for his recklessness in a piece labeled "Reagan's Record: An Economy Out of Control." Prestige press has been no consistent friend to Ronald Reagan, even the conservative prestige press.

The First Two Years

William Greider has been the most consistent complainant about what he terms a "lame" press corps, one given to "impotence" as far as Reagan is concerned. But Greider admits that Reagan was roughed up in December of 1982 and January of 1983. We suspect he would declare our findings irrelevant to the other twenty-eight months of the Reagan administration.

Let's review the "historical" record. First, some ancient history: our data from the 1980 campaign have already shown that Reagan was the second most negatively treated candidate in all of Campaign '80. Only


Reagan's Believe It or Not!
OPTICAL ILLUSION
THERE ARE NO CIA AGENTS HERE. (IT'S ALL IN YOUR MIND)
A REDWOOD TREE SHAPED LIKE AN OIL DERRICK FOUND IN CAL. BY J. WATT
MR RR. FROM WASH DC. CLAIMS... THIS CONTAINS ALL OF THE NUTRITION A SCHOOL CHILD NEEDS IN A DAY
CATSUP
MX
THIS IS A PEACE KEEPER...
THIS IS NOT
FREEZE
6000 LB. WATERBUG
FOUND BY EPA IN TIMES BEACH MO.
CLOSED
THIS TREE GIVES OFF MORE POLLUTION THAN A STEEL MILL IN YOUNGSTOWN

Jimmy Carter did worse. (*Public Opinion*, February/March 1983) But what about more recent history?

Since his inauguration, minus the shooting, Reagan has actually been on a press journey that Homer might have concocted for a movie-minded midwestern hero. Since 1981, the press has covered fully and dutifully, each of the following "problems": Nancy's "little gun" problem; Nancy's china purchase; Nancy's clothing budget; the Lefever nomination; the ketchup-is-a-vegetable fiasco; the uncharitable president routine; the night Ron slept through the Libyan air war; Watt's attack on liberals; the Richard Allen scandal; the apostasy of David Stockman; General Schweitzer's declaration of inevitable nuclear war; the Bob Jones imbroglio; the Max Hugel resignation; Haig vs. Kirkpatrick; the Thomas Reed affair; the Bill Casey stock portfolio; Ron's $58,000 handyman; the ACDA flaps; Rita Lavelle's luncheon calendar; Ice Queen Annie, from Gorsuch through Burford; Watt's war on the Beach Boys; White House disarray; Watt's "fire-sale" prices on coal leases; Reagan's constant vacationing, both from Washington and from current events; and now, of course, Debategate.

Have we forgotten any? The media seem to have forgotten most of these crises, even though they covered them at the time. And note, too, that this list does not include Reagan's *policy* problems, like unemployment, like El Salvador, like MX basing, like the Russians, like the Allies, all of which came up in soft news features and hard news reports.

Explaining Press Misperceptions

The press has spent lots of time explaining how it is that Reagan bamboozles them. In *CJR*, C. T. Hanson invokes a three-part explanation—Reagan's charm; "the cowed opposition"; the "bovine" habits of the press. All good explanations, but for a faulty premise. The real question is why the press has insisted on wearing sackcloth and ashes for the last two years.

We see four factors at play here. First is politics. Liberal reporters probably do have a hard time accepting moderate levels of political success from a man who is so immoderately conservative. As tough as the *Journal* has been with Reagan, the *Times* has been much tougher. Right-of-center and profoundly right-of-journalism, Reagan makes it easy for journalists to see themselves as failing whenever he succeeds.

Ideology is, however, only a part of this. The press sees a free ride for Reagan because it confuses amicable relations in the White House with good press for the president. The press has mistakenly used invective as the litmus test of criticism. Because reporters smile more than they ever did with Johnson, Nixon, or Carter, they assume that they have given Reagan a free ride.

Sam Donaldson has been among the most outspoken critics of his own press reporting, blaming himself for not going after Reagan enough. But Donaldson has gone after Reagan a lot. Donaldson smiles more than he used to, but he continues to blast away at Reagan, for his frequent vacations, for his failed policies, for his false facts, and for his notions of leadership.

Third, the press is doing to the press what it does to all institutions—accentuates the negative. Media are so preoccupied with institutional deficiencies, they insist on finding fault with themselves as well as everybody else. Our data from 1983 actually show that most press stories about the news media are critical of the media. Doubting their coverage of Reagan is one more instance of their obsession with being watchdogs.

Finally, press people are currently engaged in a magnificent irony. They have fallen into the same trap that Reagan, the Democrats, and the public have been slipping into for years—blaming the media for whatever occurs in politics, especially the unexpected.

Journalists read polls; they see Reagan doing comparatively well in terms of public approval. But journalists neither understand nor appreciate Reagan's modest rise in those surveys. To the press, Reagan's polls must represent their own failure to get the story out. Just as Reagan foolishly, but predictably, blamed the media for the recession, journalists unpredictably blame themselves for Reagan. Journalists see an effect and assume the cause. And media are everybody's *first* cause.

Conclusions

For the past thirty-two months, the press has not been at Ronald Reagan's throat, but it has been consistently nipping at his heels. Reagan had a brief press honeymoon after his election and a real affair with the press right after he was shot. But the basic thesis about Reagan's powers to disarm the media is mostly a myth.

And, as for media effects—if we *must* assume media effects—it's crucial to point out that Reagan is *not* all that popular. A number of polls show him behind his Democratic opponents. Reagan is not the Republican Rasputin, and the public does not regard him as magic. It's mostly the press that does that.

In the last analysis, the nation's reporters have written or said that Reagan is dumb, lazy, out of touch with reality, cheap, senile, ruining NATO, tearing up his own social safety net, even violating his constitutional oath. What else could anybody ask these reporters to say?

We have our doubts about Reagan. After having read and watched all this reportage, how could we not? We have our doubts about the nation's press as well. But one thing we know for sure: the White House press has neither flacked for Ronald Reagan nor ignored his shortcomings—personal or policy-related. If you still don't believe it, pick up this morning's paper. Watch tonight's evening news.

Authors' note:
We thank the John and Mary Markle Foundation for providing funds to conduct this research.

by Ivor Crewe

Why ~~Conservatives~~ Labour Lost ~~Won~~ the British Elections

About the BBC/Gallup Survey

The survey on which this article is based was commissioned by BBC Television, conducted by Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Ltd., and designed by the author. Four thousand one hundred and forty-one face-to-face interviews were conducted on June 8 and 9; 3,174 in England and Wales and 967 in Scotland (weighted down for overall Great Britain figures). Northern Ireland was excluded from the survey. The sample was a quota sample composed of age, sex, and housing. The survey incorporated weighted oversamples of 862 respondents in Labour-held marginal constituencies and 738 in Liberal-Conservative and Conservative-Liberal marginal constituencies. Each interview lasted about thirty minutes. The survey was not an exit poll, though it took on many of the properties of one; its size, the proximity to the election, and the closeness to actual results of the survey findings we have verified make it possible to use the survey much as one would an exit poll. The vote recorded by the survey compared with actual election results in Great Britain (in parentheses) as follows: Conservative 43.9 percent (43.4 percent); Labour 28.7 (28.2); Lib./SDP 25.8 (25.9); and other 1.6 (2.5).

All election results are deceptive. They are judged by seats won, even though seats do not switch in exact tandem with votes. They are judged by the national flow of the vote, even though this masks a flux of underlying crosscurrents. Nineteen eighty-three is no exception. The Conservative net gain of thirty-seven seats[1] produced a landslide majority of 144, but came from a modest 42.4 percent of the vote (and an even more modest 30.8 percent of the total electorate). This is 1.5 percent less than the party's popular vote margin in 1979, and markedly lower than those elections in the 1950s in which the Conservatives won a series of less spectacular victories, or indeed the 1970 election under Mr. Heath. The Conservatives' vote share was actually *higher* when it lost narrowly to Mr. Wilson in 1964 (43.4 percent) and virtually the same (41.9 percent) when it lost so decisively in 1966.

The electorate did not embrace the Conservatives; it rebuffed Labour and flirted with the Alliance. At 25.4 percent the Alliance's vote share was the best performance of the center in sixty years. The Labour vote was down by 9.3 percent—the sharpest fall incurred by a major party at a single election since the war. Labour's 27.6 percent share was its lowest since 1918—a year in which the party failed to contest a third of the seats. If performance is judged by the average share of the constituency vote going to Labour candidates, this was Labour's poorest showing since the party was founded in 1900. Thus, what needs to be explained about 1983 is not why the Conservatives did so well, but why Labour did so badly, and the Alliance not quite well enough.

The Desertion of Labour Partisans

The overwhelming majority of Conservative identifiers were loyal to their party (90 percent). The small mi-

[1] The Conservatives gained 58 seats over the 339 seats the party won in 1979. The BBC/ITN estimated that, taking into account the redistricting that took place between the 1979 and 1983 elections, the Conservative base would have been 360. Thus, the 37-seat gain.

nority who deserted switched to the Alliance, and a mere 1 percent moved to Labour (see table 1).

Table 1
PARTY IDENTIFICATION 1979 AND 1983, AND VOTE 1983

Of those who identified themselves (in 1983) as:	Con. (N=1,400)	Lab. (N=1,152)	Lib./SDP (N = 555)
Voted:			
Con.	90%	6%	13%
Lab.	1	76	3
Lib./SDP	9	17	84
Of those who identified with a party in 1983 (N=3,562)	44%	38%	16% (11% Liberal, 4% SDP, 1% Alliance)
Of those who identified with a party in 1979 (N=2,109)	41	42	14*

Note: *All Liberal. The SDP was founded in March 1981; the Alliance between the SDP and Liberal party was agreed in September 1981. Party identification is measured by the question: "Leaving aside this particular election, would you say you *generally* think of yourself as Conservative, Labour, Liberal, SDP (in Scotland/Wales: Nationalist), or what?" The conventional incliner question was asked in 1983, not in 1979, and so has been excluded to enable precise comparisons between the two elections: those replying "no party," and "don't know" are also omitted. Non-voters and refusers have been excluded from the figures on the 1983 vote. "Other" not shown.
Source: Survey by Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Ltd., for the BBC, June 8-9, 1983.

Among Alliance identifiers (of whom the majority are Liberal), loyalty was a little weaker (84 percent). By historical standards, however, this is exceptionally strong. In 1979 only 57 percent of Liberal identifiers actually voted Liberal. Their vote has always been less reliable than that of their major party counterparts, mainly because some are reluctant to "waste" a Liberal vote in a no-hope seat.

The dramatic figures are those for Labour identifiers. Almost a quarter (24 percent) abandoned their party in the voting booths. Desertion on such a scale has not been recorded in a British election. These figures, moreover, are confined to *voters*. Add abstainers, and the desertion rates, which of course rise for all three groups of identifiers, reach 36 percent for Labour.

Also damaging to Labour's prospects is the fact that the proportion of partisans identifying with Labour itself fell from 42 percent in 1979 to 38 percent this time. This is the first election in which surveys record a larger number of Conservative than Labour identifiers. Even so, to infer from these slight shifts a partisan realignment toward the right (or the center) would be wildly premature. But the probability of such a realignment is stronger than at any time since the 1920s. The 1983 election destroyed much of the old party landscape. Whether or not it is rebuilt, or how it may be rebuilt, are open questions.

The Flow of the Vote

The change in the three parties' vote share (Conservative — 1.5 percent, Labour — 9.3 percent, Liberal/SDP + 11.6 percent) lead to an obvious conclusion: the Conservatives owe their triumph, Labour its humiliation, to a direct switch of votes from Labour to the Alliance. But the BBC/Gallup survey suggests that Labour charges of an SDP "betrayal" are, however comforting, far too simple.

It is certainly true, as table 2 shows, that Labour suffered massive desertions. Well over a third (37 percent) of its 1979 support switched. But by no means did all Labour deserters go to the Alliance. For every three switching to the Liberal/SDP, one went to the Conservatives and one stayed home. Moreover, there was less than unswerving loyalty among 1979 Conservatives (23 percent switched) and 1979 Liberals (28 percent switched). The overall effect of the two-way traffic between the Alliance and the major parties was a mere 1.4 percent swing from Labour to Conservative—just

Table 2
THE FLOW OF THE VOTE FROM 1979 TO 1983

To see how the supporters of each party in 1979 voted in 1983, read down the columns of figures.

Of those who voted—party (or did not vote/too young) in 1979:	Con. (N=1,521)	Lab. (N=1,252)	Lib. (N=382)	Did not vote (N=357)	Too young (N=396)
Voted in 1983:					
Con.	77%	7%	14%	22%	28%
Lab.	4	63	9	12	17
Lib./SDP	13	22	72	14	20
Other	—	1	—	—	2
Did not vote	6	7	5	52	32

Note: Percentages do not add to 100 because of rounding.
Source: Survey by Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Ltd., for the BBC, June 8-9, 1983.

	Professional/ managerial 1983	Professional/ managerial 1979-83	Office/ clerical 1983	Office/ clerical 1979-83	Skilled manual 1983	Skilled manual 1979-83
Con.	62%	−5	55%	−3	39%	−7
Lab.	12	−6	21	—	35	−12
Lib./SDP	27	+12	24	+4	27	+16
Lab. to Con. swing		0.5%		−1.5%		2.5%
Lab. to Lib./SDP swing		9.0		2.0		14.0
Con. to Lib./SDP swing		8.5		3.5		11.5

Note: 1979 figures on housing and employment sector taken from British Election Study, 1979.
Source: Survey by Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Ltd., for the BBC, June 8-9, 1983.

over a third of the total swing.

The Alliance's differential impact on the relative fortunes of the major parties was only one of four components in the national swing, albeit the single most important. Next in significance was the larger proportion of direct converts from Labour to Conservative (7 percent) than vice versa (4 percent). This added another 1 percent to the swing.

Labour was also hit by differential turnout. Former nonvoters gave the Conservatives a 10 percent majority over Labour (22-12 percent), equivalent to an extra 0.5 percent of the national swing. However, the Labour official's traditional lament of differential abstention ("we failed to get our vote out") did not occur, despite the rise in nonvoting since 1979. The abstention rates of those voting Conservative, Labour, and Liberal in 1979 were almost identical. Labour's supporters in 1979 did not stay at home on June 9. They went to the voting booths and switched parties.

The fourth nail in Labour's coffin was hammered in by new voters. Until 1979 surveys consistently showed that, compared to the old, the young voted Labour in higher proportions and, in addition, swung more heavily against whichever party held office. In 1979, for the first time, new voters divided equally between Labour and the Conservatives. This time the swing to the right has gone further still. Labour came in *third* among new voters, taking a mere 17 percent of their vote, 3 percentage points behind the Alliance and 11 percentage points behind the Conservatives. This added another 0.7 percent to the swing. That Labour should fail so dismally among the young at a time of severe youth unemployment must seem a mystery. Ironically, unemployment was part of the reason. Among unemployed 18-22 year olds, almost half (47 percent) did not bother to vote at all.

Who Moved?

Let us put flesh onto this skeleton of the electorate by asking: who moved? Differences between men and women and across age groups were slim (see table 3). A permanent feature of all elections until recently was the higher Conservative vote among women than men. The gap disappeared in 1979 and has now gone into reverse. For the first time, and under Britain's first woman Prime Minister, the Conservatives drew less support from women than men. The Alliance, not Labour, benefited, taking 4 percentage points more votes among women (28 percent) than men (24 percent).

Conservative support increased with increasing age, but along a gentler gradient than in the past. The odd group out was not the new generation of voters—the object of such disproportionate media attention in

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Table 3
VOTE BY SEX AND AGE

	Men		Women		18-22 years		65 and over	
	1983	1979-83	1983	1979-83	1983	1979-83	1983	1979-83
Con.	46%	−1	43%	−3	41%	−2	48%	−3
Lab.	30	−9	28	−11	29	−12	33	−4
Lib./SDP	24	+11	28	+14	30	+13	19	+7
Lab. to Con. swing		4.0%		4.0%		5.0%		0.5%
Lab. to Lib./SDP swing		10.0		12.5		12.5		5.5
Con. to Lib./SDP swing		6.0		8.5		7.5		5.0

Note: Age categories 25-34, 35-44, 45-64 not shown. 1983 percentages for those groups are: for 25-34, 45% Conservative, 32% Labour, 23% Liberal/SDP; for 35-44, 47%, 27%, 26%; for 45-64, 46%, 27%, 27%.
Source: Survey by Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Ltd., for the BBC, June 8-9, 1983.

Table 4
VOTE BY SOCIAL CLASS

Semi-skilled/unskilled manual		Trade unionists		Unemployed		HOUSING: Owner/occupiers		HOUSING: Council tenants		SECTOR OF EMPLOYMENT: Private sector		SECTOR OF EMPLOYMENT: Public sector	
1983	1979-83	1983	1979-83	1983	1979-83	1983	1979-83	1983	1979-83	1983	1979-83	1983	1979-83
29%	−3	32%	+1	30%	−10	55%	−2	21%	−7	48%	+3	37%	−3
44	−11	39	−14	45	−4	17	−10	55	−6	26	−13	36	−8
26	+14	28	+12	26	+15	28	+12	24	+13	26	+11	27	+11
	4.0%		7.5%		−3.0%		4.0%		−0.5%		5.0%		2.5%
	12.5		13.0		9.5		11.0		9.5		12.0		9.5
	8.5		5.5		12.5		7.0		10.0		4.0		7.0

Economist, remarked editorially: "Mrs. Thatcher's first government has not honored its promise of structural radicalism. Its austere reputation derives more from the recession . . . and from Mrs. Thatcher's personal rhetoric than from the deliberate actions of its cabinet. With the single exception of the Falklands war, Mrs. Thatcher has actually shown herself a too cautious, too piecemeal, and rather insecure Prime Minister."

Finally and perhaps importantly, Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan have retained the public backing needed to govern, even in the face of economic dissatisfaction, not through being loved but rather through being thought necessary. As *The Economist* argued in endorsing Thatcher for a second term, ". . . Britain is in mid-course towards at last tackling economic ills that have undermined its domestic wealth, its social cohesion, not to mention . . . its effectiveness abroad." [*The Economist*, June 4-10, 1983, p. 12.] A similar case is made by Mr. Reagan's supporters in the United States.

This sense that Thatcher and Reagan are attempting necessary corrections has been shared, the polls tell us, by majorities of their countries' electorates. This is why, when confronted with recession and a surge of unemployment, their popular standing bent but did not break. Polls in the United Kingdom and the United States keep showing an otherwise curious tension between the public's substantial opposition to many specific policies, and its simultaneous endorsement of the overall direction of policy change. When asked whether the effort will make Britain [the United States] better in the long run, majorities in both countries have consistently answered "yes." The much celebrated patience of British and American voters is not that at all, but rather a cautious mandate to proceed, however haltingly, along a new course.

Envoi

It would be senseless to claim that British and American politics are in any sense becoming identical. But they do now share some impressive similarities—and certainly far more than in 1800, 1900, or even 1950. This electoral convergence seems not to be happenstance but rather the result of deep-seeded social and institutional developments accruing from advanced industrialism. The capacity of the latter to override vast historic differences of class and culture is a major dimension of contemporary politics.

CREWE

(Continued from page 9)

every election—but, as happened in 1979, the old. Among those over 65, the Conservative vote dropped by more (— 3) than did the national Conservative vote (— 1.5); the Labour vote by less (— 4) than the national Labour drop (— 9.3), resulting in a tiny 0.5 percent swing to the Conservatives. Labour policy on pensions and the government's record could be an explanation, although only a fifth of those over 65 cited pensions as an important issue. An alternative explanation is that those over 65 are the generation of the 1930s and World War II: the majority would have first voted in, and contributed to, the Labour landslide of 1945. Some of the Labour loyalty induced in their formative years will have lasted until today.

The Alliance did best among new voters (30 percent), and worst among those over 65 (19 percent), probably because party loyalties are least fixed in the young and most ingrained among the old. But the Alliance's campaign must have been particularly effective among first-time voters, since all *pre*-election surveys found a lower than average vote for the Alliance in this group.

Table 5
CLASS VOTING 1959-1983

	1959		1964		1966		1970		Feb. 1974 and Oct. 1974		1979		1983	
	Non-manual	Manual	Non-manual	Manual	Non-manual	Manual	Non-manual	Manual	Non-manual	Manual	Non-manual	Manual	Non-manual	Manual
Voted:														
Con.	69%	34%	62%	28%	60%	25%	64%	33%	52%	24%	60%	35%	58%	33%
Lib./Nationalist/ other minor party	8	4	16	8	14	6	11	9	25	19	17	15	26	29
Lab.	22	62	22	64	26	69	25	58	23	57	23	50	17	38
Class index of Labour voting (Alford Index)		40		42		43		33		34		27		21
Non-manual Con. + manual Labour voters as % of all voters		65%		63%		66%		60%		55%		55%		47%

Note: Data on voting in 1959 were obtained from recall in 1964 survey.
Source: 1959-1979, Bo Särlvik and Ivor Crewe, *Decade of Dealignment*, Table 3.5, p. 87; 1983, Survey by Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Ltd., for the BBC, June 8-9, 1983.

Social class in Britain continues to structure party choice (see table 4). The partisan differences between manual (blue collar) and non-manual (white collar) workers are still greater than those between occupational strata within the two groups. Yet the class basis of party choice has weakened at an accelerating rate over the last quarter century (see table 5). One measure of class voting, known as the Alford index, is the percentage point gap between Labour's share of the non-manual as against manual vote. In the two elections of the 1960s it stood at 42 and 43. In 1983 it was down to 21. An alternative measure of class voting is the number of Conservative non-manual workers and Labour manual workers as a proportion of all voters (the proportion voting for what would be *their* "class party"). The figure was 65 percent in 1959, 60 percent in 1970, 55 percent for the rest of the 1970s, and is now 47 percent. For the first time since surveys began, fewer than half of all British voters (and thus barely over a third of the British electorate) voted for their class party.

Mass unemployment, therefore, failed to produce the widely anticipated class polarization of the vote. In the middle classes there was barely a swing to the Conservatives at all. Among the professions and management the Labour vote fell by 6 percentage points, but was matched by a similar drop (5 percentage points) in the Conservative vote. Among clerical and office workers the small Labour vote held up. The swing to the Conservatives occurred in the working class—2.5 percent among skilled manual workers, 4.0 percent among the semi- and unskilled. This was not because the working class Conservative vote went up, but because the working class Labour vote, which had already hemorrhaged badly in 1979, continued to bleed away—mainly to the Alliance. Only at the very bottom of the economic ladder, among the unemployed, was there a hint of a working class backlash. Here the Conservative vote (which had risen sharply in 1979) dropped by 10 percentage points, Labour's by only 4, to produce what was technically a pro-Labour "swing" of 3 percent. Support for the Alliance was remarkably even across the class spectrum. It did not draw disproportionately from the professions, nor was it anathema to the real working class, as some had anticipated.

Defection from Labour was widespread across the entire social spectrum of the Labour vote. But it was especially heavy on the periphery of its social constituency—38 percent of 1979 non-manual Labour voters switched in 1983, 36 percent of its white collar union vote switched, and so did 33 percent of its non-union vote. The largest-scale switching occurred among homeowners (44 percent switched from Labour), working class owners as much as middle-class owners. The Labour vote held up best—although still not very well—among council tenants[2] (21 percent switched), blacks (21 percent), and those over 65 (25 percent). But there is scant comfort for Labour here. Council tenants are a slowly diminishing group; blacks are a tiny minority; and those over 65 will rapidly depart from the electorate.

The continuing abandonment of the Labour party by manual workers makes its claim to be the party of the working class look increasingly threadbare—sociologically, if not ideologically. True, the Labour vote remains largely working class; but the working class has ceased to be largely Labour. On June 9 it split its vote three ways, giving Labour a mere 5 percent advantage over the Conservatives. Among trade unionists the Labour vote was only 7 percent ahead of the Conservatives. Labour's share of the working class *electorate*, as distinct from those who voted, was down to barely a quarter (27 percent). More than ever before it is the middle classes, not manual workers, whose vote reflects class consciousness and solidarity.

The decline in the working class Labour vote, moreover, is not simply an inevitable concomitant of a Conservative landslide. In 1959, when the Conservatives' overall majority was 100 seats, 62 percent of manual workers still voted Labour; on June 9 the figure was 38 percent. The transformation of working class partisanship over the past quarter century must rank as the most significant postwar change in the social basis of British politics.

To be sure, Labour remains the party of a *segment* of the working class—the *traditional* working class of the council estates (45 percent of all manual workers), of the public sector (34 percent), of Scotland and the North (38 percent). Among these slowly dwindling groups Labour was still the first, if not always the majority, choice. The vote among the old working class broke this way: among council tenants, 19 percent Conservative, 57 percent Labour, 24 percent Alliance; among those who work in the public sector, 29 percent, 46 percent, 25 percent respectively; among those living in Scotland and the North, 32 percent, 42 percent, and 26 percent. But Labour has lost the *new* working class. Among private sector workers (66 percent of all manual workers), it ran neck and neck with the Conservatives (36 percent Conservative, 37 percent Labour, 27 percent Alliance). Among manual workers owning their houses (43 percent of all manual workers), the vote was: Conservative 47 percent, Labour 25 percent, Alliance 28 percent. Among manual workers living in the South (36 percent of manual workers), the Conservatives had a similarly commanding lead (42 percent), and Labour (26 percent) came in *third*, behind the Alliance (32 percent).

The old working class is now too small to give Labour electoral victory; the new working class too big to be ignored. By 1983 twice as many manual workers worked in the private rather than public sector (66-34 percent). Almost as many were homeowners as council tenants (43-45 percent); almost as many lived in the South as in the North and Scotland combined (36-38

[2] Tenants in local government housing.

percent). The division of Britain into "two nations" is no longer between the classes but within the working class; and the more secure, more affluent of these nations is increasingly preponderant. To regain its old electoral strength, Labour will have to find ways of appealing to both.

What Moved Voters?

The Conservatives' landslide by default, secured through Labour's weakness rather than their own strength, is underlined by the sharp increase in negative voting since 1979. Fifty-nine percent of all voters —and 73 percent of those deciding during the campaign—said they disliked the other party(ies) more than they liked their own. The question asked to determine this was, "What would you say is stronger—your *like* of the Conservatives (Labour/Liberal-SDP Alliance) or your dislike of Labour (the Conservatives/the Conservative and Labour parties)?" This begrudged vote was lower among Conservatives (45 percent positive to 55 percent negative) than Labour (38 to 62) or the Alliance (37 to 63). Seventy-eight percent of those Conservatives who decided how to vote during the actual campaign said they were voting more because they disliked the opposition than because they embraced the Conservatives (22 percent). Among those late deciders voting Labour, the figures were 70 percent negative to 30 percent positive.

Evidence from the 1983 election strongly suggests that, as in previous elections, policies counted for much more than personalities and perceptions of the country's interest more than self-interest. One test is how people actually vote when they prefer the policies of one party but the leader of another; on June 9 they split 83 percent to 17 percent in favor of the first. Faced with a dilemma between two parties, one with the "best policies," the other "best for people like me," voters divided 72 percent to 28 percent in favor of the party with the "best policies."

This decisive but not exclusive dominance of national policy considerations is revealed when the vote is compared with people's choice of parties on different criteria (see table 6). If votes were cast solely for a Prime Minister or a cabinet, Labour's share would have dropped to about 15 percent, barely half of what it got, and the Alliance would have become the major party of opposition. If people had voted strictly according to their perceived self-interest, Labour's share would have been 5 percent higher than it was. If policies were *all* that counted, the Conservatives would have won 50 percent of the vote and an even more staggering majority.

Table 6
PARTY PREFERENCES ON VARIOUS CRITERIA

Which party . . .	Con.	Lab.	Lib./SDP
Has the best policies?	50%	25%	24%
Is best for people like you?	43	33	22
Has the best team of leaders?	58	17	24
Do you generally identify with?	44	38	16

Who would make the best Prime Minister?	Thatcher	Foot	Steel	Jenkins
	46%	13%	35%	6%

Note: The small numbers of respondents answering "none," "all the same," and "don't know" have been omitted. "Other" not shown.
Source: Survey by Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Ltd., for the BBC, June 8-9, 1983.

From the debris of electoral data two statistics emerge as hopeful for Labour: even in its worst defeat of the century, 33 percent of voters still think that their self-interest lies in voting Labour; 38 percent continue to regard themselves as essentially Labour.

If policies count, which ones in particular? Not unexpectedly, the most important issue for voters was unemployment (72 percent cited it), followed way behind by defense (38 percent), prices (20 percent), and health (11 percent) (see table 7). No other issue was cited by as many as 10 percent, even though respondents could mention as many as they wished. Omissions from the list are conspicuous. References to strikes fell from 20 percent in 1979 to 3 percent this time, and mention of taxes from 20 percent to 4 percent. Immigration, the hidden mover of votes in the 1960s and 1970s, dropped off the bottom of the political agenda (1 percent). Reflecting the politicians, electors were

Table 7
THE ISSUES THAT MATTERED

	Percent mentioning an issue as one of the two most important in influencing their vote*						Party preference on issue (among those citing it as important)	
	All	Change 1979-83	Con. loyalists	Con. defectors	Lab. loyalists	Lab. defectors	1983	1979
Unemployment	72%	+45	54%	73%	84%	75%	Lab. +16	Lab. +20
Defense	38	+36	46	41	33	42	Con. +54	n.a.
Prices	20	−22	27	15	15	13	Con. +40	Lab. +13
NHS/Hospitals	11	+ 7	4	12	20	16	Lab. +46	n.a.
Pensions	8	+ 1	4	7	14	10	n.a.	Lab. +27
Education	6	− 2	6	11	4	9	n.a.	n.a.
EEC	5	+ 1	7	4	2	9	Con. +50	Lab. + 8

Note: *This was an open-ended question. The issues above were those most frequently mentioned.
Source: Survey by Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Ltd., for the BBC, June 8-9, 1983.

staggeringly parochial. Foreign affairs and international peace came to the lips of only 24 of the 4,141 respondents; Northern Ireland to a minuscule 3 (the survey was confined to the British mainland). And the Falklands? Precisely 1.4 percent claimed that it affected their vote.

Unemployment was clearly the dominant issue on voters' minds; no other had grown in importance so much since 1979. Why, then, did Labour do so badly? The answer is that saliency is not enough. For a party to gain votes from an issue it must be preferred on that issue among those to whom the issue matters. And as table 7 shows, Labour's lead as the party for jobs actually fell, from 20 to 16 percentage points between 1979 and 1983. The lengthening dole queues made more people put unemployment at the top of the agenda, but fewer people were convinced that Labour could shorten them. As a result, unemployment damaged the Conservative vote without repairing Labour's; at best it prevented Labour's disaster from turning into catastrophe.

Other issues, ranked lower in importance, actually made a bigger impact, compensating the Conservatives for what they lost on jobs. Defense is the prime example. In 1979 it was mentioned by just 2 percent; in 1983 by 38 percent. Among the latter the Conservatives were preferred as the defense party by 54 percentage points. Nor should one underestimate the role of prices. True, prices had dropped from first to third place in importance, no doubt reflecting the falling rate of inflation. But the Conservatives were still rewarded for their ostensible success. In 1979 Labour had the edge, by 13 percentage points, as the party to best handle prices. By 1983 there had been a massive turnaround: the Conservatives were preferred by 40 percentage points.

There was only one issue apart from unemployment on which Labour was preferred to the Conservatives—the National Health Service (by 46 percentage points)—but this was something that consciously affected only one voter in ten. On the remaining issues—prosperity, peace, the EEC, crime, strikes, taxation—the Conservatives were the public's first choice, usually by a wide margin.

Table 8

THE BEST (AND WORST) PERSON FOR PRIME MINISTER

	Thatcher	Foot	Steel	Jenkins
Who would make the best Prime Minister?	46%	13%	35%	6%
The worst Prime Minister?	25	63	2	10
Best minus worst	+21	−50	+33	− 4
Overall ratings of party leaders (% best minus % worst) among:				
Con. loyalists	+86	−89	+ 9	−7
Con. defectors	+12	−73	+58	+3
Lab. loyalists	−59	+34	+34	−9
Lab. defectors	− 8	−54	+56	+6

Source: Survey by Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Ltd., for the BBC, June 8-9, 1983.

The Negative Vote

The effect of the party leaders cannot, of course, be ignored. Not since the war (probably much earlier) has a major party leader been regarded as so implausible a Prime Minister as Michael Foot (table 8). Sixty-three percent said he would make the worst Prime Minister. Those voters remaining Labour certainly had their doubts: under half (44 percent) regarded him as the best potential Prime Minister, with as many choosing David Steel or Roy Jenkins. Four years earlier almost all Labour supporters had been happy with Jim Callaghan. For many of these 1979 Labour supporters the misgivings were too hard to swallow. Among Labour defectors only 4 percent thought Foot would make the best Prime Minister; fully 58 percent thought him the worst.

Michael Foot was more of a liability to his party than Margaret Thatcher was an asset to hers. She was first choice as Prime Minister, but in the eyes of only slightly more people than actually voted Conservative (44 percent) or chose Callaghan (44 percent) when he went down to defeat in 1979. Moreover, among a substantial minority of voters she incurred intense hostility, 25 percent saying she would be the worst Prime Minister. Her combined "best" and "worst" score of + 21 did not in fact match up to David Steel's (+ 33), who had numerous admirers and virtually no detractors.

The question of who was least wanted as Prime Minister turned out to be crucial. It correlated more strongly with the vote than the choice of who would be best. The great majority of Conservatives made Margaret Thatcher their first choice, but even more made Michael Foot their last; Labour voters were half-loyal to Foot, but overwhelmingly hostile to Thatcher. More people voted to keep the other party leader out of No. 10 than to put their own in. More people voted against than for.

Sifting through the mounds of data, however, one is struck by the way leaders mattered less than policy. The distance between Labour loyalists and Labour defectors was greater on all ten issues of the survey—even on health and unemployment—than on the question of who would make the best, or worst, Prime Minister. For example, on the overall, underlying election issue of which party was more likely to create prosperity, Labour was picked by 83 percent of its loyalists, but by a mere 5 percent of its defectors. The election result turned on issues, on the government's record, and the opposition's policies, not on Margaret Thatcher's resolve or Michael Foot's walking stick.

Had the popularity of party leaders mattered more, the Alliance would have done better. Although its 26 percent share of the vote was a 60-year best for a center party, it fell well below the 40 to 45 percent levels of

support recorded by the opinion polls late in 1981. Many must have seriously considered voting for the Alliance at some time (or actually done so in local elections) only to drift away by polling day. Table 9 shows why.

The Alliance itself was not the liability sometimes thought. Of the 16 percent of voters claiming to have considered voting Liberal/SDP, only to decide against, a mere 9 percent cited Roy Jenkins as their reason for not doing so; 8 percent named the SDP (many of these being the same respondents), and 4 percent named the Liberals. At the very most, the partnership between the Liberals and the SDP cost the Alliance 2 percent of the vote. As regards 1979 Liberal voters, only 12 out of 273 in the survey defected because of Roy Jenkins and/or the SDP. If everyone had suppressed his doubts, the Alliance's vote would have risen by a mere 0.3 percent.

Table 9
WHY THE LIBERAL/SDP ALLIANCE DIDN'T DO BETTER

Reason for not voting for the Alliance:	Respondents who seriously considered voting for the Alliance but eventually did not (16% of voters)	
Obvious that Alliance could not win	31%	58%
Would have let Labour in	18	
Would have let the Conservatives in	9	
Roy Jenkins	9	
Lack of clear policies	16	
Might have voted Liberal, but disliked SDP	8	
Might have voted SDP, but disliked Liberals	4	
Saw no reason to change from usual party	15	
None of these reasons	16	

Note: Multiple responses per respondent.
Source: Survey by Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Ltd., for the BBC, June 8-9, 1983.

The Alliance failed to poll its potential support for the usual reason—the squeeze on third parties. Fifty-eight percent of potential Alliance supporters explained their decision to vote differently in strategic terms: the Alliance could not win, and a vote for it would only let the Conservatives or (mentioned twice as often) Labour in. Thus the Alliance lost more votes than it gained from tactical voting. In Gallup's sample, tactical calculation accounted for the drift away of 324 potential supporters, as against the recruitment of 241 actual voters—a net loss to the Alliance of 2 percent.

The new Conservative government has been elected on a minority vote that is lower and more negative than in 1979. What kind of mandate, if any, does it have? As it turns out, a surprisingly strong one.

Table 10 shows the public's views on the major Conservative proposals of the campaign. As in 1979, a free vote in the Commons on capital punishment is overwhelmingly popular (90 percent approve), almost as much among Labour and Alliance supporters as Conservatives. Norman Tebbit, the Cabinet Secretary for Employment, it emerges, is perfectly entitled to claim a mandate for his proposed reforms of the trade unions: 72 percent want stricter laws to regulate unions, a rise of 16 percent since 1979; so do a majority of trade unionists themselves (61 percent). The public (but not the unemployed) continue to place more faith in private enterprise (61 percent) than the state (39 percent) as a creator of jobs, although the proportion is down from 1979 (74 percent). Denationalization of British Steel and British Leyland will find more sympathizers (57 percent) than objectors (43 percent). And the majority (56 percent) are now reconciled to the siting of cruise missiles in Britain—a sharp reversal of opinion since earlier in the year.

Table 10
THE MANDATE

	Percent of respondents saying that this is a "good idea"
A free vote in Commons on death penalty	90%
Stricter laws to regulate the activities of trade unions	72
Tackle unemployment by allowing private companies to keep more of their profit (as opposed to relying on the government)	61
Sell off substantial parts of British Steel and British Leyland to private companies	57
Allow cruise missiles to be sited in Britain	56
Cut taxes, even at cost of reducing some public services like health, education, and welfare	20

Note: The small number of "don't knows" have been calculated out; thus all other respondents thought each proposal a "bad idea."
Source: Survey by Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Ltd., for the BBC, June 8-9, 1983.

Only one policy—cutting the provision of education, health, and welfare in order to reduce income tax—is emphatically rejected (by 80 percent). But then that was not a Conservative proposal; it was only part of its alleged "hidden manifesto." According to the public, proposals to cut public services should not be hidden; they should be dumped. Keynes has been rejected; Beveridge has not.

Author's note:
This is an expanded version of a two-part article that first appeared in The Guardian *on June 13 and 14, 1983. I am grateful to* The Guardian *for permission to reproduce parts of the article here.*

by Richard Rose

Two and One-Half Cheers

In the election that took place this June in Britain, less than half of the electorate voted conservative. A substantial number did so more because they feared the socialist alternative than because they embraced Mrs. Thatcher's pro-market ideology.

After years of exposure to the welfare state, what do the British people think about the economy? Does living in a welfare state make people more inclined to look to government for their livelihood, or does it stimulate a reaction *against* state control of the economy, because of problems arising from bureaucratic efforts to supplant the market? There is also a third alternative: people may want the market to guarantee the nation's wealth, but want the state to provide a high level of welfare to its citizens.

The impact of the welfare state upon market mentality is of fundamental importance to the future. If the market mentality is dead or dying, then the prospects are poor for reviving the economies of western welfare states by conventional market incentives. The prescriptions of neoclassical economists will fail, as people are socialized to ignore market incentives. But, if the welfare state is as unpopular as politicians such as Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher proclaim, then the growth of government economic intervention should strengthen belief in basic principles of the market. Or people may be illogical but not stupid, welcoming the benefits provided by government, while still accepting that the market must generate money to pay for welfare state programs.

Britain as a Test

Britain provides an unusually good test of the stamina of the market mentality, for it has been a leading welfare state since the election of a Labour government in 1945. The great majority of British voters have never known what it was like to do without a national health service, state pensions and social services for the elderly, an education system offering free university tuition to everyone eligible, and an elaborate range of programs intended to prevent or alleviate unemployment.

Today, more than half the incomes received by Britons are paid by the state. Nearly 8 million people are employed in the public sector, while pensions, unemployment benefits, and other payments in lieu of a weekly wage are made to more than 10 million Britons. The number working in the private sector is now about 15 million, a decline of 4 million since 1966. This explains why public expenditure as a share of the national product in Britain (41 percent) is much larger than in the United States (33 percent).

The British welfare state has been sustained by an interparty consensus for nearly two generations. Its wartime architects were two Liberals with social con-

for the Market in Britain

sciences, John Maynard Keynes and William Beveridge, and a Conservative, R. A. Butler. Sir Winston Churchill, Harold Macmillan, and Edward Heath were as happy to boast of the achievements of the welfare state as were Clement Attlee and Harold Wilson.

The Conservative government returned in 1979 under Margaret Thatcher's leadership has not succeeded in reversing the growth of the welfare state. Public expenditure as a share of the national product has risen under her administration, and the Conservative party has been split into anti-statist drys, led by Mrs. Thatcher, and wets, led by ex-Cabinet ministers or silent but ideologically unsympathetic colleagues in the Cabinet.

If the welfare state kills the market mentality, then Mrs. Thatcher is nothing more than a Queen Canute, hurling the ideas of Adam Smith and Milton Friedman at a tide that will sooner or later engulf her. Yet electoral success suggests that the tide may be turning. Certainly, if willpower alone could do it, Mrs. Thatcher could convert her fellow countrymen to the free-market doctrines of Victorian Britons.

Puzzled about the state of mind of their countrymen, a London public opinion firm, Marplan, undertook an elaborate study of popular understanding of economic issues, covering both attitudes toward the market and toward the welfare state. Because of the difficulty of asking ordinary people about relatively abstract economic concepts, more than a year was spent in developing the questionnaire. Marplan undertook three pilot questionnaires, modifying questions in keeping with reactions of respondents, and developing coding categories that reflected the variety of views that people have about different aspects of the economy.

The results reported here were obtained by a nationwide quota probability sample of 900, stratified by age, sex, region, class, employment status, and trade union membership. Thanks to careful piloting, the number of "don't know" responses was usually very low. But because most people answered in light of their own experience and not in terms of a formal textbook model of the economy, the number of unclassifiable "other" responses was often high.

Economics as Morality

In political debate, economic issues are often discussed in moral terms. Unemployment is "bad," and inflation is "corrupting." Socialism is "fair" or capitalism is "freedom." In a society in which less than one-fifth of the population regularly goes to church, economic faiths have come to represent values important to many Britons. When Britons were asked to say what the words "capitalism" and "socialism" meant to them, many answers reflected moral values rather than eco-

Table 1

Question: You often hear on TV or read in the newspapers about capitalism and socialism. What do these words mean to you? (Socialism) . . . (Capitalism)

What Socialism Means to Britons	
Positive replies (39%)	
Equal rights ensured for all	16%
All are ensured a fair standard of living	11
Welfare state	8
Economic equality	4
Negative replies (27%)	
Government controls distribution of wealth	10
Government controls everything	8
Marxism, Communism	7
Other negative comments	2
Neutral, ambiguous (27%)	
Workers' control through unions, cooperatives, profit-sharing, government action	13
Labour government	11
Miscellaneous	3

What Capitalism Means to Britons	
Positive replies (37%)	
Private business free from government interference, free enterprise	36%
People have right to make living their own way	1
Negative replies (47%)	
Inequalities of money	25
Inequalities of power	17
Profit motive dominates	5
Neutral, ambiguous (7%)	
Conservatives	1
Miscellaneous	6

Note: The 900 respondents could give more than one answer to the open-ended question; a total of 1,075 replies were available for classification by the author.

Source: Survey by Marplan, April 1981.

nomic concepts (see table 1).

Socialism tends to be a positive symbol (39 percent of all replies favorable), associated with "equal rights" or "fairness." It is also described as synonymous with the welfare state, or with economic equality. The bulk of negative replies, 27 percent of the total, see socialism as a doctrine of state control, or simply as Marxism or communism.

The Labour party's political assault upon the capitalist ethic has many adherents; capitalism's image in Britain is negative. Unfavorable descriptions (47 percent) stress the inequalities of power ("Top people have great influence over others") and of money ("Control is in the hands of those who supply the capital"). The positive characteristics of capitalism are fewer, accounting for 37 percent of replies, and different, stressing the economic dimension of capitalism as a system of enterprise free from government direction.

Britons see socialism as a means for collectively promoting equality and a fair standard of living by the state, and capitalism as freedom from government interference. However, far more people identify socialism with the Labour party than identify capitalism with the Conservative party. The Conservatives have been far readier to describe themselves as anti-socialist than to say what they stand for. In the political arena, the ideological battle is not so much between socialism and capitalism as between socialism and the rejection of socialism.

Economics as Mentality

Moral judgments can express opinions derived from ideal (and even unrealistic) values; they do not necessarily reflect judgments about the way the world works. The contrast between a realistic mentality and an idealistic morality is very sharp in economic affairs. When asked directly about how the economy works, the great majority of Britons (69 percent) see theirs as primarily a private enterprise economy, albeit usually subject to government controls to curb abuses (see table 2). Even more striking, 77 percent say that this is the way they want the national economy to work. Government concern with social policies is not regarded as interference with the economy, and only 22 percent see

Table 2

DESCRIPTIONS OF AND ASPIRATIONS FOR THE BRITISH ECONOMY

Question: Here is a card which has on it several different ways people now describe the economic system we have here in Britain. (A) If you had to choose one, which one would you say best describes the system we have? (B) Now, which one on the card would you like to see our economic system become?

	Best describes British economic system	Preferred system
Private enterprise with enough government controls to curb business abuses	44%	39%
Private enterprise with only a minimum of government regulation	25	38
The government involving itself with the day-to-day planning of companies	16	13
All industry owned and controlled by the government	6	5
None of these	8	6

Note: Sample size = 900.
Source: Survey by Marplan, April 1981.

British industry as subject to government planning; only 18 percent would like to see this happen.

Popular readiness to accept market discipline is shown very clearly when working people are questioned about their wages. Offered three alternative definitions of a reasonable wage, the choice is overwhelming for a market definition.

British workers reject squeezing employers for all they are worth, whatever the economic consequences (only 4 percent took this view). Only 19 percent regard the trade union negotiator's doctrine of comparability as the appropriate base for a wage settlement. The ideal wage settlement is seen as an agreement that gives higher wages to workers, and leaves money on the table for employers (endorsed by 74 percent).

In an affluent economy, there are ample profits to finance increased wages, new investment, and rising profits. Everybody benefits when the market economy works well. Unfortunately, the British economy has not been a successful market for the past decade. In an economy that is contracting or growing very slowly, most wage increases cannot keep up with inflation.

Since 1980, rising unemployment has made British trade union leaders accept wage settlements below the prevailing rate of inflation. The Marplan survey explains why this is practicable. Only 9 percent of workers interviewed asserted that their wages should increase in purchasing power even if the economy is not growing, and only 14 percent said that wages should keep pace with inflation even if the economy is contracting. About three-quarters of British workers realize that if the national pie is contracting, then their wages cannot expand as they would like.

The market mentality is also dominant when workers are asked whether they see productivity linked with the standard of living, and thus, with individual wages. A total of 73 percent say that productivity is very important, and another 16 percent say it is somewhat important. Increasing productivity is viewed as a cooperative activity: management, trade unions, and individual workers are regarded as almost equally important in determining productivity. Only 6 percent see productivity as a matter for which government can take first responsibility.

Although "profit" is one of the dirtiest words in the socialist lexicon, it remains positively valued in Britain. When people are asked about the acceptable and actual levels of business profits, answers tend to coincide—albeit people overestimate the profitability of British industry today. When asked whether or not money must be set aside for investment and dividends before profits can be shared with workers, a surprisingly high proportion, 69 percent, are prepared to let businesses make the principal decision about what to do

DON WRIGHT
DIDN'T I TELL YOU, NANCY? IF I RUN FOR PRESIDENT AGAIN, ALL I HAVE TO DO IS CAMPAIGN EXACTLY LIKE MAGGIE THATCHER.
I'M GOING TO NEED SOME UNDERSTATED PINK AND BLUE SUITS WITH THE SKIRTS CUT JUST BELOW THE KNEE AND THREE OR FOUR PAIRS OF BEIGE PUMPS.

with profits; only 19 percent believe that profits should benefit workers first.

The general preference of Britons for private enterprise over a planned economy doesn't mean that British people give private enterprise an unqualified endorsement. When presented with a series of detailed statements about particular features of the economic system, 53 percent agree that the average citizen needs government as a protection against business.

There is no tendency in Britain for young people who have had the least experience with market conditions to be any more anti-market than their elders. Class differences about the economy are surprisingly limited, too, in a country where social divisions are frequently said to be a symptom or an explanation of what's wrong with the nation's economy.

The £6.4 Billion Question

The market mentality has survived surprisingly well the existence of nearly forty years of welfare state programs, but it does not enjoy a monopoly of popular favor. The British people give at least two cheers for the market, but they also give two cheers for social programs of the welfare state. Unlike Mrs. Thatcher and President Reagan, who often rail against government as necessarily bad, ordinary voters are pro-market but not anti-state.

Positive endorsement of the role of profit-making businesses in the economy is joined with a belief in the British government's responsibility for managing the economy. Unemployment and inflation are seen as major responsibilities of government: 78 percent believe that government can control inflation, and 69 percent believe that it can control unemployment. The onus is on government, whether Labour or Conservative, to have both anti-inflation and full employment policies.

But public opinion gives no clear directive to government about the particular policies that it should adopt to control inflation and stop unemployment. Less than half of the respondents could give even an approximately accurate description of the term "money supply," a key concept in the Thatcher government's anti-inflation battle. Even fewer would be able to hazard an accurate guess about a Keynesian economic policy.

Ordinary people are like economists in one respect: they disagree in their diagnosis of and prescription for unemployment, viewed as by far the greatest problem facing Britain today. Most of the reasons given for unemployment are, simply, other ways of describing economic recession. Only 18 percent blame government policy for causing unemployment; blame for unemployment is spread among union, management, workers, and international competitors, too. When asked explicitly what government can do to reduce unemployment, the most frequent response refers to government measures to encourage private enterprise (36 percent), with direct government employment and investment second (25 percent). Action against unions, imports, or inflation were considered relatively insignificant.

The principal role of British government is complementing or compensating for the market, not substituting for it. Whereas most Americans would probably regard British government as claiming too large a share of the national product in taxation, most Britons think that it is too small. The most expensive programs of British government concern old age pensions, health, and education. Eighty percent think even more money should be spent on health care, 66 percent believe more money should be spent on pensioners, and 66 percent also want to spend more money on education. These programs are popular because their benefits are very widespread. By contrast, unemployment benefits, concentrated among a minority of workers, are deemed suitable for increased spending by only 21 percent, and spending on economic aid for foreign countries, by only 7 percent.

On balance, the program preferences of Britons imply further growth in government. The programs most favored for expansion are the costly ones. By contrast, the three programs that a majority would like to cut—nationalized industry subsidies, foreign aid, and Common Market contributions—account for a relatively small fraction of public expenditure.

The benefits of the welfare state have costs, and Britons know this. They correctly perceive income tax as the major source of government revenue, but do not recognize the role of social security contributions, the second most important source of revenue. If taxes are to rise, a majority of Britons follow the current economic fashion of preferring to tax expenditure rather than income. They reject the Keynesian idea of financing increased spending by borrowing more, a position in accord with the Thatcher government's policy, which has cut borrowing rather than taxation.

The £6.4 billion question—for that is the magnitude of tax increase required today to provide a significant increase in welfare state benefits—is whether people would rather pay higher taxes for higher benefits, pay lower taxes for fewer benefits, or leave things as they are. Mrs. Thatcher campaigned in 1979 on a program of cutting taxes, a theme muted in the 1983 election by the government's failure to do much to implement that pledge.

Notwithstanding its electoral success, the Thatcher government has failed to secure popular support for an effective tax-cutting policy, which can only be carried through by cutting spending on major welfare state programs. The Labour party's electoral failures have occurred even though welfare state programs are very popular. When the Conservatives won the 1979 general election, opinion was divided three ways. The number prepared to cut taxes even though it meant cutting spending on health, education, and welfare was as great as the number prepared to raise taxes to increase spending. The median voter was in favor of keeping things as they were. By 1983, the median voter has come to

Table 3

POPULAR ATTITUDES TOWARD TAXES AND BENEFITS IN BRITAIN, 1978-1983

Question: People have different views about whether it is more important to reduce taxes or keep up government spending. How about you? Which of these statements comes closest to your own view?

Preferred option:	Oct. 1978	May 1979	Feb. 1980	Mar. 1981	Feb. 1982	Mar. 1983
Taxes being cut, even if it means some reduction in government services, such as health, education, and welfare	25%	34%	22%	20%	21%	23%
Things should be left as they are	23	25	20	23	26	22
Government services such as health, education, and welfare should be extended, even if it means some increase in taxes	39	34	52	49	49	49
Don't know	13	7	6	8	5	6

Note: Quota sample of approximately 1,000.
Source: Gallup Political Index (London) latest that of March 1983.

favor increasing taxes and increasing expenditures on welfare state programs. Tax-cutting and program-cutting are endorsed by only 23 percent of the electorate (see table 3).

Why the Worry?

The widespread endorsement of the market mentality is puzzling to anyone familiar with the sophisticated dailies and weeklies published in Britain, where much of the commentary takes for granted government direction of the economy. It is also inconsistent with Mrs. Thatcher's rhetorical style, which often appears to be that of the head of a self-conscious minority crusading passionately to convert the indifferent or infidel majority.

One reason why so much attention is given to anti-market attitudes in the media is political. Socialism and capitalism are seen as political doctrines, a view that Mrs. Thatcher and Karl Marx would endorse equally. The doctrines are concerned with power in society, and political parties are organized to compete for power. Labour voters may not believe in socialist dogmas, but they can see advantages in redistributing power and money to people like themselves. In a complementary way, Conservative voters are not so much against the welfare state as they are in favor of a government that will restrain socialist interference with private enterprise.

Anti-market values also attract attention because of the institutional power of the trade unions, and of the entrepreneurs of anti-market ideas within the unions. Active participation in a trade union, undertaken by 14 percent of the electorate, is one of the few social characteristics that make a Briton less inclined to endorse the market mentality. While anti-market entrepreneurs are usually a minority among active trade unionists, like any group of entrepreneurs they are disproportionately important.

The political structure of Britain is a pyramid of power, and individuals who establish themselves with a claim to represent the base of their union can exercise influence out of proportion to their numbers. Communists, Trotskyites, and other caucus groups in the British trade union movement have long practiced this tactic. By capturing or influencing union leadership—especially on what union officials may regard as "unimportant" political issues—anti-market entrepreneurs can reap their profit in influence. Because unions dominate the Labour party through financial and institutional power, they can stimulate left-wing Labour MPs to carry forward the battle against the market in Parliament. The mass of Labour voters are not anti-market—but the votes on which Labour MPs depend in party caucuses are disproportionately anti-market.

From 1979 to 1983, Margaret Thatcher demonstrated that it is possible for a determined free-market political ideologue to use a position of power to promote ideas. Survey evidence indicates that the anti-socialist doctrines that she preaches are usually endorsed by voters—as long as they are restricted to the economy. But when Mrs. Thatcher seeks to turn neoclassical economic doctrines into an anti-welfare state political philosophy, she is in a minority.

The ideas of state and market are seen by most Britons as complementary rather than in conflict. The word that best describes this outlook does not exist in Anglo-American politics, which is trapped in an ideological as well as semantic confusion between economic and political liberalism. The best descriptive term is the *Sozialmarkt* or Social Market, coined for the program of the German Economic Minister Ludwig Erhard in the 1950s. It describes a society in which government respects market principles, while also using a share of the wealth created in the market for social purposes. Comparing the state of the German economy with that of Britain today, who could blame the British voters for wanting to combine both the market and social welfare policies?

by Arthur Miller

Is Confidence Rebounding?

As president, Jimmy Carter called it "a subject more serious than energy or inflation . . . a fundamental threat to American democracy." Others have expressed emotions ranging from mild concern to frantic alarm over the same phenomenon—America's declining faith in her institutions. Many surveys have chronicled the downward trend which began in the mid-sixties. But the crisis may be over. Between 1980 and 1982, the descending spiral of trust in political institutions was reversed.

The University of Michigan's Institute for Social Research has conducted biennial election studies since 1952. The questions designed to tap sentiments about confidence and trust focus on basic norms and on the expectations citizens have of their government—that it should be trustworthy, equitable, efficient, and responsive to the people. After nearly two decades of decline —as more and more Americans came to believe that the national government and the politicians were not meeting their expectations—confidence is turning up. In the 1982 survey, people were more likely to say that they "trusted the government to do what is right," that "government was run for the benefit of all," that "public officials cared about what they thought," and fewer of them said that "the government in Washington wastes a lot of the money we pay in taxes" (see table 1).

Historical and Political Significance

The American public remains predominantly negative toward government and public officials, but the shift toward a more positive attitude is historically and politically important. Public support for the political system legitimizes electoral outcomes and policy decisions, even if they are not entirely popular. It aids survival of the system during periods of conflict and turmoil. When trust in government wavers, it imparts the message that the legitimacy of the political authorities and institutions is less secure. Extended periods of declining public support generally suggest the existence of deep-seated cleavages that government has been unable to resolve.

The long-term trend of growing discontent evident since the early sixties was, for example, the result of electing a series of incumbents all of whom proved incapable of dealing effectively or fairly with a number of ongoing social, economic, and political problems. Compounding these problems was the shock of Watergate. The degree of change evident between 1980 and 1982 is quite substantial for a two-year period, given the historical forces pushing in a negative direction. The recent shift marks a return to a level of public confidence found in the mid-seventies, though considerably more improvement is necessary before support can reach the heights of the early sixties.

Politically, the shift suggests that several things might be changing. For instance, the polarization associated with the civil rights movement, the Vietnam War, and women's push for equality—all of which contributed to distrust during the sixties and seventies—may be subsiding. Political volatility, signalled by a long period of one-term presidents, has coincided with the downward spiral of support for politicians and government, and may subside some with an improved public outlook. If the good will of the public has been undermined, and diffuse support for the political system wanes, policy makers lose some of the flexibility they need to build coalitions that will back their decisions. This inability to mobilize public support leaves politicians vulnerable to the cynical charge that they are all alike, so it makes little difference which of them gets elected. Consequently, declining political participation coincides with a greater willingness to turn incumbents out. A rise in confidence signals an improved political climate.

How Widespread Is the Shift?

If the recent increase in trust in government had occurred only among the partisan supporters of a newly elected president or among only one ideological group,

it would be less politically significant. During the first two years of the Carter presidency, for example, confidence in government increased among Democrats but declined among Independents and Republicans. In the aftermath of events between 1978 and 1980, even Democrats' confidence dwindled. But the 1982 upturn is not limited to Reagan's partisan constituency; it includes Democrats as well as Independents (see table 2).

The increase for Democrats was not as marked as it was for either Independents or Republicans (in relative terms the Democrats are more distrusting than Republicans at the end of 1982), but the *decline* in Democratic confidence that could be expected after the election of a Republican president did not occur.

A slightly different pattern of improvement appeared across ideological groups. The level of trust and magnitude of positive change found for self-classified liberals was virtually the same as for Democrats, but distrust among conservatives had not abated to the same extent that it had for Republicans. Conservatives remained *more* cynical than liberals in 1982 (−12 and −4 on Index), despite the election of a conservative.

The increase in trust also occurred equally across most demographic groups. Of all the social groups examined, only blacks shifted in a direction that ran counter to the population trend. Their level of support, as measured by the Trust Index, dropped from +2 in 1980 to −5 in 1982. In 1980, there had been a significant difference in confidence levels by race (whites were −31 on the Index) because trust among blacks had increased under the Carter administration. The surprisingly small drop in support among blacks since 1980 and the improvement among whites in 1982 (−4 on Index) has all but eliminated this disparity.

The greater magnitude of improvement for Republicans than for Democrats suggests that the change to a Republican president has had an effect. Nevertheless, it provides little explanation for the improvement among Democrats, and it does not explain why conservatives remain more distrusting than liberals, than

Table 1

INDIVIDUAL CONFIDENCE IN GOVERNMENT ITEMS, 1964-1982

Question: How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right—just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time?

	1964	1966	1968	1970	1972	1974	1976	1978	1980	1982
None of the time*	0%	3%	0%	0%	1%	1%	1%	4%	4%	2%
Some of the time*	22	28	36	44	44	61	62	64	69	62
Most of the time	62	48	54	47	48	34	30	27	23	31
Always	14	17	7	7	5	3	3	3	2	2
Don't know	2	4	2	2	2	2	3	3	2	3
PDI[a]	55	34	25	9	8	−26	−30	−39	−48	−31

Question: Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all people?

	1964	1966	1968	1970	1972	1974	1976	1978	1980	1982
Few big interests*	29%	33%	40%	50%	53%	66%	66%	67%	69%	61%
Benefit of all	64	53	51	41	38	25	24	24	21	29
Don't know	8	14	9	9	9	9	10	9	10	10
PDI	35	20	12	−9	−16	−42	−42	−42	−48	−32

Question: Do you think that people in the government waste a lot of money we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or don't waste very much of it?

	1964	1966	1968	1970	1972	1974	1976	1978	1980	1982
A lot*	47%	**	59%	69%	66%	74%	74%	77%	78%	66%
Some	44	**	34	26	30	22	20	19	17	29
Not much	7	**	4	4	2	1	3	2	2	2
Don't know	2	**	3	1	2	2	3	2	3	3
PDI	4	**	−21	−39	−33	−50	−51	−57	−59	−35

Question: I don't think public officials care much what people like me think.

	1964	1966	1968	1970	1972	1974	1976	1978	1980	1982
Agree*	35%	34%	43%	47%	49%	50%	51%	51%	52%	46%
Disagree	62	57	55	50	49	46	44	45	44	49
Don't know	2	9	2	3	2	5	4	5	4	5
PDI	26	22	12	2	0	−4	−7	−6	−8	+3

Note: *Indicates cynical response; **Data not available.

[a]The Percentage Difference Index is calculated by subtracting the percentage giving a cynical response from the percentage giving a trusting response.

Source: Surveys by the University of Michigan, Institute for Social Research, latest that of November 1982.

Table 2

CONFIDENCE IN GOVERNMENT BY PARTY IDENTIFICATION

Trust Index[a]	1980 Total	1980 Democrats	1980 Independents	1980 Republicans	1982 Total	1982 Democrats	1982 Independents	1982 Republicans
	N=1,614	N=842	N=208	N=527	N=1,418	N=778	N=156	N=449
High	23%	27%	21%	17%	35%	34%	36%	39%
Medium	26	28	25	23	27	27	20	28
Low	51	45	54	60	38	39	44	33
PDI[b]	−28	−19	−33	−43	−2	−5	−8	+5

Note: [a]The Trust Index was formed by combining responses to three items dealing with whether or not the government does what is right, whether it's run for the benefit of all or just a few, and whether or not it wastes the taxpayer's money. These three items form a subset of the five-item Trust in Government Index traditionally used by ISR.

[b]The Percentage Difference Index is calculated by subtracting the percentage of responses low in trust from the percentage of responses high in trust. Possible values range from −100 to +100. A negative value indicates a predominance of distrust while a positive value indicates a predominance of trust.

Source: Surveys by the University of Michigan, Institute for Social Research, latest that of November 1982.

Democrats, or than blacks.

Presidential Popularity

One plausible explanation for increased trust can be dismissed—Reagan's personal popularity. Given all the problems of the Carter administration, one might reasonably assume that Reagan is simply a more appealing president, and that this has increased public confidence in government. This is not so. At the end of 1982, Reagan's popularity was somewhat lower, actually, than Jimmy Carter's had been two years earlier.

Reagan's and Carter's job approval ratings likewise fail to explain the increase in trust. Reagan's 1982 approval rating was moderately higher than Carter's 1980 rating. But among Democrats, presidential approval declined sharply between 1980 and 1982, while their confidence in government increased. Among Republicans, presidential approval was nearly unanimously disapproving of Carter and even more overwhelmingly approving of Reagan, therefore offering no explanation for why some Republicans were trusting in 1980 while other Republicans remained distrusting in 1982. Replacing Carter with a presumably more positively evaluated incumbent apparently was not the basis for a resurgence of trust.

Economic Performance

A more telling explanation can be found in the performance of the economy. The economic outlook of Republicans and Independents improved significantly between 1980 and 1982. Compared with two years earlier, Republicans in 1982 were less likely to report that their personal financial situations were deteriorating; they were more likely to say that the national economy had improved; and they were very optimistic about an even greater economic recovery in the coming year. A more modest improvement in Independents' economic attitudes also occurred over the two years. In addition, both partisan groups looked far more favorably upon Reagan's handling of inflation than Carter's.

These economic assessments played an important part in increasing confidence. Those who were more optimistic were also more supportive of government. This correlation between economic attitudes and political trust is evident for Democrats as well as for Republicans and Independents. However, Democrats' perceptions of their economic situation did not improve between the two surveys. Yet, among those Democrats who said economic conditions were better or not worse, trust rose significantly; among economic pessimists, levels of trust changed minutely, if at all (see table 3).

Democrats, who had expected the worst when Reagan was elected, were apparently surprised and relieved that economic conditions did not deteriorate to anticipated levels. When disaster failed to strike—the high levels of unemployment notwithstanding—they responded with an increase in trust, even though their overall economic attitudes failed to improve.

Even after controlling for party identification, expectations have a strong effect on confidence. Those who had voted for Reagan in 1980 but then felt pessimistic about the economy in 1982, were significantly less trusting than economic pessimists who had voted for Carter. Similarly, Reagan voters who were optimistic about an economic recovery in 1982 exhibited less confidence in government than economic optimists who had voted for Carter. The relatively higher levels of trust in 1982 among Carter voters apparently resulted from having their worst expectations unrealized. Only among black Democrats was there a deterioration in perceived economic conditions resulting in lower trust.

Evaluations of economic performance, though, provide only a partial explanation for increased confidence. Let us remember that the historical trend of decreasing confidence began during the affluent sixties, and the recent upturn has appeared during a severe recession. Changing economic conditions alone do not fully account for shifts in political trust.

Policy Directions

The Reagan administration's attacks on government spending and federal regulations played some role in improving the public's attitudes. In 1980, the 34 percent of all respondents who thought that government

Table 3

CONFIDENCE IN GOVERNMENT BY ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

	1980				1982			
	Total	Democrats	Independents	Republicans	Total	Democrats	Independents	Republicans
Personal financial past is:								
Better now	−26[a]	−16	−33	−38	7	3	19	10
Same	−18	−17	−21	−23	2	2	27	14
Worse now	−38	−25	−44	−58	−15	−16	−10	−14
National economic future will:								
Get better	−17	−10	−26	−31	7	10	5	6
Stay same	−25	−17	−23	−38	−3	−5	−10	6
Get worse	−46	−36	−53	−59	−28	−33	−38	− 9
President's handling of inflation:								
Approve	− 1	0	−17	− 2	10	17	4	8
Disapprove	−41	−33	−40	−49	−18	−17	−32	−27

Note: [a]All entries are PDIs. See Table 2, footnote b for explanation.

Source: Surveys by the University of Michigan, Institute for Social Research, latest that of November 1982.

Table 4

CONFIDENCE IN GOVERNMENT BY ATTITUDES TOWARD GOVERNMENT SERVICES

	1980				1982			
	Total	Democrats	Independents	Republicans	Total	Democrats	Independents	Republicans
Government services[a]								
Reduce	−60[b]	−53	−68	−62	−34	−34	−55	−30
	(34%)	(22%)	(34%)	(53%)	(40%)	(27%)	(46%)	(60%)
In-between	−46	−47	−51	−57	−26	−33	−33	−13
	(20)	(19)	(23)	(20)	(29)	(31)	(26)	(27)
Increase	−37	−34	−33	−51	−27	−31	− 9	−18
	(46)	(59)	(43)	(27)	(31)	(42)	(28)	(13)

Note: [a]The actual question reads: Some people think the government should provide fewer services, even in areas such as health and education, in order to reduce spending. Other people feel it is important for the government to provide many more services even if it means an increase in spending. Where would you place yourself on this (seven-point) scale?

[b]Entries are PDIs.

Source: Surveys by the University of Michigan, Institute for Social Research, latest that of November 1982.

should provide fewer services to reduce spending were significantly less trusting than those who felt that government should provide more services. Between 1980 and 1982, the population, including Democrats, shifted toward favoring further cuts (see table 4).

During that period, Democrats' increased confidence in government occurred primarily among those who favored cutting services. Apparently, the cuts in federal spending initiated by the Reagan administration increased their perception that government was responsive to their preferences. Among Independents and Republicans, on the other hand, the increases in confidence were greater for those opposing cuts in government services than for those favoring cuts. These shifts left Republicans and Independents who favored yet further cuts even more cynical than they had been in 1980, relative to their partisan counterparts who opposed cuts (see table 4). Apparently, reductions in government programs were not large enough to satisfy those conservatives who had expected deeper cuts.

These data imply that further government reductions will produce even higher levels of trust, but a closer look at the evidence suggests this may not be true. The distrusting did not express an across-the-board opposition to government spending. Indeed, significantly more than a majority of the distrusting thought the government was already spending "too little" on health concerns (59 percent), fighting crime (68 percent), aiding the handicapped (63 percent), and education (57 percent). The programs on which they were relatively more likely to say government was spending "too much" included foreign aid (86 percent), welfare (60 percent), and food stamps (58 percent). Future cuts in spending without attention to these priorities are as likely to reduce distrust as to increase it.

As confidence has declined, feelings about the size and scope of government have become increasingly associated with political trust. Those who feel that government has become involved in too many facets of American life have become more and more cynical over the years. In turn, declining confidence has spawned a desire to curtail the activities of a government which

the public perceives as unresponsive and incapable of resolving social and economic difficulties.

Ronald Reagan has tapped this growing discontent by articulating an antigovernment philosophy and pursuing cutbacks in the scope of the federal government. In the short run, this approach has restored some considerable degree of political trust. But differences of opinion on the size and scope of the federal government are at the very core of political cleavages in this country. Achieving a widely acceptable level of further cuts in government spending or greater reductions in government regulations and activity will probably increase cynicism on the left while it may not be enough to decrease dissatisfaction among conservatives.

That this is a likely scenario for the future is suggested by the relationship between trust and attitudes toward government regulations presented in table 5. The lowest levels of confidence in government are found both for those who feel that there is "too little" and for those who say there is "too much" government regulation of business and industry. The further reduction of political distrust will depend on the government's reaching a delicate balance that appeals to both of these opposing positions—not a simple task.

Conclusion

Does the recent rise in public confidence imply a growing consensus for President Reagan's conservative policies? Clearly not. The public remains divided on the key elements of the Reagan program. In fact, during the past two years Americans' support for increased defense spending—a major priority for the Reagan administration—has declined. Even so, it is evident that the administration's actions have helped stem the tide of a continuing decline in public confidence. They have bolstered the public's faith in the government's ability to act with a decisive approach to legislation and the economy. The successful passage of considerable legislation during Reagan's first two years in office, and the more recent decline in inflation and interest rates, convey the message that government can act effectively and responsibly.

Nevertheless, it was not simply improved economic performance, or increased activity, or the perception that someone was finally "doing something" that led to the restoration of trust, although these were important factors. The key element added by the Reagan administration was the theme underlying those changes—the need to limit the role of the national government. Two sets of citizens responded positively to this call: conservatives and those who were fed up with government. Improvements in confidence, then, came mainly from Republicans, and from Independents and Democrats who favor a reduction in government.

It remains to be seen whether or not confidence will continue to increase. Reducing the scope of government may have only a short-term beneficial effect. It may lower expectations for what government should be doing, but fail to solve the basic social dilemmas which underlie expressions of policy dissatisfaction. Major problems persist—high unemployment, record deficits, a deteriorating educational system, ailing industries, to mention only a few. Reducing the role of the federal government's activities merely shifts the responsibility for a solution onto other social, economic, and governmental institutions—or onto individuals.

Despite Jimmy Carter's pronouncement about a malaise in the American spirit, the American people have not lost confidence in themselves. Over the past two decades, they have lost confidence in their political leaders and in their government. Nor does this discontent merely represent an increase in healthy skepticism or vigilance on the part of those who feel government may be unduly limiting their liberty. It reflects, instead, a continuing disillusionment with the political authorities and institutions and their ability to manage the country's conflicts and concerns.

The recent resurgence in public confidence suggests that at least some segments of the population feel government is now acting more responsibly. Let us remember, however, that the public is still predominantly distrusting. The challenge remains for this and future administrations to broaden the current trend toward greater confidence to the population as a whole.

Table 5

CONFIDENCE IN GOVERNMENT BY ATTITUDES TOWARD GOVERNMENT REGULATION, 1982

Government regulation[a]	Total	Democrats	Independents	Republicans	Liberals	Conservatives
Too little	−11[b] (17%)	−18 (25%)	0 (10%)	18 (8%)	− 9 (26%)	−31 (11%)
About the right amount	25 (25)	20 (25)	31 (30)	33 (22)	33 (37)	24 (19)
Too much	−22 (58)	−28 (50)	−46 (60)	− 9 (70)	−37 (37)	−18 (70)

Note: [a]The actual question reads: Let's talk about the relationship between government and business. Do you feel the government in Washington regulates and controls too little of what goes on in business and industry, is there too much regulation, about the right amount, or don't you have an opinion on this?

[b]Entries are PDIs.

Source: Surveys by the University of Michigan, Institute for Social Research, latest that of November 1982.

BRITISH ELECTIONS

Question: How would you vote if there were a general election tomorrow? Which party are you most inclined to support? (Asked of those who were undecided or refused)



LATE POLLS see page 26

1979	Con.	Lab.	Lib.	SDP	Alli-ance	Com-bined Alli-ance**
May*	44%	37%	14%			
Aug.	44	45	9			
Sept.	42	43	12			
Oct.	41	46	11			
Nov.	40	45	13			
1980						
Jan.	40	43	14			
Feb.	38	46	14			
Mar.	38	46	13			
Apr.	39	44	14			
June	41	43	13			
July	37	47	13			
Aug.	37	48	13			
Sept.	37	46	15			
Oct.	34	50	15			
Nov.	36	50	13			
1981						
Jan.	35	45	17			
Feb.	33	41	17	8%		
Mar.	28	38	17	15		
Apr.	30	38	17	12		
June	31	39	16	12		
July	30	36	13	18		
Aug.	30	39	13	16		
Sept.	27	38	16	17		
Oct.	27	31	14	26		
Nov.	27	27	8	16	19%	44%
Dec.	27	29	11	19	13	43

1982	Con.	Lab.	Lib.	SDP	Alli-ance	Com-bined Alli-ance**
Jan.	29	30	12	15	13	40
Feb.	30	33	12	11	11	34
Mar.	34	34	11	11	8	30
Apr.	35	30	10	11	12	33
May	44	30	10	7	7	25
June	48	28	10	8	6	23
July	45	31	10	4	8	22
Aug.	44	30	9	6	8	24
Sept.	42	30	13	4	10	27
Oct. 7-12	42	33	10	5	9	23
Oct. 21-26	43	32	10	6	8	23
Nov. 4-10	42	33	10	5	8	23
Nov. 18-24	43	35	9	6	6	21
Dec. 9-12	42	35	10	6	6	21
1983						
Jan. 6-12	44	35	10	4	6	20
Jan. 20-26	44	36	8	5	6	19
Feb. 3-9	45	32	9	6	6	21
Feb. 17-23	46	32	10	5	6	21
Mar. 3-9	41	27	13	7	10	30
Mar. 17-23	43	28	9	8	10	28
Apr. 7-13	43	34	10	5	7	22
Apr. 17-23	46	33	10	4	7	20
May 5-11	46	32	9	4	9	22
May 19-23	49	33	7	3	6	17
June 2-5	44	28	8	6	13	26
June*	42	28				25

Note: *May 1979 and June 1983 figures represent general election results. "Other" not shown. **Liberal plus SDP plus Alliance categories equal Combined Alliance.
Source: Surveys by Market & Opinion Research International, latest that of June 2-5, 1983.

Rating the Leader...

Question: Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way . . . the government is running the country . . . Mrs. Thatcher is doing her job as prime minister?


Percent
100
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Percent satisfied with the way:
Mrs. Thatcher is doing her job as prime minister
The government is running the country
J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983

	Satisfied with government	Satisfied with Thatcher
1979		
August	34%	45%
September	33	44
October	35	44
November	30	41
1980		
January	30	39
February	26	37
March	28	37
April	33	43
June	32	42
July	32	38
August	30	37
September	27	35
October	27	34
November	25	32
1981		
January	26	33
February	23	32
March	19	29
April	24	33
June	25	34
July	22	31
August	22	29
September	20	28
October	22	30
November	20	28
December	18	25

	Satisfied with government	Satisfied with Thatcher
1982		
January	23	32
February	23	30
March	29	36
April	34	41
May	49	56
June	51	59
July	42	51
August	40	49
September	37	46
October 7-12	38	46
October 21-26	38	46
November 4-10	38	47
November 18-24	41	48
December 9-15	38	47
1983		
January 6-12	41	49
January 20-26	42	49
February 3-9	39	46
February 17-23	41	49
March 3-9	40	47
March 17-23	42	48
April 7-13	41	47
April 17-23	41	49
May 5-11	43	51
May 19-23	44	53

Source: Surveys by Market & Opinion Research International, latest that of May 19-23, 1983.

And the Opposition

Question: Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way Mr. Foot is doing his job as leader of the Opposition?

Question: Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way Mr. Steel is doing his job as leader of the Liberal party?



Question: Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way Mr. Jenkins is doing his job as leader of the SDP (Social Democratic party)?



Source: Surveys by Market & Opinion Research International, latest that of May 19-23, 1983.

Britons Assess the

Question: What would you say is the most important issue facing Britain today? What do you see as other important issues facing Britain today?



Note: Other categories not shown. None was more than 18%. In a May 19-23 poll asking what issues do you think the general election will/should be about, 80% said it will be about unemployment, 66% said it should be. Prices/Inflation: will be = 17%, should be = 22%. Defense/Foreign affairs: will be = 8%, should be = 10%. Disarmament/Nuclear weapons: will be = 29%, should be = 22%.

Source: Surveys by Market & Opinion Research International, latest that of May 5-11, 1983.

Question: Which do you think is more important for the country, keeping inflation down, or reducing unemployment? What do you think is more important for you and your family?



Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates (International) for the *London Observer*, May 26-27, 1983.

State of Their Nation

Question: Please could you tell we whether, on balance, you agree or disagree with the following statement. . . . In the long term this government's policies will improve the state of Britain's economy.



Source: Surveys by Market & Opinion Research International for *The Economist*, latest that of March 16, 1983.

Question: Do you think the budget proposals generally are a good thing or a bad thing . . . for you personally . . . for the country as a whole?



Source: 1979 survey by National Opinion Polls (NOP), London; all others by Market & Opinion Research International for *The Economist*, latest that of March 16, 1983.

Question: Do you think that the general economic condition of the country will improve, stay the same, or get worse over the next 12 months?



Source: Surveys by Market & Opinion Research International, latest that of May 19-23, 1983.

LATE POLLS—VOTING INTENTION

Date	Survey Organization	Conducted for	Sample size	Cons.	Lab.	Alliance
April 21-25	MORI	*Sunday Times*	1,216	45%	30%	23%
May 4-9	Gallup	*Daily Telegraph*	950	49	32	18
May 5-6	Harris	*London Observer*	1,053	46	38	15
May 6	NOP	*Sunday Mail*	1,058	47	34	18
May 9-11	Marplan	*The Guardian*	1,200	46	34	19
May 11	Harris	Thames TV	1,048	52	31	17
May 11-16	Gallup	*Daily Telegraph*	948	46	33	19
May 16-17	NOP	*Daily Mail*	1,548	49	31	19
May 17-18	MORI	*Sunday Times*	960	45	36	18
May 17-18	Harris	Thames TV	1,053	45	35	17
May 19-20	Marplan	*Sunday Mirror*	1,250	46	34	18
May 19-20	Harris	*London Observer*	1,052	45	36	18
May 20-23	Gallup	*Daily Telegraph*	1,700	48	33	18
May 23	NOP	*Daily Mail*	1,104	52	33	14
May 23-25	Marplan	*The Guardian*	1,500	48	32	19
May 24-25	Harris	Thames TV	1,034	48	33	18
May 24-25	MORI	*Sunday Times*	1,023	46	30	23
May 24-26	Gallup	*Sunday Telegraph*	2,015	49	32	18
May 25-30	Gallup	*Daily Telegraph*	918	48	28	23
May 26-27	Harris	*London Observer*	1,029	47	30	21
May 27	Marplan	*Sunday Mirror*	1,325	50	31	19
May 31-June 1	Harris	Thames TV	1,038	46	28	24
May 31-June 1	Marplan	*The Guardian*	1,500	47	30	22
May 31-June 2	Gallup	*Sunday Telegraph*	1,989	46	32	22
June 1-3	MORI	*Sunday Times*	942	45	28	25
June 2-3	Harris	*London Observer*	1,041	47	28	23
June 3	NOP	*Sunday Mail*	1,074	47	29	23
June 3	Marplan	*Sunday Mirror*	1,311	44	27	28
June 6-7	NOP	*Sunday Mail*	1,040	46	28	24
June 7-8	Gallup	*Daily Telegraph*	2,003	45	27	26
June 7-8*	Harris	*London Observer*	537	47	25	26
June 8	Marplan	*The Guardian*	1,500	46	26	26

Note: *The June 7-8 Harris poll for the *London Observer* was a telephone call-back survey. 537 respondents in the June 2-3 poll who had telephones were surveyed by Harris again on June 7-8.

General Electric: Bringing the Polls to Life

From 1964 through 1982, General Electric executives received quarterly reports designed to help them understand the public context in which their business operated. Trendex, Inc., interviewed a national sample of 2,000 by telephone for the General Electric Quarterly Index of Company Relations (QICR). Each interview took approximately thirty-five minutes. There were two versions of the questionnaire to accommodate more questions within the time limit.

Those of us associated with the surveys (which over the years also included Herbert Krugman, Richard Maisel, and Nelson Foote) felt we had a unique perspective on the public mood and how it changed. Other surveys covered many of the same topics, but had shorter trend lines, or were more narrowly focused. The General Electric interview was designed to give respondents maximum opportunity to say what was on their minds in their own terms. Every interview opened with the question: "What are you most interested in or concerned about lately?" with emphasis on the interests and concerns of the *respondent* rather than any preconceived notion of what the "issues of the day" were. This emphasis had practical significance: we were able to detect some changes in public opinion earlier than others did, and we were able to discount some widely heralded changes in attitudes that simply did not emerge when people were given a chance to define their own concerns.

When the surveys were discontinued, the General Electric Company agreed to make the data base available to scholars and other students of public opinion through the Roper Center. The questions that appear on the next ten pages are a good representation of the structured questions in the data set. These trends illustrate some of the ways the G.E. surveys supplement currently available data.

For example, while changes in beliefs about nuclear power have been widely attributed to the March 1979 events at Three Mile Island, changes have in fact been occurring since 1973. Respondents had grown more and more likely to say that a great increase in nuclear power plants would make communities more dangerous, and not as likely to say that there would be less air pollution or fewer fuel shortages. On the question of danger to the community, the pace of change actually *slowed* somewhat after Three Mile Island.

When the objective is early detection of change, there is no substitute for frequent measurements. For example, many of the changes in support for various government activities occurred *between* elections when there were fewer private surveys conducted on such attitudes. Support for space exploration increased after the launching of the first space shuttle in April 1981, and support for defense increased after the fall of South Vietnam in the spring of 1975.

The G.E. series confirmed the deterioration in perceived value for a wide variety of goods and services that has been well documented elsewhere. Some goods and services have changed less than others. For example, in 1966 respondents gave federal taxes about the same (rather negative) value rating as they gave local taxes. In the intervening years, however, while local taxes did not deteriorate further, federal taxes declined sharply in perceived value.

The section includes a series of questions that were asked in 1980, 1981, and 1982 to test the public's evaluation of the United States as an industrial country in competition with Japan, West Germany, England, and France. Within this context, comparisons are made primarily between Japan and the United States. Comfortable majorities selected Japan as doing "the best job of selling its products to other countries" and as "having the hardest working employees." The United States earned comparable majorities for its employee benefits—"highest wages" and "best protection plans."

Japan's industrial image has improved while the United States's image has declined. Between 1980 and 1982, Japan widened its lead over the United States for "having the best equipped factories," drew ahead of the United States for "highest quality products," and substantially reduced the United States's lead for having "the most advanced technology."

Joan S. Black
J. S. Black & Associates
Easton, Connecticut

Nuclear

Question: Do you feel that future power needs of your community can be handled with existing facilities or do you think there will be a need for additional power plants?



Note: The sample size for many of the quarters is one-half (1000-1100) of the total sample. "Don't know/no answer/refusnd" calculated out. All were less than 10%, except 1970-I, 1974-IV, 1975-I which were 11-12%.

Question: When a new power plant *is* needed [in your community] would you favor or oppose a plant that uses nuclear power? Would you favor or oppose a plant that uses coal [when a new power plant *is* needed in your community]?

If new power plant is needed in community,would...



Note: The sample size for many of the quarters is one-half (1000-1100) of the total sample.
Source: Surveys by Trendex for General Electric, latest that of October 29-November 7, 1982.

Reaction

Question: Please tell me what effect, if any, you think a great increase in the number of (atomic/nuclear) energy plants would have . . . Would our communities be: more dangerous, less dangerous, or about the same as they are today? Would there be more air pollution, less air pollution, or about the same amount? Would it make the cost of electricity higher, lower, or about the same as it is today? Would the amount of radiation the average person is exposed to be higher, lower, or about the same as it is today?







Note: *Surveys from 1973-III–1978-III asked about "atomic energy"; 1978-III–1382-III asked about "nuclear energy." In 1978-III one-half of the sample was asked about atomic energy, the other half about nuclear energy. Results shown above for 1978-III are nuclear energy results. The atomic energy results were not significantly different. For "community danger" "more" = 47%, "same" = 47%, "less" = 6%; for "air pollution" "more" = 22%, "same" = 34%, "less" = 44%; for "cost of electricity" "higher" = 43%, "same" = 30%, "less" = 27%.

Source: Surveys by Trendex for General Electric, latest that of July 30-August 8, 1982.

The Years of

Question: Could you please tell me how much danger you feel there is of an accident or mishap in the following situation. . . . Do you think there is great danger, some danger or very little danger in living near a nuclear energy plant (1975-I) Could you please tell me how much danger you feel there is of an accident or mishap in living near a nuclear energy plant? Do you feel there is great danger, some danger, or very little danger? (1976-IV through 1982-III).



Note: The sample size for many of the quarters is one-half (1000-1100) of the total sample.
Source: Surveys by Trendex for General Electric, latest that of July 30-August 8, 1982.

Question: Overall, would you say that science and technology do more *good* than harm, more *harm* than good, or about the same of each?



Note: The sample size for many of the quarters is one-half (1000-1100) of the total sample.
Source: Surveys by Trendex for General Electric, latest that of October 29-November 7, 1982.

Living Dangerously

Question: Could you please tell me how much danger you feel there is of an accident or mishap in the following situations . . . do you think there is great danger, some danger, or very little danger in traveling in airplanes . . . traveling by automobile . . . using new types of drugs and medicines . . . going out alone in your neighborhood. . . . living near an atomic energy plant.











Note: Sample size for all quarters except 1971-II is one-half (1000-1100) of the total sample.
Source: Surveys by Trendex for General Electric, latest that of July 30-August 8, 1982.

The Public Evaluates

Question: I would like to get your opinion on several areas of important *government* activities. As I read each one, please tell me if you would like the government to do more, do less, or do about the same as they have been on. . . .



Note: Each quarter shown based on one-half (1011 or 1038) of the total sample.
Source: Surveys by Trendex for General Electric, latest that of October 29-November 7, 1982.

Government Activities

Question: I would like to get your opinion on several areas of important government activities. As I read each one, please tell me if you would like the government to do more, do less, or do about the same as they have been on . . .

Question: I'd like to know if you have given any thought recently to what the government is or is not doing about each of the activities I mentioned before. Have you recently thought about what the government *is or is not doing* about . . .

Question: (Asked only of those who said the government should be spending more for the category asked) I noticed you said you would like the government to do more on (named item). Would you favor this increased activity if it required an increase in taxes?



Note: Each response based on one-half (1011 or 1038) of the total sample.

Note: Each response based on one-half (1011 or 1038) of the total sample.

Note: Response based only on the half of the sample which responded "more" to given category.

Source: Surveys by Trendex for General Electric, latest that of April 30-May 18, 1982.

Is Japan

Question: Now I'd like to ask you a few questions about five industrial countries. The countries are France, West Germany, the United States, Japan, and England. Each of these countries makes products such as cars, clothing, appliances, cameras, airplanes and so on . . . which *one* of these five countries . . . France, West Germany, the United States, Japan, or England . . . makes the highest quality products? Which *one* . . .

Makes highest quality products



Makes best looking products



Has most advanced technology



Does best job of selling its products to other countries



Has most highly skilled workers



Employees make highest wages



Note: * = less than .5 percent. All responses based on one-half (1034-1045) of the total sample. Other responses not shown include "all," "none," "neither," "don't know/no answer/refused." They ranged from 2-17%.

#17

Employees have the best protection plans for retirement, sickness, or unemployment



Has the most up-to-date and best equipped factories



Business executives do best job managing companies



Has hardest working employees



Workers have most pride in their work



Business gets most help and support from national government



Source: Surveys by Trendex for General Electric, latest that of October 29-November 7, 1982.

Value in

Question: Now let's talk about your feelings toward some of the things you pay for. As I read each item to you, would you please tell me whether you feel you are getting good, moderate, or poor value for the money you might pay. . .



Source: Surveys by Trendex for General Electric.

America



latest that of January 29-February 16, 1982.

POLISH SOLIDARITY

POLLING THE POLES

Three months after the agreements between the government and strike committees in Poland were signed, the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences conducted a survey (a representative quota sample of 2,500 adults) to determine public attitudes toward the agreements, their implementation and other problems in Poland. Some of the results of the December 1980 survey are shown below. More complete results appear in "Poles 80" in *Sisyphus Sociological Studies* published by the Polish Scientific Publishers (Warsaw, 1982).

[**Question:** Do you approve or disapprove of the agreements signed by the government and the strike committees?*]





[**Question:** Some people think the implementation of the Gdansk agreements has been excessively delayed. Do you agree with that?*]



[**Question:** Who would you say is responsible for the delay in implementing the Gdansk agreements? (Asked of those who said implementation of the agreements had been excessively delayed = 67%.)*]



Note: *Exact wording of the questions in brackets could not be determined.

SOLIDARITY '80

Question: Do you think that the present sociopolitical situation in Poland threatens the independence of our State?



Question: Please expand on what you feel represents the greatest threat to Polish independence.



Note: Categories "Germany," "Czechoslovakia," "Countries to which we are indebted," not shown. All = less than 5%. (Multiple responses accepted)

Question: What do you think is the most important problem to be solved on a national scale in Poland?



Note: Economic reform was mentioned as the most important national problem by professionals and technicians. Manual and clerical workers mentioned the standard of living as the most important problem.

Question: There have recently been many discussions concerning changes in economic management and in sociopolitical life in this country. We present herewith a list of the various principles on which the organization of public life in Poland could be based in the 1980s. How far do you support or reject these principles?



Source: Survey by the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, December 1980.

1983

Question: Does Solidarity still exist?



Question: Does the Communist party still exist in Poland?

Note: When asked: "Do you think that the Polish people support the clandestine movement of Solidarity," 76% said they do, 11% said they do not, and 13% had no comment.

Question: Is the intervention of the Soviet army in Poland still possible?



Question: Who do you think was responsible for the attempt on the Pope's life?



Note: 600 Poles were interviewed in six cities: Warsaw, Lublin, Lodz, Cracow, Wroclaw, Schtetin; and in rural areas.
Source: Survey by Public Socrate (France) for *Paris Match* and ABC News, May 2-June 8, 1983.

by Robert Shogan and William Schneider

Labor's Gamble: The Presidential Endorsement and the Polls

QUESTION: What presidential candidate wants the endorsement of an organization whose leadership's reputation—for rectitude rates twenty-third among twenty-four occupations, ranking higher only than car salesmen?

ANSWER: Walter Mondale. Also, in alphabetical order, Alan Cranston, John Glenn, Gary Hart, and Ernest F. Holling.

The organization in question is the AFL-CIO, which this fall, for the first time in its history, plans to select one candidate from the Democratic field and give him its united backing, well before a single vote has been cast in the party's 1984 primaries and caucuses. What makes the prospect of this momentous pat on the back so attractive to the aforementioned five contenders for the 1984 Democratic nomination is the labor federation's multi-million dollar political machine, admired by friends and envied by foes for its prowess in generating support for its favored candidates and getting voters to the ballot box on election day.

All told, the labor federation and its affiliated unions, in campaigning among their nearly 14 million members, can call upon resources valued at somewhere between $15 million and $25 million. That's big bucks in a presidential campaign where the federal limit on spending for each candidate is expected to run about $20 million, exclusive of fund-raising costs.

But an array of public opinion polls raises a huge question about this largesse, creating a dilemma for labor and for whichever candidate gains its endorsement (right now Mondale seems to have the inside track). The basic question is whether the organizational boost from labor's political apparatus will outweigh the potential backlash from the electorate. Surveys show that voters don't much like the idea of interest groups in general throwing their weight around in politics and, as the barely favorable comparison with car salesmen suggests, most citizens regard union hierarchs in particular with disfavor. Moreover, polls of labor's own rank and file give reason for doubting the solidarity of their response to an endorsement.

Indeed, one Democratic candidate for president, Reubin Askew, says he would not accept the labor endorsement before the nomination for the same reason he would not take the backing of the National Association of Manufacturers. He doesn't want to be perceived by the electorate as "a captive" of either group, says his press secretary James Bacchus. Of course, as As-

kew's advisers concede, the conservative former Florida governor wouldn't have much chance of securing the AFL-CIO's backing in any case. But poll data show that Askew does have a point about public attitudes toward the support of candidates by labor unions and other interest groups.

In April 1983, the Harris survey asked people whether they would trust various kinds of political action committees if they were to support a presidential candidate in 1984. A majority said no in seventeen out of nineteen cases, including both business and labor PACs, pro- and anti-gun control PACs, pro- and anti-abortion PACs, and pro- and anti-ERA PACs. Only two kinds of political action committees were trusted by most Americans—a consumer PAC and a pro-environmental PAC, neither of which most people regard as a special interest.

Consistently, when polls ask about endorsements, those who say that an interest group's seal of approval would make them less likely to vote for the endorsed candidate outnumber those who say it would make them more likely to vote for him or her. That was the case when Penn + Schoen (for *The Garth Analysis*) asked in February about endorsements by the AFL-CIO and the National Association of Manufacturers, when the CBS News/*New York Times* poll asked in April about an AFL-CIO endorsement, when Gallup asked in May about a labor union endorsement, and when the *Los Angeles Times* poll queried in May about endorsements by the Chamber of Commerce, the AFL-CIO, the NAACP, and the Moral Majority.

To be sure, most voters—about 65 to 80 percent—now tell pollsters that an endorsement by the AFL-CIO or some other interest group would not change their vote. The impact of the actual endorsement on voter decisions, however, would be likely to increase considerably because of the big splash the endorsement would make in the press. What is ominous for the AFL-CIO, and for its chosen candidate, is that the endorsement, and all the hoopla surrounding it, would be taking place against a backdrop of public attitudes that seem negatively predisposed toward labor's prospective new enterprise. In a Penn + Schoen poll (for *The Garth Analysis*) in December, 56 percent viewed a labor endorsement in 1983 as "an unfair attempt by the unions to influence the outcome of the elections," while only 25 percent thought it was "a good attempt to unify labor support behind one candidate."

In simplest terms, most citizens think organized labor is fine as long as it stays in its place—the workplace.

Sweet and Sour Sentiments

On twenty-two occasions between 1936 and 1981, the Gallup poll asked Americans whether they approved or disapproved of labor unions. Majorities of 55 to 76 percent said they approved each time. When the ABC News/*Washington Post* poll repeated the question in January 1982, the margin of approval was two-to-one.

In the same ABC News/*Washington Post* survey, strong majorities agreed that "labor unions improve wages, working conditions, and job security for workers" (78-18 percent), that "labor unions ensure fair treatment for workers" (65-31 percent), and that "most workers who are not in management jobs would be better off belonging to a union than not belonging to one" (56-37 percent). Those interviewed rejected the views that "wages and working conditions would have reached today's level even without the efforts of labor unions" (70-24 percent), and that "labor unions may have been needed at one time in the United States, but not any longer" (60-37 percent). By 57 to 32 percent, respondents said they were personally more sympathetic to labor than to business.

Public sentiment toward unions turns sour, however, when people are asked about the influence of organized labor in broad areas beyond shops and factories. Sixty percent of those surveyed by CBS News/*New York Times* in September 1981 felt labor unions have "too much influence in American life and politics." The ABC News/*Washington Post* poll of January 1982 showed 55 percent were of the opinion that labor unions should have less influence on how the country is run; only 17 percent thought they should have more influence.

In the political arena, labor has to reckon not only with the public's suspicion of interest groups, but also with a special stigma attached to union leaders, an attitude these officials understandably find frustrating. "We conduct ourselves in, I think, a very genteel fashion," says Ben Albert, public relations director of the AFL-CIO's Committee on Political Education (COPE), the labor federation's political arm. "I don't know what the hell we can do to make the public think we're wonderful. We're a reputable, respectable organization with many wide concerns, many of which go far beyond our own members." Nevertheless, fairly or not, many Americans feel differently.

While Americans often sympathize with labor more than business, they have a much more negative view of labor leaders than of business leaders. Labor leaders are widely perceived as corrupt and autocratic. In 1976, 1977, and 1981, Gallup inquired about the honesty and ethical standards of people in many different occupational groups. Labor leaders came out at or near the bottom of the list in all three surveys. In the 1981 test, 48 percent gave union leaders low or very low ratings. Only car salesmen did worse (55 percent low or very low). On the other hand, 19 percent gave unfavorable ratings to business executives.

In a 1976 Harris survey, 80 percent agreed with the statement, "Labor unions are as much a part of our democratic system as private companies, farm groups, and other organized parts of American society." But majorities in the same poll also agreed that "many union leaders have used their union positions to benefit them-

selves financially" (76 percent), that many union leaders have ties to organized crime (64 percent), and that most union leaders have become arrogant and no longer represent their workers (59 percent).

Pros and Cons

In a result particularly relevant to the planned presidential endorsement, the January 1982 ABC News/*Washington Post* poll found the public agreeing, 57 to 33 percent, that "labor union leaders are out of touch with the workers they represent." That perception underlines a concern shared by a number of labor leaders and their allies—that the endorsement must not be perceived as an edict dictated to the members from on high.

"If the decision is seen as coming from the bottom up, it will be well received," predicts Peter Hart, pollster to the Mondale campaign and a consultant to the AFL-CIO. "If it's top-down, not so well received."

The manner in which the endorsement process is conducted will, of course, have a great deal to do with the unions' ability to persuade their members—who will be the focus of their political activity—to go along with the choice. Under federal law, union political operations in support of a particular candidate that are financed by members' dues—pamphlets and newspapers, registration and get-out-the-vote drives—must be aimed only at union members and their families. And it is clear from the polls that the union leadership cannot take these voters for granted.

"Most UAW (United Auto Workers) members feel almost starved for accurate, reliable information about the political choices that face them," Peter Hart wrote in summarizing the findings of a 1979 poll of the rank and file commissioned by the union's leadership. "Among many, the UAW has the credibility to provide such information." But Hart added, "Among many others, it must still develop this credibility."

In recent public polls, members of union households who say they would be more likely to vote for the endorsed candidate outnumber those who would be less likely to support the endorsee—by 23 percent to 10 percent in the *Los Angeles Times* survey. But the great majority of union household voters, like other Americans, currently say an endorsement would not alter their choice at the ballot box either way.

The effectiveness of the endorsement will hinge on the backing of this presently neutral bloc, and this in turn, as union officials acknowledge, will depend greatly on how the endorsement decision is reached. Unless the endorsement has "broad-based support," says Don Stillman, government affairs director for the United Auto Workers, "its value is in question."

As things stand now, the final decision on whether and whom to endorse will be made at the December meeting of the AFL-CIO's general board, consisting of the presidents of each of the federation's ninety-eight unions. Each president's vote will be weighted according to the membership of his union, and a two-thirds vote will be necessary for endorsement. Though the action would be binding only on the AFL-CIO and its nearly 800 state and local branches, federation officials expect the vast majority of the individual unions, including all the big ones, to go along with the decision.

The process by which the individual unions will decide whom they favor, or whether they favor an endorsement at all, has been left up to them to work out. Some will probably rely on informal consultations with regional and local officials, as many unions have done in the past. Another possibility, which the UAW and other unions are considering, is a poll or canvass of their members.

But some union leaders don't want their hands tied by a rank-and-file verdict. Thus, the Bricklayers' union plans to poll its members on their attitudes toward the competing Democratic candidates but won't ask specifically whom they favor for an endorsement. "A whole range of things could happen after the poll that could change the feelings of members," says Joan Bassett, political director of the union. "We need some flexibility."

"Some of the unions are in a bind, particularly those with pluralistic membership, because they are going to have diversity of sentiment," says William R. Hamilton, who polls for the presidential campaign of John Glenn, currently Mondale's chief rival for the Democratic nomination. "As soon as you ask the membership the endorsement question, you'll generate opposition to the union leadership."

The problems of pluralism within the union movement are compounded within the Democratic party as a whole, by the divisions between the blue-collar Democrats and the white-collar professionals who make up an increasingly large segment of the party, particularly its leadership cadres.

The split in the Democratic party that began in 1968 with the insurgency against Lyndon Johnson's conduct of the war in Vietnam had significant class overtones. The "party regulars" who supported Hubert Humphrey in 1968 and 1972 and Henry Jackson in 1976 were predominantly blue-collar Democrats. The "new politics" voters, who emerged with the candidacy of Eugene McCarthy in 1968 and later rallied behind George McGovern in 1972 and Morris Udall in 1976, tended to draw most heavily from upper middle-class suburbanites, many of whom were traditionally Independents or Republicans. The Vietnam War and "the social issues" drove these two factions of the party apart during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Union members and working-class Democrats, while liberal on economic issues, show little enthusiasm for the cultural and foreign policy liberalism of the new politics Democrats.

The *Los Angeles Times* poll reveals a sharp class difference in the responses of registered Democrats to the proposed AFL-CIO endorsement. Blue-collar Democrats said, on balance, that they would be more likely rather than less likely to support a union-endorsed can-

didate. White-collar Democrats, on the other hand, were either negative or neutral toward the idea. The difference between liberal blue-collar Democrats and liberal white-collar Democrats is particularly striking. It should be noted that, in the *Los Angeles Times* survey, registered Democrats split 60 percent white collar and 40 percent blue collar, with the result that, overall, Democrats were slightly more negative (16 percent) than positive (14 percent) toward the idea of a union endorsement (see figure 1).

Figure 1

Question: Suppose the leadership of the AFL-CIO, the national federation of labor unions, were to endorse a political candidate for president—would you be more likely to vote for that candidate, or less likely, or wouldn't the support of that group make any difference in your vote one way or the other? (Asked of registered Democrats only)



Note: Figures in parentheses show percentage of all registered Democrats. N = 450 registered Democrats.
Source: *Los Angeles Times* Poll, May 8-12, 1983.

The problem posed by these divisions for the candidate who gains the endorsement is that a good many Democratic voters might consider him too closely tied to organized labor. "I think the candidate who gets the endorsement, and you have to presume it will be Mondale, will be seen by the electorate as being inordinately beholden to the labor unions," says President Carter's former pollster, Patrick Caddell. "What I am saying is that somebody is going to make an issue out of this."

And any charges of favoritism to labor made against a candidate during the struggle for the Democratic nomination are likely to carry over into the fall campaign. "If the issue is raised during the primaries about what commitments and what promises have been made by an opponent who had the labor endorsement—those kinds of things stick to the wall," says President Reagan's pollster, Richard Wirthlin.

One factor contributing to the intraparty friction between union leaders and other activist Democrats is that labor has been associated with the "old politics" rather than the "new politics" in the prolonged internal struggle over the party's rules for nominating its standard-bearer. It was the reforms in the rules, made in the wake of the Democrats' fractious 1968 Chicago convention, that contributed greatly to the deep sense of frustration among labor's leadership and provided much of the impetus for the current endorsement effort. In a revealing address to a union leadership group last fall, AFL-CIO president Lane Kirkland, the driving force behind the endorsement plan, spoke nostalgically of the pre-reform era. "In the old days, the party leaders knew that in the general election, they needed labor to draw some of the water and hew some of the wood," he said. "They wouldn't nominate anyone who was too offensive to the trade union movement. We had substantial leverage, not control, but avenues under the system by which we could convey our views. The system worked."

Then came the procedural revolution wrought by the McGovern-Fraser reform commission. "So-called participatory democracy was introduced, creating serious problems for all of us accustomed to operating under the old system," Kirkland said. And as he noted, labor's efforts to grapple with those problems during the previous three presidential campaigns produced decidedly unsatisfactory results.

The breaking point for labor's patience was the 1980 election when, by the Gallup poll's estimate, 48 percent of union members and their families voted against Democratic incumbent Jimmy Carter, who, like every other Democratic standard-bearer in recent years (with the notable exception of George McGovern), had been the declared choice of the AFL-CIO. Surveying the political wreckage, Kirkland concluded, "You can't sell a lousy candidate to working people."

He then made it a prime order of business to try to convince other labor leaders that the way to assure themselves of a more marketable Democratic candidate in 1984 was to fall into step behind a particular candidate before the nomination process began, instead of, as in the past, waiting for its conclusion. Depending on the flow of political currents in the next few months, the AFL-CIO might still back away from or postpone its fateful decision. But Kirkland does not seem so inclined. When Gary Hart, hopeful of improving his own standing as a candidate by scoring well in the early primaries, asked Kirkland why the federation did not at least delay its decision until voter sentiment had been tested at the polls, Kirkland was blunt and to the point. "We're tired of being shut out," he said.

Kirkland is widely respected for his prudence and his pragmatism. Yet it is difficult for him and for his colleagues to gauge the risks involved in the endorsement course, as revealed by the opinion surveys. After all, labor leaders are no more gifted than anyone else at seeing themselves as others see them.

by John Kenneth White and Dwight Morris

Is New York's New Deal No More?

Diagnosing the health of the Democratic party in the Empire State, pollster Richard Wirthlin reached the startling conclusion that "In New York, the New Deal coalition is sick." For years, political pundits have described the New York state of mind in terms of "haves" versus "have-nots," Protestants versus Catholics, natives versus immigrants. And the Democratic party's New Deal engine of "have-nots," Catholics, and immigrants assembled nearly fifty years ago by Franklin D. Roosevelt, hummed along for more than a generation.

At first glance, the engine still appears to be running smoothly. Democrats maintain a healthy 891,569 voter registration lead over the GOP, proving that the old loyalties die hard. The party controls every statewide office with the exception of one U.S. Senate seat and the comptroller's slot. Survey data confirm the Democrats' advantage: among every demographic group, with the exceptions of Protestants, and those of British, Italian, and German stock, Democratic identifiers outnumber Republicans. Even among those with the highest incomes, the Democrats prevail (see table 1). To paraphrase Everett Ladd, the Democrats are indeed New York's "Everyone Party."

However, for some time the New Deal engine has sputtered at election time. A few examples:

- Of the last four presidential elections, Democratic nominees have won New York state only twice: Hubert Humphrey in 1968 and Jimmy Carter in 1976.

Table 1
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NEW YORK STATE ELECTORATE BY PARTY AFFILIATION, 1982

	Democratic	Republican	Independent/Other		Democratic	Republican	Independent/Other
Statewide	40%	28%	32%	*By education:*			
By sex:				Less than high school graduate	54	23	23
Male	36	27	37	High school graduate	41	31	28
Female	44	29	27	Some college	33	31	36
By ethnicity:				College graduate	36	25	39
Latin	28	15	57	*By union membership:*			
Italian	33	36	31	Union member	49	20	31
German	25	43	32	Non-union member	35	32	33
Black	75	3	22	*By professional group:*			
Polish	41	29	30	Blue-collar	40	26	33
Irish	36	25	39	Non-blue-collar	39	29	32
Puerto Rican	57	22	21	*By ideology:*			
British	24	41	35	Liberal	55	14	32
By religion:				Moderate	38	29	33
Protestant	33	39	28	Conservative	28	39	32
Catholic	40	26	34	*By income:*			
Jewish	55	11	34	Less than $10,000	53	26	22
By age:				$10,000-19,999	41	29	30
18-29 years	42	28	31	$20,000-29,999	42	26	32
30-44 years	40	23	38	$30,000-39,999	37	29	34
45-64 years	38	29	34	$40,000 and over	33	26	41
65 and over	42	35	23				

Note: Responses exclude "don't know" and "no answer."
Source: Survey by the *New York Times*, October 10-16, 1982.

- In 1978, a *New York Times* survey conducted midway through the gubernatorial campaign showed incumbent Hugh Carey, an Irish Democrat, losing the Irish vote to Perry Duryea—also Irish, but a Republican.
- Four years later Republican gubernatorial candidate Lewis Lehrman nearly captured Erie County —a traditional Democratic bastion then in economic doldrums with 12.5 percent unemployment.

In part, the detachment of the New Dealers from the Democratic party was unavoidable, particularly as memories of F.D.R. faded, and more elements of the old coalition joined the ranks of the "haves." An analysis of white Protestants and Catholics shows that the discrepancies in earned income which prevailed a half century ago have been eliminated. Nine percent of white Protestants compared with 10 percent of Catholics earned less than $10,000 in 1982, while 14 and 15 percent respectively earned more than $40,000. In the middle income categories, there is no more than 3 percentage points difference between the two groups, according to a 1982 *New York Times* survey.

As Catholics prospered, many were inclined to vote their self-interest. As an analysis of the past three statewide elections indicates, this spelled trouble for the Democrats. Of the building blocks that once formed the Democratic majority, only blacks and Jews remained intact.

Table 2

DEVIATIONS FROM DEMOCRATIC STATEWIDE VOTE, NEW DEAL SUBGROUPS 1978, 1980, 1982

	1978 Governor's race	1980 U.S. Senate race	1982 Governor's race
Democratic statewide vote percentages	51%	44%	50%
Catholics	0	−11	− 5
Blacks	+17	+24	+32
Jews	+21	+32	+13

Source: Surveys by CBS News/*New York Times* exit polls, 1978, 1980, and 1982.

By the end of the 1970s, stubborn new problems like double-digit inflation and high taxes imposed by state government undermined the remaining links of Catholics to the Democratic party. As the earning power of the average New Yorker eroded, frustrations over tax levies increased. By 1982, nearly two-thirds of all registered voters believed that state taxes were "too high."[1]

A crime epidemic also heightened voter frustrations with government. Richard Wirthlin's 1982 surveys found many New Yorkers afraid that society was becoming "unhinged." As he explained it, "One of the purposes of society is to protect life and limb. And many New Yorkers feel that the state is not providing [them] with that very basic protection of life, limb, and property."

As the party in power, the Democrats became the object of the voters' ensuing wrath. United States Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan sounded the alarm in 1980, observing that there was "a movement to turn Republicans into Populists, a party of the people arrayed against a Democratic party of the state." New York Mayor Ed Koch agreed in 1981, saying, "What happened over the last decade is that we became the party of the status quo, the party of government for government's sake, the party of abstraction." To many, the Democratic party suddenly seemed bankrupt, devoid of new ideas in the midst of troubling economic and social circumstances. Some Democrats viewed their previous allegiance to the New Deal as apostasy. Ed Koch, for instance, branded New Deal Democrats as "kneejerk liberals," saying:

> I don't believe in half their crap . . . that government is better if it does more. It's the New Deal out of the thirties—that government solves all the problems. I once believed that. I have *contempt* for government.[2] [Emphasis added.]

Yet, while many Democrats were jettisoning the New Deal, the voters exhibited a strong commitment to the idea of a big and involved government. In a 1982 *New York Times* survey, significant pluralities believed the state provided "too little" assistance to school districts, local governments, and poor people.

Table 3

ATTITUDES TOWARD SPENDING FOR STATE PROGRAMS (NEW YORK VOTERS, 1982)

	Spending too little
State aid to school districts	52%
State aid to local government	44
Assistance to poor people	40

Source: Survey by the *New York Times*, October 10-18, 1982.

Although the liberal tenets of the New Deal still had majority backing, the voters were searching for new answers to new problems.

Frayed Contracts

Political philosopher Thomas Hobbes once described life before government as "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." To remedy this, Hobbes advocated a "social contract" between citizen and government, with government's chief responsibility that of terminating anarchy. John Locke agreed with Hobbes, and proposed that government's obligations under the social contract be extended to include a citizen's right to "liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression."

The Founding Fathers, admirers of Hobbes and Locke, formed their own social contract, grandly stating in the Preamble to the Constitution that the federal government seeks to "establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, [and] promote the general welfare. . . ." From 1787 to the New Deal, governments of both Democratic and Republican persuasion proposed major extensions of the contractual obligations—especially in the areas of economic security, education, and minority rights—often with considerable popular support.

In the years immediately following World War II, so ingrained was the New Deal liberalism that the fundamental philosophical differences between the two parties virtually disappeared. Sociologist Daniel Bell proclaimed an "end of ideology," and arguments between Democrats and Republicans in New York state were reduced to which party could manage the sprawling government apparatus. For fifteen years Nelson Rockefeller personified the "end of ideology" debate. Labeled a "me-too" Republican by his critics, Rockefeller built "the most complex, fascinating, and socially advanced state government in U.S. history."[3] Among the Rockefeller monuments were the transformation of a modest chain of teachers' colleges into the world's largest university system; the first state council to support the arts; and the first state minimum wage law. By the end of the Rockefeller epoch, however, the social contract began to unravel. Inflation, unemployment, and crime were its undoing.

Inflation. Under the social contract, government has an obligation to insure that its currency has value. By 1980, the federal government was failing in this effort: a 1967 dollar was worth only 41 cents. As inflation pushed the cost of everything higher, governments raised taxes to keep pace. By 1980, New Yorkers paid, on average, $1,495 in state and local taxes—ranking fortieth in the nation in after-tax income.

Unemployment. By election day 1982, New York's unemployment rate had climbed to 9.5 percent, nearly double that of a decade earlier. Employment in manufacturing was hit especially hard, falling to its lowest levels since July 1939. "Smokestack cities," once leaders of the industrial revolution, were left reeling. Buffalo, for example, had an unemployment rate of 15.3 percent. For a growing share of blue-collar workers in particular, the economic floor collapsed.

Crime. New York's crime rate had always seemed high, but in 1982 it appeared more ominous than ever: a violent crime once every three minutes, a burglary every ninety seconds. Hobbes once said that before there was government man lived in "continual fear, and danger of violent death. . . ." In 1980, the number of reported murders and nonnegligent homicides increased 55 percent from 1970. To many New Yorkers, the criminal justice system seemed not only unable to cope with the influx, but also to favor the accused. Says Mayor Koch, "There's a balancing of interests between the rights of defendants and the rights of society. I believe that the pendulum has swung much too far in favor of protecting the criminal. And I believe that the people want this brought back to some centrist position." These lapsed clauses of the social contract were important to New York's voters in 1982.

Table 4

Question: What do you think is the (most important/second most important) problem facing New York State today?

	Most important problem facing New York State	Second most important problem	Total
Unemployment	42%	18%	60%
Inflation/taxes	22	24	46
Crime	17	23	40

Source: Survey by the *New York Times*, October 10-16, 1982.

Ripped Coalitions

As the social contract began to unravel, many Republican candidates became its reweavers—Republican U.S. senatorial candidate Alfonse D'Amato, for example, asked New Yorkers in 1980 to trade in their "Cadillac" welfare program for a downsized "workfare" model; to support the Kemp-Roth 30 percent tax-cut proposal; to enact a death penalty law.[4] D'Amato's call for substantial change in the status quo paid off. A CBS News/*New York Times* survey midway through the campaign showed that when asked which candidate—D'Amato, Holtzman, or Javits—would "do the most for middle class people," most respondents named D'Amato.[5] The "fighter for the forgotten middle class" (D'Amato's campaign slogan) scored well among those who were pillars of the New Deal coalition, capturing 46 percent of the blue-collar vote and 55 percent of the Catholic vote.

Republican gubernatorial candidate Lewis Lehrman pursued a similar strategy in 1982. Branding his Democratic opponent, Mario Cuomo, a representative of "past failed policies," Lehrman touted a list of "new ideas": a 40 percent reduction in state income taxes; slashing the sales tax in half; restoring the death penalty for persons convicted of first-degree murder. He also promised to create 200,000 new jobs, most in manufacturing. Cuomo labeled Lehrman's ideas as "unrealistic," and a sharp philosophical debate ensued between the "old liberalism" and the "new right."

> *Lehrman:* My opponent holds . . . that the purpose of government is charity. I'm with James Madison . . . who said that the purpose of government is to do justice. And when an innocent life is taken in cold blood, it seems to me that the death penalty is appropriate. . . .

Cuomo: The suggestion by my opponent that I've said the purpose of government is charity as if to indicate that that excludes justice is . . . simplistic political talk. [Government has] an obligation in charity to help those who are in need—people who are in wheelchairs because they are born that way, people who are too old to take care of themselves, a pregnant woman in Essex County that cannot feed a fetus, a child she is carrying. . . . To suggest that because I believe that government has an obligation, in charity, to deal with them that I don't believe government has an obligation to justice is a kind of simplistic thinking that on another occasion I might call pandering. . . .[6]

Cuomo's summons of the New Deal past contrasted with Lehrman's anger at the present. And the voters began to respond to the Republican candidate. By mid-October, a *New York Times* survey found that a plurality of voters placed a higher degree of confidence in Republican Lewis Lehrman's ability to restore two clauses of the social contract—reducing the crime rate and dealing with government taxation and spending. Even when asked whom they trusted more to decrease unemployment—an issue claimed by the Democrats since the 1930s—fewer than half picked Cuomo.

Table 5

Question: As governor, who would you trust more to make the right kinds of decisions about. . . ?

	Would trust Cuomo more	Lehrman
Reducing unemployment in state	45%	39%
Dealing with state taxes and spending	41	44
Reducing the crime rate	40	42

Source: Survey by the *New York Times*, October 10-16, 1982.

Although Cuomo won the election by a narrow margin, he did so in a fashion radically different from Roosevelt's a half century before. Then Roosevelt carried New York largely on the basis of Catholic, Jewish, and some black support. In 1982, Cuomo's Catholic support did not exceed his statewide percentage. Although Cuomo is the first governor of Italian extraction in New York history, the Democrat captured only 58 percent of the Italian vote. He fared even less well among other, mostly Catholic, ethnics, barely winning the Polish vote and actually losing the Irish vote. Sixty-four percent of Jewish voters sided with him as did a solid 83 percent of blacks—the only remnants of the New Deal coalition where party attachments remained firm.[7]

Other New Deal Democrats left the fold: 50 percent of blue-collar workers sided with the Republican nominee; Lehrman nearly pulled even with Cuomo among clerical and sales workers; and he did better than expected among the unemployed.[8] In sum, Lehrman scored well among those most disenchanted with the existing social contract. Those most satisfied tended to back Cuomo—among them some groups long identified with the GOP: those with a college or postgraduate degree, 49 and 61 percent of their votes, respectively;[9] professional and managerial workers gave him unusually heavy support;[10] and those in the upper income strata.[11] Reviewing the figures, Wirthlin maintains in an interview:

> The Lehrman coalition was not a typical Republican coalition. And yet the fact remains that if there was anyone who should have been able to put the New Deal coalition back together with a vengeance, it should have been Mario Cuomo. The fact that he did not accomplish this is the most significant outcome of the Lehrman-Cuomo campaign.

1984 and Beyond

For nearly fifty years, the Democrats reigned supreme in the Empire State. Now, says Wirthlin, "New York is in a state of transition from a classically liberal, Democratic-dominated state to a state where the trend of change, because of the way the issues are breaking, is favorable to Republican candidates."

Clearly, the Republicans have bested the Democrats when it comes to projecting themselves as instruments of social change. The opportunities for the Ronald Reagans of 1984 and Lew Lehrmans of the late 1980s and the 1990s are indeed significant.

Yet, this does not mean that the Republicans are on their way to becoming New York's new majority party. Rather than switch party allegiances, New Yorkers prefer to let Democrats and Republicans scramble among themselves for voter support. The result: *No longer can any party lay secure claim to enough voters to form a lasting majority.* Republicans, as well as Democrats, will continue to suggest ways to restore the lapsed clauses of the social contract, but so far, neither has been able to transform the revolt at the ballot box into an enduring mandate.

[1] *New York Times* survey, October 10-16, 1982. The results: 67 percent of all registered voters felt state taxes were too high; 3 percent, too low; 27 percent, about right; 3 percent, no opinion.

[2] Ken Auletta, "Profile: Mayor Edward I. Koch," *New Yorker*, September 10, 1979, p. 79.

[3] Neal R. Peirce, quoted in Joseph E. Persico, *The Imperial Rockefeller* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), p. 215.

[4] "After Javits, the GOP Turns Right with D'Amato," *New York Times Magazine*, October 19, 1980.

[5] CBS News/*New York Times* poll, *New York Times*, October 21, 1980. The results: D'Amato, 34 percent; Holtzman, 28 percent; Javits, 21 percent; no opinion, 17 percent. The survey was conducted October 13-17, 1980.

[6] Authors' recording of Cuomo-Lehrman debate on "Inside Albany," October 30, 1982.

[7] CBS News/*New York Times* exit poll, November 2, 1982.

[8] ABC News exit poll, November 2, 1982, showed Lehrman and Cuomo running in a dead heat at 48% among the unemployed. The CBS/*New York Times* exit poll gave Lehrman 37% and Cuomo 58% of the unemployed vote. While these polls show very different results, Lehrman nonetheless did much better than expected among the unemployed.

[9] ABC News exit poll, November 2, 1982.

[10] CBS News/*New York Times* exit poll, November 2, 1982. The results: 48 percent of the professional and managerial workers backed Cuomo; 49 percent, Lehrman; 3 percent, other.

[11] ABC News discovered that among those earning more than $40,000 annually, 55 percent backed Cuomo while 44 percent chose Lehrman. ABC News exit poll, November 2, 1982.

by Edwin Harwood

Alienation: American Attitudes toward Immigration

On May 18, the Senate passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act, a sweeping immigration bill better known as Simpson-Mazzoli. This bill, and one which is pending in the House, would slow the influx of illegal aliens by imposing sanctions on employers who hire them. It would also provide legal status to an estimated 2.3 million illegal aliens who are already in this country.

Many Americans fear that the United States is losing control of its borders due to the massive number of illegal aliens entering the country. According to public opinion surveys taken over the past several years, the public overwhelmingly opposes the entry of illegal immigrants and wants the government to take strong measures to keep them out. This restrictionist sentiment is not confined only to illegal aliens. The public has become increasingly reluctant over the past decade to let political refugees and legal immigrants come in from abroad, and apparently has come to feel this way because of mounting economic worries.

Poll findings are surprisingly consistent on the level of public concern over the illegal alien problem. In May 1982, a survey conducted by Audits & Surveys for the Merit Report found 84 percent of the public either "very" or "fairly" concerned about the number of illegal aliens in the country. A year earlier, in August 1981, 87 percent of respondents in an NBC News/Associated Press poll said illegal immigration was "very" or "somewhat" serious, up from the 74 percent who felt this way in October 1977. The Field Institute's June 1982 survey of California residents found a similar number (89 percent) agreeing that illegal immigration was "very" or "somewhat" serious. Although California's Hispanic residents were somewhat less likely than blacks and other whites to feel this way, fully 82 percent of the Hispanics surveyed also agreed it was a problem. Seventy-five percent of Californians also said illegal immigrants were having an overall negative impact on the state with

Hispanics being less likely (64 percent) to feel this way. More than any other part of the country, California is a mecca for the "new wave" of immigrants, legal and illegal. According to estimates by the Rand Corporation, more than 2 million foreign immigrants have settled in Los Angeles alone since 1970—over 90,000 in 1982.

Public consensus that the government should act to remedy the problem of illegal immigration is strong. In June 1980, 91 percent of those surveyed by the Roper Organization agreed that an all-out effort should be made to stop illegal entry into the United States. In its June 1982 survey of California residents, the Field Institute found that 77 percent said the government should do more to discourage illegal foreign nationals from coming into the country.

Respondents overwhelmingly endorse the Immigration Service's current enforcement actions, such as deportation and raids on businesses suspected of employing illegal aliens. Thus, in the May 1982 Merit survey, which appeared just after the Immigration Service had launched its "Operation Jobs" raids on businesses across the country, 70 percent of those polled said they approved of the government arresting illegal aliens at their work places. Three-quarters of Californians polled by Field in June 1982 favored deporting aliens who had entered illegally.

The public is equally firm in its support of new enforcement measures, including penalties for employers who hire illegal aliens—one of several remedies proposed in the Simpson-Mazzoli bill. In October 1977, Gallup found that 72 percent of Americans favor a law that would ban employment of illegal workers, and three years later, in November 1980, 76 percent of respondents in another Gallup poll agreed that there should be such a law. Exactly the same percentage of Californians polled by Field in June 1982 supported heavy penalties for employers caught hiring illegal workers. However, in September 1982, Gallup reported a slight decline in support for a law against hiring illegals—65 percent in favor—which is somewhat puzzling in view of the worsening economic outlook.

Public sentiment on whether Americans should be required to carry a national I.D. card to help deter illegal immigration is somewhat more ambivalent. In October 1977 and again in November 1980, Gallup found Americans willing to endorse such a measure by two-to-one margins. However, the thrust of this question was whether everyone "should be required to carry an identification card such as a social security card." In an earlier poll, Gallup found only 45 percent of the public approving a *new* card that would contain a photo and fingerprints, which suggests that Americans are less in favor of a "special" new card, perhaps because they fear their privacy will be invaded. Californians polled by Field in the summer of 1982 *disapproved* by a two-to-one margin a law requiring a "special identification" card issued to all citizens.

Hostility

Survey data about public attitudes on amnesty, which would permit illegal aliens who have lived in the United States since a certain date (Simpson-Mazzoli stipulates before 1980) to stay on, are even less consistent, possibly because of differences in question wording. Gallup found only 39 percent favored amnesty in 1977 when it asked whether "illegal aliens who have been in the United States for seven years (should) be allowed to remain." About the same percentage (37 percent) approved amnesty when polled again in 1980. In striking contrast, in June 1982 the Field Institute found 73 percent of Californians willing to grant a liberal amnesty to illegal aliens who had been here at least five years—possibly because of the massive number of immigrants who have already established themselves in that state.

Americans are not much more hospitable toward immigrants who want to enter the country *legally*. In 1965, Gallup found only 33 percent of the public wanted legal immigration decreased; by 1977, 42 percent had come to feel this way. And by March 1982, Roper found that 66 percent wanted legal immigration cut back compared with a mere 4 percent who said more aliens should be allowed to enter. The NBC/AP poll of August 1981 found almost exactly the same percentages: 65 percent favored less immigration compared with only 5 percent who wanted more.

Although America has traditionally been a haven for political refugees, surveys over the past several years show that Americans want to roll up the welcome mat even for the world's oppressed. In August 1979, 57 percent of those polled by Gallup opposed allowing the Indochinese "boat people" to enter while only 32 percent favored their being allowed in. In May 1980, Gallup asked its sample if refugees from political oppression should be allowed to enter the United States or be kept out until unemployment had fallen below 5 percent. Sixty-six percent favored keeping political refugees out until unemployment had declined. In the same month, the Harris survey reported 68 percent of its sample opposed to admitting more Cuban refugees, a figure that rises to 75 percent when the issue of U.S unemployment is introduced into the question. (Gallup's May 1980 poll found 57 percent of Americans opposed to letting the Cuban refugees enter the country.)

While Europe was traditionally the primary source of U.S. immigration, Latin Americans and Asians now represent 82 percent of all immigrants—a fact that has not escaped a large portion of the American public. In December 1979, the Roper Organization gave respondents a list of predictions for the 1990s. The public split 41-42 percent on whether Spanish-speaking people will outnumber blacks as the country's largest minority group.

In a March 1981 ABC News/*Washington Post* poll, Americans were asked if the government should encourage or discourage different nationality groups from coming to the United States. In the case of each group, clear majorities believed that government should discourage their coming here, although the majorities favoring such a policy were smaller in the case of northern Europeans (53 percent) and Russian Jews (56 percent) than for Iranians (79 percent), Cubans (78 percent), and Vietnamese (67 percent). Fifty-eight percent of the whites and 71 percent of the blacks in the sample felt immigrants were taking jobs Americans could be doing. Roper also asked in March 1982 whether a number of immigrant groups have been a good thing or a bad thing for our country. The pattern which emerged showed the most recent arrivals are perceived as less desirable (see table 1).

Economic concerns appear to be the main reason for the increase in opposition to both legal and illegal immigrants. In an early 1976 Gallup poll commissioned by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, job competition and negative pressure on wages were

cited by substantial majorities (87 percent and 83 percent, respectively) as being either "serious" or "somewhat serious" problems caused by illegal aliens. In the 1982 Field Institute survey of Californians, job competition was cited most frequently (46 percent) when respondents were asked to list

Table 1

Question: Since the beginning of our country people of many different religions, races and nationalities have come here and settled. Here is a list of some different groups. (Card shown respondent) Would you read down the list, and thinking both of what they have contributed to this country and have gotten from this country, for each one tell me whether you think, on balance, they've been a good thing or a bad thing for this country?

	Good thing for country	Bad thing
English	86%	6%
Irish	62	7
Jews	59	9
Germans	57	11
Italians	56	10
Poles	53	12
Japanese	47	18
Blacks	46	16
Chinese	44	19
Mexicans	25	34
Koreans	24	30
Vietnamese	20	38
Puerto Ricans	17	43
Haitians	10	39
Cubans	9	59

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 82-4), March 20-27, 1982.

what they felt were the unfavorable effects of illegal immigration. However, when asked if there were *favorable* effects of illegal immigration, 30 percent cited the fact that illegals often took jobs that Americans were unwilling to perform. Other possible negative impacts of illegal immigration in the areas of crime and welfare, for example, were mentioned infrequently.

Immigration vs. Immigrants

The problem for the policymaker or lawmaker who would use these findings to support new policy initiatives is that the surveys reveal Americans' *general* attitudes on both legal and illegal *immigration*. Yet it may be much more important to know how Americans respond to *immigrants* as people. In the case of illegal immigration, one of the ironies the Immigration Service confronts when it seeks to apprehend and remove foreign nationals who are in the country unlawfully, is that the deportable alien is likely to have many more defenders who want to help him stay than antagonists who want to see him leave.

Although the Immigration Service receives most of its tips on illegal aliens from citizens and legal aliens, only the individual who provided the tip and the Immigration Service are apt to care about seeing the alien deported, unless of course the alien is a notorious criminal or suspected spy. From the content of the letters and calls they receive, INS officers believe that most of these tips are motivated by personal grudges rather than by any public-spirited concern to see aliens removed.

Americans may feel that as a general policy deportable aliens should be removed, but personally there is little advantage to them to lobby for the removal of specific individual aliens they don't know, and hence have no reason to concern themselves about. Much different, however, is the situation involving the illegal who is the personal friend, neighbor, or co-worker of a citizen and whose threatened deportation arouses the citizen's immediate concern, along with the concern of other neighbors, the alien's minister or priest, and other acquaintances. When "good" aliens who appear to have "made it" by acquiring homes and stable careers are arrested, scores and even hundreds of citizens will mobilize to sign petitions and write their congressmen.

Ambivalent Hospitality

Americans want the law enforced against illegal *immigration* but are ambivalent about enforcing it against illegal *immigrants*, or at any rate against those who have earned a stake in our society by contributing to society and/or acquiring "equities" (homes, jobs, businesses, and so on) regardless of whether or not such equities make the alien and his family legally eligible for immigration benefits.

This ambivalence is reflected in the public's seemingly contradictory attitudes. In a 1976 Gallup poll for the Immigration Service, although 57 percent said illegal aliens should be sent back, almost the same number (58 percent) said illegals should have a chance to become U.S. citizens. The same pattern was found in Field's 1982 California survey: Over two-thirds (65 percent) also felt that illegal immigrants who pay taxes should receive public health services and other public benefits, and fully 70 percent agreed that foreign-born immigrants make as good or better citizens as native-born Americans.

One could hypothesize that the public is truly ambivalent in the sense of holding logically inconsistent views. However, a more plausible explanation is that Americans make a crucial *distinction* between two categories of illegal aliens. Those aliens *who have not yet arrived here* ought, they feel, to be kept out along with those who have arrived so recently that they have few if any equities in American society, and no doubt just as important, few if any friends. The longer the alien remains, and the bigger the stake he or she achieves in the society, the greater the "right" he or she has to stay on regardless of what the immigration law requires.

That this hypothesis is at least plausible is hinted at by a survey finding, although it does not bear directly on illegal immigration. In the August 1979 Gallup survey, only 32 percent of the respondents favored letting the Indochinese boat people enter the United States. But when respondents were asked if they thought the boat people would be welcomed in their communities in the event they did manage to come, 57 percent said they would. Even among those respondents who opposed their coming in, fully 51 percent said they would be welcomed by their community if they came.

Of course, it could be that Americans don't want to appear uncharitable to an interviewer. But on the other hand, it could also be that the alien who manages to get a foothold on American soil is no longer faceless and unknown, unlike the alien still abroad or the Mexican who has just jumped the fence in Tijuana. And aliens who become familiar, especially when they act as "good Americans" ought to act, are individuals not only deserving of public sympathy but exceptions for whom the law ought to be bent.

When Immigration officers apprehend faceless and unknown aliens in the immediate area of the border or exclude them when they try to pass through port-of-entry checkpoints with fraudulent documents, they wear white hats. But when they try to enforce the law and pick up aliens who have managed to acquire a stake in society, they become bad guys.

$3.50

2110-1 A

Public Opinion

Published by American Enterprise Institute

Aug/Sept 1983

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00090200 G
ACQUISITIONS EDITOR
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WASHINGTON DC 20014

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Public Opinion

Volume 6, Number 4 August/September 1983

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PUBLIC OPINION, August/September 1983, Vol. 6, No. 4. Published bimonthly by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. Copyright 1983 American Enterprise Institute. Subscription rates: $18.00 for one year, $34.00 for two years. Individual copy: $3.50. Information on bulk orders of multiple subscriptions available on request. Editorial and business offices: c/o AEI, 1150 17th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Send changes of address and all subscription correspondence to Circulation Department, c/o AEI, same address. "American Enterprise Institute" and are registered service marks of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.

Second class postage paid at Washington, D.C.

ISSN 0149-9157

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by Humphrey Taylor

Nine Nations Assess Economic and Security Issues

Pity the poor politicians. If they do what the public wants they are blamed for slavishly following the polls; if they don't they are blamed for being unresponsive to public opinion. But those who believe that a statesman (apart from being a *dead* politician) is someone who leads opinion rather than follows it, have a strong case. If the free world's foreign, defense, and trade policies were made by the polls or by referendums and not by leaders willing, on occasion, to go against public opinion, the Western alliance would be in for a very bumpy ride. And if some current trends in public opinion continue, even the most unresponsive (statesmanlike?) leader will not be able to ignore them.

Events in 1983 may have deceived us. The British and West German elections were widely and simplistically interpreted, particularly in the United States, as strong endorsements of Mrs. Thatcher's and Chancellor Kohl's staunchly pro-NATO, pro-American policies. But diligent readers of *Public Opinion* already know that the Atlantic alliance is in trouble at the grass roots —Ben Wattenberg's optimism and these elections notwithstanding.

Indeed, the available data strongly suggest that these two elections had a great deal to do with specific national issues, with the rejection of unpopular alternative governments, and very little to do with major foreign policy issues. That pro-Western, pro-NATO, pro-American, right-of-center parties and leaders were elected to power was, obviously, profoundly important. But to interpret the results as a ringing European endorsement of NATO, increased European enthusiasm for defense spending and the deployment of Cruise and Pershing missiles, or a new found faith in the United States, would be a mistake.

Perhaps because they are more dramatic, most of the surveys on international relations conducted in the United States and in Europe have focused on defense and nuclear issues and on attitudes toward NATO, the United States, and the U.S.S.R. Less attention has been given to international economics and trade policies in spite of evidence of strong protectionist sentiments and a feeling in almost every country that *other* countries' trade policies are the problem.

Neither economic issues nor defense issues should be considered in isolation. They affect each other and are both deeply affected by underlying perceptions of, and attitudes toward, different countries. If trade no longer "follows the flag" as the British used to believe, trade policies will always be influenced by other foreign policy considerations (and business leaders who are adversely affected will always complain). So it is appropriate to begin a review of the potential impact of public opinion on trade and economic policies with an overview of what the polls have been telling us about noneconomic policies. Eight findings strike me as important.

About the Surveys

The Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, in cooperation with the *International Herald Tribune* and Louis Harris France undertook a multi-country survey on international security issues last fall. A second survey followed this spring on international economic tensions. Fieldwork for the spring survey was done between March 15 and April 1 among nationwide representative samples of people eligible to vote. Sample sizes ranged from 936 to 1,618. The data in figures 1 and 2 are from the spring survey; table 1 data are from the fall 1982 survey; tables 2, 4 and 5 from the spring 1983 survey.

1. *Neutralism in Europe has increased and is very substantial.* Bill Schneider (*Public Opinion*, February/March 1983) drew attention to a Gallup survey which showed majorities of West Germans and the Dutch and pluralities of the British and French favoring "a move toward neutralism in Western Europe," and USIA data that the desire to get out of NATO and become a "neutral" country increased everywhere during 1981, Ronald Reagan's first year in office.

Underlying these opinions are the large minorities (from 20 to 44 percent) in Britain, West Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, and France who believe that military force of any kind should never be used in response to a direct attack by the Soviet Union.

2. *Many Europeans seem to feel that they're innocent bystanders caught between two superpowers.* Consequently, they feel that the arms race is more likely to cause a war than it is to deter it. But their response to this is often confused; many Europeans favor both continued membership in NATO *and* a European move toward neutralism.

3. *Distrust of American leadership is substantial and has increased over the last six years.* The most dramatic evidence of this was British Gallup data reported (*Public Opinion*, February/March 1983) by Norman Webb and Robert Wybrow, showing the proportion with little or no confidence "in the United States's ability to deal wisely with present world problems" rising from 38 percent to 70 percent between 1977 and 1983.

An average of only 35 percent in four West European countries found Ronald Reagan more credible than Yuri Andropov on limiting nuclear weapons.

Harris surveys in France, Germany, Britain, Norway, Spain, the Netherlands, and Italy in September 1982 found that sizable minorities in every European country believed the "U.S. military buildup" or "U.S. aggressive policies toward the U.S.S.R." were major causes of international tension. The image of a trigger-happy President Reagan dies hard (table 1).

However, it should be reported that in all these countries except Spain the fear of a Soviet threat and of a Soviet arms buildup was substantially stronger than the fear of the United States (table 1).

4. *Doubts about the Western alliance and U.S. leadership are strongest and are increasing most rapidly among the European young "successor generations" and European elites.* They were shown by Bill Schneider and Stephen Szabo (*Public Opinion*, February/March 1983) and by other European surveys to be more anti-American, more neutralist and less pro-NATO than the population as a whole.

5. *Americans themselves are in no mood for an active international role.* The proportion of Americans who favored this country taking "an active part in world affairs" has fallen from about 70 percent in the 1950s to—54 percent—in November 1982.

Furthermore, Harris data show that most Americans (66 percent) believe that the United States is bearing an unfair share of the West's defense burden, a view with which most Europeans disagree.

6. *Public opinion in each of nine Western countries surveyed is far more concerned with domestic economic issues, in particular unemployment, than with any foreign policy or defense issues* (table 2). While this finding is not a surprise, it underlines the pressures on democratically elected governments to address these pocketbook issues first.

7. *There is no mandate in any Western country for substantially strengthening defense.* Indeed, the Harris survey for the Atlantic Institute (table 2) showed a relatively low level of concern in every country that West-

(Continued on page 54)

Table 1

Question: Which of the following things do you feel are most responsible for current international tensions?

	FRANCE	GERMANY	GREAT BRITAIN	NORWAY	SPAIN	NETHER-LANDS	ITALY	USA
The Soviet military buildup	21%	55%	33%	57%	23%	38%	37%	27%
The U.S. military buildup	14	39	15	28	26	24	20	11
U.S. interest rates and role of the dollar	45	28	7	4	18	11	19	19
The extension of Soviet influence	19	28	19	13	7	24	16	22
Superpower activities in third world	29	26	16	28	31	17	15	17
Insufficient unity in Western Europe	26	36	17	8	27	20	24	18
West European governments being too willing to give in to U.S.S.R.	8	16	9	4	4	6	5	19
U.S. aggressive policies toward U.S.S.R.	15	28	24	14	30	22	26	10
The growing popularity of neutralism and pacifism in Western Europe	10	10	9	6	6	10	5	16

A Familiar Story?
See page 20

CENTRAL AMERICA
How Informed Are We?

Question: Do you think U.S. policy generally supports or opposes the government of El Salvador? Do you think U.S. policy generally supports or opposes the government of Nicaragua?



Note: Sample size = 1,025 registered voters.
Source: Survey by Penn + Schoen for *The Garth Analysis*, June 24-28, 1983.

Question: Which side do you think the United States government is backing—the rebels or the government (in the war between the government of El Salvador and the rebels in El Salvador)? Do you happen to know which side the United States is backing, the rebels or the government (in the fighting between the Sandinista government in Nicaragua and the rebels seeking to overthrow that government)?



Note: 5% volunteered the response "Neither" in the case of El Salvador, 1% for Nicaragua. In March 1982, 11% said the U.S. was backing the rebels in El Salvador, 65% said the government, 2% said neither, and 22% had no opinion.
Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, July 28-August 1, 1983.

Question: How about Nicaragua? Would you say that Nicaragua is an ally . . . or friendly, but not an ally . . . or unfriendly, but not an enemy of the United States—or haven't you heard enough about that yet to say?


Respondents who had heard or read enough
Ally 4%
Friendly but not an ally 17%
Nicaragua is unfriendly but not an enemy of the United States 36%
Enemy 13%
Not sure 29%

Note: Sample size = 1,396. Responses based on those who said they had heard or read enough to say = 75%.
Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, May 8-12, 1983.

The Importance

Question: How would you describe the importance of El Salvador and other Central American countries—like Guatemala and Nicaragua—to the defense interests of the United States—are they very important or not very important?

Note: Sample size = 1,489.
Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, April 7-11, 1983.

Question: Would you say that the situation in (Latin/Central America) is a threat to the security of the United States or not? (If say "yes, a threat," ask:) Well, is that a major threat to the security of the United States, or a minor threat?



Note: Sample size for April 1983 = 990.
Source: Surveys by ABC News, April 1983, ABC News/Washington Post, May 11-15, 1983 and July 28-August 1, 1983.

of the Region

Registered voters

If El Salvador were taken over by Communist forces...



Question: If El Salvador were to be taken over by Communist forces, how serious a concern would that be to the United States: very serious, somewhat serious, not very serious, or not serious at all?

Note: Sample size = 1,025 registered voters.
Source: Survey by Penn + Schoen for *The Garth Analysis*, June 24-28, 1983.


Great/Somewhat of a threat to the U.S.
Not very much/No threat at all
Don't know
If the Communist party came to power through peaceful elections in:
Mexico 80% 12% 8%
Saudi Arabia 80% 11% 9%
France 69% 22% 9%
El Salvador 64% 26% 10%
Iran 59% 32% 9%

Question: I am going to read a list of countries. For each, tell me how much of a threat it would be to the United States if the Communists came to power. What if the Communist party came to power through peaceful elections in _____? Do you think this would be a great threat to the United States, somewhat of a threat to the United States, not very much of a threat to the United States, or no threat at all to the United States?

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, October-December 1982.

Respondents who had heard or read about situation in El Salvador

No opinion 10%
Not very/Not at all likely 15%
If rebel forces succeed in taking over government in El Salvador, it is very/fairly likely that same thing will happen in other Latin American countries 75%

Question: If the rebel forces succeed in taking over the government in El Salvador, how likely do you think it is that the same kind of thing will happen in other Latin American countries—very likely, fairly likely, not very likely, or not at all likely?

Note: Question was asked only of those respondents who had heard or read about the situation in El Salvador (67%).
Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, March 11-14, 1983.

U.S. Motives

Question: Now I'm going to mention some things people sometimes say about the United States and its activity in Latin America. After each, please tell me whether you tend to agree or disagree, or perhaps, if you have no opinion. First, do you tend to agree or disagree that the United States interferes improperly in the internal affairs of Latin American countries? Do you tend to agree or disagree that most of the actions taken by the United States in Latin America are done for reasons of self-defense? Do you tend to agree or disagree that the American form of government is the best kind of government for most Latin American countries?







Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, May 11-15, 1983.

Question: Do you think the people of El Salvador would be better off today or worse off today, if the United States had not become involved in El Salvador?



Note: Sample size = 1,489.

Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, April 7-11, 1983.

Question: Who do you think is interfering more in El Salvador today: the United States or Cuba and Nicaragua?



Note: Volunteered responses "U.S. not interfering," "Cuba and Nicaragua not interfering," and "None are interfering" were less than 5% each.

Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, July 28-August 1, 1983.

Question: Do you believe that the Reagan administration is trying to overthrow the government of Nicaragua, or is the administration just trying to stop Nicaragua from sending arms to rebel forces in El Salvador?


Overthrow government of Nicaragua
15%
Don't know
26%
Reagan administration is just trying to stop Nicaragua from sending arms to rebel forces in El Salvador
59%

Note: In a May survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, 50% said the U.S. usually backs the right side in Latin American disputes, 13% said the wrong side, 9% volunteered the answer "it depends," and 29% gave no answer.

Source: Survey by Penn + Schoen for *The Garth Analysis*, June 24-28, 1983.

The Vietnam Analogy

Question: Do you think the United States is heading for the same kind of involvement in Central America as it had in the Vietnam War or do you think the United States will avoid that kind of involvement this time? (ABC News/*Washington Post*) How likely do you think it is that the U.S. involvement in El Salvador could turn into a situation like Vietnam—that is, that the U.S. would become more and more deeply involved as time goes on? Would you say this is very likely, fairly likely, not very likely, or not at all likely? (Gallup) What are the chances that the United States commitment to aid El Salvador will turn into another Vietnam situation for this country? Would you say the chances are very likely, somewhat likely, somewhat unlikely, or very unlikely that El Salvador will become another Vietnam —or haven't you heard enough about it yet to say? (*Los Angeles Times*)


In El Salvador, U.S. heading for same involvement as in Vietnam
Not heading for same involvement
ABC/Washington Post
42%
58%
Very, Fairly, Somewhat likely
Not very, Not at all likely, Somewhat, Very unlikely
Likelihood of U.S. involvement turning into another Vietnam
Gallup
75%
25%
Chances that U.S. commitment to aid El Salvador will turn into another Vietnam situation
Los Angeles Times
63%
37%

Note: Gallup responses based on those who had heard or read about the situation in El Salvador = 84%. *Los Angeles Times* responses based on those who had heard enough to say = 92%.

Source: Surveys by ABC News/*Washington Post*, July 26-August 1, 1983; The Gallup Organization, June 24-27, 1983; and the *Los Angeles Times*, April 4-10, 1983.

Question: Now let me read you some statements about U.S. involvement in El Salvador. For each, tell me if you agree or disagree . . . What happens in El Salvador is more important than Vietnam because El Salvador is much closer to the United States than Vietnam.

Disagree
42%
Agree, what happens in El Salvador is much more important then Vietnam because El Salvador is much closer to the U.S.
58%

Note: Sample size = 1,252.

Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates, April 29-May 4, 1983.

Question: The Reagan administration has said it has no intention right now of sending American soldiers to fight in El Salvador. Do you think the Reagan administration is telling the truth about that or not?


No opinion
11%
Reagan administration is telling the truth about not intending to send American soldiers to El Salvador now
47%
Administration is not telling the truth
43%

Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, July 26-August 1, 1983.

Strong Reluctance

Question: President Reagan has asked Congress for an additional $110 million in military aid to the government in El Salvador, over and above the $26 million already allocated for 1983. Do you think the Congress should grant that additional military aid, or not—or haven't you heard enough about that yet to say?

Note: Sample size = 1,233. Responses based on those who had heard enough to say = 86%.
Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, April 4-10, 1983.



Question: If the Communists were about to overthrow the government of El Salvador would you support giving the present government three times as much U.S. military aid to try to stop the rebels?

Note: Sample size = 1,365.
Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, June 20-26, 1983.


Should U.S. give El Salvador three times as much military aid if Communists were about to overthrow the government
49%
33%
18%

Question: President Reagan is asking Congress for increased military and economic aid to Central America. Do you agree or disagree with Reagan that Congress should approve that money?

Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, July 28-August 1, 1983.



Question: Should economic aid to the government of El Salvador be increased or decreased?

Note: Sample size = 1,025 registered voters.
Source: Survey by Penn + Schoen for *The Garth Analysis*, June 24-28, 1983.



Question: Which of the following best summarizes your view of what American policy should be in El Salvador: send no aid to the government; send military aid but no troops; send economic aid to the government; send American troops to support the government?

Note: Sample size = 1,025 registered voters.
Source: Survey by Penn + Schoen for *The Garth Analysis*, June 24-28, 1983.



to Get Involved

Approve/Favor | Disapprove/Oppose | No opinion/Don't know/Not sure

Sending American troops to fight in El Salvador...



Question: And would you approve or disapprove of the United States sending troops to fight in El Salvador?

Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, May 11-15, 1983.

...if only way to save current government



Question: (If disapprove:) What if sending American soldiers seemed to be the only way to save the current government in El Salvador from being defeated, would you approve or disapprove of sending American soldiers in that case?

Note: Asked only of respondents who replied "disapprove" to previous question.
Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, May 11-15, 1983.

...if government of El Salvador about to be defeated by leftist rebels



Question: Would you favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops if the government of El Salvador were about to be defeated by leftist rebels?

Note: Sample size = 1,233.
Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, April 4-10, 1983.

...if clear that El Salvador was going to be taken over by Communist forces:



Question: If it was clear that El Salvador was going to be taken over by Communist forces, would you favor or oppose sending American troops to fight to prevent a Communist takeover?

Note: Sample size = 1,025 registered voters.
Source: Survey by Penn + Schoen for *The Garth Analysis*, June 24-28, 1983.

U.S. military exercises around Nicaragua



Question: Would you say you approve or disapprove of those U.S. military exercises (large scale military exercises on land and sea areas around Nicaragua's borders)?

Note: Asked of those respondents who said they had heard or read about the military exercises — 60%.
Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, July 28-August 1, 1983.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS: WHAT'S PAST IS PROLOGUE

1941: A DIVIDED CONSCIENCE



Question: If the question of the United States going to war against Germany and Italy came up for a national vote within the next two weeks, would you vote to go into the war or to stay out of the war? (June-July 1940) If you were asked to vote (today) on the question of the United States entering the war (now) against Germany and Italy, how would you vote—to go into the war (now) or to stay out of the war? (September-October 1940 through June-July 1941) It has been suggested that Congress pass a resolution declaring that a state of war exists between the United States and Germany. Would you favor or oppose such a resolution at this time? (November 1941)

Note: "No opinion" calculated out in November 1941 = 11%.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of November 7-12, 1941.

Question: Which of these two things do you think is the most important for the United States to try to do—to keep out of war ourselves or to help England win, even at the risk of getting into the war? (September 1940 through May 1941) Which of these two things do you think is the more important—that this country keep out of war or that Germany be defeated? (September 1941 through November 1941)



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of November 15-20, 1941.

USE OF TROOPS . . .

Question: The United States is now sending war materials to help the French fight the Communists in Indochina. Would you approve or disapprove of sending United States soldiers to take part in the fighting there?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, August 15-20, 1953.

Question: Some people say that the United States should send our armed forces into Cuba to help overthrow Castro. Do you agree or disagree?



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of September 20-25, 1962.

SOMETIMES

Question: If the hostages are released unharmed, which *one* of the following do you think the U.S. should do with respect to Iran? If one or more of the hostages is harmed, which *one* of the following do you think the U.S. should do with respect to Iran . . . Do nothing, punish diplomatically/economically, use military force?



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of March 28-31, 1980.

Question: There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using U.S. troops in other parts of the world. I'd like to ask your opinion about several situations. First, would you favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops if . . . Soviet troops invaded Western Europe . . . Japan were invaded by the Soviet Union . . . The Arabs cut off all oil shipments to the U.S. . . . North Korea invaded South Korea?



Note: The "Oppose/sending troops/Don't know/Not sure" response has not been separated to show "Oppose" alone because in the original punched data for 1982 "Oppose," "Don't know," and "Not sure" were lumped into one code.

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, late October-November 1982.

PUBLIC FAVORS MAJOR DEFENSE COMMITMENT

Question: We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First (Read item A) . . . are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on (Item) . . . military, armaments, defense.



Note: "Don't know" calculated out for comparison purpose; 1973 = 14%; 1974 = 13%; 1975 = 13%; 1976 = 12%; 1977 = 13%; 1978 = 11%; 1979-1982 were less than 10%. Too little/About right = "Too little" + "About right."

Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 83-1), latest that of December 4-11, 1982.

Question: Turning now to the business of the country—we are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount . . . the military, armaments and defense.



Note: "Too little/About right" = "Too little" + "About right."

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, latest that of February-April, 1983.

KEEPING THE U.S. NO. 1

Question: Do you think the military strength of the United States should be superior to the Soviet Union, should be about equal in strength, or doesn't the United States need to be (exactly) as strong as the Soviet Union?



Note: Sample sizes: June 1979 = 1,422; September 10-14, 1980 = 1,417 registered voters; September 19-21, 1980 = 817 registered voters; September 23-25, 1980 = 810 registered voters. October 1980 results based on "probable electorate."

Source: Surveys by CBS News/*New York Times*, latest that of January 26-29, 1981.

Question: Do you think the United States should be equal in military strength to the Soviet Union, or do you think we have to be stronger than Russia militarily?



Note: In a July/August ABC/*Washington Post* survey, 22% said the U.S. should "spend whatever is necessary to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union." 61% said we should "spend whatever is necessary to be about equal in military strength with the Soviet Union." In October of 1981, the figures were 40% and 46%.

Source: Surveys by the *Los Angeles Times*, latest that of November 14-18, 1982.

SUPPORT FOR U.S. WORLD ROLE

Question: Do you think it would be best for the future of this country if we take an active part in world affairs, or if we (stay/stayed) out of world affairs?



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, October 1945 and August 1947; National Opinion Research Center, January 1950 through June 1965; National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, spring 1973 through spring 1978; Louis Harris and Associates, November 1980; National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, spring 1982 and spring 1983.

BETTER DEAD THAN RED

Question: Suppose you had to make the decision between fighting an all-out nuclear war or living under Communist rule —how would you decide?


1961
Live under communist rule 6%
Undecided 14%
If had to decide, would fight an all-out nuclear war rather than live under communist rule 80%

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, October 19-24, 1961.

Question: Would you be willing to risk the destruction of the United States rather than be dominated by the Russians, or not?



Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, March 14-17, 1982.

COMMITMENT TO CONTAINMENT

Question: Now I'm going to read a few statements, and for each, I'd like you to tell me whether you tend to agree with that statement or disagree with it, or if, perhaps, you have no opinion about it. . . . The United States should take all steps, including the use of force, to prevent the spread of communism (October 1981, ABC News/*Washington Post*) Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The U.S. government should take all steps necessary—including the use of military force—to prevent the spread of communism? (January 1982, July 1982, *Los Angeles Times*)



Note: Agree = "Strongly agree" + "Agree." Disagree = "Strongly disagree" + "Disagree." Sample size for July 1982 = 1,102.

Source: Surveys by ABC News/*Washington Post*, October 14-18, 1981, and by the *Los Angeles Times*, January 3-7, 1982 and July 4-6, 1982.

Question: I am going to read a list of possible foreign policy goals that the United States might have. For each one please say whether you think that it should be a very important foreign policy goal for the United States, a somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an important goal at all. . . . Containing communism.



Note: A list of 14 possible foreign policy goals was presented. "Protecting jobs of American workers" was first = 77%; "helping to bring democratic forms of government to other nations" was last = 29%.

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, late October/November 1982.

THE SPORTS PAGES

PLAYING TO WIN

Question: How often do you try your best to win?



Note: Sample size = 1,087 respondents who said they participate in at least one sport and who had an opinion.

PARENTS ON THE PLAYING FIELD

Question: How often do you: Encourage your children to . . . participate in sports . . . practice their skills away from the game . . . be aggressive in competition . . . play better than other team members or athletes . . . spend less time playing sports?



Note: Sample size = 197 respondents whose children participate in organized competitive sports and who expressed an opinion.

Question: When watching your children compete how often do you: feel as if you are competing in the game . . . shout encouragement to your children or their team . . . worry about your child being injured . . . yell at the referee or game official . . . argue with the coach or manager?



Source: Survey by Research & Forecasts

Note: Sample size = 198 respondents whose children participate in organized competitive sports and who expressed an opinion.

PROFESSIONAL APPEAL

Question: Given the choice, would you rather be: an internationally recognized scientist, a professional athlete, an internationally recognized statesperson, a famous movie star?



Note: Sample size = 1,319 respondents. 14% said "None of the above" and 2% said "Don't know" or gave no answer.

SPORTING DIPLOMACY

WILL ATHLETICS REPLACE THE ARMS RACE?

Question: I'm going to read to you a list of statements. Please tell me whether or not you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree . . . International sports competition reduces the threat of war?



Miller Brewing Company, October 1-30, 1982

Note: Sample size = 1,319 national respondents, 625 men, and 589 women who expressed an opinion.

FANS RULE VIOLENCE OUT

Question: In general, do fights between players where no one is seriously injured add to your enjoyment of the game, do they lessen your enjoyment, or do they have no effect either way?



Note: Sample size = 1,258 national respondents, 621 men, and 624 women who expressed an opinion. * = less than .5 percent.

FIRST IMPRESSIONS

Question: When you first meet a person of the opposite sex, which one or two of these things about physical appearance do you tend to notice first? (Card shown respondent) Now using the same card, when you meet a person of the same sex, which one of these things about physical appearance do you tend to notice first?



Note: * = less than .5%. Items are ranked according to the sum of both questions.
Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 83-5), April 23-30, 1983

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST

Just because a geographic area or set of policies assume great political importance, it does not follow that polling on this topic will yield important knowledge. Sometimes the structure of public opinion is simply not very developed. American opinion on the long-standing conflict between Israel and the Arab states is a good case in point.

We can confirm from polling on Middle East issues that many more Americans feel sympathy with Israel than with the P.L.O. or the Arab countries. While this attachment is affected somewhat by proximate events, it is deeply rooted in our culture and—as the graph on this page shows—remarkably stable. American perceptions of prominent political figures there do change: The standing of Menachem Begin has deteriorated steadily over the past five years. And, Americans are reluctant to see their nation's troops committed; the Middle East is no exception to this general aversion.

Outside of such broad perspectives, however, there really is no settled public opinion in the United States on Middle East questions. As a result, survey work on various policy options shows extraordinary bounce and is virtually meaningless.

Public opinion *in Israel* is obviously a very different story. There, the immediacy of the conflict imparts an informed concreteness to specific policy questions. The data on pp. 38-39 show some important currents.

E.C.L.

Question: In this trouble are your sympathies more with Israel or more with the Arab states? (Asked of those who heard or read about the troubles in the Middle East)* (Jan. 1969-Dec. 1973, Gallup) In the Middle East situation, are your sympathies more with Israel or more with the Arab states? (Asked only of respondents who had heard or read about the situation in the Middle East) (Jan. 1975-July 1982 Gallup) In the Middle East situation, are your sympathies more with Israel or more with the Arab nations? (Aug. 1982-Feb./Mar. 1983, ABC/*Washington Post*)



Note: * Typically 80-92 percent had heard or read about the Middle East situation. February 1978 was a telephone survey. Sample size for August 1982 = 913; for September 1982 = 1,007.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, January 1969-July 23-26, 1982, and ABC News/*Washington Post*, August 1982 through February 25-March 2, 1983.

BEGIN'S RATINGS SLIDE

Question: (Respondents were handed a Scalometer card.) You will notice that the 10 boxes on this scale go from the highest position of plus five—for someone or something you have a very *favorable* opinion of—all the way down to the lowest position of minus five—for someone or something you have a very *unfavorable* opinion of. How far up or down the scale would you rate the following? . . . Menachem Begin.



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of August 13-16, 1982.

Question: Would you say your feelings about Israel's prime minister, Menachem Begin, are very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable—or don't you have an impression of him one way or the other?



Note: Favorable = "Very favorable" + "Somewhat favorable." Unfavorable = "Somewhat unfavorable" + "Very unfavorable." Sample size for August 1982 = 913; for September 1982 = 1,007.

Source: Surveys by ABC News/*Washington Post*, latest that of February 25-March 2, 1983.

AND PLO NOT SEEN AS REPRESENTATIVE

Question: Do you think the PLO does or does not represent the point of view of a majority of Palestinians? (Asked of those who have followed recent developments in the Middle East and have heard/read about PLO) (Gallup, January 1978) Do you think the PLO does or does not represent the point of view of a majority of Palestinians? (Asked of those who have heard of PLO) (ABC News/*Washington Post*, March-September 1982.)



Note: * = Not available. Sample size for August 1982 = 913; for September 1982 = 1,007.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, January 20-23, 1978, and by ABC News/*Washington Post*, March 3-8, 1982 through September 24-26, 1982.

POTENTIAL POWDER KEG

Question: Here is a list of four major areas in the world. (Card shown respondent) In each one of these areas there are some governments supported by the United States, and some governments supported by the Soviet Union. Which one of these four areas, do you think, presents the greatest threat to the United States in terms of getting us involved in a major war with the Soviet Union?



Note: In an April 7-11, 1983 survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, when asked the importance of Israel to the defense interest of the United States responses were:Very important, 69%; Not important, 20%; Don't know, 11%.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 83-6), June 4-11, 1983.

Question: There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using U.S. troops in other parts of the world. I'd like to ask your opinion about several situations. First, would you favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops if . . . Arab forces invaded Israel?



Note: The "Oppose sending troops/Don't know/Not sure" response has not been separated to show "Oppose" alone, because in the original punched data for 1982 "Oppose," "Don't know," and "Not sure" were lumped into one code.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, November 17-26, 1978, and late October-November, 1982.

CONFLICTING OPINION ON U.S. ROLE

Question: As you may know, there has been fighting between Israel and the PLO in Lebanon recently. One of the proposals that has been made to insure a lasting peace in Lebanon is to create a multinational peace-keeping force that would patrol southern Lebanon. There has been talk about including U.S. troops in such a force. If such a force is created, would you favor or oppose having U.S. troops in it?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 82-7), July 10-17, 1982.

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of President Reagan sending American military troops to Lebanon?



Note: There was significant difference by sex: Men approved 53%, disapproved 38%, not sure 9%. Women disapproved 52%, approved 35%, not sure 13%.

Source: Survey by NBC News/Associated Press, October 18-19, 1982.

ISRAELI PUB

Question: How would you rate the political agreement reached between Israel and Lebanon?


Israeli respondents
No opinion 2%
Undecided 14%
Good agreement 23%
Bad agreement 16%
Agreement between Israel and Lebanon is neither good nor bad 45%

Note: The question "If you had taken part personally in the decision to accept the agreement or reject it, would you have voted for the agreement, voted against the agreement?" was also asked. The responses were: "for" = 67%, "against" = 11%, "undecided" = 21%, "no opinion" = 1%.
Source: Survey by Modi'in Ezrachi Research Institute, June 1983.

Question: Who is best suited to be the prime minister?

Question: Who is best suited to be the defense minister?

Note: Other candidates for prime minister include Navon 23% (Feb.), 15% (March), 20% (May), Rabin 5%, 4%, 6% and Perez 4%, 4%, 4%.
Source: Survey by Modi'in Ezrachi Institute, latest that of May 1983.

Question: If the elections were held today which party would you vote for?



Note: Poll results were converted into seats. There are 120 seats in the Israeli Knesset. Thus, 61 seats are required for a majority.
Source: DAHAF Research Institute, August-September 1982; Modi'in Ezrachi Research Institute, October 1982-June 1983.

LIC OPINION

A DIVIDED ISRAEL?

Question: In your opinion how is the goverhment coping with the current situation?



Note: Coping well = "Coping very well" + "Coping well". Not coping well = "Coping not so well" + "Coping not at all well".
Source: Surveys by Modi'in Ezrachi Research Institute, latest that of May 1983.

Question: In view of what is known to you about the situation in Lebanon, what do you think Israel should do?



Note: * = less than .5 percent.
Source: Survey by Modi'in Ezrachi Research Institute, June 1983.

Question: In view of what is known to you today, do you think the operation in Lebanon was justified?



Note: * = less than .5 percent.
Source: Survey by Modi'in Ezrachi Research Institute, June 1983.

RATING THE REGIONS: A TASTE FOR SOUTHERN COMFORT?

Question: Here is a map that shows the four basic regions of the country—Northeast, South, Midwest and Far West. I'm going to read some statements and I'd like you to tell me which *one* of those four regions first comes to mind as I read each one. (Map shown respondents) First, you'd like to go there on vacation.

MIDWEST
NORTHEAST
•It's the most dangerous part of the U.S.
•It's the most cosmopolitan part of the country
•It has the country's highest cost of living
•Most of the people who run things come from there
FAR WEST
•It's the most exciting part of the country
•It's the prettiest part of the country
•You'd like to go there on vacation
SOUTH
•You'd like to live there
•The people there speak with accents
•It has the best weather in the U.S.
•It has the friendliest people
•It's growing in importance
•The people there are extremely religious
•It has the best job opportunities

	Northeast	South	Midwest	Far West	Don't know
Percent who live in each area	23%	32%	27%	18%	
You'd like to go there on vacation	15	29	10		3%
You'd like to live there	16		18	27	4
The people there speak with accents	20		8	3	6
It's the most dangerous part of the U.S.		13	10	23	18
It has the best weather in the U.S.	6		8	36	5
It has the friendliest people	10		21	16	9
It's the most cosmopolitan part of the country		7	11	13	12
It has the country's highest cost of living		6	8	30	10
It's growing in importance	6		14	25	12
The people there are extremely religious	5		19	7	18
It's the prettiest part of the country	15	26	15		7
It's the most exciting part of the country	21	16	7		12
Most of the people who run things come from there		11	13	15	20
It has the best job opportunities	15		12	24	18

Note: Alaska and Hawaii not included.
Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 83-6), June 4-11, 1983.

by Seymour Martin Lipset and William Schneider

Confidence in Confidence Measures

In June, Arthur Miller reported in these pages the results of a poll taken during the two months following the 1982 election. According to data gathered by the Center for Political Studies (CPS) of the University of Michigan, the American public's confidence in government increased between the end of 1980 and the end of 1982 ("Is Confidence Rebounding?" June/July 1983).

To be sure, Miller emphasized that the increase was small. The average level of trust in government back in 1964, computed from three questions indexed by Miller, was 31 points in the trusting direction. By 1980, the average had dropped to −52, or a strongly distrusting attitude. Distrust lifted to −33 in 1982—still negative and still far from the positive figures of the mid-1960s, but nevertheless the first sign of any improvement since this series began eighteen years earlier. In our recent book, *The Confidence Gap: Business, Labor, and Government in the Public Mind*[1], we show that the increasing distrust of government found in the CPS polls should be viewed as part of a general trend of data showing growing cynicism toward all major institutions in American society. Do these other polls corroborate the Michigan finding that confidence was on the rebound at the end of 1982?

The answer is no. A general question on confidence in institutions has been asked in twenty-seven surveys taken between 1966 and 1983 by either the Harris poll or the National Opinion Research Center (NORC):

> As far as the people running [various institutions] are concerned, would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in them?

Ten institutions have been included in almost all of these surveys: medicine, education, the military, organized religion, the U.S. Supreme Court, major companies, the press, the executive branch of the federal government, Congress, and organized labor. The average level of confidence in leaders of these ten institutions dropped precipitously in the late 1960s. In 1966, an average of 48 percent said they felt "a great deal of confidence" in people running the ten institutions. In 1971, the average was 28 percent. From 1971 to 1981, the average confidence level varied between 23 and 34 percent. The general trend was one of continuing slow decline over the decade.

Harris posed this confidence question in late October and early November 1982, just before the CPS survey went into the field. His results showed the lowest average level of confidence ever recorded in these surveys—21 percent. The average had fallen by two percentage points since September 1981, the last time Harris had asked this question. Confidence in the three branches of the federal government had fallen even faster, however: confidence in the leaders of Congress was down three points, the U.S. Supreme Court four points, and the White House eight points.

NORC included the confidence question in its 1982 and 1983 General Social Surveys, administered between February and April of each year. NORC's average confidence level for 1982 was 26 percent, the same as had been recorded in the previous General Social Survey (1980). In 1983, that was down to 23 percent, the lowest NORC had ever found. Again, the drop was sharper for institutions of national government: three points for Congress, four points for the Supreme Court, and six points for the executive branch. In short, there is nothing in either the Harris or the NORC data to suggest any rebound of public confidence in government or other institutions during 1982 or early 1983.

The confidence question used by the Roper Organization elicits attitudes toward our basic institutional "systems" rather than the people running various institutions: "our political system, our system of administering justice, our system of business and industry, and our system of organized labor." As a result, confidence levels in the Roper surveys tend to be substantially higher than those reported by Harris and NORC. In February 1983, the percentages describing each of these systems as "basically sound" were 69 for our political system, 64 for business and industry, 50 for justice, and 42 for organized labor. The average for the four systems—56 percent—was unchanged since February 1981. Confidence in the political and justice systems was up slightly from 1981, confidence in business was the same, and confidence in la-

bor was slightly down. Indeed, responses to these questions in early 1983 were about the same as they had been in early 1977, when an average of 55 percent called each system "basically sound." The Roper data, then, show no signs of any significant shift in the months immediately following the 1982 election.

In 1976, 1977, July 1981, and May 1983, the Gallup poll asked the public to rate the "honesty and ethical standards" of people in various professions. These surveys reveal almost no change over time. For eleven professions tested in 1976 and 1977, the percentages giving "high" or "very high" ratings averaged 28 in the first year and 27 in the second. The average high ratings were exactly the same—26 percent—for twenty occupations included in the 1977 and 1981 polls. Twenty-four groups were tested in the 1981 and 1983 surveys. Again, no significant shift was found; 29 percent gave high ratings in 1981 and 28 percent gave high ratings in 1983, on the average. The honesty ratings of senators and congressmen went down slightly between 1981 and 1983, while the ratings of state and local political officeholders went up a bit. In both years, however, all four political groups fell into the bottom half of the list, along with business executives, labor union leaders, and various kinds of salesmen.

Finally, the Harris survey has regularly administered a battery of questions since 1966 aimed at gauging the level of alienation in the American public: "The rich get richer and the poor get poorer," "Most people with power try to take advantage of people like yourself," "What you think doesn't count very much any more," "The people running the country don't really care what happens to you," and "You're left out of things going on around you." These items do not explicitly measure confidence in institutions, but they do show the same long-term trend as the confidence questions. From 1966 to 1976, the level of alienation (as indicated by agreement with the above statements) doubled, from an average of 29 percent to an average of 57 percent. The latest alienation figures reported by Harris—from a poll taken in February 1983—indicate an average of 62 percent alienated, up from 56 percent in January 1982 and tied with the highest levels previously reached (August 1976 and May 1980).

Explaining the Uptick

Given all this evidence, what could explain the sudden, if modest, resurgence of political trust found in the CPS survey—particularly at a time when the economy was nearing the trough of the recession and the president's approval ratings were slipping badly?

One piece of evidence that seems consistent with the CPS findings is the fact that voter turnout in the 1982 midterm election was 1.2 percent higher than in 1978, the previous midterm election. This was the first increase in voter participation in twenty years. Our own research and that of others, however, has failed to uncover any relationship between trust in government and voter participation. For instance, the *New York Times* reported after the 1976 election that "the nonvoters scarcely differed from the voters on a broad range of questions designed to measure dissatisfaction and distrust."[2] The rise in voter turnout in 1982 appears to be related to polarization over President Reagan's economic program, not to increasing trust in government. *Congressional Quarterly* reported that the increase in turnout was concentrated among Democratic voting groups, including blacks and "economically threatened blue-collar workers in the industrial Frostbelt."[3]

Professor Miller suggests an explanation for the Michigan findings that we are inclined to agree with. He notes that the questions used in the CPS index are strongly influenced by partisanship and ideology. That is not surprising, given the fact that they tap attitudes toward *what the federal government does*, which is a principal issue of contention between Democrats and Republicans and between liberals and conservatives: "How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right . . . ?", "Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all people?", "Do you think that people in the government waste a lot of the money we pay in taxes . . .?" (These questions are introduced by a statement indicating that they refer to "the government in Washington.")

In the past, every time the White House has shifted from one party to the other, the correlation between partisanship and political trust has reversed. In 1958, Republicans were more trusting than Democrats. In 1964, Democrats were more trusting than Republicans. In 1972, Republicans were more trusting than Democrats. And in 1978, Democrats once again moved ahead of Republicans.[4] Table 1 summarizes these shifts over time. Between 1958 and 1972, the level of political trust fell faster among Democrats than among Republicans. Between 1972 and 1980, the reverse was true. Miller's data show

"Out of my way, Virgil . . . I've had it with your facts and figures!"

that, between 1980 and 1982, when the White House changed from Democratic to Republican control, political trust again followed suit. Trust rose sharply among Republicans, somewhat less rapidly among Independents, and only slightly among Democrats. Nevertheless, it is significant that trust went up in all three groups.

Miller also identifies an ideological component to political trust. "As confidence in government has declined," he reports, "feelings about the size and scope of government have become increasingly associated with political trust." In other words, people who were ideologically opposed to a powerful and active federal government became increasingly distrustful over the years. Ronald Reagan was the first president in fifty years to respond to these resentments. The central item on his administration's agenda has been the curtailment of the federal government's growth. For the first time since Herbert Hoover, there is an anti-government administration in control of the White House.

Miller finds that the resurgence of confidence in government came primarily from those who shared the Reagan administration's ideological outlook.

> . . . . It was not simply improved economic performance, or increased activity, or the perception that someone was finally "doing something" that led to the restoration of trust, although these were important factors. The key element added by the Reagan administration was the theme underlying those changes—the need to limit the role of the national government. Two sets of citizens responded positively to this call: conservatives and those who were fed up with government. Improvements in confidence, then, came mainly from Republicans and from Independents and Democrats who favor a reduction in government.

In other words, trust in government rose among people who are normally distrustful of government!

The change measured by the 1982 CPS survey appears to have been, in large part, ideological in origin. It can be detected in the CPS questions because those questions are ideologically "loaded"—they assess attitudes toward federal government activity. As we have seen, however, no surge of confidence can be detected in more ideologically neutral questions concerning the *quality of leadership* in our political, social, and economic institutions. At the end of 1982 and the beginning of 1983, those assessments remained as negative as they had been for the past five years —which is to say, considerably more negative than in the years preceding.

What will it take to turn these confidence measures around? We argue in *The Confidence Gap* that the decline of confidence after 1965 was a response to events, or to the perception of events. Beginning in the mid-1960s, the country experienced an unremitting barrage of bad news. In the initial period—roughly 1965 to 1974—most of this bad news flowed from disastrous events in the political system rather than in the economy—the Vietnam War, protest movements, Watergate, exposés of corruption in high places, and urban violence. Beginning with the oil embargo at the end of 1973, bad news about the economy tended to command the country's attention, albeit accompanied by a regular smattering of social conflicts, foreign policy disasters, and political scandals.

Each time things quieted down momentarily, the poll data suggest that the public started to regain confidence. This happened in 1972 and early 1973, but it was soon followed by Watergate. It happened again in 1977, the first year of Jimmy Carter's presidency, but attitudes shifted downward again when the country was faced with economic and foreign policy reversals. Another mild upswing occurred in 1981 as Ronald Reagan took over the presidency and the country regained some hope. Those positive feelings were quickly suppressed, however, by the ensuing deep recession of 1982. In order for confidence in institutions to be restored to a significantly higher level, we will need a sustained period of good news, far longer than the modest upswings experienced in the past decade.

Such an upswing may be under way right now. Signs of economic recovery began to accumulate in the spring of 1983. A Gallup poll taken in March showed a 10 percent jump over the January figures in the proportion of Americans who felt that Reagan's policies would make the nation's economic situation better. The percentage who felt that Reagan's policies would improve their own family's financial situation went up by nine points. In late July, fully half of those interviewed by ABC News and the *Washington Post* said that the nation's economy was getting better—up from 18 percent in January and 39 percent in March. The Gallup poll shows a 10 percent improvement in President Reagan's job rating during the first half of 1983, though recent polls show some backsliding.

Table 1

CHANGES IN "TRUST IN GOVERNMENT," 1958-1972, 1972-1980, AND 1980-1982, BY PARTY IDENTIFICATION

	1958-1972[a]	1972-1980[a]	1980-1982[b]
Democrats	−58	−30	+14
Independents	−51	−54	+25
Republicans	−33	−79	+48

[a] Recomputed from Warren E. Miller, "Misreading the Public Pulse," *Public Opinion*, vol. 2 (October/November 1979), table 6, p. 14. 1980 data supplied by Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan, from 1980 American National Election Study. Shifts are based on five-item index of political trust (see W. Miller, p. 11).

[b] Recomputed from Arthur Miller, "Is Confidence Rebounding?" *Public Opinion*, vol. 6 (June/July 1983), table 2, p. 16. 1980-1982 shifts are based on three-item index of political trust (see A. Miller, table 2, note a).

The recent drop in the unemployment level is an especially hopeful sign. Our research revealed that confidence in institutions is more sensitive to the unemployment rate than to the inflation rate. A drop of 1 percent in unemployment, which has just about taken place since last winter, should drive confidence levels up by almost 3 percent—all other things being equal.[5] Are all other things equal? So far, the inflation rate has remained low, the commotion over Jimmy Carter's misappropriated briefing book has not developed into a major scandal, and public apprehension over U.S. intervention in Central America has remained subdued. As long as there is good news about the economy and no countervailing bad news from other sectors, we would not be surprised to see public confidence rebound in the latter part of 1983. A durable restoration of trust in institutions will require something more than a shift in the ideological posture of government; it will require an improved level of performance.

1 New York: The Free Press, 1983. See especially chapter 1.
2 See Lipset and Schneider, p. 341.
3 *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, November 13, 1982, pp. 2850-51.
4 Warren E. Miller, Arthur H. Miller, and Edward J. Schneider, *American National Election Studies Data Sourcebook, 1952-1978* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), table 4.33 (p. 270) and figure 4.7 (p. 272).
5 Lipset and Schneider, p. 64.

by John P. Katosh

Tracking the Gross National Spirit Index

Along with the Gross National Product (GNP) and the stock market, America's Gross National Spirit (GNS) is up this year.

According to a recent American Council of Life Insurance (ACLI) survey, the GNS Index, first introduced by *Public Opinion* magazine in June of 1981, now stands at 1,246. The six question index is up more than 15 percent from a similar ACLI survey a year ago, when the Index stood at 1,082.[1]

The six questions in the GNS Index are: 1. In general, how satisfied are you with the way things are going in the United States today? Are you very satisfied, more or less satisfied, or not at all satisfied? 2. Over the next year or so, do you think things will go better for the United States, go worse, or stay about the same? 3. Over the next year or so, do you think the United States economy will get better, get worse, or stay about the same? 4. Do you approve or disapprove of the way (name incumbent) is handling his job as president? 5. How satisfied are you with the way things are going for you personally? Are you very satisfied, more or less satisfied, or not at all satisfied? 6. How satisfied are you with your family's financial situation? Are you very satisfied, more or less satisfied, or not at all satisfied? We added a seventh question in 1983 which will be discussed later.

Much of the increase is attributable to Americans' optimism about the future outlook for the country. In 1982, we were more satisfied with the way things were going in our personal lives than we were optimistic about the country's future. This year, Americans' sense of personal satisfaction is about the same as 1982, but our optimism about the future of the country and its economy is significantly higher.

This year about half those surveyed (45 percent) think the U.S. economy will get better over the next year or so. About a year earlier, only 30 percent felt that way. Perhaps even more important, as we emerge from an eighteen month recession, only 16 percent think the economy will get worse in the next year. A year ago, a plurality of 38 percent felt that way.

Similarly, 39 percent now think things will go better for the United States over the next year or so, while less than half that number, 19 percent, feel things will go worse. Last year, 34 percent thought things would go worse and only 27 percent said "better." Overall, the economic outlook component of the GNS was up 40 percent and the nation's outlook score up 29 percent.

Americans also exhibit increased satisfaction with the way things are going in the United States today, although they are not as satisfied about that as they are optimistic about the future. In 1982, a plurality (48 percent) said they were not at all satisfied with how things were going. This year a majority (59 percent) say they are more or less satisfied, while 35 percent say they are not at all satisfied. In both years though, very few citizens said they were very satisfied—6 percent in 1983, 5 percent in 1982.

This increased sense of optimism is not reflected in Americans' views of their personal situations—either in their personal lives or their families' financial situations. Only a third of those interviewed (33 percent) say they are very satisfied with the way things are going for them personally, and less than a quarter (23 percent) feel very satisfied about their families' financial situations. In each instance slightly more than half indicate that they are more or less satisfied with these matters. The fact that about 5 percent fewer respondents say they are "not at all satisfied" with these aspects of their personal lives contributes slightly to this year's GNS increase.

One component of the GNS Index does show a decline in 1983: the assessment of Ronald Reagan's job performance. At the time our survey was conducted, 42 percent of the sample approved of the way Reagan was "handling his job as president" and 58 percent disapproved. Almost a year earlier the president's ratings were slightly higher: 48 percent approved and 52 percent disapproved.

Subgroups and the GNS Index

As might be expected, these public attitudes and their resulting Gross National Spirit Index scores vary by social, economic, and political characteristics. In the examination of demographic and attitudinal groups, the consistent methodology of the ACLI surveys becomes particularly useful.

Republicans have the highest GNS score in 1983 (1,648) just as they did in 1982 (1,470). (Unfortunately for the Index—as well as the GOP—only 17 percent of our sample considered themselves Republicans.) Independents show the largest percentage gain among partisan groups in 1983, increasing their score to an above average 1,330 from 1982's 1,054. Democrats score 1,056.

Separated or divorced respondents register the greatest percentage increase from last year. While still 100 index points less optimistic than average, their 1983 GNS score (1,146) is up 54 percent, or 400 points, over 1982. Unemployed persons also show a substantial percentage increase from 1982—38 percent. Nonetheless, their GNS this year (904)—like last year's score (654)—is

[1] The data reported here were collected for the American Council on Life Insurance by Yankelovich, Skelly & White, Inc. The surveys consist of personal interviews conducted with adults eighteen years of age or older representing a cross-section sample of the continental United States. In 1982, 1,252 persons were interviewed between April 17 and May 16. In 1983, 1,508 persons were interviewed between March 19 and April 17. The data from both surveys have been weighted by selected demographic characteristics to reflect their actual distributions in the population.

the lowest for any group examined.

Students comprise the only demographic group in the study whose GNS score declined from last year. In 1982 students scored 1,174; this year they score only 1,146.

Not too surprisingly, GNS scores are positively related to increased levels of education and family income among the population. But, there is no such relationship with age. In fact, 1982's most optimistic age group, the eighteen- to twenty-four year-olds (1,150), is 1983's most pessimistic age cohort (1,172). This year's most optimistic cohorts are twenty-five to twenty-nine year-olds (1,356) and those age sixty-five and over (1,328). The elderly were also the second highest group (1,132) in 1982.

Finally, it is interesting to note that this year's Gross National Spirit score is truly a national figure. The GNS Index is remarkably uniform across the four major regions of the country. Only sixty index points separate the West (1,274) and the South (1,214)—the regions with the highest and lowest GNS scores. It may be significant, however, to point out that the South showed the smallest percentage increase in 1983 (7 percent) and, as a result, ranks last after having occupied the top spot in 1982 with a score of 1,132.

A Seventh Question

One of the six GNS questions, the presidential job approval rating, generated some controversy at the time the Index was introduced.

Critics argue the presidential job approval question has three major faults, two substantive, one methodological. Substantively, the critics claim presidential job approval is a poor measure of citizens' confidence in their government or its leaders, and that, furthermore, attitudes regarding the president are too closely linked to partisan and ideological identifications and their demographic correlates. Methodologically, it is argued that because this is the only question which offers respondents a dichotomous rating (approve/disapprove) with no mid-range response, the measure may have an undue effect on the overall Index—either positively or negatively, depending upon the circumstances.

In an attempt to answer these criticisms and thus improve the GNS Index, this year's ACLI survey asked respondents a seventh GNS question: "How satisfied are you with the way our system of government in the United States is working these days? Are you very satisfied, more or less satisfied, or not at all satisfied?" This "replacement" measure was specifically designed to address the criticisms leveled at the presidential job approval question. On its face it seemed that this question was: (a) a more appropriate, albeit less direct, measure of citizens' feelings about their government; (b) unlikely to be as strongly affected by partisan feelings, and (c) like the other five GNS questions, trichotomous in its choice of responses.

In fact, the majority of respondents, 58 percent, did choose the middle response, indicating that they are "more or less satisfied" with the way our system of government is working. Only 8 percent claim to be very satisfied, while one in three, 34 percent, said they are not at all satisfied. In a revised 1983 GNS Index, this replacement question would have contributed 148 points. Since the presidential job approval question provided 168 points to the original Index, the 1983 revised GNS Index would have been 1,226—a decline from the original Index of 1.6 percent.

Substantively, the answer to whether this new question is a better or more appropriate measure than the presidential job approval rating rests, of course, "in the eye of the beholder." Empirically, however, with respect to the matter of partisan identification, the newer question fares quite well. The data below report measures of association between the "old" and "new" questions on selected attitudinal and demographic variables.

These figures clearly indicate a significantly lower degree of association between the variables related to partisanship and the new GNS measure of governmental performance. (Table 1)

It would be most rewarding to be able to end this article with a strong recommendation for the replacement of the presidential job approval rating in the GNS Index with the new question on government satisfaction. There is a problem, however, and it is revealed in the following data:

While some degree of correlation among any series of public opinion index questions is to be expected, it is disconcerting that each question which utilizes some degree of satisfaction as part of its response set is more strongly related to the new question on government performance than the presidential job approval question. (Table 2)

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Table 1	Q4. Approve/Disapprove of president's job performance	Q7. Satisfaction with way our system of government is working
Party identification (Dem, Ind, Rep)	—.27	—.03
Political ideology (Lib, Mod, Con)	—.25	—.03
Family income	—.21	—.04
Race (White, Nonwhite)	.20	.06
Education	—.13	—.03
Sex (Male, Female)	.10	.02

Table 2	Q4. Approve/Disapprove of president's job performance	Q7. Satisfaction with way our system of government is working
Q1. Satisfaction with way things are going in U.S.	.33	.44
Q2. How will things go for U.S.?	.37	.21
Q3. How will things go for U.S. economy?	.35	.23
Q5. Satisfaction with way things are going personally	.21	.31
Q6. Satisfaction with family's financial situation	.23	.33

Breaking the Monopoly

Pollsters must be willing to attempt more creative research techniques if they are to be accurate in assessing (and perhaps predicting) policy preferences. The majority of the published national polls might have been more successful in predicting the 1980 presidential election results if the pollsters had better understood voter motivations.

Research results used to support one side or another in a public affairs controversy will almost always appear more legitimate when based on quantitative data, because (other things being equal) surveys based on large samples, properly selected, *are* more legitimate. Yet, adherents of a particular policy position could also use qualitative research to provide perspective for quantitative findings.

It would be a mistake to infer from this article that group discussions and other qualitative research techniques could eliminate the need for quantitative research. It is much more likely that a qualitative study would provide a useful supplement to quantitative work. Yet, by understanding the situations in which focused group discussions are most appropriate, the public affairs researcher can use them to much greater advantage. The marketing research community has held a virtual monopoly on this technique for at least the last two decades; it is time for public affairs research to catch up.

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The highest levels of association between questions, both in 1982 and 1983, occurred between questions 5 and 6 (.57 in 1983, .55 in 1982) which used the satisfaction responses, and questions 2 and 3 (.57 in 1983, .65 in 1982) which used a "go better, stay the same, go worse" triad response set.

Thus, there is fairly clear evidence pointing to a significant pattern of response set bias among the questions comprising the GNS Index. When the authors of the original Index were describing the process they used to develop the questions for the Index they stated: ". . . general ratings should use the same set of alternatives, both to increase 'face validity' of comparison, and to avoid respondents' (confusion)." (*Public Opinion*, August/September 1981) Perhaps in light of these latter findings, it would be appropriate to review—and probably revise—that premise.

When the editors of this magazine originally introduced the notion of an index of our gross national spirit, they acknowledged their first attempt was "not a perfect product" and expected it would "change over time." The problems identified here with the first revision of that effort should not be considered fatal to the concept of a Gross National Spirit Index. We have learned much from these detailed examinations of the Index. What is more, evidence from the two ACLI surveys indicates that the Index is indeed related to (if not currently a predictor of) other societal indicators of real change in the country's well-being. We have both the ability and opportunity to refine and improve this measure. It is a challenge we should not ignore.

GROSS NATIONAL SPIRIT SUMMARY

	1982	1983	Percent change
Total sample	1,082	1,246	15.2
Sex:			
Male	1,150	1,286	11.8
Female	1,018	1,208	18.7
Age:			
18-24	1,150	1,172	1.9
25-29	1,070	1,356	26.7
30-34	980	1,196	22.0
35-44	1,082	1,248	15.3
45-54	996	1,196	20.1
55-64	1,020	1,236	21.2
65 and over	1,132	1,328	17.3
Education:			
Less than high school graduate	964	1,116	15.8
High school graduate	1,090	1,240	13.8
Some college	1,120	1,354	20.9
College graduate	1,232	1,414	14.8
Race:			
White	1,140	1,298	13.9
Nonwhite	710	938	32.1
Income:			
Less than $10,000	912	1,004	10.1
$10,000-$19,999	1,106	1,128	2.0
$20,000-$29,999	1,044	1,354	29.7
More than $30,000	1,380	1,454	5.4
Employment:			
Full time	1,096	1,270	15.9
Part time	1,090	1,340	22.9
Retired	1,204	1,232	2.3
Housewife	1,084	1,286	18.6
Student	1,174	1,146	−2.4
Unemployed	654	904	38.2
Marital status:			
Married	1,126	1,294	14.9
Never married	1,102	1,140	3.4
Widowed	1,050	1,228	17.0
Separated/Divorced	746	1,146	53.6
Party identification:			
Democrat	922	1,056	14.5
Republican	1,470	1,648	12.1
Independent	1,054	1,330	26.2
Region:			
Northeast	1,046	1,248	19.3
North Central	1,034	1,268	22.6
South	1,132	1,214	7.2
West	1,094	1,274	16.5
Urbanicity:			
Metro	1,046	1,222	16.8
Non-Metro	1,182	1,308	10.7

Taylor

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ern defenses are inadequate—notwithstanding the Russian deployment of its SS-20s. Another Harris survey for the French *Institute International de Geopolitique* showed a marked reluctance in France, Germany, Italy, and the United States to spend extra tax dollars on defense (the British, in post-Falklands mood, were split).

8. *Many surveys show not only that American and European attitudes are widely different, but also that attitudes vary in different European countries* (table 3). There is no Atlantic consensus, nor is there a European consensus. The French, as they so often do, have very different perceptions of the world, of the causes of international problems, and of the appropriate response to current problems. They are more critical of U.S. economic policies, but somewhat less likely to criticize U.S. military policies, than are most other Europeans. Spain and Greece tend to be more critical of the U.S. than of the U.S.S.R. and to be hostile to NATO.

Economic Indicators—Nine Nations

That then is the dismal state of the alliance within which Western governments must negotiate to resolve their differences not only over defense and strategic issues but also their sometimes conflicting economic policies and trading priorities. The most recent Harris survey for the Atlantic Institute studied European, Japanese, and American attitudes on these subjects, and the results do not show much mutual understanding or agreement on either the nature of our economic problems or their solutions.

Not all the findings are discouraging. Surprisingly large proportions (from 23 percent in Britain to 52 percent in Norway) believe that "living beyond the country's means" is a major cause of economic difficulties (table 4). This—and Mrs. Thatcher's election victory—may strengthen the resolve of governments.

One division which the survey revealed was between the United States (and to a lesser extent, Great Britain), where most people believe that current economic problems can be solved by *domestic* policies, and the other six countries where majorities believe that only *international* measures can restore economic well-being (figure 1). But the perceived international causes differ sharply. The Spanish and Italians are the most inclined to blame oil prices; the Germans to blame Japanese export policy; the Japanese, Spanish, and French to blame U.S. economic policy; the French, Germans, and Spanish to blame lack of European cooperation; the British to blame low-cost exports from the newly industrialized third world, while the French put the most blame on international monetary instability (table 3).

A superficial reading of the results to other questions about some possible solutions might suggest more agreement (figure 2). But, while the percentages may be similar, the meanings are not. And the answers to questions on two issues are contradicted by other answers to similar questions, differently worded, on the same issues—clear evidence of public confusion and a tendency to react to rhetoric rather than policy.

Pluralities in every country favor government measures "to stimulate national production." But pluralities in every country, except Norway, also favor "reducing the role of the government in the economy."

More ominously, majorities or pluralities in all nine countries favor increased protection of their own national manufacturers. Yet majorities or pluralities in these same countries also favor more international free trade. The explanation for this apparent contradiction is probably not willful self-deception, but a view held in every country that "we trade more fairly with the world than the world does with us"—a view, I suspect, that most businessmen, politicians and media in every country sincerely believe and propagate.

These opinions are all part of the political environment in which our elected leaders operate and seek re-election from time to time. If the prospect of responding to, changing, or flying in the face of public opinion does not thrill them, they may wish to remember Churchill's comment that democracy is the worst form of government—except all the others.

Table 2

Question: Which of the following are your greatest concerns for yourself and your country today?

	FRANCE	GERMANY	GREAT BRITAIN	NORWAY	SPAIN	NETHER-LANDS	ITALY	USA	JAPAN
The threat of war	34%	16%	26%	31%	48%	33%	44%	25%	36%
The energy crisis	15	10	6	3	16	9	23	18	27
Inflation	48	21	22	12	26	12	43	35	33
Inadequate defense	6	4	8	4	5	7	6	12	10
Unemployment	70	82	67	83	87	74	67	52	23
Social injustice	24	28	13	11	25	19	27	22	24
Crime	32	33	37	12	22	53	61	41	36
Nuclear weapons	19	42	32	42	29	47	33	20	28
Excessive government spending	21	34	10	8	9	25	21	33	25
Poor political leadership	14	14	17	6	5	24	27	36	20

Figure 1

Question: Which of the following four statements about the current economic situation most clearly approximates your own opinion?


We are experiencing:
a severe long term economic crisis which will require fundamental adjustments and which for which...
can only be solved at the international level
solutions can be found in your country
a period of economic difficulty but growth should resume over the next two years if appropriate...
international measures are taken
steps are taken
Not sure
France 28% 19% 26% 20% 7%
Germany 23% 19% 21% 20% 17%
Great Britain 30% 30% 13% 27% 10%
Norway 48% 12% 20% 18% 4%
Spain 35% 23% 12% 14% 16%
Netherlands 36% 12% 20% 16% 16%
Italy 27% 20% 16% 16% 21%
United States 10% 18% 22% 42% 8%
Japan 37% 16% 10% 7% 30%

Figure 2

Question: For each of the following policies that have been proposed to deal with present economic difficulties, please indicate whether you personally would support or oppose . . .

Support
Oppose
Protect national producers by increased import restrictions
Progressively reduce trade restrictions and encourage free international trade
Stimulate national production through government measures
Reduce role of government in economy
55% 26 France 45% 27 44% 34 France 41% 30
48 24 Germany 49 24 63 23 Germany 35 34
65 20 Great Britain 57 25 62 18 Great Britain 41 39
51 42 Norway 61 29 82 12 Norway 46 46
57 18 Spain 53 45 36 32 Spain 35 27
43 32 Netherlands 35 30 79 4 Netherlands 40 28
55 23 Italy 53 21 72 10 Italy 38 26
65 31 U.S. 58 35 58 40 U.S. 60 33
35 22 Japan 44 12 49 11 Japan 27 13

Table 3

Question: And which of these possible international causes for our current economic difficulties do you consider the most important?

	FRANCE	GERMANY	GREAT BRITAIN	NORWAY	SPAIN	NETHER-LANDS	ITALY	USA	JAPAN
Major changes in oil prices	28%	27%	26%	35%	54%	27%	41%	34%	35%
Japan's export policy	27	36	18	7	8	21	6	25	27
America's economic policy	27	26	9	16	30	17	13	26	32
Insufficient economic cooperation among European countries	38	29	24	30	29	23	27	18	13
Low-cost exports from third world countries, for example Taiwan, Singapore, or Korea	35	34	40	23	7	21	12	33	11
Instability of the international monetary system	49	18	19	24	34	11	38	25	23

Table 4

Question: In your country, which of the following do you consider to be the most important national causes for our current economic difficulties?

	FRANCE	GERMANY	GREAT BRITAIN	NORWAY	SPAIN	NETHER-LANDS	ITALY	USA	JAPAN
Employers are not dynamic enough	24%	24%	21%	25%	31%	8%	9%	16%	12%
Inadequate government economic policies	31	33	28	26	28	30	60	34	53
Too restrictions of constraining social legislation and labor costs	47	17	10	23	17	30	19	30	13
Irresponsible behavior of labor unions	17	20	41	15	18	10	32	37	14
Our society is living beyond its means	39	44	23	52	35	35	29	38	25
Inadequately modernized industry	30	7	25	4	27	8	13	24	6